HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE NO: 108644/2025
( I) REPORTABL E: NO
(2) OF INTER EST TO OT HER JUDGE S: NO
(3) REVlSED.
In the matter between:
ITHUBA LOTTERY RF (PTY) LTD
ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS
and
THE MINISTER OF TRADE, INDUSTRY
AND COMPETITION
NATIONAL LOTTERIES COMMISSION
SIZEKHA YA HOLDINGS RF (PTY) LTD
BOSELE GAMING RF (PTY) LTD
WINA NJALO RF (PTY) LTD
RINGETA CONSORTIUM RF (PTY) LTD
Applicant
Intervening Party
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
Sixth Respondent
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076-15
076-16
076-16
GIYA GAMES HOLDINGS RF (PTY) LID
UMBULELO LOTTERY SERVICES RF PTY LTD
LEKALINGA RF (PTY) LTD
2
Seventh Respondent
Eighth Respondent
Ninth Respondent
CASE NO: 228028/2025
In the matter between:
RINGETA CONSORTIUM RF (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
MINISTER OF TRADE, INDUSTRY AND
COMPETITION First Respondent
NATIONAL LOTTERIES COMMISSION Second Respondent
SIZEKHAYA HOLDINGS RF (PTY) LTD Third Respondent
ITHUBA LOTTERY RF (PTY) LTD Fourth Respondent
BOSELE GAMING RF (PTY) LTD Fifth Respondent
WINA NJALO RF (PTY) LTD Sixth Respondent
GIY A GAMES HOLDINGS RF (PTY) LTD Seventh Respondent
UMBULELO LOTTERY SERVICES RF (PTY) LTD Eight Respondent
LEKALINGA RF (PTY) LTD Ninth Respondent
Summary: Administrative Law - Review of a decision by the Minister of Trade,
industry and Competition (the Minister) to award the Fourth
National Lottery License (the License) to Sizekhaya Holdings RF
(Pty) Ltd- The Request/or Proposals (RFP), only provided/or an
Evaluation Committee, an Aqjudication Committee, external quality
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assurance of the processes of these two committees and a final
Quality Assurance Committee assessing the report to be tabled by
the National Lotteries Commission (NLC) for the Minister's
decision. Found that it was impermissible for the Minister to
thereafter, unbeknown to the applicants for the License, appoint,
utilise and rely on a fresh re-evaluation performed by a new body
appointed by him, being a Ministerial Committee, in order to advise
the Minister when making his decision. Such conduct procedurally
and substantively unfair. Decision set aside and a remitted with
ancillary directives ordered. A separate application by the Economic
Freedom Fighters to extend the ambit of section 13(2)(b)(iv) of the
Lotteries Act 57 of 1997 to include a prohibition against indirect
financial interest by political office bearers in applicants for
licences, as opposed to only direct interests, not granted. The RFP
already provided for such extended prohibition.
ORDER
I . The decision of the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition
' (the Minister) to award the Fourth National Lottery and Sports
Pools License (the License) to· Sizekhaya Holdings RF (Pty) Ltd
(Sizekhaya), is hereby reviewed and set aside.
2. The License Agreement concluded between the Minister, the
National Lotteries Commission and Sizekhaya pursuant to the
award of the License is declared invalid.
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3. The issue of the award the License is referred back to the Minister
for reconsideration.
4. In taking the decision to award the License afresh, the Minister is
directed to disregard the report of the Ministerial Committee and
the recommendations made by it.
5. The declaration of invalidity made in para 2 above, is suspended
for two consecutive periods of six months from date hereof, the first
period to allow the Minister the opportunity to decide to award the
license afresh and the second period to allow the Minister to
negotiate and conclude a new Licence Agreement and to make
transitional arrangements, should the decision be to not award the
Licence to Sizekhaya.
6. The application by the Economic Freedom Fighters (the EFF) is
refused.
7. In respect of the application of the EFF and the costs occasioned
thereby, including the applications for intervention, each party
thereto shall pay its own costs.
8. In respect of the applications by Ithuba Lottery RF (Pty) Ltd and
Ringeta Consortium RF (Pty) Ltd, the first, second and third
respondents in the respective applications, shall jointly and
separately pay the costs of these applicatio'ns.
9. All costs orders shall include the costs occasi_oned by the briefing
of multiple counsel, including Senior counsel. For ·purposes of
taxation, such costs shall be on scale C as contemplated by Rule 67.
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JUDGMENT
The matter was heard in open court and the judgment was prepared and authored
by the judge whose name is reflected herein and was handed down electronically
by circulation to the parties' legal representatives by email and by uploading it
to the electronic file of this matter on Caselines. The date of handing-down is
deemed to be 02 November 2026.
DAVIS,J
Introduction
[1] On 7 August 2023 the National Lotteries Commission (the NLC), by way
of the publication of a Request for Proposal (the RFP) invited interested parties
•-: ,
to submit applications to be awar~ed the Fourth National Lottery Licence (the
Licence). This was done in terms of section 13(2)(a) of the Lotteries Act (the
Act) 1.
[2] After a protracted process whereby numerous applications had been
submitted and considered, the Minister of Trade, Industry and Competition (the
Minister) announced on 28 May 2025 that he had decided to award the Licence
to Sizekhaya Holdings RF (Pty) Ltd (Sizekhaya).
[3] As was the case with preceding lottery Iicenses2, the award spawned
litigation. The present review applications were preceded by an (unsuccessful)
1 57 of 1997 .
2
The first licence was awarded to Uthingo Management (Pty) Ltd. When it was unsuccessfu l in securing the
second licence, it challenged the award thereof in Uthingo Management {Pty) Ltd v Minister of Trade and
Industry [2007] 2 All SA 649 (T). In similar fashion, the subsequent holder of the second licence sought to
challenge the award of the third licence. It attempted to do by unsuccessfully applying for an interim interdict
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application for an interim interdict to prevent the implementation of the award
3
•
The first review application was soon joined by other applications for review.
[4] These applications, as well as a separate application relating to a
constitutionality challenge to section 13(2)(b )(iv) of the Act, form the subject
matter of this judgment.
The present applications
[5] In case no 108644/2025 lthuba Lottery RF (Pty) Ltd (Ithuba) is the
applicant and the Minister is the first respondent. The NLC is the second
respondent and Sizekhaya is the third respondent. The other respondents are the
other applicants who were in the final running for the award of the Licence. They
are Bosele Gaming RF (Pty) Ltd (Bosele), Wina Njalo RF (Pty) Ltd (Wina Njalo ),
Ringeta Consortium RF (Pty) Ltd (Ringeta), Giya Games Holdings RF (Pty) Ltd
(Giya), Umbulelo Lottery Services RF (Pty) Ltd (Umbuleleo) and Lekalinga RF
(Pty) Ltd (Lekalinga).
[6] Various of the unsuccessful applicants launched their own review
applications but in the end, only Ithuba (in case no 108644/2025) and Ringeta (in
case no 228028/2025) proceeded with their applications. They were heard jointly.
[7] The Economic Freedom Fighters (the EFF) was joined as an intervening
party and where Ithuba and Ringeta pursued the review and setting aside of the
Minister's decision on administrative law principles, the EFF pursued a
constitutional challenge to section 13(2)(b)(iv) of the Act to the effect that it
should be interpreted expansively to also prohibit "indirect" financial interests of
should be interpreted expansively to also prohibit "indirect" financial interests of
in Gidani (Pty) ltd v Minister of Trade and Industry (81420/2024) (2014] ZAGPPHC 960 (9 December 2014) (Gidani I) and obtained partial success in a subsequent review in Gidani (Pty) ltd v Minister of Trade and Industry (s1420/2024) c20.1sJ ZAAGPPl-iC 457 (4 July 201s) (Gldanl 11) before unsuccessfully applying for the review and setting aside of the third licence in Gidani (Pty) ltd v Minister af Trade and Industry (65337 /2015) (2016] ZAGPPHC 609 (13 May 2016) (Gidani Ill).
3 lthuba lottery RF (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Trade Industry and Competition (108644/2025) (2025] ZAGPPHC 1298 (27 November 2025).
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political office-bearers in applicants for lottery licences as opposed to its current
formulation which only refers to "direct" financial interests.
[8] The Minister, the NLC and the successful applicant Sizekhaya, opposed all
these applications.
[9] Understandably, despite the fact that only two review applications
proceeded and others fell by the wayside, the papers remained volwninous and
exceed numerous thousands of pages. The heads of argwnent alone exceeded
650 pages. Numerous case management meetings were also needed to massage
the matters ripe for hearing in order to cater, as far as possible, for the availability
of the understandably large number of legal practitioners involved.
The RFP
[l O] The starting point, not only of the process which ultimately led to the
impugned award, but also for consideration of the arguments relating to
procedural and substantive fairness of the evaluation of the applications for the
License, is the RFP.
[11] It is by now settled law that an RFP such as the one applicable in this
matter, constitutes an essential element of a valid evaluation process as it
prescribes a procedure for the evaluation of applications or bids, as the case may
be, which may not be "disregarded at whim"4.
[12] The RFP provided for a three-stage process. First an Evaluation
Committee had to evaluate the applications and prepare a report in respect of its
findings. Secondly, the NLC's Adjudication Committee had to assess the report
of the Evaluation Committee, which had been quality assured by and independent
quality ass urer appointed by I.he NLC " to ensure that at! criteria were applied
• Al/pay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Office of the SA Social Security Agency 2014
(1) SA 604 (CC) at para 40.
