S.C v L.J.H and Another (2026/105403) [2026] ZAWCHC 659 (6 November 2026)

65 Reportability

Brief Summary

Appeal — Return of minor children — Section 18(1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 allowing court to make decisions effective pending appeal under exceptional circumstances — Appellant removing children from Australia without consent — Court finding that irreparable harm must be proven alongside exceptional circumstances — Appeal upheld, order for immediate return of children set aside, children to remain in South Africa pending Supreme Court of Appeal decision.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
REPORTABLE
Case No.: 2026-105403
In the matter between:
S C Appellant
(Passport No: [0])

and

L J H First Respondent
(Passport No: [0])
THE CENTRAL AUTHORITY FOR THE Second Respondent
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
In re the application for the return of the minor children:
A J H (“AH”), H C H (“HH”) and B R H (“BH”).
Coram: Cloete, J et Wille et Kusevitsky, JJ
Heard: 11 September 2026
Further Developments: 21 and 23 October 2026.
Delivered: 6 November 2026

Summary:
Section 18 (1) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 permits a court to make a decision effective
pending an appeal under exceptional circumstances. This may be ordered where a successful
litigant, in terms of section 18 (3), is additionally able to show that he or she will suffer irreparable
harm if the court’s order remains suspended and the unsuccessful litigant will not suffer such
harm if the order is implemented , despite an application for leave to appeal. The enquiry into
exceptional circumstances is always determined on a case -by-case basis. There is no general
rule for what constitutes exceptional circumstances. A Hague Convention matter is not per se
exceptional. Appeal upheld.


ORDER

_____________________________________________________________________________

The following order is granted:
1. The appeal is upheld.
2. The order granted directing the immediate return of AH, HH and BH to Australia is set
aside.
3. AH, HH and BH are to remain in the Republic of South Africa pending the decision of the
Supreme Court of Appeal on the merits of the appeal.
4. The costs of the application are to be costs in the appeal.

JUDGMENT


WILLE, J: (Cloete, J concurring and Kusevitsky, J dissenting)
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an opposed application about cognisable judicial harm, or, put another way,
legally recognised prejudice in the context of a ringfenced automatic appeal.1
[2] Because this appeal is ringfenced and discretionary, it focuses on very limited issues.
This appeal is not about rehearsing the merits of the dispute between the appellant (the mother),
the first respondent (the father), and the minor children.2
[3] The test to be applied is as follows. Section 18 of the Sup erior Courts Act 10 of 2013
permits a court to make a decision effective pending an appeal under exceptional circumstances.
This may be ordered where a litigant, in terms of section 18 (3) , is additionally able to show that
he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the court’s order remains suspended and the other party
will not suffer such harm if the order is implemented despite an application for leave to appeal.3
[4] The enquiry into exceptional circumstances is always determined on a case -by-case
basis. Put another way, there is no general rule for what constitutes exceptional circumstances.
They exist where something is rare, unusual or uncommon.4
[5] Furthermore, the exceptional circumstances enquiry is the overarching consideration, but
it cannot be divorced from the irreparable harm determination. Determining whether the
threshold requirements are satisfied requires more than a tick-box approach.5

1 In terms of section 18(4)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013, (the Act).
2 The ages of the children are 12, 13 and 17 years respectively.
3 This case is thus about “exceptional circumstances” in a “Convention” setting.
4 As a general proposition.

[6] Thus, the absence or presence of irreparable harm becomes subsumed into whether
exceptional circumstances exist. The latter cannot exist without irreparable harm. They are
close cousins. A mechanical approach is impermissible. Although a litigant must prove
irreparable harm, this does not usurp the function of the court. Ultimately, this court , on appeal
and at this stage, must determine whether irreparable harm will be suffered.6
[7] To argue otherwise would undermine the rule of law and remove the rationality,
reasonableness, and proportionality yardsticks of our settled jurisprudence.7
[8] This case also concerns the statutory scheme for appeals and the hierarchy of our
courts. The relevant section 18 provisions were no doubt enacted to make execution an
extraordinary deviation, not an administrative default. Parliament incorporated the Hague
Convention into South African law via the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, yet deliberately subjected all
High Court orders to the uniform appeal framework of the Superior Courts Act without creating an
exemption for Hague proceedings. Normal appellate delay is an unavoidable incident of the
constitutional right to appeal and cannot in itself constitute an exceptional circumstance. I say
this because at the time the matter was argued before us, the appellant had lodged an
application for leave to appeal (petition) with the Supreme Court of Appeal.8
RELEVANT BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
[9] The matter concerns three children, A H (17 years old), H H (14 years old) and B H (12
years old) (“the children”), born of the marriage between the appellant and the first respondent.
The appellant and the first respondent permanently separated in August 2020.9
[10] The children , who w ere primarily in the appellant’s care since birth, lived with the
appellant and the first respondent on a shared, week-about residency basis since June 2023.10

5 Tyte Security Services CC v Provincial Government 2024 (6) SA 176 at 180 at paragraph 9 B-C.

6 Tyte Security Services CC v Provincial Government 2024 (6) SA 176 at 180 at paragraph 11 F
7 Tyte Security Services CC v Provincial Government 2024 (6) SA 176 at 180 at paragraph 10 D.
8 Since the hearing of the matter leave to appeal has been granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal.
9 It is alleged that this was because of a domestic violence incident.
10 This arrangement has also been beset with problems.

[11] The appellant (the taking parent), without the first respondent’s knowledge or consent,
brought the children to South Africa with her just before their school holidays in March 2026, and
they have lived with her here since.11
[12] The children have all stated clearly and consistently that they wish to remain in South
Africa with their mother.12
[13] The children have also, to some extent, maintained a relationship with the first
respondent.13
THE PRIOR LITIGATION
[14] The first respondent launched an urgent application on 9 May 2026 (“the main
application”) in terms of which he sought the return of HH and BH to Australia in terms of the
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.14
[15] In respect of AH, the application was chartered in terms of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
based on the best interest of the child principle.15
[16] The appellant raised an Article 13(b) defence in respect of HH and BH and, in respect of
AH, denied that it would be in his best interest s to return to Australia to live with the first
respondent on a full-time basis.16
[17] She alleged that she personally fears the first respondent , inter alia due to previous
assaults and his p sychological functioning, and that she cannot, for various reasons , return to
Australia.17
[18] The court a quo found that the appellant had failed to establish a defence in terms of
Article 13(b) and further ordered the return of A H in terms of the best interest of the child

11 This is not disputed.
12 Voice of the Child Report and Addendum prepared by Ms Bruwer.
13 Through telephonic communication.
14 The Convention.
15 The Children’s Act, 38 OF 2005.
16 AH is not subject to the provisions of the Convention.
17 The merits of these allegations are not for this court to decide.

principle and in compliance with an order granted by Mr Justice Cohen of the Family C ourt of
Western Australia, Perth on 22 April 2026.18
[19] The appellant filed an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and the first
respondent then launched the section 18(3) application on 6 July 2026. The applications were
heard on 15 July 2026.19
[20] On 31 July 2026 , the application for leave to appe al was dismissed , and the Court
granted an immediate execution order in terms of section 18(3) of the Act.20
[21] The appellant filed an application (a petition) to the Supreme Court of Appeal for leave to
appeal against the judgment and order in the main application.21
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
[22] Sections 18(1) and (3) of the Act provide for the following:
‘…18 Suspension of decision pending appeal
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under
exceptional circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and execution
of a decision which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal or
of an appeal, is suspended pending the decision of the application or
appeal.
(2) …
(3) A court may only order otherwise as contemplated in subsection (1) or
(2), if the party who applied to the court to order otherwise, in addition
proves on a balance of probabilities that he or she will suffer irreparable
harm if the court does not so order and that the other party will not suffer
irreparable harm if the court so orders…’22

18 Para 83 of the judgment dated 29 June 2026.
19 This application was dismissed.
20 This is the order which form the subject of this appeal.
21 This was granted in the SCA on 22 October 2026 and the matter is to be heard on 8 December 2026.
22 Sections 18(1) and (3) of the SC Act.

[23] Thus we are here dealing with a default position. The operation and execution of a
decision which is the subject of an application for leave to appeal is suspended pending the
decision of the application or appeal unless the court under exceptional circumstances orders
otherwise.23
[24] Section 18(3) informs a two-fold test and analysis, namely:
(i) The requirements are cumulative and more onerous than the common law. This
means something sufficiently out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature, a
deviation from the norm.
(ii) The two irreparable-harm findings do not involve a balancing exercise but must both
be established on a balance of probabilities.24
THE FIRST RESPONDENT’S SUBMISSIONS
[25] The first respondent’s case is that the appellant is merely seeking to delay the
proceedings, that she is manipulating the children, and that they are not expressing their true
wishes about returning to Australia.25
[26] Further, it is alleged that the children’s emotional and psychological well-being are at risk
whilst they remain in South Africa in the appellant’s care . This is because the children have not
settled in South Africa and need to be returned to their day-to-day lives in Australia as a matter of
urgency, so they can reintegrate by returning to their previous schools and being with their
friends.26
[27] In Koch, the Constitutional Court rejected the previous approach that Hague Convention
matters fall to be determined on the Plascon-Evans test applicable to motion proceedings fo r
final relief , and held that such applications must be decided, essentially, on a balance of
probabilities, having regard to a conspectus of all the evidence. 27
THE GROUNDS FOR EXECUTION

23 My emphasis.
24 Incubeta Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Another v Ellis and Another 2014 (3) SA 189 (GSJ) paragraphs 16, 22 and 24;
25 These issues are not for this court to decide.
26 These circumstances, viewed in isolation cannot be “exceptional circumstances”.

26 These circumstances, viewed in isolation cannot be “exceptional circumstances”.
27 Ad Hoc Central Authority v Koch NO (2024) 3 SA 249 (CC), delivered on 27 November 2023. See also Ad Hoc Central
Authority for the Republic of South Africa and Another v LCC (2026/034707) [2026] ZAWCHC 301 (10 June 2026 paras 8 – 12.

