AFADWU obo Members v Hamman and Another (2026/232698) [2026] ZALCCT 189 (6 November 2026)

40 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Collective dismissals — Section 189/189A LRA — Urgent application under s189A(13) for interim relief to halt purported retrenchments and VSPs — Applicant union sought to interdict implementation and set aside VSPs on behalf of members, alleging failure to consider potential purchaser and lack of meaningful consultation — Facts: merger conditions, s197 transfer, section 189 notices issued, CCMA facilitation held with multiple meetings, employer presented business rationale and VSP offering two weeks' pay per year (with limited enhancements), vast majority of affected employees accepted VSPs, only one applicant member remained unsigned and facilitation to continue in respect of that employee — Legal issue: whether s189A(13) jurisdiction is engaged and whether employer complied with a fair procedure so as to preclude interim relief — Holding: Court found jurisdiction under s189A(13) properly invoked but that the employer had complied with a fair and meaningful consultation process; applicants failed to show clear-cut procedural unfairness going to the core of the process; urgent relief and set-aside of VSPs not justified; application dismissed.

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AFADWU obo Members v Hamman and Another (2026/232698) [2026] ZALCCT 189 (6 November 2026)
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THE
LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, CAPE TOWN
Case
no:
2026-232698
(1)
Reportable: Yes
(2)
Of interest to other Judges: Yes
(3)
Revised: Yes
In the matter between:
AFADWU OBO
MEMBERS                                         

Applicant
and
GERHARDUS
HAMMAN
First Respondent
PREMIER
FMCG (PTY) LTD                                       

Second Respondent
Heard
:
5 October 2026
Delivered
:
6 November 2026
Summary:
(Urgent application – Applicant seeks relief under section 189A
(13) of the LRA – Applicants must show second
respondent did
not comply with a fair procedure – second respondent complied
with a fair procedure – application dismissed)
JUDGMENT
MAY,
AJ
Introduction
[1] 
Applicant approaches this Court on an urgent basis for interim relief
in the form of a rule
nisi
that:
1.1  the purported
retrenchment of the employees by the First and Second Respondent does
not constitute a fair and just retrenchment
process as contemplated
in
section 189
of the
Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
;
1.2  the proposed
Voluntary Severance Packages (VSP) offered by the First and Second
Respondent be halted until all possible
alternative remedies are
exhausted;
1.3  the applicants
that have signed VSP’s unintentionally or under duress be
provided with an option to return back
to work obtaining alternative
relief other than retrenchment; and
1.4  the employment
relationship between the Applicants and the First and Second
Respondents remain extant and unaltered.
[2] 
Applicants further sought an interdict interdicting and restraining
the First and Second Respondents from implementing
the purported
section 189
process and an order that the First and Second
Respondents pay the costs of the application.
[3] 
The application was launched on the 21
st
of September
2026, was initially enrolled for hearing on 28
th
of
September 2026. The matter eventually served before this Court on 5
October 2026.
The
facts
[4] 
The facts are largely common cause. The second respondent is a member
of the Premier Group. They manufacture, distribute
and market branded
and private label fast moving consumer goods in South Africa. The
Group purchased 100% of the shares of RFG
Holdings Limited by way of
a share swap (merger). The merger was approved by the competition
commission on 6 March 2026 and included
conditions to the effect that
the Group will not retrench any employees (defined as permanent
employees) for a period of three
years referred to as merger specific
retrenchments subject to the proviso that merger specific
retrenchments excludes voluntary
retrenchments and/or voluntary
separation agreement and any retrenchments lawfully effected for
operational requirements unrelated
to the merger.
[5] 
Second Respondent underwent an internal restructuring as a result of
the transfer of employees of RFG Foods (Pty) Ltd
to the second
respondent in terms of
section 197
of the LRA. RFG Foods was a
subsidiary of RFG Holdings.
[6] 
The fruit products operation (situated in Tulbagh) to which this
application relates was an operation of RFG Foods and
became an
operation of the second respondent pursuant to the
section 197
transfer. On 28 and 29 July 2026, the second respondent issued
notices in terms of
section 189
(3), read with
section 189A
, of the
LRA, inviting consulting parties to consult on the contemplated
dismissals. At the same time, the second respondent requested