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consistently and impartially". The Adjudication Committee's own report was to
be independently quality assured by a further independent quality assurer, being
a Quality Assurance Committee (QAC) appointed by the Minister. After such
quality assurance, the Adjudication Committee was required to submit its report
and recommendations to the Minister.
[13] The third and final stage was when the Minister, after consultation with the
NLC, would make the ''final decision to award the Licence to the successful
applicant"5.
[14] The first stage referred to above, itself comprised of three stages, namely a
pre-qualification stage, a technical assessment stage and a final financial and B
BBEE evaluation stage. The criteria by which applications were to be assessed
and the weighting accorded thereto, were meticulously circumscribed in the RFP.
[I 5] At the technical evaluation stage, the RFP established ten criteria, with all
assigned different weightings, resulting in a total of 100 available points.
[16] The financial and B-BBEE evaluations were assessed in terms of six
different criteria, also assigned specific weightings, also resulting in a total of 100
points.
[I 7] The RFP made it clear6 that the technical, financial and B-BBEE
evaluations would "encompass those categories and weightings" which would be
taken into account.
[ 18] Any deviation from the above process by the Minister, was constrained,
both in law7 and in terms of the RFP itself The RFP provided in clause 10.2
thereof that the Minister may only "modify, amend or augment" the RFP during
5 Clause 8.2.5 of the RFP
6 In clauses 8.5 and 8.6.3 thereof.
7 See Gidani II at para 19.
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the application process and then only after consulting with the NLC and if this is
done, the applicants may re-apply or submit "modifications, amendments or
augmentations or changes" to their applications.
[19] A further aspect of the RFP relevant to this litigation is clause 2.4.1 thereof,
which provides that, before the License is granted "the Minister must be satisfied
that .. . no political party or political office-bearer in the RSA has any direct
and/or indirect interest in [an] applicant or is a significant shareholder of [an}
l • t " app tcan ....
How the evaluation process unfolded
(20] The Evaluation Committee, comprising of seven members, after the
relevant evaluations referred to above had been performed, ranked Ringeta first
at 73,92 points, Sizekhaya second with 72,95 points, Wina Njalo third at 72.64
points and Ithuba fourth at 72.04 points.
[21] The Adjudication Committee, comprising of four members of the NLC
board, recognised certain anomalies in the Evaluation Committee's scoring
process and conducted what it called an "objective analysis on moderated scores".
In its report, adopted on 9 October 2024, the Adjudication Committee
recommended Ringeta as the preferred bidder and Sizekhaya as the reserve
bidder.
[22] The NLC had earlier appointed MMB Consulting Inc to perform a quality
assurance evaluation. This evaluation should have been done before the NLC 's
report was finalised and presented to the Minister, but it was only done on 24
October 2024, after the report had already been submitted. As I shall indicate
hereunder, nothing much turns on this irregularity, except for noting that the
quality assurance evaluation undertaken, appears to have been done somewhat
superficially.
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[23] What is however more astounding (the Minister labelled it "perplexing")
is that the second quality assurance evaluation which the RFP contemplated,
being the one performed by the QAC with members appointed by the Minister,
also took place after the NLC's report had already been delivered to the Minister.
[24] The QAC's quality assurance evaluation was more thorough than the first
evaluation and engaged with numerous deficiencies which it had identified in the
preceding processes, in particular, the failure to complete checks for fitness and
propriety or to undertake a proper B-BBEE analysis.
[25] The NLC explained that the dates of the reports of the two quality
assurance committees themselves, are of no moment as the first quality assurance
evaluations had been conducted right throughout the whole evaluation process
and was in any event not done to confirm rankings or recommendations, but to
ensure that the processes were fair and that all bidders were treated equally. In
respect of the second quality assurance process, the NLC explained that this " ...
served the purpose of providing assurance to the Minister of the regularity of the
entire process undertaken by the NLC '.
The Minister's decision
[26] After having received the second quality assurance report, the Minister
consulted with the NLC's adjudication committee. He says that after this, he
concluded that he was not in a position to award the licence. He was concerned
that the evaluation and adjudication of applications had not been properly
conducted by the respective committees. He therefore delayed taking a final
decision.
(27] As a consequence of the above, the Minister appointed a new committee
on 26 January 2025 to advise him on his decision. In the papers, this committee
is referred to as the "Ministerial Committee" and I shall also do so. The
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Ministerial Committee, which then comprised of all the members of the QAC,
except for the senior advocate, one of the attorneys and the Chief Director Legal
Services of the Department of Trade and Industry
[28] The terms of reference given to the Ministerial Committee were (in the
words of their subsequent report) "to reassess the bids for the Fourth National
Lottery and Sports Pools Licence and to recommend to the Minister the names of
the preferred and reserve bidders".
[29] After having performed its mandate, the Ministerial Committee concluded
as follows:
" 183 Having considered all the RFP 's categories, it is evident that
there is a distinct difference between, on the one hand, Giya
Games, Lekalinga and Umbulelo and, on the other hand,
Bosele, lthuba, Ringeta, Sizekhaya and Wina Njalo.
184. We recommend that Giya Games, Lekalinga and Umbulelo
not be considered ...
188. Bosele 'sand Wina Njalo 's financial models and plans are less
compelling that those of Jthuba, Ringeta and Sizekhaya.
Therefore Bose le and Wina Njalo are not recommended ...
l 89. The economic analysis shows that both Sizekhaya 's and
lthuba 's financial models and business plan are feasible and
attainable. Sizekhaya 's projected revenue is more ambitious.
Nevertheless, it is sustainable, realistic and viable ...
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190. Even if Sizekhaya 's revenue projections are not attained as
proposed, it is possible and likely that they will not be lower
than lthuba 's, Ringeta 'sa nd Wina Njalo 's ...
191. A /though Ringeta is a strong applicant, it is not recommended
for the following reasons:
191.2 Absent a contravention of section 13(2)(b)(iv), there is
also an important risk. A widespread perception that
the lottery is a vehicle for funding a politic~! party
would probably have a dramatic effect on the number
of people playing, which would undermine the purpose
of the lottery and negatively affect the beneficiaries of
theNLDT F8.
191. 3 Ringeta 's proposed percentage and Rand-contribution
to the NLDTF is lower than Sizekhaya 's. It is
significantly lower after the exclusion of gambling
games.
192. lthuba provided stronger localisation and. supplier
development strategies compared to the other bidders, and it
also holds a higher overall B-BBEE rating. According to the
economic experts, Ithuba, alongside Sizekhaya and Ringeta,
submitted credible and pragmatic financial and business
plans, with a high likelihood to grow contributions to the
NLDFT While lthuba has proposed a relatively modest
contribution percentage lo the NLDTF, the feasibility and
8 The NLDTF is a reference to the National Lottery Distribution Fund, established in terms of section 21 of the Act and managed by the Board of the NLC.
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sustainability of these contributions are a key strength and an
important consideration for lthuba to be a reserve bidder.
193. In our view, Sizekhaya meets the requirements of section I 3.
There are no material concerns regarding the fit and proper
requirements and direct financial interest by a political party
or political office-bearer. It has sound commercial and
business plans and an excellent technology partner. Its
proposed contributions to the NLDTF are the highest. They
may be ambitions, but they are attainable.
194. Therefore, we recommend that the preferred bidder be
Sizekhaya and the reserve applicant be lthuba".
[30] I have quoted the conclusions rather extensively for reasons which shall
become more apparent Jater.
[31] The Ministerial Committee 's report was delivered on 25 April 2025. On
28 May 2025 the Minister announced that Sizekhaya had been awarded the
Licence and that lthuba was the reserve applicant.
(32] On 4 July 2025 Ithuba instituted the first of the review applications referred
to at the inception of this judgment. On 5 August 2025, the Minister, delivered
his reasons for the reward.
[33] FoUowing media reports by AmaBhungane, the Minister instructed the
NLC to investigate Sizekhaya's political connections, including the alleged
connection of two of its members with Deputy President Mashatile. Up to the
time of the hearing of this matter, no report of such investigation had featured in
the papers. This issue is relevant to the case advanced by the EFF, which I shall
deal with later in the judgment .
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[34] In the reasons furnished by the Minister, he deals with the first quality
assurance process as follows: "I am iriformed that during the evaluation and
adjudication process, the NLC appointed independent external quality assurers
. . . [they J were chartered accountants. They reviewed the evaluation and
adjudication processes while they were taking place. They identified a number
of risks during the evaluation process, which their report states were addressed
during adjudication".
[35] In respect of the QAC and the timing of its report, the Minister stated:
"Contrary to the provisions of paragraph 8. 2. 4, the QA C was appointed when the
NLC had already made its recommendations to me. Quite why the NLC did not
wait for the QA C to perform its functions before it made its recommendations, is
not clear to me. However, I was not prepared to forego the QAC process, which
was important for me to make a decision. As it turned out, the QA C's findings
were significant in that they brought certain material to my attention". In his
reasons, the Minister further stated that one of the terms of references of the QAC
was to advise him on whether the recommendations of and processes followed by
the NLC were rationally and legally compliant with, amongst others, the
provisions of the Act and the RFP.