[28] At the hearing we raised with counsel the appellant’s pending petition , as well as the
expedited process contained in Supreme Court of Appeal Practice Directive 1/2024 with regard
to Hague Convention matters. It was then agreed that the sensible approach would be to await
the outcome of the petition before we delivered judg ment. The delay ground has now been
somewhat diluted by developments. On 21 October 2026, we were provided with the order of
the Supreme Court of Appeal dated 16 October 2026, in which the appel lant was granted leave
to appeal on the merits to that Court . On 22 October 2026, we were also provided with the
Directives of that Court in relation to the appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal will now hear the
appeal on 8 December 2026. In any event, the appellant did not delay the expeditious hearing of
the main application.28
[29] It is so that these matters fall to be dealt with expeditiously for obvious reasons. This
does not mean that these cases, because of their features alone , mean that exceptional
circumstances arise without meeting the legal threshold for purposes of a section 18(3)
application.29
[30] It is undisputed that the appellant removed the children from Australia contrary to the
agreed shared residency order in place since 2023 . The appellant says she did so for good
reason. This, however, is not for this court to determine.30
[31] The first respondent 's next point is that the appellant is “manipulating” the children .
Again, this is a disputed issue, and the children have stated their preference to remain in the
appellant’s care.31
[32] Again, this is not an issue for this court to decide. So too is the allegation that the
children’s wishes are not their own . Suffice it to say that they are not “young” children and are
acutely aware of the ‘toxic’ relationship between their parents as evidenced in the expert reports
filed.32

28 This is not disputed.
29 The normal threshold test applies irrespective.

filed.32

28 This is not disputed.
29 The normal threshold test applies irrespective.
30 This dispute is beyond the jurisdictional remit of this court in this discrete application.
31 Voice of the Child Report and Addendum prepared by Ms Bruwer.
32 Voice of the Child Report and Addendum prepared by Ms Bruwer.

[33] Finally, without descending into the merits of the dispute between the appellant and the
first respondent about a number of collateral issues, it seems evident from the expert report filed
that the minor children are coping in their existing environment and that they are not in any sort
of imminent danger and are not suffering any psychological harm while they remain in South
Africa.33
CONSIDERATION
[34] In my view, the first respondent has not set out any facts evidencing, in the context of
exceptional circumstances , that the children need to be returned immediatel y pending the
outcome of the appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeal. The children have been in South Africa
for over six months and have apparently, on the available independent evidence of the school,
adjusted to their school. They seemingly also wish to remain in the care of the appellant in South
Africa.34
[35] AH deposed to an affidavit in which he stated, inter alia, that it was his choice to remain
in South Africa with the app ellant. He felt strongly about this and stated that his views were not
heard and that he would not return to Australia regardless. AH is seventeen (17) years old and
has expressly stated that it is his wish and choice to remain in South Africa with the appellant .
AH, of course, does not fall under the Hague Convention , since it applies only to children under
the age of 16. It is also common cause that all three children share a close bond.35
[36] AH was found to be a mature and thoughtful young man who is acutely aware of the
conflict between his parents and has witnessed serious incidents of domestic abuse. The expert
reported, inter alia, as follows in this regard:
‘…AH is nearly seventeen years old [he attained the age of 17 years on 26 July 2026] . At this
developmental stage, autonomy and self -determination are central to identity formation, and
adolescents whose clearly and repeatedly expressed wishes are overridden commonly

adolescents whose clearly and repeatedly expressed wishes are overridden commonly
experience this not as a parenting decision made in their interests, but as a loss of voice and
agency. This is recognised in the literature as a risk factor for anger, resentment, and diminished

33 Voice of the Child Report and Addendum prepared by Ms Bruwer.
34 Voice of the Child Report and Addendum prepared by Ms Bruwer.
35 This cannot be disputed.

trust in the adults and systems involved in the decision, and, in older adolescents particularly, is
more likely to produce resistance or a rupture in the relationship with the parent to whom they are
returned than acceptance of the outcome. Thus, a meaningful risk may be that he experiences
the outcome as something done to him rather than for hi m. Separately from the question of
autonomy, an enforced return without his mother would constitute a significant relational loss for
A, given his stated wish not to be separated from her. It is well documented that adolescents
separated from a primary attachment figure in this manner may display grief -like reactions,
including low mood, anxiety, disrupted sleep and appetite, difficulty concentrating, and irritability,
particularly where the separation is abrupt…’
and
‘…As the eldest of the three boys, AH's emotional state is also relevant to his brothers, given the
close relationship between the siblings described throughout the Report and this addendum;
distress experienced by A H may reasonably be expected to affect HH and BH as well. I make
this observation to assist the Court in managing outcome -neutral welfare risk, and not as a
submission on the merits of the application…’36
[37] AH is a seventeen ( 17) year-old minor . His position is expressly excluded from the
Convention. The first respondent’s case regarding AH may involve a jurisdictional error. I say
this because the first respondent concedes that, pursuant to Article 4 of the Hague Convention,
the Convention does not apply to a child aged 16 or older. Despite this, the first respondent
appears in truth (and this is merely an observation for present purposes ) to seek to apply
summary Convention return principles to AH. The Convention's summary return presumptions
cannot be elevated to apply to AH without due consideration in terms of the Children's Act.37
[38] I say this because o nce a child reaches sixteen (16) years, summary restoration of the

[38] I say this because o nce a child reaches sixteen (16) years, summary restoration of the
status quo ante without a plenary inquiry is legally impermissible. The position of AH had to be
assessed strictly, and independently, under section 7 and section 9 of the Children's Act.38

36 Voice of the Child Report and Addendum prepared by Ms Bruwer.
37 This may be a good ground of appeal. It is certainly a very arguable ground of appeal.
38 An independent investigation and assessment needed to be followed.

[39] Thus, forcing an execution order under Section 18(3) on a seventeen (17) year-old risks
subjecting a non -Convention ‘adolescent’ to unauthorised summary repatriation mechanics ,
where the appellant is then effectively precluded from pursuing her constitutional right to exhaust
the appeal remedies available to her. This is because, once the children leave the jurisdiction of
the South African courts , any order made here will not bind the judicial authorities in Austra lia.
As counsel for the first respondent correctly conceded at the hearing, should the Supreme Court
of Appeal subsequently set aside the court a q uo’s order, that Appeal Court’s order may well
have no practical effect, irrespective of the first respondent’s undertaking to comply therewith.
Moreover, Section 10 of the Children’s Act mandates that every child who is of such an age,
maturity, and stage of development as to be able to participate has the right to participate, and
their views must be given due consideration.39
[40] Turning now to the core consideration . The Convention's substantive objectives require
a rigorous statutory threshold to displace the default suspension of an order pending appeal
under Section 18 of the Act. Under Section 18(1), read with Section 18(3), the default rule
remains that the operation and execution of a decision subject to an application for leave to
appeal or an appeal is suspended. The statutory requirements under Section 18(1) and 18(3) are
cumulative jurisdictional prerequisites and not discretionary weighing.40
[41] Thus, exceptional circumstances arise from the specific facts of the case . Proof on a
balance of probabilities that the applicant for execution will suffer irreparable harm if execution is
not ordered and proof on a balance of probabilities that the other party (and, in child -centred
matters, the children) will not suffer irreparable harm if the order is put into operation is
required.41

required.41
[42] The first respondent implicitly contends that because the Convention requires the
expeditious return of children to restore the status quo ante, the overarching delay occasioned by
appellate procedures inherently creates exceptional circumstances warranting immediate
execution. I say this reasoning may be legally untenable. I say so because every Convention

39 This is mandatory.
40 Tyte Security Services CC v Provincial Government 2024 (6) SA 176 at 181 at paragraph 13 G.
41 Tyte Security Services CC v Provincial Government 2024 (6) SA 176 at 181 at paragraph 11 H.

application involves allegations of wrongful removal, a statutory objective of summary return, and
the reality that appellate proceedings may consume time.42
[43] For circumstances to be exceptional within the meaning of Section 18(1), they must be
out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature; something excepted in the sense that the general
rule does not apply . Thus, something uncommon, rare or different . If the general objective of
expeditious return under Article 11 of the Convention were sufficient to satisfy Section 18(1), the
default rule of suspension would be rendered entirely nugatory in every international child
abduction matter. An underlying international treaty objective cannot override the express
statutory safeguards enacted in Section 18.43
[44] The prompt return mandate informs the adjudication of the substantive merits of the
Convention application and the six-week benchmark under Section 23(1) of the Children's Act 38
of 2005. It cannot serve as a jurisdictional lever to strip an aggrieved litigant of the automatic
statutory stay, pending appellate review.44
[45] The first respondent also argues that exceptional circumstances exist because there is a
small window of opportunity for the boys to return to Australia and immediately resume their pre -
abduction routine, schools, grades, peers, and familiar therapists. I disagree. The children
previously resided under a shared, week -about residency regime pursuant to a 2023 parenting
order. Under the execution order, the children would not return to a shared parenting structure .
Rather, they would be placed into the sole, exclusive daily care of the first respondent. This
constitutes an untested change in their custodial environment, not the preservation of an existing
routine.45
[46] Moreover, it is noted that the court a quo put no protective measures in place for the
children following their return to Australia, and the Central Authority , although duty -bound to do

so, does not appear to have made the necessary enquiries with its counterpart in Australia, nor
given any input to the court a quo on this score. This is concerning. Protective measures are not

42 This may apply in every Convention case.
43 The statutory threshold must still be met.
44 The statutory threshold must still be met
45 This especially in the case of AH.
45 This cannot be disputed.

limited to domestic violence risks, something which is regrettably often misunderstood and thus
overlooked.46
[47] The assertion that a temporary delay during the prosecution of an expedited appeal will
permanently extinguish their capacity to reintegrate into Australia is speculative and unsupported
by empirical expert evidence.47
[48] Under Section 18(3), the applicant must prove that he or she will suffer irreparable harm
if the interim execution order is not granted. Because Section 18(3) requirements are strict
jurisdictional facts, judicial discretion cannot bypass them or subsume them into a free -floating
enquiry into the general interests of justice. Where the applicant establishes no personal
irreparable harm, the court lacks the statutory competence to order execution under Section
18(3).48
[49] To circumvent this lack of proof, the first respondent seeks to rely on Ad Hoc Central
Authority v Koch to argue that harm to the children can replace the statutory requirement of harm
to the litigating parties.49
[50] In respect of AH, t he best interests of the child are paramount in substantive custody
determinations under Section 28(2) of the Constitution . Section 18(3) regulates the exceptional
suspension of the ordinary appellate hierarchy. Thus, even if child -centric harm were imported
into Section 18(3), one cannot ignore the potentially irreversible psychological trauma inflicted on
the children by their forcible removal to Australia prior to the determination of the appeal by the
Supreme Court of Appeal.50
[51] I say this because the purpose of the default suspension under Section 18(1) is to
prevent the creation of irreversible factual situations pending appeal. In this case, o nce minor
children are physically removed to a foreign jurisdiction, the South African appellate court's ability

46 This is unfortunate.
47 This is in any event not for this court to decide.
48 Tyte Security Services CC v Provincial Government 2024 (6) SA 176 at 182 at paragraph 14 D.

