Pieters NO v Master of the High Court, Cape Town and Others (312/2026) [2026] ZAWCHC 661 (6 November 2026)

45 Reportability

Brief Summary

Insolvency Law — Locus standi — Application for relief regarding the Pieters Family Trust's insolvent estate — Applicant, a former trustee, lacks standing to seek declaratory relief and accounting from the respondents — Application dismissed due to improper service, lack of urgency, and unresolved disputes of fact — Court finds that the applicant's claims are barred by the provisions of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CIRCUIT LOCAL DIVISION, THEMBALETHU)

JUDGMENT

Case number: 312/2026
In the matter between:
C. H. PIETERS N.O. Applicant

and

THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN First respondent
THE JOINT CURATORS OF THE INSOLVENT TRUST,

PIETERS FAMILY TRUST Second respondent

ABSA BANK LTD Third respondent

Coram: Van Zyl, J
Heard on: 29 July 2026
Judgment: : 6 November 2026

Summary: Application for wide-ranging relief in relation to trust whose estate that
has been finally sequestrated – - no proper service - no urgency - disputes of fact –
no locus standi – remedies provided by Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 not invoked for
reopening of account – proceedings pending in relation to the same issues as those
raised in application - application dismissed

___________________________________________________________________

ORDER

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant shall pay the third respondent’s costs, including the costs of
two counsel where employed. Counsel’s fees are to be taxed on Scale C.


JUDGMENT


VAN ZYL, J:

Introduction

1. This is one of those revolving -door matters that never seem to reach their
destination. The applicant, in his capacity as “former trustee and interested
party”, seeks wide-ranging relief in relation to the now defunct Pieters Family
Trust. In essence, the applicant seeks declaratory relief and an order
directing the respondents to render a full reconciliation and accounting in
respect of the claim proved by the third respondent (“ABSA”) against the
insolvent estate of the Trust. ABSA was a proved creditor in the Trust’s
insolvent estate.

2. The notice of motion deserves quoting in full to illustrate the breadth of the
relief sought:

“1. That the forms, service and time periods prescribed by the Uniform Rules of
Court be dispensed with to the extent necessary and that this application be heard
as a semi-urgent application.

2. Declaring that substantial disputes and unresolved reconciliation issues continue
to exist concerning the proved claims submitted by ABSA against th e insolvent
estate of the Pieters Family Trust.
3. Declaring that the proved claims require proper reconciliation and reconsideration
within the context of the 2016 settlement structure, Court order, arbitration
proceedings, alleged mortgage bond documentation, alleged suretyship obligations,
prescription issues, post-liquidation interest and treatment of repossessed assets.
4. Directing the Respondents to provide a full reconciliation and accounting
concerning the proved claims, interest calculations, disp uted amounts, repossessed
assets, alleged mortgage bond exposure and related matters.
4.7 (sic) The dates upon which the relevant accounts were allegedly closed
or terminated, including commercial asset finance facilities.
4.8 Copies of all summonses and related process allegedly served upon or
issued against the Pieters Family Trust in its alleged capacity as surety for
Edie Pieters Eiendomme BK.
4.9 The dates upon which the Pieters Family Trust was allegedly pursued,
sued or called upon as surety.
4.10 A full accounting reflecting the basis upon which post-liquidation interest
was allegedly calculated and capitalised.
4.11 Copies of reconciliations, ledger balances and statements relied upon in
calculating post-liquidation escalation.
4.12 The dates upon which the relevant commercial asset finance
agreements were allegedly cancelled, terminated or closed.
4.13 Particulars of repossessions, disposals and sales of assets including
proceeds realised and allocation thereof.
5. Directing that pending final recon ciliation and determination of the disputes, no
further reliance be placed upon disputed portions of the proved claims without proper
disclosure.
6. Granting the Applicant leave, if necessary, to approach the Court for further or
alternative relief.

alternative relief.
7. Directing that the costs stand over for later determination alternatively be costs in
the cause.
8. Granting further and/or alternative relief.”

3. Only ABSA opposes the application which is, at the heart of it, an oblique
attack on a liquidation and distributi on account that the Master confirmed on

29 September 2021 in respect of the Trust’s estate. The confirmation of the
account is common cause between the parties.

4. On the applicant’s own version, the matter has run its course, or the issues
raised by the applicant are already being dealt with elsewhere. The applicant
used to be a trustee of the Trust. The underlying dealings by and activities of
the Trust s pan the period 2005 to 2016, and the Trust’s estate was finally
sequestrated on 26 August 2019 under the provisions of the Insolvency Act
24 of 1936. The second respondent (the joint curators), were appointed on 4
November 2019, and the administration of the estate vested in them. ABSA’s
claim in the insolvent estate of the Trust was proved on 2 October 2020, and
the account was confirmed on 29 September 2021.