(36] In furnishing the reasons for his decision, which followed the
recommendations of the Ministerial Committee, the Minister adopted paragraphs
from the Committee 's report virtually verbatim. The Minister's reasons for
electing to award the reasons for electing to award the Licence to Sizekhaya read
as follows: "This was a close race and a tight finish, in my view, Sizekhaya pipped
the others to the post. It presented a well-balanced bid. It has satisfied the
requirements in section 13 of the Lotteries Act. It has an impressive technology
partner. Its financial plans and modes are sound. Its projected revenue and
partner. Its financial plans and modes are sound. Its projected revenue and
percentage contribution to be NLDTF, Sizekhaya 's contributions to the NDLTF
are likely to be Lhe highest. . .I chose Ithuba Lottery as the reserve applicant. The
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reasons for this were the fo llowing. lthuba Lottery's technology partner was
local. Overall, it provided stronger localisation and supplier development
strategies compared to the other bidders, and it also held a higher overall B
EBEE rating. lthuba Lottery submitted credible and pragmatic financial and
business plans, with a high likelihood to grow contributions to the NLDFT While
Jthuba Lottery proposed a relatively modest contribution percentage to the
NLDFT, the feasibility and sustainability of these contributions were a key
strength and an important consideration".
[37] In respect of Ringeta and the issue of interests of political office bearers,
the Minister's reasons were the following:
"58. During my consideration of this matter, a question arose
about whether Ringeta's application contravened section
l 3(2)(b)(iv) of the Lotteries Act.
59. The facts pertaining to Ringeta are set out in the QA C's and
the Ministerial Committee's reports. For convenience, I
repeat them below:
59.1. The shareholding of Ringeta shows that the Batho
Batho Trust holds 70% of the shares in Thebe
Investment Consortium (Pty) Ltd; the Thebe Investment
Consortium (Pty) Ltd owns 100% of the shares in
Thebe SPV 021 (Pty) Ltd; the Thebe SPV 021 (Pty) Ltd
owns 49% of the shares in Ringeta Consortium
Holdings (Pty) Ltd; and Ringeta Consortium Holdings
(Pty) Ltd owns 51% of the shares in Ringeta
Consortium (RF) (.Fty) Ltd, which is the applicant
referred to as Ringeta.
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59.2. Dr Sibongiseni Maxwell Dhlomo is an ANC member of
Parliament and a trustee of the Batho Batho Trust. He
is therefore a political officer bearer as contemplated
in the Lotteries Act.
59.3. The original Batho Batho Trust Deed was amended in
2007 so that the term "beneficiaries" meant "any group
of people and black designated groups in South Africa
as defined in the Codes". The Codes are the codes
issued in terms of the B-BBEE Act.
59.4 In 2020, the definition was amended to read: "any
group of persons, including black people, black women
or black designated groups, in South Africa".
59.5 Clauses 2.1 and 2.2 of the Trust Deed as amended in
2021 state of the following:
2.1 The principal object of the Trust shall be to
promote, encourage and facilitate the
development of black people, black women and
black designated groups in South Africa in order
to reverse the effects of historic disadvantage by
ensuring that not less than 85% of the net income
of the Trust from time to time is distributed for
the benefit of black Beneficiaries.
2. 2 The Trust shall seek to achieve its principal
object as set 01.11 in clause 2. 1 by focus ing on
programmes and initiatives for the benefit of
Beneficiaries that are carried out through rural
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groups, women groups, youth leadership,
community empowerment, faith based and
community groups, and/or promote education or
democracy".
59.6 The Batho Batho Trust is reported to be a regular
funder of the ANC. According to the reports of the
Independent Electoral commission ("IEC ") on the
declarations of the funding of political parties, the
Batho Batho Trust has contributed RI 5 million to the
ANC on each of the following dates: 21 December
2021, 20 October 2022, 4 April 2023 and 2 April 2024.
60. The NLC contended that neither the ANC nor Dr Dhlomo had
a "direct financial interest" in Ringeta. Ringeta was of the
same view.
61. The legal advice that I received from senior counsel was that
there was indeed a contravention of this section in that Dr
Dhlomo was a political office-bearer and had a direct
financial interest in a shareholder or Ringeta.
62. it was also pointed out to me that there may be a
contravention of paragraph 2. 4.1. 4 of the RFP, even though
the RFP goes beyond what is stated in section 13(2)(b)(iv) of
the Lotteries Act, in that Dr Dhlomo was a political office
bearer and had an indirectfinancial interest in a significant
shareholder of Ringeta.
63. It was also pointed out to me that Mr Nhlanhla Nene, a former
ANC Miniter of Finance, heads the Thebe Investment
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Consortium (Pty) Ltd, which is a shareholder of Ringeta. In
my view, this is irrelevant, as he is not a political office-bearer
of the ANC.
Finding
64. Notwithstanding the concerns about Ringeta 's possible
contravention of section 13(2)(b)(iv) of the Lotteries Act or
paragraph 2. 4.1. 4 of the RFP, R;ngeta was not my first choice
because its projected rand value contributions to the NLDTF,
especially after the exclusion of its gambling games, were
much lower than Sizekhaya 's".
[38] So far, the formal chronology.
lthuba's case
[39] The first leg oflthuba ' s case is that the Minister's decision was vitiated by
substantive irregularities. This contention was made for three reasons. The first
was that there was no compliance with Section 13(3)(a) and (b) of the Act which
provides that, when awarding the License the Minister shall take into account
whether any person who appears to the Minister to be likely to manage the
business or any part of the business of the National Lottery and that of the
License, is a fit and proper person to do so and whether any person for whose
benefit that business is likely to be conducted is a fit and proper person to benefit.
[ 40] The contention was further that the Minister could not have taken this into
account because he did not have all the relevant facts before him and omitted to
call for further investigations. It is common cause that the Security Services
Agency conctucLed a probity assessment, however, it was not able to screen
foreign persons or entities for fitness and propriety and had no alternative
objective mechanism screening such persons. The only assessment which was
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accordingly applied to foreign nationals was the "auto assessment" in terms of
which bidders were only asked to explain whether shareholders were under
investigation or had been found guilty of an offence, even though the RFP
assessed fitness and propriety in terms of a broader set of criteria.
[ 41] The second ground for alleging that the Minister's decision was irregular
was that Ithuba contended that the Minister could not reasonably have satisfied
himself that the self-assessment or declaration by persons who said that they had
not been convicted of an offence had in fact not been so convicted or were not
under investigation. The contention is that the Minister was required to
investigate the veracity of these declarations.
[ 42] The third submission was that the absence of direct financial interest of
political office bearers requirement in terms of Section 13(2)(b )(iv) of the
Lotteries Act has been expanded by the RFP so as to include indirect financial
interests. The allegation was again that the Minister has failed to sufficiently have
these investigated.
[43] The further basis oflthuba's attack on the Minister' s decision was that his
decision was vitiated by procedural irregularities. A number of such irregularities
were raised but the "most glaring" one, called as such by Ithuba, was that the
creation and use of the Ministerial Committee was unlawful. The contention was
that the RFP set out the process for evaluation and adjudication of applications
and that it did not make provision for any such committee. Through the
Ministerial Committee, the entire evaluation and adjudication process was
effectively run afresh. Although Ithuba conceded that, in terms of Gidani II, the
Minister was at liberty to rely on advisors, it contended that the Ministerial
Committee and the mandate the Minister required it to perform, went beyond that
of advice and instead usurped the roles of the Evaluation and Adjudication
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Committees. This was also primarily because this scoring criteria prescribed in
the RFP was "jett isoned", by the Ministerial Committee.
[ 44] During oral argument, lthuba did not disavow itself any of the
abovementioned aspects raised in its papers and in heads of argument filed on its
behalf, but emphasised the following further contention, namely that the
Minister's decision was ultra vires insofar as it pertains to the issue of fully
committed funding at the time of the application. For purposes of this contention,
Ithuba relied on clause 7.1.9 of the RFP which provides as follows: "Each
applicant must also be in a position to show, by the date of the issue of the license,
that the finances for the application are irrevocably committed''.
[ 45] Clauses 23.15.5 and 23.15.5.5 of the RFP provide that, in terms of the "debt
and equity funding arrangements", a successful bidder " ... must obtain fully
committedfinancingfrom its funders before the Minister can award the license".
[ 46] Ithuba argued that, in addition to the funds required for a performance bond
and the guarantees issued in terms thereof, Sizekhaya had not indicated
sufficiently that it had sufficient own resources or sufficiently committed
finances. Ithuba argued that the issue is a binary question and that the Minister
must, on reasonable grounds, have satisfied himself that such funding had been
available prior to the award of the License. The fact that Sizekhaya had only in
October 2025 obtained operational funding in addition to the performance bond,
indicated that it had not, at the time of the award of the License, been in
possession of fully committed funding.
[47] In Gidani III, where the issue was "inadequate financial resources" also
featured, Mothle J found that a facility letter by a bidder's bank, which appeared
to be " ... only subjec t to the standard administrative process of completing the
legal and commercial documentation and that no further approval within the
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bank would be required ... " was sufficient. Mothle J found that the Minister did
therefore not act irrational or unreasonably in accepting that the letter from the
bank provided fully committed funding.