facilitation by the CCMA by submitting the requisite referral form to
them.
[7] 
The facilitation process commenced on 6 August 2026 and included the
Applicant, Solidarity, NUFAS, representatives from
the second
respondent, representatives from non-union salaried staff,
representatives from the commercial and shipping departments
and
representatives from non-union staff. After the second respondent
presented their business rationale to the parties, it was
agreed that
questions would be submitted to the second respondent in writing by
14 August 2026 and the second respondent would
provide answers
thereto by 21 August 2026. The second facilitation meeting would take
place on 26 August 2026.
[8] 
At the following facilitation meeting, a dispute arose as to whether
a representative from COSATU could participate in
the meeting as well
as a person who was no longer an employee of the second respondent.
The Commissioner indicated that he would
make a ruling on the matter
and a further facilitation session was scheduled for 8 September
2026.
[9] 
At the third facilitation meeting, and after the second respondent
made a full financial presentation to answer the questions
posed by
the parties, spokespersons on behalf of the employee parties
presented without prejudice demands which included that the
second
respondent pay severance packages to permanent salaried and wage
staff as well as to employees on fixed-term contracts,
that severance
be calculated at four weeks’ pay for every year of service,
that years of service be rounded up from 0.5 to
a full year, that
employees receive three months’ notice pay, that the minimum
amount payable be R100 000.00, that a
gratuity be paid to
seasonal employees who would have reached normal retirement age in
the coming season, that the second respondent
continue paying for
employees on formal training programmes, including apprentices and
that the second respondent investigate the
possibility of offering
employees other skills to make them more employable. The next meeting
was scheduled for 14 September 2026.
[10] 
At the facilitation meeting the second respondent presented its VSP
proposal which was to be offered to three groups
of employees to wit
permanent salaried staff, permanent wage staff and employees on
fixed-term contracts as at July 2026, that
the severance package on
offer would be two weeks’ wages for every completed year of
service, that the second respondent
would rely on
section 198B
(10)(b) of the LRA and that severance would be backdated to 1 January
2015 for permanent employees who were made permanent in October
2024,
that one month’s notice would be given on the basis that
employees would stop working on 30 September 2026 and October
would
be paid as notice and that if 100% of employees accepted the VSP’s
, the minimum amount payable would be R50 000.00.
For any
outstanding work remaining, employees would first be offered VSP’s
and then retained on fixed-term contracts thereafter.
The second
respondent, after some further discussions, agreed to increase the
notice pay with an additional 2 weeks’ pay.
The parties
concluded the meeting on the understanding that the facilitation
process was conducted with prejudice, that it was
not necessary to
sign a separate agreement and the parties had reached an agreement.
The meeting concluded and it was agreed that
the parties would meet
again on 30 September 2026 for the fourth meeting to finalise the
matter.
[11] 
The VSP’s were thereafter delivered to each of the affected
employees and by the time the answering affidavit was
deposed to,
which was on 24 September 2026, of the salaried staff affected 100%
of them had signed VSP’s and of the wage
staff all employees
bar 2 signed the VSP’s. In respect of the Applicant’s
members, only 1 of their 107 members did
not sign a VSP. The rest all
signed VSP’s.
[12] 
Applicant delivered the urgent application on 18 September 2026, and
this effectively stalled the facilitation process.
As things stand,
as at the date of hearing the matter, only one employee has not
signed the VSP which is the Applicant’s
member and, as
confirmed by Counsel appearing for the second respondent, Mr
Mndebele, the facilitation process will continue in
respect of the
one employee.
Applicants’
case
[13] 
Applicants’ relief, other than the prayers related to the
setting aside of the VSP’s, is on behalf of the
one employee.
In this respect, the Applicants contend that it made a proposal to
the second respondent, on or around the 8
th
of September
2026, that there is a potential investor and/or buyer that is willing
to purchase the business as a going concern
in terms of
section 197
of the LRA and that they furnished the second respondent with the
contact details of this potential buyer. Applicants contend,
in
essence, that the second respondent’s failure to consider the
potential buyer and possible sale means that there will
be no
meaningful consultation as required in terms of
section 189
as the
sale could obviate the need for the retrenchments in
toto.
Misjoinder
and non-joinder
[14] 
The first respondent who deposes on behalf of the second respondent
contends that he has been misjoined to the proceedings.
At the
hearing of the matter, Mr Seloga, appearing for the Applicants,
conceded that no case is made out against the first respondent
and
that the relief is sought against the second respondent only. The
concession is correctly made.
[15] 
Mr Seloga also conceded that any relief sought could only be sought
in relation to the Applicants’ members and
not in relation to
any of the employees who were represented by any of the other unions
or representatives. In essence therefore
the Applicant could only
seek to interfere in the signed VSP’s, if they can at all,
concluded by their own members. this
concession means it is
unnecessary for the Court to determine the non-joinder objection
raised by the second respondent.
Urgency
[16] 
The second respondent disputes that the matter is urgent and contends
that the Applicants have failed to address whether
they will obtain
substantial redress in due course. The second respondent also submits
that the Applicants have failed to satisfy
the other requirements for
urgency as well.  In addition, the second respondent has raised
that the Applicants have failed
to set out the basis, whether
statutory or otherwise, it relies on to found the Court’s
jurisdiction to entertain the application.
Finally, the second
respondents contend that applicants have not sought an order that the
VSP’s concluded between the parties
be set aside nor have they
laid out a basis for same.
[17]
It is trite
that whether a matter is urgent involves two considerations, whether,
in terms of
Rule 38
, the reasons for urgency and why urgent relief is
necessary has been set out and whether the Applicant will not obtain
substantial
relief at a later stage. The consideration requires an
application to explain that unless relief is granted as a matter of
urgency,
something is likely to happen, the possible prejudice to the
parties, that urgency was not self-created and that the applicant
acted expeditiously
[1]
.
[18]
Section
189A
(13) empowers a consulting party to approach the Labour Court
for an order compelling the employer to comply with a fair procedure,

