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[2015] ZAWCHC 112
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Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of Control v Injo Investments CC (A80/2014) [2015] ZAWCHC 112; 2016 (3) SA 62 (WCC) (21 August 2015)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN
CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
Case
No: A80/2014
DATE:
21 AUGUST 2015
REPORTABLE
In
the matter between
:
ATTORNEYS
FIDELITY FUND BOARD OF
CONTROL
.................................................
Appellant
V
INJO
INVESTMENTS
CC
...................................................................................................
Respondent
Court:
Justice President J M Hlophe, Justice V Saldanha
et
Justice
J Cloete
Heard:
27 July 2015
Delivered:
21 August 2015
JUDGMENT
CLOETE J:
Introduction
[1]
This is an appeal with the leave of the
court a quo which found in favour of the respondent on certain
limited issues separated
in terms of rule 33(4).
[2]
The respondent had sued the appellant as
first defendant in its capacity as professional indemnity insurer for
payment of the total
sum of R1 040 000 together with
interest and costs, arising from eight substantially identical claims
in respect of which
the respondent had already obtained default
judgment against the second defendant, Phokombe & Viljoen
Incorporated (‘
PV’
),
a company which traded as a firm of attorneys in Alberton, Gauteng.
The respondent was unable to recover any part of the judgment
debt
from the second defendant and/or its directors and thus lodged a
claim with the appellant, which in turn repudiated liability,
resulting in the respondent instituting action against it.
[3]
When the matter served before the court a
quo the parties submitted an agreed statement of facts, to be
supplemented by oral evidence,
together with the issues which they
had formulated for determination in terms of rule 33(4).
[4]
The salient agreed facts were that:
4.1
At all relevant times PV traded as a firm of attorneys and its three
directors were duly admitted and practising attorneys and
holders of
Fidelity Fund certificates;
4.2
PV operated a trust account in terms of s 78 of the Attorneys
Act 53 of 1979 (‘
the Attorneys
Act’
) and through its directors
conducted conveyancing;
4.3
During the period October to November 2006 PV represented to the
respondent that certain of its clients, as sellers of immovable
property, wished to conclude discounting agreements with it; that
they had already signed these agreements and that attendant
warranties provided by PV had been duly authorised by the clients
concerned;
4.4
The aforementioned representations were made by PV with the intention
of inducing the respondent to act on the correctness thereof,
which
it did, by signing the agreements and making payment of the sums
comprising its claim into PV’s trust account; and
4.5
PV’s representations were false and it misappropriated the
funds so paid.
[5]
The issues to be determined were:
5.1
Whether the payments were made to PV in the course of its practice as
a firm of attorneys;
5.2
Whether the funds so paid were entrusted by the respondent to PV as
envisaged in s 26(a) of the Attorneys Act; and
5.3
In the event of it being found that the funds were so entrusted,
whether the transactions constituted loan agreements in terms
of
s 47(1)(g) read together with s 47(5)(b) and (c) of the
Attorneys Act.
[6]
It was further agreed that in the event of
the respondent not succeeding on either of the first two issues, the
action fell to be
dismissed.
[7]
For reasons which will become apparent
later in this judgment it is only necessary to deal with the second
issue, namely that of
entrustment.
Evidence
relating to entrustment in the court a quo
[8]
The only witness who testified was Mr John
Swanepoel (‘
Swanepoel’
),
the respondent’s duly authorised representative to whom the
abovementioned representations had been made. I will refer
only to
those aspects of his evidence which are relevant to the entrustment
issue.
[9]
Swanepoel initially testified that the
respondent conducted the business of providing bridging finance for
attorneys who handled
conveyancing transactions. However it emerged
that in the instant matter bridging finance was not provided to PV
per se but rather
to “clients” of these attorneys who, it
was represented to Swanepoel, had sold their immovable properties and
required
bridging finance pending payment to them of the proceeds of
such sales upon registration of transfer to the purchasers concerned.