49 Ad Hoc Central Authority, South Africa and Another v Koch NO and Another 2024 (3) SA 249 CC.
50 It cannot be said that by not removing the children the judicial cognizable harm will be irreparable.

to provide effective relief is compromised (and may be compromised forever), which may render
any success on the pending appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeal entirely moot.51
[52] Put another way, if the execution order is implemented and the children are removed to
Australia, only for the SCA to subsequently uphold the appellant’s appeal, and provided the
judicial authorities in Australia are somehow persuaded to give effect to that order (something
which was not addressed at all by the first respondent and Central Authority before us, as is also
often the case concerning the myth of ‘mirror orders’), the children would be subjected to a
second cross-continental relocation back to South Africa. It is fair to say that exposing children
to multiple international dislocations within months creates acute psychological harm, defeating
the negative jurisdictional requirement of Section 18(3) that the children will not suffer irreparable
harm.52
[53] The prospects of success argument has since the hearing of the matter undergone a
chameleonic change. The first respondent and the Central Authority relied heavily on the court a
quo’s finding that the appellant had no prospects whatsoever of success on appeal . The SCA
has now granted leave to appeal, and it will hear the matter on 8 December 2026. In any event,
the prospects of success cannot be determined solely by a self-affirming conclusion. To treat a
court’s refusal of leave to appeal as conclusive would render every simultaneous Section 18(3)
application an automatic rubber -stamp, destroying the purpose of the Section 17(2)(b) petition
process.53
[54] Furthermore, if AH's return is reversed, the resulting separation of siblings directly
impacts the Article 13(b) (intolerable situation) threshold for the two younger children. Section
18(4) was enacted precisely because interim execution is an extraordinary deviation from the
common law. It confers an automatic right of appeal and mandates an automatic suspension of

common law. It confers an automatic right of appeal and mandates an automatic suspension of
the execution order pending that appeal (section 18(4)(a)(iv)). Here, the appellant is legitimately

51 It may even “oust” the jurisdiction of our Apex court.
52 This cannot be seriously disputed.
53 In every case the jurisdictional threshold must be met.

utilising an automatic statutory remedy to protect her children from cross-border relocation before
the SCA determines her appeal.54
CONCLUSION
[55] I hold the view that the first respondent has failed to satisfy the strict, cumulative
jurisdictional requirements of Section 18(1) and Section 18(3) of the Act. Ponnan JA supports
my view to some extent, when he eloquently set out the law and the test to be applied in cases
such as these, stating the following:
‘…Simply put, the tenth respondent has been losing daily revenue on not being permitted to
perform under a lawfully awarded tender. On the other side of the coin, the twenty -second
respondent has been benefiting from an unlawfully awarded tender for close to three years and
will suffer no judicially cognizable harm whatsoever if the tenth respondent were to perform the
services provided in its contract for the remaining little more than one year of its intended
duration. The twenty -second respondent does not engage with these factual averments, which
are common cause…’55
[56] Here, the appellant (and the children) may suffer judicially cognizable harm should the
order be put into execution pending the appeal hearing to be determined in the SCA. Thus, in
my view, preserving the ordinary statutory suspension pending the expeditious determination of
the appellant's appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal remains the only course consistent
with our jurisprudence and Section 28(2) of the Constitution.56
[57] Insofar as it may still be necessary to consider prospects of success in the context of
whether exceptional circumstances exist in the circumstances of this matter, in my view, the
appeal may enjoy good prospects of success in light of the recent order issued by the Supreme
Court of Appeal and because any decision pertaining to A H will impact on the Article 13(b)
enquiry in respect of HH and BH.57

54 This cannot be an abuse of the court process.

enquiry in respect of HH and BH.57

54 This cannot be an abuse of the court process.
55 Tyte Security Services CC v Provincial Government 2024 (6) SA 176 at 186 at paragraph 25 at B.
56 Again, because of the developments since the hearing this cannot be seriously disputed.
57 The enquiry for AH is a separate enquiry.

[58] It follows that if AH does not return to Australia, it would impact the younger boys and
place them in an intolerable situation, as they would be in their father’s sole care, without the
appellant and their older brother, with whom they have a close and dependent relationship, and
against their wishes. Thus, there are good prospects that if the SCA reaches a different finding
on whether AH should be ordered to return, this will affect the outcome of the Article 13(b) shield
that has been raised.58
[59] Given the aforesaid, the first respondent has failed to show, on a balance of probabilities,
that there are exceptional circumstances to justify a deviation from the common law position on a
narrow enquiry in terms of section 18(4), and irreparable harm to himself versus absence of such
harm to the appellant or the children, if the order remains suspended pending the outcome of the
hearing in the Supreme Court of Appeal.59
COSTS
[60] Given the developments and that the matter is to be determined in the Supreme Court of
Appeal, I take the view that the costs of this Section 18(4) appeal are to be costs in the appeal.60
ORDER
[61] I would propose an order in the following terms:
1. The appeal is upheld.
2. The order granted directing the immediate return of AH, HH and BH to Australia is set
aside.
3. AH, HH and BH are to remain in the Republic of South Africa pending the decision of the
Supreme Court of Appeal on the merits of the appeal.
4. The costs of the application are to be costs in the appeal.



58 The enquiry for AH is a separate enquiry.
59 Tyte Security Services CC v Provincial Government 2024 (6) SA 176 at 186 at paragraph 27 at F.
60 The SCA will deal with the merits of the case.

________
WILLE, J
I agree, and it is so ordered:
_________
CLOETE, J


KUSEVITSKY, J (dissenting)
[62] I have read the main judgment and the proposed order and, for the reasons
which follow, I hold a different view.

[63] As also indicated in the main judgment, when this automatic appeal in terms
of section 18(4)(a)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act, No. 10 of 2013, (“the Superior
Courts Act”) was heard:

63.1 a petition by the appellant, (“the mother”) to the Supreme Court of
Appeal of the order of the court a quo for the immediate return of the
two minor children to Australia (“the Hague Convention order”) had not
yet been decided; and

63.2 this constituted full bench was seized with an automatic appeal against
an order granted by the court a quo in terms of a section 18(3)61
application by the first respondent, (“the father”) wherein the court
granted an immediate execution order62 (“the execution order”).

[64] This court therefore, after hearing argument in the automatic appeal,
postponed this decision pending the outcome of that petition to the Supreme Court
of Appeal (“SCA”). It is common cause that the SCA has granted the mother leave
to appeal the merits of the Convention order to it, to be heard on 8 December 2026.


61 of the Superior Courts Act
62 The section 18(3) application and the application for leave to appeal (having being dismissed) was
heard simultaneously.

[65] What is apparent, given the above, is that as a consequence of the above,
there are now two parallel appeal processes under consideration – the Hague
Convention appeal and this procedural automatic appeal in terms of section 18(4) of
the Superior Courts Act. In my view, this has caused somewhat of an anomalous
situation in the prosecution and adjudication of these matters, when these
simultaneous appeals serve before different appellate courts and calls for
simultaneous adjudication. The effects are self-evident. It creates the potential for
uncertainty and delay, with potentially detrimental consequences, when one has
regard to the nature of the underlying cause of action or substantive relief being
sought.

[66] Given that we are tasked with an automatic appeal. it is trite that it is therefore
not for this court to deal with the merits of that appeal. Our automatic appeal is
procedural in nature only and to be adjudicated accordingly.

[67] As a starting point, it is trite that judicial discretion, an aspect to which I shall
return, is absent where a court, without delving into the merits, makes a
determination as to whether, for purposes of The Hague Convention, a child that
has been abducted, is to be so returned to their place of habitual residence. A court
is not concerned with the merits - that is to be decided by the trial court. If the
jurisdictional requirements are present, subject of course to any exceptions present
under Article 13(b), a court has no discretion – it must order the return of the
children, with such conditions as may be necessary.

[68] What then of a section 18(3) execution? The purpose of a s18(3) application
is to enforce an order despite an application for leave to appeal. Furthermore,
section 18 requires a court to exercise a discretion in determining what factors
constitute exceptional circumstances for purposes of a suspension.

[69] Whilst this might be applicable to an order granted in the usual commercial

[69] Whilst this might be applicable to an order granted in the usual commercial
course, I am of the view that different considerations should apply in matters in
relation to children subject to the Hague Convention.

[70] What would the consequences be for a court to exercise a discretion as to
whether exceptional circumstances exist? In my view, this would be contrary to the
purpose of a statutory obligation. I deal with this discussion later. The court is not
concerned with the merits – if the jurisdictional requirements are met, a court is
enjoined to enforce the order of the return. Discretion should play no part in this
evaluation or determination. This is because as it stands, an appeal court exercises
a discretion in what it considers exceptional circumstances. This is a value judgment
based on subjective considerations, not objective facts.