interdicting or restraining the employer from dismissing an employee
prior to complying with a fair procedure or directing the
employer to
reinstate an employee until it has complied with a fair procedure
[2]
.
Such an application is
sui
generis
and
is accorded a degree of urgency.
[3]
The relief is usually sought in the form of a pre-emptive interdict.
The aim of
section 189A
(13) is to provide a remedy to employees to
approach the Labour Court to set their employer on the right track
where there is a
genuine and clear-cut procedural unfairness which
goes to the core of the process. The section is aimed at securing the
process
in the interest of a fair outcome
[4]
.
[19]
It would be
inappropriate to afford an Applicant the remedies set out in
section
189A(13)(a)
-(c) if they delayed unduly between the occurrence of the
alleged procedural flaw or if the flaw is formal or insignificant or
if
the relief is sought after the retrenchment process is completed.
This is so because procedural flaws must be corrected early and

effectively to allow the parties to continue with the consultation
process, with the possibility of the flaws being corrected and

consensus being reached
[5]
.
[20] 
The last facilitation was held on 14 September 2026 where the final
offer was accepted. The Applicants allege that they
sought a further
extension of 60 days for further consultation which was refused. The
second respondent contends that a further
extension was unwarranted
as 99% of the employees had accepted the VSP’s and as such an
extension would serve no useful purpose.
[21] 
The application was thereafter delivered on 18 September 2026 and
filed on 21 September 2026. The Applicants have therefore
not unduly
delayed the Application at all, and it would therefore be appropriate
to afford the Applicants the remedies under
Section 189A
(13)
provided a proper case is made out for the relief sought.
Is
Section 189A
(13) engaged?
[22]
Jurisdiction
is determined on the basis of the pleadings and not on the
substantive merits of the case. The Applicants’ pleadings

should contain the legal basis of the claim under which the
Applicants have chosen to invoke the Court’s competence. The

Court must interpret the formal terminology of the notice of motion,
the contents of the supporting affidavits to establish what
the legal
basis of the Applicants’ claim is.
[6]
[23]
The second
respondent contends that the Applicants must specifically indicate on
what provision of the legislation the Applicants
rely on to found
jurisdiction.
[7]
[24]
It is
apparent from the Applicants’ Notice of Motion and Supporting
Affidavits that they seek intervention in pending retrenchment