This much is evident from Swanepoel’s testimony that:
9.1
The parties to each discounting agreement were the respondent on the
one hand and PV’s client on the other;
9.2
Before concluding each discounting agreement the respondent required
proof of what Swanepoel referred to as the ‘
underlying
sale transaction’
[1]
;
9.3
The purpose of including PV’s trust account details in each
discounting agreement was so that:
‘…
once
a transaction has been finalised and I approved the transaction, then
I would pay over the money into Phokompe & Viljoen’s
trust
account… thereafter they should actually pay the client then…’
[2]
;
9.4
The sole reason why PV’s trust account was utilised was so
that:
‘…
I’ve
got security with the attorneys… If I pay the money directly
over to the client, I’ve got no security. Once
I’ve paid
the money over into the attorney’s trust account, then I’ve
got security from the attorney that he
will look after the money and
make sure that the client gets paid.’
[3]
9.5
Apart from the recordal in each discounting agreement that payment
was to be made by the respondent into PV’s trust account,
there
was no specific term obliging the respondent to effect payment in
this manner in order to fulfil its obligation to the “client”
concerned;
[4]
and
9.6
There was nothing to prevent the client from instead repaying the
respondent at his or her election either before or upon receipt
of
the sale proceeds.
[5]
[10]
Swanepoel was referred to one of the
discounting agreements and its attendant warrantee (given that all
eight claims were substantially
identical it was unnecessary to
separately refer to each one).
[11]
The
relevant terms of the discounting agreement
[6]
are as follows:
11.1
The “client” sold to the respondent the surplus of the
sale proceeds of the immovable property concerned. The ‘
surplus’
was calculated as the selling price less the client’s disposal
costs (inclusive of any amount owing under a mortgage bond)
[7]
;
11.2
The purchase price payable for the surplus would be paid by the
respondent into PV’s trust account and then in turn by
PV to
the client (in one instance the respondent purchased the surplus of
R275 540 for R100 000)
[8]
;
11.3
Payment of the surplus purchased was to be made by PV to the
respondent within 24 hours of registration of transfer if the
client
had not already paid it directly to the respondent; payment
nonetheless remained the client’s liability
[9]
;
11.4
The client was also liable for the fees stipulated in clause 3; and
11.5
Failure by the client to make payment ‘
of
any amount due’
would
constitute a breach of the discounting agreement and the respondent
would have the right to claim immediate payment ‘
of
all outstanding amounts due by the client’.
[10]
[12]
The
warrantee provided by PV in each instance was a separate document and
did not form part of the discounting agreement. Although
clause 1 of
the discounting agreement contains certain warranties on the part of
the client, these do
not
include an irrevocable instruction to PV to make payment of the
surplus to the respondent upon registration of transfer, and clause
1.5 of the discounting agreement provides only that ‘
this
agreement is entered into by Injo Investments on the warranties
expressed in this agreement’.
[11]
[13]
Although
Swanepoel repeatedly confirmed that PV was obliged to pay over the
purchase price to the client concerned, he also expressly
denied that
PV’s trust account was thus merely a conduit for purposes of
payment.
[12]
This
contradiction in his testimony is perhaps best explained by his
evidence relating to how he viewed PV’s role in the
transactions:
[13]
‘
the
agreement was actually between me and Phokombe & Viljoen, not the
client, although the client was a person that should have
received
the money.’
And
further:
‘
What
agreement are you referring to?---The agreement that I would pay the
money over to them, they would pay the client and as soon
as the
transaction is registered, that they would pay me back.’
[14]
[14]
The
‘
agreement’
to which Swanepoel referred was not the discounting agreement, but
PV’s warrantee which he described as ‘
an
undertaking’
to repay the respondent.
[15]
The warrantee provides at clause 4 that:
‘
The
Conveyancer/Attorney has received irrevocable instructions to pay to
Injo Investments the amount as recorded in this agreement.’
[16]
[15]
The reference to ‘
this
agreement’
in clause 4 purports
to be a reference to the discounting agreement, although the latter
in turn makes no concomitant reference
to PV’s warrantee.
The
court a quo’s findings on entrustment
[16]
S 26(a) of the Attorneys Act provides that:
‘
26.
Purpose of fund.