[71] A potential re-evaluation of the consideration is to be had, in my view, when
an an applicant in s18(3) proceedings has to meet the requirements for the
enforcement of a return order made pursuant to the Hague Convention. In the
normal course, as alluded to earlier, all an applicant has to prove in order to
discharge their burden is to prove exceptional circumstances and prejudice and/or
irreparable harm to the appellant (being sustained by the appellant) and that the
respondent will not.

[72] Thring J addressed the phrase “exceptional circumstances” in general and
more specifically in respect of section 5(5)(a)(iv) of the Admiralty Jurisdiction
Regulations Act 105 of 1983. There, the learned Judge recorded that where in a
Statute, it is directed that a fixed rule should be departed from only under
exceptional circumstances, effect will, generally speaking, best be given to the
intention of the Legislature by applying strict rather than liberal meaning to the
phrase and by carefully examining any circumstances relied on as allegedly being
exceptional. The court was therefore alive to this distinction.

[73] Thus what constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’ in that iteration of the Admiralty
Act, as held in MV Ais Mamas 2002 (6) SA 150 (C) , is the following summation of the
meaning of the phrase, given as follows at 156I – 157C:

meaning of the phrase, given as follows at 156I – 157C:

“What does emerge from an examination of the authorities, however, seems to be the
following:
1. What is ordinarily contemplated by the words 'exceptional circumstances' is
something out of the ordinary and of an unusual nature; something which is

excepted in the sense that the general rule does not apply to it; something
uncommon, rare or different; 'besonder', 'seldsaam', 'uitsonderlik', or 'in hoë mate
ongewoon'.
2. To be exceptional the circumstances concerned must arise out of, or be incidental to,
the particular case.
3. Whether or not exceptional circumstances exist is not a decision which depends upon
the exercise of a judicial discretion: their existence or otherwise is a matter of fact which
the Court must decide accordingly.
4. Depending on the context in which it is used, the word 'exceptional' has two shades of
meaning: the primary meaning is unusual or different; the secondary meaning is
markedly unusual or especially different.
5. Where, in a statute, it is directed that a fixed rule shall be departed from only under
exceptional circumstances, effect will, generally speaking, best be given to the intention
of the Legislature by applying a strict rather than a liberal meaning to the phrase, and by
carefully examining any circumstances relied on as allegedly being exceptional.”63 (“own
emphasis”)

[74] Sutherland J in Incubeta Holdings and Another v Ellis and Another 64 found
that exceptional circumstances would exist in circumstances where a forfeiture of
substantive relief resulted because of procedural delay, regardless of the outcome
of the appeal. This is precisely what happened in casu.

[75] What then would the practical effect be on an appellant and a respondent in a
section 18 application matter subject to the Hague Convention? The nuances in the
approach of the two stage appeal process that is created are novel and potentially
problematic in matters subject to the Hague Convention.

[76] Section 18 of the Superior Courts Act states:
i) “(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), and unless the court under exceptional
circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and execution of a decision which
is the subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is suspended

is the subject of an application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is suspended
pending the decision of the application or appeal.
ii) (2) Subject to subsection (3), unless the court under exceptional circumstances
orders otherwise, the operation and execution of a decision that is an interlocutory
order not having the effect of a final judgment, which is the subject of an
application for leave to appeal or of an appeal, is not suspended pending the
decision of the application or appeal.
iii) (3) A court may only order otherwise as contemplated in subsection (1) or (2), if
the party who applied to the court to order otherwise , in addition proves on a
balance of probabilities that he or she will suffer irreparable harm if the court does

63 Ibid at para 17
64 Incubeta Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 2014 (3) SA 189 (GJ) at 196C-197C

not so order and that the other party will not suffer irreparable harm if the court so
orders.
iv) (4) If a court orders otherwise, as contemplated in subsection (1)—
(i) the court must immediately record its reasons for doing so;
(ii) the aggrieved party has an automatic right of appeal to the next
highest court;
(iii) the court hearing such an appeal must deal with it as a matter of
extreme urgency; and
(iv) such order will be automatically suspended, pending the outcome of
such appeal…” (“own emphasis”)


[77] The court in Incubeta65 held that the test in relation to the provisions of section 18
is two-fold: the requirements are:

(a) Whether or not ‘exceptional circumstances ‘exist, and
(b) Proof on a balance of probabilities by the applicant of-
(i) The presence of irreparable harm to the applicant/victor, who
wants to put into operation and execute the order, and,
(ii)The absence of irreparable harm to the respondent/loser, who
seeks leave to appeal.
[78] Put differently,

(a) are there exceptional circumstances which would warrant the court
departing from the automatic suspension of the original order?
(b) did the party who applied to the court to order otherwise, prove that the
other party will not suffer irreparable harm if the court so orders?
(c) did the party who applied to the court to order otherwise, prove that the
other party will not suffer irreparable harm if the court so orders?

[79] In Incubetha, the court held that the new threshold test in section 18 was no
longer discretionary with an eye to balancing harm. The test requires a finding of fact,
not an exercise of discretion. The test must be fact specific. The concept of ‘exceptional’
is to be applied in a way functional to the objective to the section. It also held that the
section was aimed at regulating procedure so as not to prejudice litigants in relation to

65 Incubeta at para 16

uncertain outcomes of an appeal.

[80] The facts in Incubeta relate to a restraint of trade. There, Sutherland J however
cautioned about importing from one kind of enquiry into another kind of enquiry, an
understanding of a familiar phrase. A given phrase in any statutory provision has a
function specific to that provision and to that specific statute and the primary aim of the
interpreter is to discover the function it performs in that specific context. It may perform
a different function in another statute and one must avoid being seduced by beguiling
similarities.66 Exceptionality must be fact -specific. The circumstances which are or may
be ‘exceptional’ must be derived from the actual predicaments in which the given
litigants find themselves.67

[81] The full court, Binns -Ward J (Fortuin and Boqwana JJ (as she then was)) in
Minister of Social Development Western Cape v Justice Alliance of South Africa 68
agreed that exceptionality was fact specific and that it is derived from the actual
predicaments in which the given litigants find themselves. 69 Binns-Ward J found that
section 18(3) has introduced an absolute threshold that did not exist at common law:
the applicant must prove that the loser will not suffer irreparable harm if the application
is granted, and that it will suffer such harm if the application is refused. If it fails to do so,
the application cannot succeed whatever the equities of the case might be. 70 The
consequence of this is that the nature of the court’s discretion has been extinguished.

[82] The court however emphasized that a court retained a wide general discretion to
grant or refuse leave and, if leave be granted, to determine the conditions upon which
the right to execute shall be exercised.71

[83] The argument is that an order in terms of s18(3) is an extraordinary remedy which
the statute envisages will only be deployed in exceptional circumstances. The reason

the statute envisages will only be deployed in exceptional circumstances. The reason
for this is self -evident: The immediate execution of a court order, when an appeal is

66 Ibid at paras 19 and 20
67 ibid at para 22
68 Unreported, WCC Case No.20806/2013 dated 1 April 2016
69 at para 22
70 Minister of Social Development supra at para 24
71 Ibid at para 26

pending and the outcome of the case may change as a result of the appeal, has the
potential to cause enormous harm to the party that is ultimately successful.72

[84] In Schuurman, the Full Bench was seized with an appeal against inter alia a
declaratory order to make payments of all orders and settlement agreements.
Kumalo J dismissed RAF’s application for leave to appeal and granted the
respondent’s a s18(3) order. The RAF petitioned the SCA for leave to appeal the
main order and later the SCA granted the RAF leave to appeal the main order. The
Full Court was thus seized with the main appeal together with the RAF’s s18(4)
automatic appeal.73

Prospects of appeal

[85] Binns-Ward J in Justice Alliance did not follow Sutherland J’s approach in the
determination of prospects of success. The latter approach considered that the
prospects of appeal do not form part of the consideration because leave to appeal
inherently carries in it an acceptance that there was a reasonable prospect the
appeal might success. Rather, it appreciated that an application in terms of section
18 (3) may arise for determination before an application for leave to appeal is heard
or decided; alternatively, after an application for leave to appeal has been refused
and a further application for leave has been noted to the Supreme Court of Appeal,
but not yet determined. The court held that, whilst acknowledging that leave to
appeal may be granted on other grounds, the court’s assessment of the prospects
of success in the appeal remains a relevant factor in the consideration. This was
based on the proposition that the less sanguine a court seized of an application in
terms of section 18(3) is about the prospects of the judgment at first instance being
upheld on appeal, the less inclined it will be to grant the exceptional remedy of
execution of that judgment pending the appeal.74


72 Road Accident Fund v Schuurman Van Den Heever & Slabbert Inc and Others (Appeal)

72 Road Accident Fund v Schuurman Van Den Heever & Slabbert Inc and Others (Appeal)
(A300/2024) [2025] ZAGPPHC 530 (28 May 2025) at para 54; Knoop v Gupta (115/2020) [2020]
ZASCA (19 November 2020)
73 This was ostensibly done by agreement.
74 Justice Alliance, supra at para 27

[86] But herein lies the distinction. The general proposition proceeds from the basis
that a court should be less inclined to order an execution on the basis that a higher
court has granted leave to appeal ergo there must be good prospect of success. But
we know that section 17(1)(a) of the Superior Court Act also grants leave where
there is some other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including
conflicting judgments on the matter. Thus, to my mind, to automatically start from
the premise that a stay must be automatically granted in light of an appeal, would,
as the case law will later reflect, be a dangerous precedent to follow if viewed as a
determinative factor alone.

[87] In University of the Free State v Afriforum, the Supreme Court of Appeal 75 , in
evaluating the role of the prospects of success, rejected the approach adopted by
Sutherland J in Incubeta and in Liviero Wilge Joint Venture & Another v Eskom
Holdings Soc Ltd 76, instead reaffirming the position adopted by the full court in Justice
Alliance.