[ 48] In the present instance, Ithuba argued that the letter relied on by Sizekhaya,
appeared to have more conditions than those in Gidani III and could be
distinguished on the face thereof. The relevant annexure to Ithuba's
supplementary founding affidavit indicated that Sizekhaya 's banker indicated
only that it had a longstanding relationship with Sizekhaya's major shareholder
" ... and is therefore pleased to provide ... a letter of support for the debt and
pe,formance guarantees in an aggregate amount . . . in order to facilitate the
conclusion of the proposed transaction. This letter of support is subject to, inter
alia ... being satisfied with the structure for proposed facility including, but not
limited to ... shareholding and support provided for the proposed facilities
suitable to [the banker], final credit and/or investment committee approval and
... the execution of all legal documentation in relation to the proposed funding
the proposed transaction, the fulfilment of all conditions precedence therein and
the same becoming unconditional to the satisfaction of[the banker] ... ". Ithuba's
case is that this arrangement constituted a "funding gap" and did not comply with
the requirements of the RFP.
Ringeta 's case
[ 49] Ringeta relied on five grounds of attack being (1) that the appointment and
mandate of the Ministerial Committee was unlawful, (2) the Ministerial
Committee 's re-evaluation was not contemplated in the RFP, (3) there was an
unlawful and irrational exclusion ~f proposed games when Ringeta's bid was
considered, ( 4) there was an irrati6nal non-consideration of Ring eta's income
feasibility, (5) there was insufficient consultation with the NLC a s contemplated
in the Act and the RFP.
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[50] In respect of the first point, namely the appointment of the Ministerial
Committee, Ringeta made common cause with the submissions made by Ithuba
in this regard but underlined that the RFP expressly did not provide for a structure
such as the Ministerial Committee. Its mandate by the Minister to re-evaluate
that which had gone before and which was expressly provided for in the RFP,
was unlawful. This unlawfulness was exacerbated by the fact that, after the QAC
had already evaluated all the previous procedures , the Ministerial Committee
appointed its own experts to assist with the performance of its mandate. This
amounted to a true re-evaluation by a body not contemplated in the RFP.
[51] Unlike the Evaluation Committee and the Adjudication Committee , which
were required to apply the criteria set out in the RFP, the Ministerial Committee
was mandated to simply "have regard to it". It did not apply the same criteria and
accordingly that prescribed in the RFP was, as already argued by Ithuba,
jettisoned. An example was the revised evaluation of the technical points
allocated by the evaluation committee. Where Ringeta for example passed the
prescribed minimum 70% contemplated in paragraph 8.5 of the RFP, the
Ministerial Committee negatively "had regard" to such an extent to Ringeta 's
technical partner , that it distorted the process contemplated by the RFP. It also
had the effect of subverting the findings of the Adjudicating Committee .
[52] Ringeta also argued that the exclusion of games proposed by it was
unlawful and irrational. In terms of the RFP bidders were encouraged to come
up with novel games in order to generate the best return on funds. Although some
"regulatory risks" had been identified in some of Ringeta 's proposed games, this
did not justify a who lesale exclusion of Rl 7 billion potential income in the
assessment. This is however what the Ministerial Committee had done by
assessment. This is however what the Ministerial Committee had done by
re liance on its own expert in thi::, regard , Genesis. E ven Genesis ·s own report was
furnished in highly qualified language and did not justify any such wholesale
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exclusion. The consequence is that Ringeta argued that there was no rational
basis for the Minister to exclude this aspect of Ringeta's bid in making his
decision.
[53] In terms of the RFP the financial case put forward by each applicant was
critical if not determinative. The RFP provided for a mechanism for the
assessment of the credibility or realistic expectation of each applicant's case.
Applying these criteria, Ringeta argued that it was ranked first even if the
aforementioned Rl 7 billion possible revenue were to be excluded. Even if the
report by the expert utilised by the Ministerial Committee were to have been
relied on by the Minister, there was no reasonable explanation how he could not
follow its recommendation. Ringeta therefore argued that it was irrational for the
Minister to ignore the provisions of the RFP, to ignore Genesis's
recommendations and to choose a successful bidder whose proposals were
"ambitious ,, as opposed to proposals which were realistic.
(54] The Ministerial Committee gave its report to the Minister on 25 April 2024.
The Minister said that he instructed the NLC to commence negotiations, which
the NLC says it started on 30 April 2026. Apart from one meeting, identified by
the NLC as having taken place on 14 April 2025, it was alleged that there was no
evidence by the NLC or the Minister that it had in fact "consulted" with each
other. This, Ringeta argued, was a mandatory requirement and not a mere
formality. To override the consultation process as prescribed in the RFP
amounted to a fundamental procedural irregularity.
The EFF's case
[55] As the EFF sought to attack Section 13(2)(b)(iv), which also prescribed
requirements for the assessment of bidders, it was appropriate LO hear its argument
prior to that of the respondents.
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[56] The EFF's argument was as follows: any exercise of public power must
be rational. Section 13 is an anti-corruption provision that aims at excluding
possible political patronage. As a matter of principle then, political players should
be excluded and such exclusion should not be limited to only direct but also to
indirect financial benefit.
[57] As a basis for the need for the section to be interpreted expansively, the
EFF argued that the case of Sizekhaya exemplified the potential of political
influence. While making the submission, the EFF was at pains to explain that it
did not seek to impugn any of the role-players identified in the AmaBhungane
media report referred to earlier, including the Deputy President, but merely
sought to correct a deficiency in the Act. The EFF argued in addition that, where
Sizekhaya was registered a mere 3 days before the February 2024 deadline for
the submission of applications for the License, its application therefore requires,
as is often needed in procurement environments , more careful scrutiny
The Minister's case
[58] In addition to the reasons already provided by the Minister and which form
part of the record, as already referred to earlier, the Minister contended (in
extensive heads filed on his behalf), that the terms of the RFP are capable of an
inte1pretation that affords the Minister the power to appoint a committee such as
the Ministerial Committee. For instance, clause 1.1.2 of the RFP defines advisors
to mean " external third party advisers or consultants appointed by the
Minister " The Minister further contends that the same objection to the
Ministerial Committee raised by Ithuba and Ringeta had been considered and
rejected in Gidani II where (at par. 24) it was found that " ... the RFP process, at
this le vel, w as not designed to identify how the Minister would make his decision
,,
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[59] Departing from this premise, the Minister contended that neither
contention by lthuba and Ringeta, namely that he was not entitled to establish a
committee that was not expressly contemplated by the RFP, nor the contention
that the Ministerial Committee impermissibly assumed functions reserved for the
Evaluation Committee and the Adjudication Committee, was correct. He
maintained that the sole purpose of the Ministerial Committee was to assist him
with evaluating concerns that had arisen from the material already before him and
to provide advice on issues relevant to the exercise of his statutory powers. The
objection to the manner in which the Minister chose to obtain and consider expert
advice, should not be elevated to a ground of review .
[60] Counsel for the Minister argued that the issue was whether the assistance
sought by the Minister from the Ministerial Committee was rationally connected
to the discharge of his statutory responsibility in terms of section 13 of the Act.
In this regard, the Minister expressly stated that "... given the magnitude,
complexity and importance of the matter, I formed the view that I was not in a
position to make a final decision on the award of the licence ... in light of the
issues identified through the evaluation, adjudication and quality assurance
processes, I was not satisfied that I had sufficient clarity on all material aspects
necessary to make a final decision. I accordingly determined that further focus to
consideration of the material was required ... in that context, the Ministerial
Committee was convened to assist me in discharging my statutory responsibilities
"
[61] The Minister elaborated on his concerns after he had received the
recommendations and reports from the Evaluation Committee, the Adjudication
Committee and the QAC which he had conveyed to the NLC at a meeting held
on 20 December 2024. These concerns related to the manner in which the
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evaluation and adjudication processes that have been concluded, the absence on
advice on whether certain applicants ought not to have been disqualified ,
notwithstanding apparent non-compliance with pre-qualification requirements or
failures to meet technical evaluation thresholds, whether there had been sufficient
and proper consideration of the probity, B-BBEE and localisation and supply
development criteria, whether a political party or political office bearer had direct
or indirect financial interest in an applicant or its shareholders and whether a
particular bidder was required to have a WLA-SCS certificate in terms of par.
11.21 of the RFP. In short, the Minister had concerns about all relevant
considerations contemplated in the RFP
[62] A further concern had arisen regarding the nati.rre of certain games
proposed by certain bidders and whether such games constituted lottery or sport
pool games or fell within the category of gambling activities regulated under the
National Gambling Act. It was particularly in respect of the last issue, which the
Minister described as a "technical issue" that the Ministerial Committee obtained
input from Legends, a specialist consultancy in the gaming industry to assist in
understanding the nature and classification of those games. The Minister
contends that the input from the specialists contracted by the Ministerial
Committee, assisted him in understanding and interrogating particular issues
arising from the bids and the reports " ... and did not involve a fresh evaluation
or scoring of the bids ... ".
[63] The Minister continued in his affidavit to explain that the Ministerial
Committee had considered information on the technology partners associated
with various other bidders, including their experience, operations, technical
capabilities and ability to support the proposed lottery model. In doing so, it
identified that a number of the applicants were supported by established
identified that a number of the applicants were supported by established
International Technology Providers with extensive operational footprints, proven
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track records in lottery environments and the capacity to support both retail and
digital platforms at scale. These factors were considered indicative of the ability
to support a complex, high volume national lottery over the licence period .