—Subject
to the provisions of this Act, the fund shall be applied for the
purpose of reimbursing persons who may suffer pecuniary
loss as a
result of—
(a)
theft committed by a practising practitioner, his or her candidate
attorney or his or her employee, of any money or other property
entrusted by or on behalf of such persons to him or her or to his or
her candidate attorney or employee in the course of his or
her
practice or while acting as executor or administrator in the estate
of a deceased person or as a trustee in an insolvent estate
or in any
other similar capacity;…’
[17]
The
court a quo reasoned as follows:
[17]
‘
ENTRUSTMENT
[30]
As to the question whether the monies paid into the trust account of
the second defendant by Swanepoel, it has been held in
authorities
such as
Industrial
& Commercial Factors (Pty) Ltd v Attorneys Fidelity Fund
[18]
,
supra, that the intention of the person making the payment in
question is the basis upon which “entrustment” is to
be
judged. Nicolas J, in
Provident
Fund for the Clothing Industry v Attorneys, Notaries &
Conveyancers Fidelity Guarantee Fund
[19]
,
supra, made the following observation on a question as to whether
payment made into an attorney’s trust account constitutes
entrustment:
“
From
these definitions it is plain that ‘to entrust’ comprises
two elements: (a) to place in the possession of
something, (b)
subject to a trust. As to the latter element, this connotes that the
person entrusted is bound to deal with the
property or money
concerned for the benefit of others…”
‘
[31]
Swanepoel was not a debtor of the second defendant. Thus, when he
made various payments into the trust account of the second
defendant,
he did not do so in order to discharge a debt. In making such
payments, he had intended that the second defendant, after
such
monies would have been deposited into its trust account, would be
held in trust pending payment to what we now know were fictitious
borrowers. Thus, his intention was to place the second defendant in
possession of the monies so paid so that the second defendant
could,
in turn, pay such monies over to what we now know were fictitious
borrowers. On the basis of the facts of the matter before
me, I have
no hesitation in concluding that the payments of the various sums of
money constituting each claim against the first
defendant constitute
entrustment.’
Submissions
on appeal
[18]
On appeal before us the appellant contended
that, as a fact, the respondent made payment into PV’s trust
account only to discharge
its obligation to PV’s ‘
client’
.
It was the client who nominated PV’s trust account as the
payment mechanism and there was nothing in the discounting agreement
which stipulated that no other mechanism could be used. That being
so, and irrespective of what Swanepoel might have asserted or
thought
to the contrary, the funds were not entrusted to PV as contemplated
by s 26(a) of the Attorneys Act.
[19]
On the other hand the respondent argued
that Swanepoel’s intention when making payment into PV’s
trust account was the
determining criterion. His undisputed evidence
was that, rather than payment to PV being in discharge of a debt, it
was intended
by him to be security for payment by PV to the client.
Accordingly, his intention was sufficient to establish entrustment
for purposes
of s 26(a).
[20]
In
support of its argument the appellant relied on the following
authorities. In
British
Kaffrarian Savings Bank Society v Attorneys, Notaries and
Conveyancers Fidelity Guarantee Fund Board of Control
[20]
it was held that:
‘
It
seems to me, when an attorney steals money entrusted to him in the
course of his practice, the person who “may suffer pecuniary
loss” by reason of the theft is the person on whose behalf the
money is held “in trust”. The section refers to
money
entrusted “by or on behalf of such persons” to the
attorney, ie by or on behalf of the person who suffers the
loss. A
person towards whom the attorney has a fiduciary relationship pays
money to an attorney or someone else pays money to an
attorney on
behalf of such a one. Money has then been entrusted to an attorney by
or on behalf of his client, ie the person with
whom he has a
fiduciary relationship. This is the situation protected by the Act.
There must be a relationship of this fiduciary
nature between the
attorney and the person who has suffered loss before the latter can
claim to be compensated in terms of s 26.’
[21]
In
Rodel
Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v Attorneys Fidelity Fund
[21]
,
where the facts were similar to the instant matter, the court found
that:
‘
[22]
In the matter under consideration the discounting agreement provides
that Rodel purchases the right of the client to the proceeds
of the
mortgage bond. By paying the first instalment into Geduld’s
trust account, Rodel in effect paid money to the debtor’s
[sic]
(Solomon’s) attorney as part
discharge of its indebtedness to Mr. and Mrs Solomons in respect of
the purchase consideration
for the proceeds of the bond. The money
was paid to Geduld at the request of the client. The client nominated
Geduld’s trust
account as the account into which payment should
be made. The standard agreement contains no terms indicating that
payment would
only be made into an attorney’s trust account.
The intention of Rodel in making the payment was to discharge its
obligation
to the client. It mattered not that the account happened
to be an attorney’s trust account.’