5. The applicant lodged an objection under section 111 1 of the Insolvency Act
on 6 December 2022, which claim was rejected. The Trust was terminated in
due course, and the applicant’s attempts to reinstate were unsuccessful. The
applicant thereafter claimed damages arising from the sequestration of the
estate. He has also instituted a High Court action in which the underlying
validity of ABSA’s claim is, amongst other aspects, questioned. Those
proceedings are pending.

6. What, then, remains?

Preliminary issues

7. There are four preliminary issues that require brief consideration.

8. The first is that t he founding affidavit is a sparse document without
elaboration in support of the relief sought. Some twenty-four annexures are
annexed. These run to more than one hundred pages . The applicant does
not identify the relevant extracts from the annexures, but invites the court and

1 Section 111(1): “The insolvent or any person interested in the estate may, at any time before
the confirmation of the trustee’s account, in terms of section 112, lay before the Master in
writing any objection, with the reasons therefor, to that account.”

the respondents to trawl through it to find the applicant’s case. It is trite that
this approach is frowned upon. The issue was dealt with as follows in
Swissborough Diamond Mines (Pty) Ltd and others v Government of the
Republic of South Africa and others:2

“Regard being had to the function of affidavits, it is not open to an applicant or a
respondent to merely annexe to its affidavit documentation and to request the Court
to have regard to it. What is required is the identification of the portions thereof on
which reliance is placed and an indication of the case which is sought to be made
out on the strength thereof. If this were not so the essence of our established
practice would be destroyed. A party would not know what case must be met….”

9. Documents annexed to an affidavit are confirmatory of facts averred in the
affidavit. They are not a substitute for those averments. The applicant
explains that he is a lay person, that he was concerned that historical records
might not remain available, and that the annexures were attached to assist
the court. I accept the applicant’s professed motive, but the consequence of
the manner in which the case is presented cannot avoided. The respondents
were left unable to know what case they had to meet. The court was, until
the applicant could be questioned at the hearing, unsure of the exa ct nature
of the dispute. The prejudice is real, and it is the direct product of the manner
in which the papers were prepared.

10. The second issue is that the papers display material disputes of fact. Final
relief may be granted on motion only on the facts admitted by the applicant
together with those averred by ABSA, unless the latter’s version is bald, for -
fetched, or untenable on the papers.3 On that approach no relief is competent
in the present matter.

11. ABSA argues, thirdly, that the matter is not urgent and that it should be struck

2 1999 (2) SA 279 (T) at 324F-G:

2 1999 (2) SA 279 (T) at 324F-G:
3 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E –
635C.

from the roll. 4 I agree, but am nevertheless inclined to consider the other
issues raised in an attempt to lay the matter to rest.

12. Finally, the application was never formally served on ABSA. The applicant
does not dispute this, but argues that because he is a lay person, he did what
he thought best to bring the matter to ABSA’s attention. This answer is not
acceptable. Service is not a formality. It is the mechanism through which a
court acquires the entitlement to adju dicate against a party, and by which the
audi alteram partem principle is given effect. Rule 4 of the Uniform Rules
prescribes the manner of service. Lay status does not exempt a litigant from
compliance with the Rules. A party who elects to litigate in this court is bound
by its Rules, and the court’s indulgence towards an unrepresented litigant
does not extend to dispensing with jurisdictional requirements. Absent proper
service there is, as against ABSA at least, no application before this court,
and no relief may competently be granted against it.

13. These are all serious issues, and the application is upon each one of them
deserving of being struck from the roll, or dismissed. ABSA nevertheless
delivered an answering affidavit despite the lack of service , albeit under
protest and without conceding any preliminary objections. It was represented
by counsel. As with the issue of urgency, therefore, I intend discussing the
remaining issues that inform the fate of this application.

Evaluation of the relief sought

14. Three difficulties, apart from the preliminary issues identified earlier, bedevil
this application. I address them in turn.

The applicant lacks locus standi


4 On trite principles. See, for example, East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and another v Eagle
Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and others [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 paras 6–9.

15. The applicant was once a trustee of the Trust, an office governed by the
provisions of the Trust Property Control Act 57 of 1988. As indicated, the
Trust’s estate has been finally sequestrated.