[64] On the issue of localisation the Minister stated that the material before the
Ministerial Committee reflected that the National Lottery does not fall within
sectors designated for local contact which are generally directed at manufacturing
industries such as steel, plastics and cement. This gave rise to inherent difficulties
in applying conventional local content measures to an activity that is
predominantly technology- and service-based. The Ministerial Committee noted
a number of limitations in a manner in which applicants had presented
localisation and expressed it as a percentage of the overall projected expenditure
rather than in terms of identifiable and verifiable components of local
procurement. The Ministerial Committee had also noted that the applicants'
financial models did not consistently provide itemised disclosure of forecast
capital expenditure and operating costs specifically attributable to supply
development and localisation. These constraints caused the Ministerial
Committee to have extensive regard to the Genesis report which assessed the
localisation and supply of development proposals against the criteria defined in
the RFP. The Minister conceded that the localisation and supply and
development had been considered by the Evaluation Committee but stated that,
in the course of the Ministerial Committee's consideration, Genesis " ... was
requested to revisit aspects of its earlier work to address the identified limitations ,
including lack of comparability, the absence of consistent financial disclosure
and the need for a more structured analysis of the localisation proposals". The
Minister was at pains to explain that this did not amount to applying a new set of
Minister was at pains to explain that this did not amount to applying a new set of
criteria but an "identified set of criteria drawn down from the relevant provisions
o.fthe RFP".
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[65] In respect of the issue of whether games should be excluded if, by their
nature, they resembled gambling games, the Minister stated that the financial
implications of these games were considered in the context of the bidders'
business and revenue models. Where projected revenue depended, in part, on
games whose regulatory status was uncertain, this raised concerns regarding the
liability of those projections. Genesis was accordingly requested to consider the
financial models that took into account the potential non-inclusion of such games.
Its investigative exercise illustrated that, in those instances where the impact of
the exclusion of certain games was significant, such exclusion or adjustment
affected underlying assumptions relating to growth, sustainability and long-term
viability.
[66] The Ministerial Committee's investigation regarding the B-BBEE status of
the applicants, reflected that all applicants, including Sizekhaya, demonstrated a
commitment to the social responsibility objectives contemplated in the Act,
including the advancement, upliftment and economic empowerment of persons
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination. While differences existed in the manner
in which the various elements of B-BBEE were structured and reflected across
the various applicants, the Ministerial Committee considered these aspects
together with other components of the applications and the Minister stated that
he had regard to the considerations formulated by the ministerial Committee in
assessing the app licants ' overall credibility fee's ability and sustainability.
[67] On the issues of probity, the Minister stated that the material before the
Ministerial Committee further included findings of the QAC in relation to the fit
and proper requirements contemplated in section 13 of the Act. In this regard, it
was recorded in respect of some of the applicants, concerns arose from credit
records and related matter s, whereas in respccL of Sizekhaya, no material
records and related matter s, whereas in respccL of Sizekhaya, no material
concerns were identified. In relation to Ringeta, the QAC identified a concern
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whether there existed a financial interest by a political party or political office
bearer. The report sets out the shareholding structure involving the Batho Batho
Trust and associated entities as well as the role of Dr Sibongisene Maxwell
Dhlomo, a member of parliament and a trustee of the Bahto Batho Trust. The
report recorded that the Batho Batho Trust had made substantial financial
contributions to a political party and that in light of the structure and role of the
trustees, a legal opinion was obtained whether this constituted a direct financial
interest. The Minister reported that, according to that opinion, the prohibition in
section 13(2)(b)(iv) is to be interpreted broadly and the involvement of a trustee
who is a political office bearer with the ability to exercise control over the trust
funds gives rise to a direct financial interest for purposes of the section. The
opinion apparently further recorded that on this basis, section 13(2)(b )(iv)
precluded awarding the License to Ringeta. Notably, despite numerous requests
therefor, the opinion was never produced as part of the record or the papers before
court.
[68] Apart from having explained why he had appointed the Ministerial
Committee, a separate part of the Minister's answering affidavit was devoted to
the Ministerial Committee's recommendations itself. In that part of the affidavit,
the Minister repeated the findings already referred to above, whereafter he stated
that: " ... in considering the MC 's report, I did not treat its recommendations as
determinative. Rather, I had regard to the reasons advanced, the underlying
material, and the extent to which conclusions were supported by the broader
record The report helped to consolidate and address matters I had already
identified as required in further enquiry and it provided a structured basis for
assessing the bids in fight of the applicable statutory and RFP requirements. My
assessing the bids in fight of the applicable statutory and RFP requirements. My
decision was therefore not made in isolation, nor was it based on a single report.
It ,vas the product of a cumula tive process, informed by multiple layers of
evaluation and acijudication as well as my own consideration of the material. The
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timing of the decision following the receipt of the MC 's report reflects the fact
that the issues had been under consideration for some time and had been the
subject of prior engagement, rather than any uncritical acceptance of the MC 's
recommendations" .
[69] Following on the above, the Minister then set out his reasons for his
decision to award the license to Sizekhaya. He again stated that he had considered
all the criteria in the Act, as amplified by the RFP and he repeated his explanations
regarding the Ministerial Committee 's contribution and "clarification". After
having eliminated the other unsuccessful bidders, the Minister was left with
Boshele , Ithuba, Ringeta, Sizekhaya and Wina Njalo as contenders. He stated in
this regard the following: "As between those applicants, the result was fairly
close. In substance, it was as described in my reasons, a photo finish. Those
applicants were all capable and serious contenders. Each had access, through
its technology partner or otherwise , to the requisite knowledge and experience.
Each appeared to have access to sufficient financial and other resources. Their
stated capacitation plans were generally satisfactory, their localisation and B
EBEE proposals were broadly sound and no material concerns were raised to me
that would suggest that, in general, they lacked the competence to conduct the
National Lottery and Sports Pools. The critical question therefore was what
distinguished one from the other when they were assessed comparatively against
the statutory and RFP criteria " .
[70] After having discussed Bosele and Wina Njalo, the Minister 's reasons in
respect of the remaining three bidders were set out in a separate discussion. He
stated that in relation to Ithuba he recognised several strengths of its application.
Ithuba had a clear localisation advantage because . its technology partner,
Pay tronic s, w a s locall y developed and locally based. lthuba 's localisation
Pay tronic s, w a s locall y developed and locally based. lthuba 's localisation
supplier development strategies were stronger than the others and its B-BBEE
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position was also comparatively strong. Its business plans were regarded as
credible and pragmatic and it was assessed at being likely to meet its projected
growth. At the same time however, the Minister expressed concerns. He noted
that Paytronics had not been WLA-SCS certified at the time of the submission
and its scale and track record were more limited than those of the larger
international partners. He also expressed concerns regarding the ~elative modesty
of Ithuba's plans to deal with competition and rejuvenate the current suite of
games. The Minister says he had regard to concerns expressed regarding changes
to lthuba 's Lotto and Powerball matrices which could affect the attractiveness of
those games. He also concluded that Ithuba's proposed contribution percentage
to the NLDTF was the lowest amongst the strong contenders.
[71] Regarding Ringeta, the Minister noted that it performed consistently well
throughout the evaluation process with a well-balanced bid and a technology
partner which enhanced the credibility of its proposal. Its financial model and
business plans were assessed positively. The Minister stated that although
Ringeta's projected Rand-value contributions to the NLDTF were significant, it
was not his preferred bidder. He stated that this was because its projected
contributions, particularly after excluding games outside the scope of the Act,
were materially lower than Sizekhaya's projections. The Minister expressly
mentioned that he did not exclude Ringeta on the basis of political involvement
or any alleged contravention of section 13(2)(b)(iv) of the Act.
[72] Lastly the Minister gave his reasons for choosing Sizekhaya. He said that
in his assessment Sizekhaya presented a credible and viable proposal. Its
technology partner, Genlot, was an experienced provider capable of supporting
the National Lottery and its technical capabilities were assessed as "robust". The
Minister conceded thaL, " . . . while cena tn aspects of ifs proposal attracted
Minister conceded thaL, " . . . while cena tn aspects of ifs proposal attracted
criticism, including its projected spend on new games and the need for further
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clarity regarding the Lease agreement with Genlot ... ", these concerns did not
detract from Sizekhaya 's overalJ viability of its technical and operational model.
Sizekhaya 's projected contributions to the NLDTF, even after the exclusion of
games falling outside the scope of the Act, remained higher than those of the other
bidders.
[73) In particular, the Minister relied on Genesis's assessment of Sizekhaya ' s
financial model and business plans. The Minister indicated this to be a "central
strength". Genesis assessed Sizekhaya ' s plans as feasible and attainable.
Although its projected growth was described as "ambituous" it was not assessed
as unrealistic. The Minister stated that what is of considerable importance to him,
was the projected Rand-value contribution to the NLDTF, which was the highest
of the leading applicants. The reason for this consideration was the statutory
obligation to consider which applicant was likely to maxin1ise the nett proceeds
for distribution to good causes.
[74) Regarding the concerns about this aspect the Minister stated that even if
Sizekhaya were not to achieve its projected revenues in full, the material before
him indicated that it would remain "highly competitive relative to the other
leading applicants ". Put differently , the Minister said, it would have to
underperform materially before its projected returns would fall below those of
Ringeta, Ithuba or Wina NjaJo. Having regard to the full record, the Minister said
that he concluded that Sizekhaya "pipped the other leading contenders to the
post".