[88] When adjudicating the s18(4) appeal, Schuurman referred to the matter of Knoop
NO supra on the question of prospects of appeal on the merits. It said this:

“59] The SCA also had the benefit of the appeal on the merits before it and in this regard
stated:

i) [50] We had the full record in the main appeal before us and had read it in
anticipation of dealing with the main appeal, but the argument on the urgent
appeal did not include any debate over prospects of success in the main appeal.
Our finding that the three requirements for making an execution order were not
established means that we did not have to consider whether there is a discretion
once they are present and, if so, whether the prospects of success should affect
its exercise. There may be difficulties if the high court takes the prospects of
success into account in granting an execution order , because it is not clear that

success into account in granting an execution order , because it is not clear that
the court hearing an urgent appeal under s 18(4) will always be in a position to
assess the weight of this factor. As I have noted, in both UFS v Afriforum and
Ntlemeza the court disposed of the appeal by disregarding the prospects of
success on appeal . The urgency of the appeal almost inevitably dictates that in
this court and possibly in a full court, the appeal court will not have the record
before it and will be confined to assessing the prospects of success in the main

75 2018 (3) SA 428 (SCA) at para 14
76 (17321/2014) [2014] ZAGPJHC 150 (12 June 2014), Satchwell J (Moshidi J concurring) – this court
only dealing with a distinct appeal of Makumie J. Another court was constituted to hear the 18(4)
application per Satchwell, Van Oosten and Spilg JJ

appeal from the judgment alone. The usual principle that an appeal court decides
the appeal on the record before the high court cannot apply in those
circumstances. If the language of s 18(4) confers a discretion, is that a full
discretion or a power, combined with a duty to exercise that power on proof of the
requirements for its exercise? These issues may warrant a reconsideration of the
approach in Justice Alliance on an appropriate occasion.” (“own emphasis’)


[89] The court found that when considering the outcome of the s18(4), the court
must have regard not just to the judgment in respect of the s18(3) application, but to
the entirety of the appeal record before it.77

[90] It is apparent therefore that there is, what seems like a discourse in the
operation of s 18 (3) and (4) matters when a simultaneous petition has been made
to the Supreme Court of Appeal and where, in fact, such petition has been granted
to it or to a full bench. The latter instance, one could argue, is conceivably more
pragmatic because that would potentially result in the main appeal being heard
together with any s 18 (4) application simultaneously.

[91] The court in Appolus and Others v Naledi Local Municipality and Others78
evaluated the process to be followed in dealing with s18(3) and (4) applications and
in circumstances where an application for leave to appeal was filed and leave
granted against the main order79 to the Supreme Court of Appeal. An order to
enforce the main (review) order had been granted in terms of s18(3) pending the
appeal process. The order to enforce the review order was launched and heard
under a different case number to the review order.80 The court, referring to the
Supreme Court of Appeal matter of City of Tswane Metropolitan Municipality v
Vresthena (Pty) Ltd and Others 2023 (6) SA 434 (SCA) concluded that the
interpretation of section 18(4) relating to “the next highest court” does not allow the

interpretation of section 18(4) relating to “the next highest court” does not allow the
appellant a second right to automatic appeal to approach the next highest court
where a full court has already heard an appeal in terms of section 18(4) of the
Superior Court Act. I respectfully disagree with this proposition.

77 Ibid at para 60
78 (UM199/2023; UM53/2003) [2024] ZANWHC 79 (18 March 2024) at para 20
79 There a court order was granted on an urgent basis reviewing and setting aside the appointment of
a Municipal Manager.
80 Ibid at para 2

[92] With regard to the question of mootness and the seemingly contentious
interpretation and application of this piece of legislation, Sutherland DJP (Adams J
and Thompson AJ concurring) stated the following in JAI HIND EMCC CC t/a
Emmarentia Convenience Centre:81

i) “[22] The case is therefore moot. However, it is appropriate that the
appeal be decided, notwithstanding that fact. The court has a discretion to
deal with a matter, even if moot, if a proper reason exists to do so to
address a 'legal issue of importance' or in the 'interests of justice'.

ii) [23] This case ventilates controversies in an area of law that has had, as yet,
only a little jurisprudential scrutiny. Few examples of the application of s
18(4) are reported. The facts in this case call for an elaborate examination
which illuminates the nuances in the application of s 18, both substantively
and procedurally.” (“own emphasis”)

[93] The court in Appolus also highlighted the ostensible confusion to the legal
position, where an automatic appeal in terms of section 18(4)(iv) of the Superior
Court Act automatically suspends the execution of the order ex lege, under
circumstances where an order has already been granted to execute the order and
where leave to appeal has been granted to the Supreme Court of Appeal. Here, it
was contended that the situation was unique in that leave to appeal to the Supreme
Court of Appeal had been granted after an appeal in terms of section 18(4) had
been noted.82 I do not however respectfully support the proposition that where a
party was awaiting a directive for the constituting of a full bench appeal in terms of
section 18(4), that an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal
would grant a party two opportunities to appeal, nor do I agree with the proposition
that a court has a discretion in considering whether or not to constitute a full court
and that doing so would be nonsensical in circumstances where leave to appeal to

and that doing so would be nonsensical in circumstances where leave to appeal to
the SCA had already been granted, as was found by that court.83

[94] I have already indicated that the effect of a section 18 appeal, in conjunction
with an appeal on the merits, creates two parallel appellate processes. Different

81 Appolus at para 27; See also Jai Hind Emcc CC t/a Emmarentia Convenience Centre v Engen
Petroleum Ltd South Africa 2023 (2) SA 252 (GJ)
82 Ibid at paras 29 and 31
83 paras 36 and 37

considerations apply to the evaluation of each respective appeal. In the appeal
before the SCA, the court will, inter alia, be seized with the evaluation of the merits
of the court a quo in granting the Hague order. As stated, this is a merits based
enquiry, and a court ‘s paramount concern is whether or not the mother in the
Hague application met the jurisdictional burden of proving an article 13(b) defence,
and whether the trial court was correct in its evaluation thereof.

[95] Conversely, this constituted full bench is seized with an automatic s18(4)
appeal process challenging the execution order granted in terms of s 18(3). Here,
the court is called upon to consider whether exceptional circumstances exist – and
existed, as was found by the court a quo in its determination of the s 18(1) and (2)
application, and whether the jurisdictional requirements were met justifying an
execution order in favour of the father in terms of s 18(3).

[96] In Ntlemeza v Helen Suzman Foundation and Another84, the Supreme Court
of Appeal held that the primary purpose of section 18(1) is to re-iterate the common
law position in relation to the ordinary effect of appeal processes – the suspension
of the order being appealed – not to nullify it. The suspension contemplated
therein would thus continue to operate in the event of a further application for leave
to appeal to this court, the SCA, and in the event of that being successful, in relation
to the outcome of a decision by the SCA in respect of the principal order. Section
18(1) also sets the basis for when the power to depart from the default position
comes into play, namely, exceptional circumstances which must be read in
conjunction with the further requirements set by s 18(3).

[97] More importantly, as to the question whether, in light of a jurisdictional point
raised by General Ntlemeza85 framed as follows:
“ [17] … In terms of s 18(1), a pending decision on an application for leave to

“ [17] … In terms of s 18(1), a pending decision on an application for leave to
appeal or an appeal was a jurisdictional requirement before a court considering an
application to enforce an order was empowered to make an execution order of the
kind set out in the preceding paragraph. It was contended that sequentially the
application for leave to appeal by General Ntlemeza had been refused before FUL’s

84 (402/2017) [2017] ZASCA 93; [2017] 3 All SA 589 (SCA); 2017 (5) SA 402 (SCA (9 June 2017) at
para 28
85

counter-application was upheld and thus the high court was precluded from
considering HSF and FUL’s counter-application, because the jurisdictional fact of a
pending decision in relation to an appeal or an application for leave to appeal was
absent.”

[98] The court in answer, held as follows:

“[29] The preliminary point on behalf of General Ntlemeza referred to in para 17
above does not accord with the plain meaning of s 18(1). As pointed out on behalf of
HSF and FUL, and following on what is set out in the preceding paragraph, s18(1)
does not say that the court’s power to reverse the automatic suspension of a
decision is dependent on that decision being subject to an application for leave to
appeal or an appeal. It says that, unless the court orders otherwise, such a decision
is automatically suspended.


[99] That appeal was against a decision of the High Court ordering the execution
of an earlier ruling issued by it, pending the finalization of an appeal or an
application for leave to appeal. The court found that there could be no doubt that an
application by the appellants for leave to execute, had there not been one earlier,
could have been brought and would have been competent after the application for
leave to appeal was filed to it. Courts must be the guardians of their own process
and be slow to avoid a to-ing and fro-ing of litigants. It said that the high court’s
order achieved that end. The high court reasonably apprehended on the evidence
before it that further appeals were in the offing and issued an order that sought not
just to crystallize the position but also to anticipate further appeal processes.86


86 Ibid 414B-D, para 32. At first blush, this seems to an execution order in perpetuity, but the position
was subsequently clarified in Knoop and Another NNO v Gupta (No. 1) (115/2020) ZASCA 149 (19
November 2020) where, following a judgment for leave to execute, the full court granted the following
order:

order:
‘Any present or future appeals, applications and petitions by any party relating to this judgment shall
not suspend the operation of the order granted on the 13 December 2019.’ The court held that the
order flew directly in the face of the statute, that explicitly says that pending an urgent appeal under s
18(4), the operation of an execution order is suspended; that Ntlemeza not only did not provide any
authority in favour of the grant of such an order, but was authority against it; and that the inherent
power of a court to regulate its own procedure cannot be used to override the provisions of a statute
directly governing the issue. Curiously, the court in Koop opined that, other than the fact that the
judgment set out s 18 as a whole, including s 18(4), it did not refer to the latter section and did not
question that the effect of the section was to suspend the execution order pending an appeal against
it. See para 31.