16. The applicant nevertheless sues as a “former trustee” of the Trust. This is
not an official capacity recognised in our law. The abbreviation “N.O.”
denotes that a litigant acts in the name of an office , or position held. A person
acts in the name of an office only for so long as he holds that office. Once the
office is vacated, there is no office in the name of which to act.

17. In terms of section 20(1)(a) of the Insolvency Act, sequestration divests the
insolvent of the estate and vests it in the Master, and thereafter in the trustee.
Whatever right of action the Trust may once have had in respect of ABSA’s
claim vested, on 26 August 2019, in the joint curators. It did not remain with
the applicant. The estate continue d to vest in the office -holder, who were
obliged to collect debts and recover property. 5 The Trust has not been
rehabilitated, and there has been no composition in terms of section 119 of
the Insolvency Act. If any person was or is competent to interrogate ABSA’s
proved claim on behalf of the estate, it is the second respondent, that is, the
joint curators who became the office-holders on sequestration.

18. The trustee of a trust derives the authority to act from section 6(1) of the Trust
Property Control Act, which provides that a trustee shall act in that capacity
only if authorised thereto in writing by the Master. A person who acts without
such authorisation acts without capacity, and the proceedings he institutes
are a nullity. 6 The applicant does not, and cannot, allege that he holds any
letters of authority. On his own version the Trust no longer exists.

19. The applicant argues, however, that he has for many years been cited as
“N.O.” and treated as a trustee in earlier litigation. Locus standi is, however, a

“N.O.” and treated as a trustee in earlier litigation. Locus standi is, however, a

5 Cook NO v SJ Coetzee Inc. 2012 (2) SA 616 (GNP) paras 10-12.
6 Lupacchini NO and another v Minister of Safety and Security 2010 (6) SA 457 (SCA) paras
1–11.

matter of substantive law. 7 It cannot be conferred by consent, acquiescence,
estoppel, or the historical conduct of an opposing litigant. That a party may
formerly have held an office does not clothe him with that office once it has
been lost.

20. The applicant submits, in the alternative, that his description as “former
trustee” should be condoned. I cannot accede to the request. Condonation is
a procedural indulgence directed at non -compliance with rules and time
limits. It cannot bestow a capacity that a litigant does not possess.

21. As a last resort, the applicant claims to be acting as a beneficiary of the Trust,
and as a person directly and substantially affected by the sequestration of its
estate. The relief sought , however, squarely concerns the administration of
the insolvent estate of the Trust , and the reconciliation of a creditor’s proved
claim. Those aspects were given over to the joint curators and the Master,
and the Insolvency Act provides its own remedies, in sections 111, 112, and
151 (as well as powers to the Master under section 1528), to an aggrieved
person. The applicant’s interest, such as it may be , entitles him to invoke
those remedies. It does not entitle him to bring a free -standing application for
declaratory and other relief against a proved creditor of the estate.

22. The applicant accordingly lacks the requisite locus standi to seek the relief
set out in the notice of motion. This is a fundamental defect in the
application, and renders it a nullity.

The liquidation and distribution account was duly confirmed , and the applicant has
failed to exercise his remedies under the Insolvency Act

23. The claim under attack is embodied in an account confirmed by the Master.
Such confirmation is final in terms of section 112 of the Insolvency Ac t. This
court is barred by section 151 of the Insolvency Act from reopening the

7 Gross and others v Pentz 1996 (2) SA 617 (A) at 632C-F.

7 Gross and others v Pentz 1996 (2) SA 617 (A) at 632C-F.
8 Section 152(2) of the Insolvency Act empowers the Master, at any time before rehabilitation,
to summon any person to furnish information concerning the estate, the administration of the
estate, or any claim or demand made against the estate.

matter other than in a way provided by section 112. I revert to this aspect
below.

24. It is common cause on the papers that ABSA proved a claim of approximately
R11 million against the insolvent estate of the Trust at the second meeting of
creditors on 2 October 2020 . The claim was admitted, and included into the
first liquidation and distribution account . T he account duly lay open for
inspection. No objection was lodged during the inspection period provided for
under the Insolvency Act. T he Master accordingly confirmed the account on
29 September 2021.

25. The Insolvency Act prescribes an exhaustive scheme for ch allenging a
trustee’s account .9 The applicant did not adhere to the legislated scheme.
Section 111(1) permits the insolvent or any person interested in the estate to
lodge a written objection with the Master “ at any time before the confirmation
of the trustee’s account”. The applicant lodged an objection on 6 December
2022, more than fourteen months after confirmation of the account on 29
September 2021. The objection was refused. Section 111(2)(a) provides that
a person aggrieved by the Master’s refusal to sustain an objection may apply
to the court within fourteen days for an order setting aside that decision. The
applicant brought no such application.