The NLC's case
[75) The NLC, m an extensive affidavit, again explained the statutory
requircmcms and the background [al:LS already referred to above. It traversed the
workings and processes of the Evaluation Committee and the Adjudication
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Committee and detailed their reports. All these already formed pati of the record
and have been referred to above and by the other parties.
[76] The issue of permis sible games was also dealt with the NLC. It explained
that the RFP defines the License as authorising the conduct of a National Lottery
and Sports Pools . It does not contain a breakdown of ''permissible game types",
or an exhaustive list of games that may or may not be offered. The game types
are determined by the statutory nature of a lottery. The industry classification
which distinguishes lotteries from gambling activities, indicate that lottery and
lotto style games are permissible and governed by the Act, which includes sports
pools , while gambling games are governed by the National and Provincial
Gambling Acts. At a briefing cession on 30 and 31 August 2023 in response to
applicants ' questions, the NLC addressed this distinction and explained the
differences to all applicants, prior to their submissions. The games that were
subsequently excluded , were therefore those about which doubt existed whether
they properly constituted lottery or sports pool games and whether they were not
in the nature of gambling activities.
[77] Particularly in response to one of the concerns of the Minister referred to
earlier, the NLC also explained the referenc es to the WLA-SCS certification,
which refers to a World Lottery Association security control standard. In this
regard clause 11.21 of the .RFP provides as follows: "The applicant must ensure
compliance to the fo llowing best practice standards and information technology
governance frameworks: World Lottery Association's security control standard.
WLA-SCS (Part A and Part BJ is the lottery sector 's only internationally
recognised information security standard. 1SO27001, the international best
practice standard for information security management system and compliance
requirements, is inco,porated into the WLA-SCS standard and control objectives
requirements, is inco,porated into the WLA-SCS standard and control objectives
for information and related technology (COBJT) provides an IT governance
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framework that helps in delivering value from IT and the understanding and
managing risks associated with IT ... ".
[78] The WLA-SCS consists of four parts that specify minimum controls
necessary for the effective management of security and integrity in lottery and
sports betting operators , where the first part incorporates TSO27001 compliance
in a global scope, the second part furnishes additional 64 lottery and gaming
specific security and integrity controls representing best practice , the third party
contains 21 controls based on products and services offered by lottery and sport
betting suppliers and the fourth and final part contains 11 controls required to
participate in games run by the US Multistate Lotteries Association. It was
therefore a requirement and a necessary one that all applicants or at least their
technical operating partners , have the necessary certification to ensure integrity
of their operations .
[79] The NLC also expanded on its interactions with the Minister. In particular ,
it listed "face-to-face " interactions after the delivery of its report and asserted that
the meetings between it and the Minister and "related continuous ongoing
correspondence" constituted compliance with the statutorily required
consultative process.
Sizekhaya 's case
f80] In dealing with Ithuba 's application, Sizekhaya ' s first contention was that,
where Tolmay J had decided matters of law as opposed to matters of fact, there
was no reason why this court should not follow her decisions. It further
contended that Ithuba had not pleaded new factual material regarding the attack
on the Minister·s acceptance that Sizekhaya had fully committed funding.
Sizekh aya contended that Ithuba was " simply rehashing the same legal argument
that have already been rejected" . It needs to be pointed out however that Tolmay
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J had in her judgment expressly stated that a court dealing with an application for
interim relief should be careful when taking a peek into review grounds. She
expressed the view that regarding those grounds , her role was limited to an
analysis of whether an interim interdict should be granted or not and was not
binding on the review court. This restraint was expressed in respect of both
matters of Jaw and of fact. Furthermore, it appears that at the consideration of the
application for interim relief in the urgent court, the documentation relating to
Sizekhaya ' s funding was not dealt with as extensively as in this review court.
Ringeta had also not yet featured in the litigation at that time.
[81] Nevertheless , Sizekhaya repeated the evidence adduced in the interim
application (with substantial redactions in accordance with the confidentiality
regime agreed to by the parties and imposed on the papers).
[82] The unredacted evidence indicated that the Gold Rush Group was a 50%
shareholder of Sizekhaya. Its ultimate holding company , Gold Rush Holdings
Limited was a JSE listed entity with a market capitalisation of over RI billion.
These shareholders would, through their bankers, provide funding for whatever
initial capital expenditure Sizekhaya might have needed, be it in respect oflottery
tem1inals to be installed in retailers or otherwise.
[83] Sizekhaya pointed out that Tolmay J had held (in paragraphs 14 to 18 of
her judgment) that sect ion l 3(2)(b )(ii) only requires the Minister to be satisfied
that a bidder has access to the necessary financial resources. This entailed
forming a rational opinion and did not require absolute certainty or w1conditional
documentation . [nsofar as the recourse to resources or loan facilities were subject
to conditions precedent , including final documentation and award of the Licence,
these were correctly assessed by the Minister as being standard administrative
these were correctly assessed by the Minister as being standard administrative
conditions. When considering the financial viability by the Minister with reliance
on the Genesis report, which affirmed the credibility and viability of Sizekhaya's
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structured funding, he had acted rationally. Sizekhaya also referred to the
observation made in Gidani III that expecting any commercial entity to commit
irrevocably before any final award would be absurd and that neither the Act nor
the RFP required such absolute certainty or unconditionality.
[84] According to Sizekhaya, Ithuba' s contention that it was not sufficient that
Sizekhaya had paid the required licence fees, provided the Minister with a
perfonnance bond and had in placed a finance lease agreement for the terminals
when it concluded the Licence agreement, should be rejected. The same rejection
applied to Ithuba's contention that Sizekhaya and not Gold Rush, should have
concluded the facility agreement for the R240 million working capital before
concluding the Licence Agreement, irrespective of the fact that such working
capital funding was not immediately required and would only be required much
later during the transaction period.
[85] Based on the above, Sizekhaya argued that the rationality test does not
require that the Minister' s decision be the only or even the best of possible
options, it only has to be one of a possible myriad of options, as long as it is
reasonable. Even if the Minister had displayed a "risk appetite"9, a decision based
thereon was neither irrational nor unreasonable. The argument was further that,
in circumstances where all applicants were ring-fenced companies, which was a
requirement imposed by the RFP, it would not have been unreasonable to have
regard to a bidder' s main shareholders and its undertakings. This would also
include the shareholders' relationships with financial institutions. When viewed
from this perspective, Sizekhaya contends that the Minister' s satisfaction as to
Sizekhaya's committed funding via its shareholders, was neither unreasonable
nor irrational.
• Gidani II, at para. 51 and 52.
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[86] On the issue of how the Minister arrived at his decision, Sizekhaya argued
that the Minister was not bound to use the weightings applied to various criteria
by the Evaluation Committee or the Adjudication Committee. The RFP was only
designed to provide a mechanism of how these two committees evaluated the
applications. It was not designed to predict how the Minister makes his decision
and, unless one were to find that the judgments in Gidani II and III were clearly
wrong on this issue and how those judgments had evaluated the role of the RFP,
then it must follow that the Minister was not bound by the rankings or
determinations arrived at by these two committees , to which one can add the
verification determination performed by the QAC.
[87] Sizek.haya further argued that once it is accepted that the RFP only provides
for the evaluation processes , ending with recommendations to the Minister by the
NLC, then the RFP does not prescribe in what manner the Minister has to reach
his decision. Sizek.haya argued that the use of the Ministerial Committee by the
Minister was entirely reasonable and ifhe had not invoked such a mechanism, he
could be accused of merely rubber-stamping the recommendations of the other
committees , or even the NLC.
[88] In respect of Ringeta 's case, Sizekhaya advanced the same argument and
argued that the Minister's reliance on the Genesis report was not unreasonable
and if that had resulted in different weighting being applied, then the Minister
was entirely entitled to rely thereon and that this was dispositive of the rationality
argument.
[89] Regarding the issue or probity and particular the accusation by Ithuba that
insufficient probity examinations had been performed in respect of the Chinese
company , Genlot Game Technology Company Limited, Sizekhaya's answer was
chat Lhere was no contractual relationship between Sizek.haya and the Chinese
company, Sizekhaya's contract was with the South African company Genlot SA
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Information Technology (Pty) Ltd. When probity is to be discussed , it is limited
to shareholding of an applicant itself and neither the RFP nor the Act extends the
requirement to shareholding of contractors.
Evaluation
[90] From what has been stated above, it is clear that there are three main issues
which may be dispositive of the whole matter. These are the issues relating to the
Ministerial Committee, the committed funding issue and the probity issue. The
lastmentioned also en com passes the issue raised by the EFF. I shall deal with
these three issues separately hereunder.
The Ministerial Committee
[91] The first question to be answered is whether the creation and use of the
Ministerial Committee was permitted by the RFP and, if not, whether the
Minister 's reliance on the report of the Ministeria) Committee constitutes a
procedural irregularity or whether he had acted ultra vires in doing so. Ln my
view, it could notionally be both.
[92] As already indicated, the RFP regulates the process for the award of the
license and its contents may not be disregarded or deviated from "at whim" 10. The
RFP does not make any mention of the creation of a Ministerial Committee. It
envisages evaluation by the Evaluation Committee and adjudication by the
Adjudication Committee, with quality assurance throughout. Thereafter a final
quality assurance is performed by the QAC, with members thereof appointed by
the Minister. The final stage envisaged by the RFP was when the Minister, after
consultation with the NLC, would take the final decision to award the License' 1.