[100] Section 18(3) requires an applicant – the father - for an execution order to
establish that the respondent (the mother) will not suffer irreparable harm if the
order is granted. In University of the Free State v Afriforum87, the court held that the
requirements introduced by s 18(1) and (3) are more onerous than those of the
common law. Apart from the requirement of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 18(1),
section 18(3) requires the applicant “in addition” to prove on a balance of
probabilities that he or she “will” suffer irreparable harm if the order is not made, and
that the other party “will not” suffer irreparable harm if the order is made. Thus, if an
applicant cannot show that the respondent will not suffer irreparable harm by the
grant of the execution order, that is fatal.88


[101] I have detailed some cases that dealt with the prospects of success. This was
one of the basis upon which the main judgment inter alia finds that the application
should be dismissed. We know that the SCA granted leave to hear the main appeal,
to it. Presumably, it would have had the whole record. It would not have had the
benefit of this judgment prior to its granting of leave. But it seems that there is a
variance in approach as to when the question of prospects of success plays a role in
the determination of a granting of leave viz a viz the record of proceedings.

[102] I say this because in Knoop NO supra, the court referred to Justice Alliance
where it was held that a court has a wide discretion to grant or refuse an execution
order once the statutory requirements are satisfied and that prospects of success in
the appeal have a role to play in considering the exercise of that discretion.89 It
further contended that this approach had been supported in Afriforum, supra.
However there was a distinguishable feature in that, in both the Afriforum and
Ntlemeza matters, the records in the main appeal were not before the Supreme

Ntlemeza matters, the records in the main appeal were not before the Supreme
Court of Appeal and the appeals decided without the full record or any consideration

87 2018 (3) SA 428 (SCA) at 433A-435, para 10
88 Knoop NO at para 48
89 Ibid at para 49

of the merits of the main appeal.90 In other words, in both of those matters, i.e. the
Afriforum and Ntlemeza, the court disposed of the appeal by disregarding the
prospects of success on appeal. In the merits of the urgent appeal against the
execution order, that court had the full record in the main appeal, but the argument
did not include a consideration of prospects of success in the main appeal. Wallis
JA held that there may be difficulties if the high court takes the prospects of success
into account in granting an execution order, because it is not clear that the court
hearing an urgent appeal under section 18(4) will always be in a position to assess
the weight of this factor.91

[103] The court highlighted the conundrum, questioning that if the language of
section 18(4) confers a discretion, if that is a full discretion or a power, combined
with a duty to exercise that power on proof or the requirements for its exercise.
Wallis J concluded that those issues might warrant a reconsideration of the
approach in Justice Alliance.92 There is thus some uncertainty, despite the
commentary to the contrary93, about whether the approach adopted in Justice
Alliance regarding the issue of prospects of success is the correct one.

[104] I turn now to consider the automatic appeal and return more specifically in the
context of the requirements enunciated by Thring J in MV Ais Mamas Seatrans
Maritime v Owners, MV Ais Mamas94, supra regarding the assessment of what
constitutes ‘exceptional circumstances’, being mindful of the intention of the
Legislature, by applying a strict, rather than a liberal meaning to the phrase. It is my
view however that this cannot be assessed in a vacuum and that consideration, as a
matter of course, must be given to the underlying intention of the foundational piece
of legislation which forms the subject of the execution order. Put different, there has
to be a distinction between the requirements of, for example, an enforcement of a

to be a distinction between the requirements of, for example, an enforcement of a
money judgment, and the requirements for a determination to execute an order

90 Ibid at para 49 – fn omitted.
91 Ibid at para 50
92 Ibid at para 50
93 See Erasmus Superior Court Practice, Vol. 1, 2023, D-128, D-130
94 2002 (6) SA 150 (C) at 156I-157C; Ntlemenza supra at para 37; Jai EMCC supra at para 7

pertaining to a return of a child in line with legislation which calls for same on an
urgent basis. A court should be mindful of not offending the very purpose and
intention of a statute.

[105] The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Abduction
requires contracting states to order a child returned to his or her country of habitual
residence upon finding that the child has been wrongfully removed to, or retained in
the contracting state. It is an international agreement to which SA acceded on
8 July 1997.

[106] The Constitutional Court in its seminal judgment of Ad Hoc Central Authority
for the Republic of South Africa and Another v Koch N.O. and Another95 deals with
inter alia the statutory imperatives of the Convention, the rights, duties and
obligations of contracting states, and the constitutional imperatives of protecting
children from the harmful effects of their wrongful removal or retention, to ensuring
their prompt return to their state of habitual residence and to secure protection for
rights of access. The Convention forms part of our domestic law, having been
incorporated into the Children’s Act.96

[107] The Convention also implicates the rights of a child in section 28 (2) of the
Constitution by mandating contracting states to return a child to the country of
habitual residence when the child was removed in the circumstances postulated by
the Convention. Article 16 of the Convention dictates that a judicial authority of the
state to which a child was removed to, or in which they are retained, shall not decide
the merits of a custody dispute until such time it has determined that the child is not
to be retuned under the Convention. To re-iterate, the return of the child takes place
without any comprehensive determination of what the best interest of the child may
demand. In the scheme of the Convention, that is the function of the state where the
child is habitually resident.97

child is habitually resident.97


95 (CCT 150/22) [2023] ZACC 37; 2024 (2) BCLR 147 (CC); 2024 (3) SA 249 (CC) (27 November
2023)
96 Koch at para 40
97 Ibid at para 35

What is required of section 18(4) appeal in the context of a Hague matter?

[108] Given my summation of the prescripts of section 18 above, I am of the view
that for purposes of evaluating ‘exceptional circumstances’ in section 18, that where
Hague matters are concerned, this should be considered exceptional for purposes
of the provision. I say against the backdrop of MV Ais. To be exceptional, the
circumstances concerned must arise out of, or be incidental to the particular case:
The very nature of Hague matters contemplate exceptional, extraordinary and
drastic measures and relief consequent to the unlawful abduction of a child and an
application for their return forthwith, bar the exceptions provided for in Art. 13.(b)
[109] The circumstances are fact specific, but it is ultimately adjudicated under a
regime of return which by its nature is extraordinary. In fact, once the jurisdictional
requirements are met for a return, and in the absence of an exception, a court is
duty bound to return the child to their habitual residence. There is no consideration
of the merits and the exercise of judicial discretion is limited. To my mind, this
should, as a matter of course, warrant the matter to be regarded as exceptional for
purposes of the Act.

[110] Furthermore, the intention of the legislature is also a guiding principle in the
evaluation of what circumstance would be considered exceptional. Hague matters
are, by its very nature, urgent. The starting point in an evaluation under section
18(3) is that the law mandates the return of an abducted child. The discretion as to
whether it therefore falls into this category is removed. Thus all that a party then has
to prove, on a balance of probabilities, is the remaining requirement to convince a
court that the other party will not suffer irreparable harm if the court were to so
order.

[111] The main judgment referred three issues which I cumulatively sum up, as

order.

[111] The main judgment referred three issues which I cumulatively sum up, as
justifying a finding that the father has failed to satisfy the strict jurisdictional
requirements of section 18(1) and (3): a refusal of an order –the hierarchy of the
courts; the hardship and psychological trauma to the children and their ostensible
wish to remain in this court’s jurisdiction, and lastly, the effectiveness of a return
order in circumstances where a removal order is upheld and the assertion made,

that once the child leaves South Africa, it loses jurisdiction over the child and any
order which will be made in an appeal court will render the matter moot.

[112] The concept of irreparable harm suffered by the party also needs to be
distinguished. Whilst in the normal humdrum of litigation, safeguards would always
be in place to secure enforcement98, the context of irreparable harm takes on an
altogether different feature when execution orders pursuant to Hague matters are
considered. Unlike normal substantive relief, the harm contemplated is generally not
by the abducting party. They are generally the ones that have caused the harm by
the very nature of abduction. The enquiry starts at the point of abduction – not what
has gone before. That is for a merits based enquiry in the domestic forum of the
abducted child. In Pennello v Pennello (Chief Family Advocate as Curiae)99 Van
Heerden AJA stated as follows:

i) “The Convention is predicated on the assumption that the abduction of a child
will generally be prejudicial to his or her welfare and that, in the vast majority
of cases, it will be in the best interests of the child to return him or her to the
state of habitual residence. The underlying premise is thus that the authorities
best placed to resolve the merits of a custody dispute are the courts of the
state of the child’s habitual residence and not the courts of the state to which
the child has been removed or in which the child is being retained.”

[113] In Sonderup v Tondelli and Another100, Goldstone J warned against turning
the hearing of a Convention application proceedings into a custody application,
holding that it would be contrary to the intention and terms of the Convention. Article
19 of the Convention provides that a decision under the Convention concerning the
return of a child shall not be taken to be a determination on the merits of any
custody issue.

[114] Goldstone J then proceeded to consider the question of the harm that an

[114] Goldstone J then proceeded to consider the question of the harm that an
abducted child may suffer as a result of an order that they be returned to the
jurisdiction of their habitual residence. He held as follows:

98 security provided or a claim for damages as some examples
99 2004 (3) SA 117 (SCA) at para 38
100 [2000] ZACC 26; 2001 (1) SA 1171 (CC) at para 30

i) ‘A matrimonial dispute almost always has an adverse effect on children of the
marriage. Where a dispute includes a contest over custody, that harm is likely
to be aggravated. The law seeks to provide a means of resolving such
disputes through decisions premised on the best interests of the child.
Parents have a responsibility to their children to allow the law to take its
course and not to attempt to resolve the dispute by resorting to self-help. Any
attempt to do that inevitably increases the tension between the parents and
that ordinarily adds to the suffering of the children.
ii) The Convention recognises this. It proceeds on the basis that the best
interests of a child who has been removed from the jurisdiction of a Court in
the circumstances contemplated by the Convention are ordinarily served by
requiring the child to be returned to that jurisdiction so that the law can take
its course. It makes provision, however, in art 13 for exceptional cases where
this will not be the case.
iii) An art 13 enquiry is directed to the risk that the child may be harmed by a
Court-ordered return. The risk must be a grave one. It must expose the child
to “physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an
intolerable situation”. The words “otherwise place the child in an intolerable
situation” indicate that the harm that is contemplated by the section is harm of
a serious nature. I do not consider it appropriate in the present case to
attempt any further definition of the harm, nor to consider whether in the
light of the provisions of our Constitution, our Courts should follow the
stringent tests set by Courts in other countries.’ (“Own emphasis”)

[115] The Supreme Court of Appeal per Plasket and Gorven JJA furthermore in LD
v Central Authority (RSA) and Another 101 on the question on harm had this to say:
i) “[27] Also in the context of the question of harm, in Pennello,, this court
cited with apparent approval a dictum of Ward LJ in Re C (Abduction: Grave

cited with apparent approval a dictum of Ward LJ in Re C (Abduction: Grave
Risk of Psychological Harm):
ii) ‘There is, therefore, an established line of authority that the court should
require clear and compelling evidence of the grave risk of harm or other
intolerability which must be measured as substantial, not trivial, and of a
severity which is much more than is inherent in the inevitable disruption,
uncertainty and anxiety which follows an unwelcome return tothe jurisdiction
of the court of habitual residence.’
iii) [28] It also commented on the approach adopted by the Constitutional
Court to the question of harm in Sonderup, stating:

101 [2022] ZASCA 6; [2002] 1 All SA 658 (SCA); 2022 (3) SA 96 (SCA) (18 January 2022) paras 27
and 28, fn omitted.