[22]
In
Attorneys
Fidelity Fund Board of Control v Mettle Property Finance (Pty)
Ltd
[22]
the latter paid monies into an attorney’s trust account
pursuant to various bridging finance transactions. The attorney in
turn undertook to pay Mettle from the proceeds of a bond and two
property transfers upon registration thereof. The attorney did
not
pay and Mettle sued the Attorneys Fidelity Fund alleging entrustment
as envisaged in s 26(a) of the Attorneys Act. The
Supreme Court
of Appeal found that, although the attorney had irrevocably
undertaken to pay, both in terms of the bridging finance
agreements
and various warranties and undertakings, there had in fact been no
entrustment:
‘
[11]
The meaning of the word “entrust” for the purposes of a
claim in terms of s 26(
a
)
of the Act has been dealt with in a number of cases. In
Industrial
and Commercial Factors (Pty) Ltd v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Board of
Control
[1996] ZASCA 84
;
1997
(1) SA 136
(A) at 144B-D, this court (per FH Grosskopf JA) quoted
with approval the following passages of the judgment of Nicholas J in
Provident
Fund for the Clothing Industry v Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyancers
Fidelity Guarantee Fund
1981
(3) SA 539
(W) at 543E-F:
“
From
these definitions it is plain that ‘to entrust’ comprises
two elements:
(a)
to place in
the possession of something,
(b)
subject to
a trust. As to the latter element, this connotes that the person
entrusted is bound to deal with the property or money
concerned for
the benefit of others (cf
Estate
Kemp and Others v McDonald’s Trustees
1915
AD at 499).
‘
(The
trustee) is bound to hold and apply the property for the benefit of
some person or persons or for the accomplishment of some
special
purpose’ (
ibid
at 508).’
”
[12]
The first element is not contentious – the moneys, representing
the initial purchase price in each case, were indeed
placed in
Langerak’s possession. The second element is more problematic.
There is no doubt that Mettle trusted the various
warranties and the
undertakings given by Langerak, and relied upon Langerak for
repayment of, inter alia, the initial purchase
price on the date of
registration. That does not, however, mean that Mettle “entrusted”
the money to Langerak as required
by s 26(
a
)
of the Act.
[13]
As indicated above, Langerak is referred to throughout the master
agreement as the “Conveyancer”. The agreement
provides
that:
“
3.1
The Conveyancer has been and will from time to time hereafter be
duly authorised by a client to conclude a transaction with
Mettle for
and on their behalf.
3.2
Any reference in this agreement to a client shall (unless the
context indicates to the contrary) be a reference to that seller,
purchaser or mortgagor duly represented by the Conveyancer.”
[14]
Importantly, “client” – who could be a seller, a
purchaser or a mortgagor – is defined as “the
Conveyancer’s client”. “Client’s claim”
is defined as a “loan claim” or a “seller’s
claim”.
[15]
It follows that Mettle – in paying the initial purchase price
in each transaction to Langerak as the representative of
the
mortgagor or seller from whom Mettle had purchased a loan claim or a
seller’s claim – was simply discharging its
debt to such
mortgagor or seller. The payment was unconditional and, the moment
the initial purchase price was paid into Langerak’s
trust
account in terms of the master agreement, Mettle’s debt was
discharged. Langerak was no more than a conduit for the
money…
[16]
This being so, there was no “entrustment” of money by
Mettle to Langerak. In the words of FH Grosskopf JA in the
Industrial
and Commercial Factors
case:
“
Where
money is paid into the trust account of an attorney it does not
follow that such money is in fact trust money … If
money is
simply handed over to an attorney by a debtor who thereby wishes to
discharge a debt, and the attorney has a mandate to
receive it on
behalf of the creditor, it may be difficult to establish an
entrustment.”
’
[23]
During argument the respondent persisted in
its reliance on
Provident Fund for the
Clothing Industry v Attorneys, Notaries and Conveyancers Fidelity
Guarantee Fund
(‘
PFCI’
)
and
Industrial and Commercial Factors
(Pty) Ltd v Attorneys Fidelity Fund
(‘
ICF’
)
which formed the basis for the court a quo’s findings on
entrustment.