10 Al/poy :,t para 40,
10 Al/poy :,t para 40,
11 This framework is dealt with in detail in the RFP, but features right at the commencement thereof. After the definitions set out in clause 1, clause 2.1.5 of the RFP explains the process to bidders as follows: "The Minister, after consultation with the NLC, is responsible for issuing a license in terms of the Lotteries Act. .. This follows an evaluation process, independent audit thereof by external audito rs and concluding negotiations for a license".
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[93] On the face of it then, the unilateral insertion of a further process, namely
a re-evaluation of everything that had gone before by another body, in this case
the Ministerial Committee, would be procedurally unfair. This procedural
unfairness is exacerbated by the fact that in casu such insertion took place without
the knowledge of the applicants and permitted a different weighting to be applied
to the criteria which the RFP had informed the bidders would be used to assess
their bids.
[94] In addition to the procedural unfairness , the creation of a new evaluative
body not contemplated by the RFP, might be beyond the powers of the Minister
and, if so, then ultra vires. It is common cause that, although he was empowered
to do so 12, the Minister had not made any changes or "modifications " to the RFP
to "amend or augment" it by, for example, providing for a re-evaluation process.
[95] On behalf of the Minister it was argued that the creation and use of the
Ministerial Committee was permitted by the RFP and therefore neither unfair nor
ultra vires. This argument has two legs. The first is that the RFP contemplates
that the Minister (and the NLC for that matter) may make use of "advisors" and
the second leg is that the RFP does not prescribe the method by which the
Minister must make up his mind.
[96] Regarding the first leg, the only definition of advisors contained in the
RFP, is that it " ... means external third-party advisers and consultants appointed
by the Minister , the DTJC13 or the NLC in respect of this RFP ... "14.
[97] The Ministerial Committee, although it in tum made use of consultants,
was not made up of outside third parties , nor were the members themselves
12 In terms of clauses 2.10.1 and 6.1 of the RFP.
13
The Department of Trade, Industry and Competition.
14 Clause 1.1.2 of the RFP.
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consultants. The members were, save for some exclusions, such as an outside
senior counse l, the same as the QAC, but now acting with a different mandate .
[98] Although the RFP, when making reference in various of its provisions to
decisions taken by the NLC and the Minister, such as whether a response to a
query by a bidder might unduly benefit it over other bidders, include references
to "advisors", all the crucial provisions relating to issues about which the Minister
must be satisfied or when he makes his final election , significantly excludes such
references .
[99] On a pure linguistic evaluation of the provisions of the RFP, I am therefore
of the view that the first leg of the Minister's argument , namely that the RFP
provided that he may make use of "advisors" to reach his conclusion and that
such use extends to the creation of a new committee , is not correct. The members
of the Ministerial Committee, were neither "advisors" of the category
contemplated by the RFP, nor did they merely "advise". The members were
firstly, as indicated earlier, largely in-house departmental employees as opposed
to being third parties and secondly , they ran, in the words of the applicants a
"parallel process " to that of the Eva luation Committee and the Adjudication
Committee. This "paralJel process" was also not an evaluation and advisory
process , but a complete re-evaluation process with its own, unilaterally assessed
criteria. The Minister' s assertion that these criteria were ''drawn down" from the
RFP cannot hold water. Apart from the linguistic absence of foreseeing such a
proce ss, a purposive interpretation 15 of the RFP indicates that it contemplated a
process which is fair and made known to applicants before they embarked on
tailoring and submitting their applications . A subsequent re-evaluation by an
unknown body was clearly not envisaged by the RFP and should therefore not
have been permissible.
have been permissible.
15 See Natal joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).
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[100] This brings me to the second leg of the argument advanced on behalf of the
Minister, namely that neither the Act nor the RFP prescribes how the Minister
must make up his mind and if he chose to do so by way of input from a new
committee appointed by him, then so be it. The fallacy, to my mind, with this
argument lies in the terms of reference given to the Ministerial Committee. It was
not required to look at or consider the reports put before the Minister and to advise
him thereon, it was required to re-evaluate all the scoring criteria, which it did.
New evaluations were performed with the use of new consultants, which resulted
in new rankings and preferences of bidders. The results of this "parallel process"
were adopted by the Minister, despite his disavowal thereof, to the extent that his
reasons for his decision, as quoted earlier, often followed the Ministerial
Committee's recommendations word for word.
[101] I accept the Minister's bona fides and will not go as far as to find that he
had abdicated his decision-making power to the Ministerial Committee or that he
had improperly followed its lead, but I do find that the creation and use of a
committee not contemplated by the RFP amounted to an unlawful and
procedurally unfair manner in which the Minister had decided to exercise his
decision-making powers.
[102] It follows that the decision falls foul of the procedurally fair requirement
for administrative actions16 and must be set aside.
The committed funding issue
[103] As already indicated earlier, the conditions precedent for the furnishing of
funding to Sizekhaya required more than the mere "standard administrative
processes" accepted as sufficient in Gidani III, but the ultimate question still is
16
Section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA).
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whether the Minister had acted reasonably in being satisfied with the proposal put
forward by Sizekhaya.
[ 104 J It is clear from the papers that the Minister had been aware that Sizekhaya' s
funding was subject to certain conditions precedent. When considering this
aspect, the Minister permissibly had regard to the Genesis report 17, which
affirmed the credibility and structure of Sizekhaya ' s structured funding plan. The
absence of a finalised loan agreement did not render the application non
compliant and 1 have already referred thereto that it was remarked in Gidani III
that to expect a commercial entity to commit irrevocably by way of a final
agreement prior to the award of a license or the finalisation of the license
agreement itself, would be absurd. This view was also shared by Tolmay Jin the
preceding application for an interim interdict. I respectfully align myself with
these views.
[l 05] I further find that the following finding in Gidani IJ18 is also applicable to
this dispute (where the shoe was on the other foot and Ithuba was the successful
applicant): "Perhaps the decision can be characterised as displaying an excessive
appetite for risk ... Even if the decision to appoint lthuba as the Preferred
Applicant can be criticised on this score, ii is neither irrational nor
unreasonable ". Although the above comments were made in respect of projected
income and turnover and not in respect of funding commitment, the funding issue
is not as linear as the applicants suggest.
[ 106] It was not unreasonable for the Minister , when considering the prospective
funding of Sizekhaya , to also look at the capability of its shareholders. I accept
the argument that this is even more so when one must bear in mind that each
bidder was required to be a single purpose entity, ringfenced only to run the
bidder was required to be a single purpose entity, ringfenced only to run the
17 As already found , the use of the Ministerial Committee was impermissible. The Min ister may, however, have made use of consultant s, such as Genesis, which fell into the definition of "advisors", as earlier indicated. 18 At paras 51 and 52.
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National Lottery and nothing else19. It was therefore also neither unreasonable
nor irrational for the Minister to have regard to the backing and support of
Sizekhaya's shareholder's relationship with its own banker. Having done so, the
Minister was "satisfied" , despite associated contingent risk. I find that this was
neither irrational, nor unreasonable and that the review attack on this aspect must
fail.
The probity issue
[107] The probity issue encompasses two aspects. One relates to possible
political patronage or benefit and the other to prospective applicants being fit and
proper".
[108] In terms of section 13(2)(b)(iv) of the Act, read with the definitions
contained in section 1 thereof, the Minister had to be satisfied that no political
party, political office bearer, which includes a member of Parliament or
provincial legislature, a member of a house or council of traditional leaders, a
member of a municipal council and any official of a political party, alliance or
movement, has any direct financial interest in an applicant for the award of the
Licence or a shareholder of such applicant. The RFP extended this requirement
to include also indirect financial interests.
[I 09] In terms of section 13(3) of the Act, the Minister also had to take into
account that the persons who would be likely to manage the business of running
the national Lottery would do so "with all due propriety and strictly in
accordance with the Constitution ... ".
[ 11 O] In order to assess and verify these requirements, the SSA had conducted a
vetting process and another consultant, Experian, had conducted credit checks.
19
As prescribed in clause 5.2.3 of the RFP, hence also the suffix "RF" to the applicant s' names.
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[111] In respect of Ringeta, the position in relation to the above issues, were
found to be the following: Ringeta Consortium Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Ringeta
Consortium) was a 51 % shareholder of Ringeta. Thebe SPY 021 (Pty) Ltd
(Thebe) was in tum a 49% shareholder of Ringeta Consortium. Thebe Investment
Consortium (Pty) Ltd (Thebe Investment) was in tum the sole shareholder of
Thebe. The Batho Batho Trust (BBT) was a 70% shareholder of Thebe
Investment. Dr Sibongiseni Dhlomo is an ANC member of Parliament and is a
trustee of BBT. Thebe Investment is headed by Mr Nhlanhla Nene, a former
Minister of Finance.
[112] The AC had found that Dr Dhlomo is not a beneficiary of the BBT and
therefore holds no direct or indirect financial interest therein. It further found that
"the mere receipt of funding by a political party from a shareholder of an
applicant !for the License}, in the absence of other direct financial interest held
by the political party in an applicant or shareholder of that applicant does not
fall within the scope of section 13 (2) (b) (iv) ... ".