(a) ‘Despite the litany of alleged incidents of physical and mental abuse
of the mother by the ‘left-behind’ father on which counsel for the
former relied in argument before the Constitutional Court in
the Sonderup case, as well as the report of a South African clinical
psychologist to the effect (inter alia) that the continuation of
the status quo in Canada would have a “severely compromising
effect on the healthy psychological development” of the child in
question, the Court held that the harm to which the child would
allegedly be subjected by a court-ordered return was not harm of
the serious nature contemplated by art 13, but rather –
iv) “. . . in the main harm which is the natural consequence of her removal from
the jurisdiction of the Courts of British Columbia, a Court-ordered return, and
a contested custody dispute in which the temperature has been raised by the
mother’s unlawful action. That is harm which all children who are subject to
abduction and Court-ordered return are likely to suffer, and which the
Convention contemplates and takes into account in the remedy that it
provides”.’”
[116] The LD matter supra, is distinguishable from the present – there the court
held that the return of the child would have the effect of breaking up her family in
South Africa. The facts of the matter was that the child had been 4 years old when
she was abducted; the parents were never married, the mother had primary
residence and the father had rights of visitation and accommodation102; the mother
married and sought a relocation application to South Africa, which was refused. The
court ordered further access to the children. The mother appealed the order and
further argument was set to be heard on 30 January 2019. Two further appeals
were unsuccessful, and thus a dismissal order granted on 3 October 2018. A last
ditch attempt was made by the mother to the Court of Cassation in Luxembourg.
She did not wait for the decision. Instead, the following day, on 4 October 2018, she

She did not wait for the decision. Instead, the following day, on 4 October 2018, she
removed the child and fled to South Africa. On 17 October 2018, five judges heard
the application and dismissed her further appeal. The SCA, following an emotional
assessment done by a psychologist found that the young child did not have the
capacity to fully comprehend the implication of her objecting a return to
Luxembourg; that ordering her return could potentially lead to an intolerable
situation given her young age, that she was attached to her mother, naturally so
given her young age, and that she would be separated from her half brother.

102 The rights were steadily increased over time in terms of orders by the Juvenile Court granted in
Luxembourg

[117] In a dissenting judgment, Mocumie JA, referring to Sonderup and Pennello,
supra, on the question as to whether South African Courts should follow the
stringent test set by courts in other countries was left open. She proposed103 that
that the correct approach is that adopted by the United Kingdom Supreme Court in
Re E (Children) (Wrongful Removal: Exceptions to Return). That case can be
summarized inter alia as follows: the risk to the child must be grave. It is not
enough, as it is in other contexts such as asylum, that the risk must be real. It must
have reached such a standard of seriousness as to be classified as ‘grave’. The
words physical or psychological harm are not qualified – intolerable is a strong word,
but when applied to a child must mean ‘a situation which this particular child in these
particular circumstances should not be expected to tolerate’; every child had to put
up with a certain amount of rough and tumble, discomfort and distress – it is a part
of growing up, but there are some things which it is not reasonable to expect a child
to tolerate.
[118] Importantly, the following was said in relation to Article 13(b) restrictions. It
stated that “what is abundantly clear is that the ‘grave risk’ is with reference to the
child; not the abducting or left behind parent.” Mocumie JA also reiterated that
section 39 of the Constitution of South Africa empowers courts in South Africa to
interpret the law in line with international and foreign law where there is no definitive
answer or where solutions can be imported, which are not readily available in their
jurisdiction, from other jurisdictions, to dispense with Hague Convention applications
in a justiciable manner.104 I fully align myself with these sentiments, an aspect which
I shall return to momentarily.
[119] The main judgment refers to the psychological trauma ostensibly suffered by
the children in the event of a return, together with the possibility of further cross-

the children in the event of a return, together with the possibility of further cross-
Atlantic travel back to Australia. However, all of this harm is self-created by the first
respondent. The children enjoyed a shared joint contact arrangement with the
father. This was summarily taken away by the mother when she secretly sold her
home, was duplicitous in taking the children out of school under the pretext of a
holiday; confiscated their cellular phones for weeks and barred their access to social

103 at para 46
104 at para 47

media to evade being located. The trauma to the older child must have been over-
whelming given that he has a girlfriend at home in his habitual residence and he
was barred from calling her or home. When the father eventually located them in
South Africa, she sought an interdict against him, preventing his access to the
children. One must bear in mind that both parties are divorced and have since re-
married and that, up until the abduction, the father exercised week-long alternate
contact with the children without demure. In Re C (a minor) (abduction) [1989] FCR;
sub nom C v C105, the court held as follows:
i) Is a parent to create a psychological situation and then rely upon it? If the grave
risk of psychological harm to the child is to be inflicted by the conduct of the
parent who abducted him, then it would be relied upon by every mother of a
young child who removed him out of his jurisdiction and refused to return. It
would drive a coach and four through the Convention at least in respect of
applications relating to young children. I, for my part, cannot believe that this is in
the interests of international relations.’

[120] Furthermore on this point, it was held that the courts are also anxious that the
wrongdoer should not benefit from the wrong; that is the person removing the
children should not be able to rely on the consequences of that removal to create a
risk of harm or an intolerable situation on return106. That is precisely what the mother
in casu claims. In my mind, she has not crossed the threshold of harm.
[121] Finally, I turn to the question of the court’s jurisdiction in the event of an
execution order being granted and the question of mootness. This issue was central
in the decision of Chafin v Chafin, 568 U.S. 165 (2013) where a unanimous United
States Supreme Court decision holding that the return of a child to a foreign country
under The Hague Convention does not render an appeal of that return moot.

under The Hague Convention does not render an appeal of that return moot.
[122] The facts of the case are the following: The petitioner Lee Chafin was a
citizen of the United States and member of the US army. Whilst stationed in
Germany, he met and married the respondent, Lynne Chafin, a citizen of the United
Kingdom. Their daughter EC was born the following year. Soon thereafter, Mr.
Chafin was deployed to Afghanistan and Ms. Chafin took their child to Scotland. Mr.

105 Re C (a minor) (abduction) [1989] FCR 197 at 205; [1989] 2 All ER 465 at 471; reported as sub
nom C v C; LD supra at para 48
106 TB v JB (abduction; grave risk of harm) (2001); LD at para 49

Chafin was eventually transferred to Alabama US and in February 2010, Ms. Chafin
travelled to Alabama with their child. Soon thereafter Mr. Chafin filed for divorce and
for child custody. Ms. Chafin was deported for immigration violation, and the child
remained in the care of Mr. Chafin for several more months.
[123] Ms Chafin filed a petition under the Convention and the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act, 42 U.S.C 11601 (ICARA) which implements the
convention. The District Court concluded that E.C.’s country of habitual residence
was Scotland and granted the petition for return. Ms. Chafin immediately departed
for Scotland with E.C. Ms. Chafin then initiated custody proceedings in Scotland and
was granted interim custody and a preliminary injunction prohibiting Mr. Chafin from
removing E.C. from Scotland. Mr. Chafin appealed the District Court’s order, but the
Eleventh Circuit Court dismissed the appeal as moot on the ground that once a child
has been returned to a foreign country, a US court becomes powerless to grant
relief. On remand, the District Court ordered Mr. Chafin to reimburse Ms. Chafin for
court costs, attorney fees, and travel expenses.
[124] The court held that the return of a child to a foreign country pursuant to a
Convention return order does not render an appeal of that order moot. On 19
February 2013, Chief Justice Roberts delivered his judgment. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsberg wrote a separate concurring judgment.

[125] The reasoning of the judgment is as follows: The court was seized with The
Hague Convention on the Civil aspects of International Child abduction, which
requires courts in the United States to order children to the countries of habitual
residence if the courts find that the children have been wrongfully removed to or
retained in the United States.

[126] The question was whether after a child is returned pursuant to such an order,
any appeal of the order is moot. As of the time of writing, that court counted 89

any appeal of the order is moot. As of the time of writing, that court counted 89
nations party to the convention, and approximately, in the 2009 fiscal year, 324
children removed or retained in other countries were returned to the United States
under the Convention, while 154 children removed to or retained in the United
States were returned to the countries of habitual residence.

[127] As stated, the Scottish court had granted Ms Chafin interim custody and a
preliminary injunction prohibiting Mr. Chafin from removing E.C. from Scotland. In
the meantime, Mr. Chafin had appealed the District Court to the Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh District. In February 2012, the Eleventh Circuit dismissed Mr. Chafin’s
appeal as moot in a one-paragraph order citing Bekier v Bekier, 248 F.3d 1051
(2001). That court held that the Eleventh Circuit had concluded that an appeal of a
Convention return order was moot when the child had been returned to a foreign
country, because the court became powerless to grant relief. In accordance with
Bekier, the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the District court with
instructions to dismiss the suit as moot and vacate its order. On remand, the District
court did so and ordered Mr. Chafin to pay Ms. Chafin’s costs.