[24]
The respondent also argued that the
appellant’s reliance on
Mettle
and
Rodel
(supra) was misplaced, given Swanepoel’s undisputed evidence of
his intention to entrust the money with PV by making payment
into
PV’s trust account as security.
Discussion
[25]
Both
parties accepted that where money is paid into the trust account of
an attorney it does not necessarily follow that such money
becomes
trust money.
[23]
They also
accepted that, as was held in ICF, if money is simply handed over to
an attorney by a debtor who thereby wishes to discharge
a debt, and
the attorney has a mandate to receive it on behalf of the creditor,
it may be difficult to establish entrustment.
[24]
[26]
Given the foundation of the court a quo’s
reasoning, namely that in accordance with the ICF case, the payer’s
intention
is determinative, it is helpful to consider the facts in
that case in order to contextualise the court’s findings
therein.
[27]
They were briefly as follows. The seller
instructed an attorney to attend to the transfer of her immovable
property to an end purchaser.
The attorney (as in the present
instance) devised a fraudulent scheme to raise bridging finance on
the seller’s behalf, by
falsely representing to ICF (a
factoring company) that the seller required the funds.
[28]
ICF agreed to provide bridging finance on
condition that certain underlying documents, including a suretyship
executed by the seller’s
father as security for payment, were
provided. The attorney forged the signatures on these documents. When
ICF handed the attorney
the cheque for the bridging finance, which in
terms of the agreement had to be made out to the seller, the attorney
then managed
to persuade ICF to instead make it payable into his
trust account, on the pretext that this would enable him ‘
to
deal with’
the funds.
Importantly, the attorney did not represent that the payment into his
trust account was at the seller’s instance.
[29]
ICF was concerned that payment into the
attorney’s trust account would not be regarded as payment to
the seller in terms of
the agreement. It thus insisted on two
conditions being met. The first was that the attorney would hold the
money in trust for
and on behalf of the seller. The second was that
the attorney would provide a trust receipt which the latter
eventually did. The
attorney stole the money and ICF sued the
Attorneys Fidelity Fund on the basis of entrustment.
[30]
It
is against this factual background that the Appellate Division found
as follows:
[25]
‘
By
insisting on payment into Maré's trust account and the
furnishing of a trust receipt Flax, in my view, manifested his
intention that Maré should keep the money for and on behalf of
Branken, and that he should deal with it as instructed by
her. That
was also the professed intention of Maré. Maré's real
intention was of course to steal the money, but he
falsely
represented to the appellant that he was receiving the money in trust
on behalf of Branken. Maré conceded during
cross-examination
that he "agreed" to "keep the money in trust for the
benefit of Branken"; and that "it
was intended to be trust
moneys" held for his client Branken. If this had been a genuine
transaction that would no doubt have
shown an intention on the part
of Maré to receive the money in trust. I do, however, consider
that the issue of entrustment
in the present case should be judged in
the light of the appellant's intention, and not Maré's
professed intention. But
Maré's concession does show that he
did not pretend to receive the money as agent on behalf of Branken.’
And
further:
[26]
‘
I
do however respectfully disagree with the finding of the Court
a
quo
that Maré "represented to Flax that he had been
instructed by Branken to accept payment on her behalf". The
evidence
shows that Maré told the appellant that he "had
to make certain payments on the instructions of Branken". He did
not pretend that Branken had given him a mandate to accept payment on
her behalf, and that any payment to him would therefore discharge
the
appellant's obligation to Branken.
Flax
obviously intended to discharge what he believed to be the
appellant's obligation under the
agreement
,
but that is not decisive of the matter. When he was asked to change
the crossing on the
cheque
he
became concerned that payment to Maré would not result in
payment to Branken. Flax consequently insisted that Maré
should pay the cheque into his trust account, clearly with the
intention that payment to Branken would only take place when the
money was paid out on behalf of Branken. The appellant's intention on
the one hand to pay Branken and its intention on the other
to entrust
the money should therefore not be regarded as mutually exclusive.