proceedings that is subject to facilitation in terms of
section 189A.
A pleading should not be read pedantically, nor should a court
overemphasise precise formalistic requirements – it is
the
substance of the allegations that should properly be considered
[8]
.
On this basis it is obvious that the Applicants’ relief is
premised on
Section 189A
(13).
[25] 
The Applicants allege that the second respondent is not engaged in
meaningful discussions with them in their failure
to consider the
potential investor/ buyer. This falls within the purview of
section
189A
(13) if established. This Court’s jurisdiction is
therefore engaged.
Has
the second respondent complied with a fair procedure
[26]
The
Applicants relief hinges on a finding that the second respondent has
not complied with a fair procedure
[9]
.
On the facts, there is nothing that supports this contention at all.
In fact, the contrary seems true.
[27] 
The Applicants’ contention is that the second respondent is
offering VSP’s without considering the potential
investor/
buyer. The second respondent disputes this and says that no offer to
buy the business had been made. They also say that
there is no
requirement that they must wait for an offer before offering the
employees VSP’s.
[28]
In
SAA
[10]
,
Van Niekerk J confirmed that nothing prevents an employer from
offering a voluntary severance package as a measure to avoid
retrenchment
and that if a VSP is offered and accepted as a means to
avoid the need for or even contemplate retrenchment, the contract of
employment
is terminated by mutual agreement and there is no
dismissal.
[29] 
The offering of the VSP’s does therefore not make the process
unfair at all. On the evidence before the Court,
it is apparent that
there was meaningful consultation duly facilitated by the CCMA
commissioner that culminated in a negotiated
agreement to offer the
VSP’s on the terms agreed upon.
[30] 
The second respondent has therefore complied with a fair procedure.
This finding in and of itself non-suits the Applicant.
I will
consider whether a case is made out for the setting aside of the
VSP’s, nevertheless.
Is
a case made out for setting aside the VSP’s
[31]
Second
respondent submits that contractual arrangements must be honoured
where the parties have entered into the contract freely
and
voluntarily
[11]
.
The Applicants have not put up any evidence to suggest that the VSP’s
were not entered into freely and voluntarily. Second
respondent
contends that when parties settle disputes in full and final
settlement, they should not be lightly released from an
undertaking
seriously and willingly embraced.
[12]
I agree.
[32]
The Applicants have not satisfied this Court that
interference is warranted on the facts. The facts, on the contrary,
show a fair,
facilitated process undertaken which culminated in VSP’s
on agreed upon terms.
[33]
The Applicants’ remaining member is not
without relief, the facilitation process continues and he therefore
has the possibility
of challenging a dismissal as being either
procedurally or substantively unfair subsequently.
[34]
Absent a finding of procedural unfairness, which
is necessary for this Court to intervene, it is unnecessary for this
Court to determine
whether the grounds for an interim interdict have
been met.
[35] 
It follows therefore that the application must be dismissed.
Costs
[36]
Both parties sought costs. This Court has a broad discretion
to make orders for costs according to the requirements of the law and

fairness. The Court must strike a fair balance between unduly
discouraging parties from approaching the Labour Court to have their

disputes dealt with and allowing matters to be brought or be opposed
that should not have been brought or opposed in the first
place.
[37] 
The Applicants approached this Court in good faith seeking to protect
the rights of its members. They were not successful
this time around,
but they should not be discouraged from approaching this Court when
they have a deserving case to do so. Each
party should therefore pay
their own costs.
Conclusion
[38] 
In the premise the following order is made:
1.  The application
is dismissed.
2.  Each party will
pay their own costs.
C.
May
Acting
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For
the Applicants: PM Seloga instructed by S Mokoena
Attorneys,
Johannesburg
For
the first and second respondent: V M Mndebele instructed by Webber
Wentzel,
Johanesburg
[1]
Association
of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others v Northam Platinum
Ltd and Another (2016) 37 ILJ 2840 (LC) paras
21 – 26.
[2]
Section
189A
(13)(a), (b) and (c).
[3]
BIFAWU
obo Miya and Another v Scorpion Legal Protection (Pty) Ltd
[2023] ZALCJHB 314; (2024) 45 ILJ 298 (LC) at para 15.
[4]
RAWUSA
v Schuurman Metal Pressing
(
Pty
)
Ltd
[2005]
1 BLLR 78 (LC).
[5]
Insurance
and Banking Staff Association and another v Old Mutual Services and
Technology Administration and another
[2006]
6 BLLR 566
(LC) at paras 14 to 17.
[6]
Gcaba
v Minister for security and Others
2019
(1) SA 238
(CC) at para 75. See also
My
Vote Counts CC v Speaker of the National Assembly
2016
(1) SA 132
(CC).
[7]
Relying on
Mothotoana
v Johannesburg Social Housing Company SOC Ltd
(2025/082814)
[2025] ZALCJHB 420 (8 September 2025) and
Tshabalala
v Mutenga and Another
(2025/205156) [2026] ZALCJHB 28 (2 February 2026).
[8]
MN
v AJ
2013
(3) SA 26
(WCC),
para 24 and
Suid
Afrikaans Onderlinge Brand en Algemene Versekerings Maatskappy Bpk v
Van der Berg en Andere
1976
(1) SA 602
(AD)
at 607E.
[9]
National
Union of Metal Workers of South Africa obo Members and Another v
South African Airways (SOC) Limited (In business rescue)
and Others
(J424/20) [2020] ZALCJHB 70;
2020 (7) BCLR 888
(LC) at para 7 (SAA).
[10]
SAA
supra
at
para 36.
[11]
With
reference to
Mohamed’s
Leisure Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Southern Sun Hotel Interests (Pty) Ltd
2018
(2) SA 314 (SCA).
[12]
Gbenga-Oluwatoye
v Reckitt Benckiser South Africa (Pty) Ltd and Another
2016
(12 ) BCLR 1515 (CC) at para 24.