26. Section 112 10 provides that the Master’s “ confirmation shall be final save as
against a person who may have been permitted by the Court before any
dividend has been paid under the account, to reopen it ”. Leave to reopen

9 See Cools v The Master and others 1998 (4) SA 212 (C) paras 21, and 47–53.
10 Section 112: “When a trustee’s account has been open to inspection by creditors as When a
trustee’s account has been open to inspection by creditors as hereinbefore prescribed and—
(a) no objection has been lodged; or
(b) an objection has been lodged and the account has been amended in accordance
with the direction of the Master and has again been open for inspection if necessary

with the direction of the Master and has again been open for inspection if necessary
as in paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section 111 prescribed and no application
has been made to the Court in terms of paragraph (a) of the said subsection (2) to
set aside the Master’s decision; or
(c) an objection has been lodged but withdrawn or has not been sustained and the
objector has not applied to the Court in terms of the said paragraph (a),
the Master shall confirm the account and his confirmation shall be final save as against a
person who may have been permitted by the Court before any dividend has been paid under
the account, to reopen it.”

must accordingly be sought and obtained from a court. The applicant did not
seek such relief.

27. The meaning of finality as contemplated in section 112 is settled. In providing
that confirmation “ shall be final”, section 112 means that the matters dealt
with in the account, being purely estate matters, are finally disposed of and
cannot be reopened. 11 It has been held that confirmation under section 112
is conclusive even as against the creditor whose claim is embodied in the
account.12 If the confirmation binds the proved creditor, it must equally bind a
person who was neither a creditor nor an office-holder.

28. ABSA’s proved claim is thus, on the authorities, finally disposed of. In Cools
v The Master13 it was held that an account is a final account only in respect of
the assets dealt with in it, and that there may be more than one plan of
distribution and more than one account. This does not assist the applicant.
The qualification in Cools is directed at assets which come to light after
confirmation, whether through investigation or fortuitously. The applicant
makes no case that assets in the Trust’s estate have come to light since the
confirmation of the account . His complaint is directed at the quantum of a
claim which was properly dealt with in the confirmed account.

29. Section 15114 of the Insolvency Act, which confers a general and wide power
of review over decisions of the Master, contains an express proviso that “ the
Court shall not re -open any duly confirmed trustee’s account otherwise than
as is provided in section 112”. This places the confirmed account beyond the
reach of the court’s general review power.

11 Gilbey Distillers & Vintners (Pty) Ltd and others v Morris NO and another 1991 (1) SA 648 (A)
at 657D–658G.
12 Absa Bank Bpk v De Villiers 2001 (1) SA 481 (SCA) at 487H-J.
13 Cools v The Master and others supra para 27.
14 Section 151: “ Subject to the provisions of section 57 any person aggrieved by any decision,

ruling, order or taxation of the Master or by a decision, ruling or order of an officer presiding
at a meeting of creditors may bring it under review by the Court and to that end may apply to
the Court by motion, after notice to the Master or to the presiding officer, as the case may be,
and to any person whose interests are affected: Provided that if all or most of the creditors
are affected, notice to the trustee shall be deemed to be notice to all such creditors; and
provided further that the Court shall not re -open any duly confirmed trustee’s account
otherwise than as is provided in section 112.”

30. In terms of section 75(2) of th e Insolvency Act, after confirmation of an
account “ no person shall institute legal proceedings against the estate in
respect of a pre -sequestration liability, save with the leave of the court in
which the proceedings are sought to be instituted” . No such leave has been
sought in the present matter.

31. The present application is neither an application under section 112 for leave
to reopen the account, nor a review under section 151 brought after such
leave, nor an application under the proviso to section 11 1(2)(a). It is a
separate application for declarators and an accounting , and is not competent
in the face of the express provisions of the Insolvency Act . In any event,
paragraphs 2 and 3 of the notice of motion seek declarations that “substantial
disputes” exist and that the proved claims “require proper reconciliation and
reconsideration”. A declaratory order under section 21(1)(c) of the Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013 must relate to an existing, future or contingent right or
obligation.15 A declaration that a dispute exists declares nothing about any
right, and would be of no practical effect . It does not assist the applicant in
furthering a case under the Insolvency Act.