[128] Meanwhile, the Alabama State Court dismissed the child’s custody
proceedings initiated by Mr. Chafin for lack of jurisdiction. The Alabama Court of
Civil Appeals affirmed, relying in part on the US District Court’s finding that the
child’s habitual residence was not Alabama, but Scotland. The Supreme Court then
granted a review of the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.
The court stated that a case becomes moot only when it is impossible for a court to
grant any effectual relief whatever to the prevailing party. See Knox v Service
Employees, 567 U.S. (2012).

[129] It was argued there that if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal,
that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a
prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed. See Smalls v Green, 159 US 651,
653 (1895). As long as the parties have a ‘concrete interest’, however small, in the
outcome of litigation, the case is not moot. Knox supra

[130] The court held that the dispute was still very much alive. Mr. Chafin continued

[130] The court held that the dispute was still very much alive. Mr. Chafin continued
to contend that his daughter’s country of habitual residence was the United States,
while Ms. Chafin maintained that E.C’s home is in Scotland. Mr. Chafin also argued
that even if EC’s habitual residence was Scotland, she should not have been
returned because the Convention defences to return apply. The court held that the

Chafins continuously to vigorously contest the question of where their daughter will
be raised. These were not a hypothetical state of facts as found in Lewis v
Continental Bank Corp, 494 US 472,477 (1990). There was also not the slightest
doubt that there continues to exist between the parties that ‘concrete adverseness’
which sharpen the presentation of issues. Ms. Chafin argued that the case is moot
because the District Court lacks the authority to issue a re-return order, either under
the Convention or pursuant to its inherent equitable powers.

[131] But the court said that that argument, which goes to the meaning of the
Convention and the legal availability of a certain kind of relief, confuses mootness
with the merits. Mr. Chafin’s claim for re-return under the Convention itself or
according to general equitable principles, cannot be dismissed as so implausible
that it is insufficient to preserve jurisdiction. See Steel Co. v Citizens for Better
Environment, 523 US 83,89 (1998).

[132] The court also found that his prospects of success are therefore not pertinent
to the mootness inquiry. As to the effectiveness of any relief, Ms. Chafin asserted
that even if the habitual residence ruling were reversed and the District court were to
issue a re-return order, that relief would be ineffectual because Scotland would
simply ignore it, a situation contended in casu. But even if Scotland were to ignore a
US re-return order or decline to assist in enforcing it, this case would not be moot.

[133] The court stated the following: The US courts continue to have personal
jurisdiction over Ms. Chafin; may command her to take action even outside the
United States; and may back up any such command with sanctions. See Steele v.
Bulova Watch Co. 344 US 280,289 (1952). No law of physics prevents EC’s return
from Scotland. Abrogated on the grounds by Abbott v. Abbott 560 US (2010), and
averred that Ms Chafin might decide to comply with an order against her and return

averred that Ms Chafin might decide to comply with an order against her and return
EC to the United States. See Larbie v Larbie 690 F.3d 295, 303-304 (CA5 2012).
After all, the consequence of compliance presumably would not be relinquished of
custody rights, but simply custody proceedings in a different forum.

[134] The court further held that enforcement of the order may be uncertain if Ms
Chafin chooses to defy it, but such uncertainty does not typically render cases moot.
Courts often adjudicate disputes where the practical impact of any decision is not
assured.

[135] For example, courts issue default judgments against defendants who fail to
appear or participate in the proceedings and therefore seem less likely to comply.
Similarly, the fact that a defendant is insolvent does not moot a claim for damages.
Courts also decide cases against foreign nations whose choices to respect final
rulings are not guaranteed.

[136] The courts have also heard the government’s appeal from the reversal of a
conviction, even though the defendants had been deported, reducing the practical
impact of any decision. The court concluded that the case was not moot because
the defendants might re-enter on their own and encounter the consequences of the
ruling. So too here, the court said. A re-return order may not result in the return of
EC to the United States, just as an order that an insolvent defendant pay 100 million
dollars may not make the plaintiff rich.

[137] But it cannot be said that the parties here have no ‘concrete interest’ in
whether Mr. Chafin secures a re-return. See Knox 567 US. However small that
concrete interest may be due to potential difficulties in enforcement, it is not simply a
matter of academic debate, and it is enough to save this case from mootness. The
court stated that Miss Chafin was correct to emphasize that both The Hague
Convention and ICARA stress the importance of the prompt return of children
wrongfully removed or retained.

[138] The court was alive and sympathetic to the concern that shuttling children
back and forth between parents and across international borders may be
detrimental to those children. But courts can achieve the ends of the Convention
and ICARA - and protect the well-being of the affected children- through the familiar

and ICARA - and protect the well-being of the affected children- through the familiar
judicial tools of expediting proceedings and granting stays where appropriate. There
is no need to manipulate constitutional doctrine and hold these cases moot. As an

aside, in a South African context, courts have regularly granted mirror orders to their
contracting counter-parts as a protection mechanism.

[139] The court opined that indeed, by doing so may very well undermine the goals
of the treaty and harm the children it is meant to protect. If these cases were to
become moot upon return, courts would be more likely to grant stays as a matter of
course to prevent the loss of any right to appeal. In cases in which a stay would not
be granted but for the prospect of mootness, a child would lose precious months
when she could have been readjusting to life in a country of habitual residence,
even though the appeal had little chance of success. Such routine stays, due to
mootness, would be likely but would conflict with the Convention’s mandate of
prompt return of a child’s country of habitual residence. The court opined that if
losing parents were effectively guaranteed a stay, it seems likely that more would
appeal, a scenario that would undermine the goal of prompt return and the best
interest of children who should in fact be returned.

[140] A mootness holding here might also encourage flight in future Hague
Convention cases, as prevailing parents try to flee the jurisdiction to moot the case.
Courts should apply the four traditional stay factors in considering whether to stay or
return order. One, whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he or
she is likely to succeed on the merits; two, whether the applicant will be irreparably
injured absent a stay; three, where the issuance of the stay will substantially injure
the other parties interested in the proceedings; and four, where the public interest
lies.

[141] In summary, the finding in Chafin was that The Hague Convention mandates
the prompt return of children to their countries of habitual residence, but such return
does not render the case moot. There is a live dispute between the parties over

does not render the case moot. There is a live dispute between the parties over
where the child will be raised, and there is a possibility of effectual relief for the
prevailing parent. The courts below therefore continue to have jurisdiction to
adjudicate the merits of the parties’ respective claims.

Conclusion

[142] There is no doubt that any delay in the return of the abducted children to their
home will cause the father and more especially the children irreparable harm. The
longer the children remain abducted, the more entrenched they become which
would make a return that more complicated. The rights of the father have been
expunged by the self-help actions of the mother.

[143] If a party in a Hague application succeeds in defeating a return order, the
practical effect of that would mean that one parent is in their habitual home and the
matter proceeds to merits since the Hague application is not a merit inquiry. The
effect of that would mean that a parent guilty of abduction would have defeated a
claim for the return of the children to the place that they are habitually resident, and
as a matter of obvious consequence, the merits of the application would not feature,
if not appealed.

[144] This, therefore, lends credence to the objective intention of the Convention,
that all a court is required to do is to evaluate objectively the jurisdictional
requirements of return. It is not final in nature because it is subject to the
determination of the merits in the country of origin, if unsuccessful. That decision
would be subject to appeal. An unsuccessful determination would mean that the
children remain in the country, and thus a s18(3) enforcement order would find no
application, because logic dictates that the enforcement of the order, that is the
dismissal of the application, would have the practical effect that the children would
remain.

[145] Enforcement orders therefore only feature where applicants have been
successful in a Hague application and where the return of the abducted children are
ordered. This could be open to abuse with dire unintended consequences for the
abducted children. As the court held, a deviation from the norm in such
circumstances would warrant the circumstances exceptional for purposes of the
Hague Convention.

Hague Convention.

[146] If the appeal is upheld, the children remain in the country, various orders to
the contrary are ignored, and a parent’s inherent parental rights are mero motu

removed. If the appeal is dismissed, the children are returned to their habitual
residence and the merits of the matter fully ventilated in that country’s jurisdiction.
The practical effect, therefore, of an order of non-enforcement having the
unintended consequence of depriving a parent of exercising contact and removing
their parental rights, would, in my view, elevate a party’s threshold to cross the
exceptional circumstances threshold.

[147] The sad consequence of this matter is that the mother has forced the children
to pick sides. Children should never have to be put in such positions because of the
actions of parents who break the law and then use any emotional and psychological
fallout as reason to bolster their disobedience. The children are of age or old
enough to determine for themselves. But herein lies the problem. The children have
been placed in the middle of an intolerable situation as a result of the mother’s
unlawful actions. She now expects the children to choose between the two. The
mother had no difficulty in the father exercising joint control prior to her abduction of
the children. Any reliance of alleged abuse and subjecting the children thereto is
misguided. The parties are not married, do not live together, and have respective
spouses, even if one were to accept that this alleged aggression was a feature of
their previous relationship. This sentiment is echoed by the majority in its support for
an order that the threshold was not met by the first respondent. But this is not
supported by the evidence. The evidence shows that, one, the mother tried to
bolster a justification for abduction based on the father’s employment history. We
know that despite this fact, the parents were no strangers to that domestic court
process in their habitual jurisdiction.

[148] In the above evaluation, I would have found that the first respondent satisfied
the requirements of exceptional circumstances and would have ordered the return of

the requirements of exceptional circumstances and would have ordered the return of
the children with conditions. However, given the fact that the appeal on the merits is
but four weeks away, the interest of justice and taking into account the welfare of
the children at this juncture of proceedings, the circumstances which have now
evolved demands that, despite my finding that the first respondent has met his
burden, that the order cannot be effected until the ventilation and adjudication of the
merits appeal in the SCA.

______________________________
DS KUSEVITSKY
APPEARANCES
For the Appellant:
Advocate A de Wet
Instructed by Bertus Preller
For the First Respondent
Advocate J McCurdie SC
Instructed by Elmarie Erasmus
For the Second Respondent
Advocate R Alves
For the Children’s Representative
Advocate J Janssen