In
coming to the conclusion that the appellant did not "entrust"
the money to Maré the Court
a quo
found that the facts
in the present case were comparable to the facts in the
Provident
Fund
case,
supra
, which were outlined as follows at 544B-C:
"It
may be accepted that by directing that the cheque for R32 238,36 be
made out (in) favour of his trust account, Kavin (the
attorney)
represented that he would be receiving the money on behalf of Gafin
(the ostensible client). But it has not been shown
that in complying
with that request, the Provident Fund impressed the payment with a
trust; its intention was, presumably, to discharge
what it and its
then attorneys considered were the Fund's obligations under the
contract of loan. They believed that it was a payment
made to Kavin
as the duly authorised agent of Gafin"
In
view of that factual finding Nicholas J held that the Provident Fund
had failed to show that it had "entrusted" any
money to the
attorney Kavin.
In
my judgment the facts of the present case differ in certain material
respects from those found in the
Provident Fund
case,
supra
.
The evidence shows that unlike the Provident Fund in that case, the
appellant in the present case was the one who insisted on
the money
being paid into the attorney's trust account. Had Flax believed that
payment to Maré would indeed be payment to
the duly authorized
agent of Branken whereby the appellant would be discharged from its
obligation under the agreement, there would
have been no need for
Flax to insist on paying the cheque into Maré’s trust
account. The
Provident Fund
case can therefore be
distinguished on the facts.’
[31]
It is fair to discern from the aforegoing
that the Appellate Division decided the matter on the basis of ICF’s
intention having
regard to the particular facts; and that the
attorney’s concession that he had never purported to represent
the seller when
accepting the money in trust played a significant
role in establishing what ICF’s true intention had been.
[32]
In the appeal before us it is clear that at
all material times PV purported to represent the client in accepting
payment of the
money into its trust account. This is borne out by the
terms of the discounting agreement, the warranty, and indeed
Swanepoel’s
own evidence. PV’s obligation was
not
to retain the money in trust and to deal with it on the client’s
behalf, but simply to pay it straight over to the ‘
client’
.
In other words, PV’s trust account was nothing other than a
conduit as was found in
Mettle
(supra) – notwithstanding the respondent’s claim that it
sought to obtain security by payment into that account.
[33]
Further,
as was pointed out in
Rodel
[27]
the court in ICF did not find that the PFCI decision was wrong, but
rather that its facts were materially different; and in the
more
recent decision of
Mettle
the Supreme Court of Appeal did not regard the payer’s
intention to be the overriding criterion. It too decided the matter
on its own particular facts.
[34]
To my mind the facts in the instant matter
are almost on all fours with those in
Mettle
and we are (of course) bound by that decision. It thus follows that
the appeal should succeed.
Conclusion
[35]
I would thus propose the following
order:
1.
The appeal succeeds.
2.
The order of the court a quo is set aside and substituted with the
following:
‘
The
plaintiff’s claim is dismissed with costs.’
3.
The respondent shall bear the costs of the appeal.
J
I CLOETE
HLOPHE
JP
I
agree and it is so ordered.
J
M HLOPHE
SALDANHA
J
I
agree.
V
SALDANHA
[1]
Record p193 lines 19 - 21
[2]
Record p194 lines 7 – 10
[3]
Record p194 lines 11 - 17
[4]
Record p197 lines 21 - 24
[5]
Record p211 line 24 – page 212 line 1 and clause 2.1 record
p42
[6]
Record p37
[7]
Record p41 preamble
[8]
Record p41 preamble
[9]
Record p42 clauses 2.1 and 2.2
[10]
Record p42 clause 4.1
[11]
Record pp41 - 42
[12]
Record
p212 lines 6 - 7
[13]
Record
p214 line 24 – p215 line 1
[14]
Record
p219 lines 20 - 23
[15]
Record
p195 lines 1 - 11
[16]
Record
p45
[17]
Record
pp173 - 174
[18]
[1996] ZASCA 84
;
1997
(1) SA 136
(AD) at 142H
[19]
1981
(3) SA 539
(W) at 543E
[20]
1978
(3) SA 242
(ECD) at 249B-F
[21]
Case
no 16833/2007
[2010] ZAWCHC 407
at para
[22]
[22]
2012
(3) SA 611
(SCA) at paras [11] – [16]
[23]
Paramount
Suppliers (Merchandise) (Pty) Ltd v Attorneys, Notaries and
Conveyancers Fidelity Guarantee Fund Board of Control
1957
(4) SA 618
(W) at 625F-G
[24]
ICF
(supra) at 143J-144A
[25]
At
142F-H
[26]
At
143A-I
[27]
At
para [20]