32. I agree with the applicant that confirmation does not render a claim immune
from challenge where fraud, material error , or misrepresentation is alleged ,
as appears to be the case in the present matter . Th e appropriate remedy
nevertheless remains an application to reopen under section 112 of the
Insolvency Act.

33. The applicant argues fur ther that he does not seek to reopen the confirmed
account, but merely seeks an explanation of how the proved claim was
calculated. As ABSA points out, t hat is a distinction without a difference.
Paragraphs 2, 3 , and 5 of the notice of motion seek declarations that the
proved claims are subject to substantial unresolved disputes and require
reconsideration, and that no further reliance should be placed upon the

reconsideration, and that no further reliance should be placed upon the

15 Cordiant Trading CC v Daimler Chrysler Financial Services (Pty) Ltd 2005 (6) SA 205 (SCA )
para 16.

disputed portions of such claims . Relief in those terms would, if granted,
deprive the confirmed account of its finality.

34. The applicant is not without a remedy , but he is in the wrong forum, via the
wrong procedure, and against the wrong party. A creditor who has proved a
claim – such as ABSA - is not the custodian of the estate’s records, and owes
no duty to account to a former trustee of the insolvent Trust. Paragraph 4 of
the notice of motion , with its sub -paragraphs demanding ledger balances,
reconciliations, account statements, copies of summonses and particulars of
repossessions, amounts to discovery sought from ABSA. Discovery is
obtained under Rule 35 in pending action proceedings, not by way of motion
against a creditor of an insolvent estate. The Insolvency Act imposes the duty
to account upon the trustee or curator, not upon a creditor.

Pending proceedings

35. Finally, and in any event, every substantive dispute raised in the present
application is already pending in the High Court , as well as in an agreed
arbitration.

36. The applicant raises the validity and enforceability of the covering bond s
upon which ABSA’s claim rested , the alleged forgery of a co -trustee’s
signature, the validity of suretyship obligations, and prescription. These are
all in issue in an action pending in the Western Cape Division of the High
Court.16 That action is actively litigated, with amended pleadings, requests for
further particulars, expert notices under Rule 36(9) , and a joint expert minute.
The joint curators of the Trust’s estate have intervened and are taking part in
the action, with the consent of the applicant and of ABSA.

37. The applicant’s alleged damages claim arising from the repossession and
disposal of the Trust’s movables, quantified by the applicant in an amount of

16 Under case number 5123/2017.

approximately R38 million, is the subject of a written arbitration agreement
concluded between the applicant and ABSA on 3 July 2025.

38. A litigant who has submitted a dispute to a chosen forum may not, while that
forum remains seized of it, invite a second tribunal to pronounce upon the
same subject matter.17

39. Paragraph 5 of the notice of motion seeks to restrain reliance upon the
disputed portions of the proved claims pending final reconciliation . Th at is a
request for interdictory relief, for which none of the requisites is pleaded. Be
that as it may, the applicant suffers no harm pending the determination of th e
action and arbitration proceedings. The joint curators have undertaken not to
pay any d ividend to ABSA until th ose proceedings have been finalised.
Nothing will therefore be distributed to ABSA in the interim, and the
applicant’s position will not deteriorate pending an ordinary hearing.

Conclusion and costs

40. This application is brought by an applicant who no longer holds office as
trustee, in proceedings that were never properly served on the respondents ,
on an urgent basis that is entirely of the applicant’s own making, and in
respect of disputes that are already pending in two other fora. In these
circumstances, there is no point in dragging the matter out for consideration
by yet another court. It falls to be dismissed.

41. ABSA sou ght attorney and client costs. I have considered granting the
request: t he applic ation is patently without merit, and ABSA has had to
employ counsel to protect its interests . I nevertheless refrain from awarding
punitive costs. The applicant is earnest in his endeavours, and clearly in
financial dire straits. Costs will therefore follow the event in accordance with
the general rule. Counsel’s fees will be taxed on Scale C in light of counsel’s
seniority, as contemplated in Rule 67A, read with Rule 69.

17 Nestlé (South Africa) (Pty) Ltd v Mars Inc. 2001 (4) SA 542 (SCA) paras 16–17.

Order

42. It is therefore ordered as follows:

1. The application is dismissed.

2. The applicant shall pay the third respondent’s costs, including the
costs of two counsel where employed. C ounsel’s fees are to be
taxed on Scale C.



P. S. VAN ZYL
Judge of the High Court
Appearances:

For the applicant: In person

For the third respondent: J. D. Maritz SC and D. B. Maritz
Instructed by: Gildenhuys Malatji Inc,