[113] The QAC disagreed and recommended that the Minister obtain legal advice
on this point. Apparently the Minister has sought such advice, but its outcome is
unknown. In addition, the QAC recommended in respect of both Ringeta and
Sizekhaya that, were the Minister to appoint either of them, that undertakings be
obtained that they would not fund any political parties. I found no indication that
the Minister had seriously considered this recommendation by the QAC. He will
have to do so when reconsidering his decision pursuant to the finding already
reached above.
(114] The EFF 's contribution to this issue is that, against the backdrop of
historically identified improper flows of millions of Rands to entities connected
to NLC members, tabled by the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) before the
Portfolio Committee on Trade, Industry and Competition, it contended that the
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scope of section 13 (2)(b )(iv) should not be limited to only direct financial
interests, but also indirect financial interests. It incorporated by reference its
papers delivered initially in the review application launched by Lekalinga.
Therein, with reliance on what was labelled investigative journalism by way of
reports by AmaBhungane dated 22 June 2025 and 27 June 2025, concerns were
raised relating to indirect links of politically connected individuals. The allegation
was that Ms Kbumo Bogatso, who is the sister of Deputy President Paul
Mashatile 's wife, Ms Humile Mashatile, is a director and co-owner of Bellamont
Gaming. She is also engaged to Mr Sibusiso Shabalala, who is a cousin of Mr
Moses Tembe, who also serves as a director of Bellamont and who is the
chairperson of Sizekhaya. Bellamont is a minority shareholder of Sizekhaya.
[115] I have already indicated that the EFF made it clear that it did not impugn
any of the persons referred to above, but merely sought, as a matter of law, to
have the requirement contained in the Act widened.
[ 116] A court must always guard against overstepping the line delineating the
separation of powers. It is surely within the ambit of Parliament to broaden the
scope of section 1 3 (2 )(b )(iv) in the manner suggested by the EFF. Must this court
then tread on legislative powers? It is not necessary to do so in the present
instance as the RFP has already, by its terms, broadened the prohibition to include
indirect financial interests. I find that I am therefore bound by the general
principle that, where it is possible for a court to decide a case, be it civil or
criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, it should do so20. For this reason
the relief sought by the EFF, cannot be granted and should be pursued by way of
legislative reform.
20
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC) a para
21, reliant on 5 v Mhungu 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC).
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[117] Having reached the above conclusions, I find it unnecessary to deal with
the other, more peripheral issues raised by the parties.
Remedy
[I 18] ln the event that the Minister 's decision is reviewed and set aside, none of
the parties seriously contended that this court should substitute any decision for
that of the Minister. The circumstances indicate that, where the decision of the
Minister is reviewed, the appropriate relief should be a remittal. The parties
however differed in their approach to the extent of the remittal and the extent of
interim relief.
[119] Ithuba, in an amended notice of motion, proposed that the Licence
Agreement concluded with Sizekhaya be declared unconstitutional , unlawful and
invalid and that the matter be remitted to the Minister and the NLC "to re-run the
tender process in terms of the RFP". It argued that there should not be any need
for a suspension of the setting aside of the award and the agreement but, if it were
to be suspended timelines need be determined for the re-running of the process.
[120] Ringeta , although it initially contended for a substitution , aligned itself
with the views of lthuba.
[ 121] The EFF contended that a declaration should be made on the
unconstitutionality of the narrow confines of section 13(2)(b) which should then
result in a suspension of the licence whilst the declaration of constitutional
invalidity is referred to the Constitutional Court. Apart from the fact that the relief
sought by the EFF should not be granted, for the reasons already stated, the
wholesale suspension of the National Lottery would prejudice so many other
innocent parties, as I shall indicate hereunder, that such relief would not be in the
public interest.
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[122] The Minister contended that, should the review be successful, it should be
limited to his decision-making and not what had gone before and accordingly a
remittaJ to himself should be more appropriate than a re-running of the whole
RFP process. The Minister is also in favour of a suspension in the meantime.
[123] The NLC argued that the only just and equitable remedy, should the review
succeed, was a referral of the decision back to the Minister for reconsideration
within a stipulated time period with a suspension of such declaration of invalidity
for a period of 12 months, divided as follows: 6 months to enable the NLC and
the Minister to reconsider the award and make a fresh decision and 6 months from
the end of that period to allow for transition for the successful applicant to take
over the operations from Sizekhaya, should Sizekhaya not be confirmed again as
the successful applicant.
[124] Once the remittal is contemplated, a court should also be mindful of not
unduly fettering he discretion of a decision-maker by ordering restrictive
directives. I shall therefore restrict the directions to those relating to the
Ministerial Committee.
Grounds for suspension
[I 25] The following relevant considerations raised by the parties are material to
the issue of the suspension of any declaration of invalidity: The NLDTF is
established in terms of section 21 of the Act. In terms of section 26 of the Act,
the revenue of the NLDTF is allocated for distribution to fund charitable
expenditure, expenditure on or connected with the development of sport and
recreation; expenditure on or connected with the arts, culture and the national
historical, natural, cultural and architectural heritage and expenditure in respect
of any other matter approved by the Minister for that purpose. If the suspension
remedy is not granted, the public interest will be adversely and irremediably
affected. Old-age homes, children's homes and the like all depend on this
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expenditure to fulfil their functions in the public interest. Without regular
contributions to the NLDTF from the uninterrupted conduct of the National
Lottery, these good causes will be adversely affected. The final determination of
the review applications, including by way of appeal, will take years to achieve.
In those years, the NLC will not have funds to continue supporting the good
causes as envisaged in the Lotteries Act. There is every justification to avoid this
consequence and a suspension of the declaration of invalidity of the License
Agreement , is therefore justifiabl e.
Costs
[ 126] I fand that, despite the fact that the EFF had not achieved success in respect
of its application (and would have to revert to Parliament for the legislative
amendments it seeks), it still bona fide pursued what it believed to be a
Constitutional issue. I find that the Biowatch-principle should therefore apply. In
respect of the review applications , I find no cogent reason why the customary rule
that costs follow the success of litigation, should not apply.
Order
[127] In the premises, the following order is granted:
., 'r
1. The decision of the Minist.~r:ofTrade , Industry and Competition (the
Minister) to award the Pou~h National Lottery and Sports Pools
License (the License) to Sizekhaya Holdings RF (Pty) Ltd
(Sizekhaya), is hereby reviewed and set aside.
2. The License Agreement concluded between the Minister, the
National Lotteries Commission and Sizekhaya pursuant to the award
of the License is declared invalid .
•
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3. The issue of the award the License is referred back to the Minister
for reconsideration.
4. In taking the decision to award the License afresh, the Minister is
directed to disregard the report of the Ministerial Committee and the
recommendations made by it.
5. The declaration of invalidity made in para 2 above, is suspended for
two consecutive periods of six months from date hereof, the first
period to allow the Minister the opportunity to decide to award the
license afresh and the second period to allow the Minister to
negotiate and conclude a new Licence Agreement and to make
transitional arrangements, should the decision be to not award the
Licence to Sizekhaya.
6. The application by the Economic Freedom Fighters (the EFF) is
refused.
7. In respect of the application of the EFF and the costs occasioned
thereby, including the applications for intervention, each party
thereto shall pay its own costs.
8. In respect of the applications by lthuba Lottery RF (Pty) Ltd and
Ringeta Consortium RF (Pty) Ltd, the first, second and third
respondents in the respective applications, shall jointly and
separately pay the costs of these applications.
9. All costs orders shall include the costs occasioned by the briefing of
multiple counsel, including Senior counsel. For purpo ses of taxation,
such costs shall be on scale C as contemplated by Rule 67.
076-64
so
/ "
J\VIS
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Division, Pretoria
Date of Hearing: 03 July 2026
Judgment delivered: 2 November 2026
APPEARANCES:
Case no: 108644/2025
For the Applicant: Adv A Cockre ll SC together with
Adv J Davis
Attorney for the Applicant: Roodt Mkhabela Attorneys Inc., Westcliff
For the intervening party: Adv M Ka-Soboto together with
Adv T Masv ikwa
Attorney for the intervening party: England Slabbert Attorneys Inc.
For the First Respondent:
Attorney for the First Respondent:
For the Second Responde nt:
c/o Lautenberg Morris Attorneys. Pretoria
Adv IV Maleka SC together with
Adv JA Motepe SC & Adv KD Magano
Bowman GilfilJan Inc., Pretoria
Adv H Maenetje SC together with
Adv B Lekokotla & Adv N Sakata
Attorney for the Second Respondent: Malatji & Co Attorneys , Sandton
c/o Ditscla Anomeys. Pretoria
076-64
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076-65
For the Third Respondent: Adv F Snyckers SC together with
Adv I Currie and Adv N Luthuli
Attorney for the Third Respondent: Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr , Johannesburg
c/o Asger Gani Attorneys, Pretoria
For the Sixth Respondent: Adv A Stein SC together with
Adv M ZGwala
Attorney for the Sixth Respondent: Nortons Inc., Johannesburg
CASE NO: 228028/2025
For the Applicant:
Attorney for the Applicant:
For the intervening party:
Attorney for the intervening party:
Adv A Stein SC together with
Adv M. Z. Gwala
Nortons Inc., Johannesburg
Adv M Ka-Soboto together with
Adv T Masvikwa
England Slabbert Attorneys Inc.
51
c/o Lautenberg MoITis Attorneys , Pretoria
For the First Respondent:
Attorney for the First Respondent:
For the Second Respondent:
Adv IV Maleka SC together with
Adv JA Motepe SC & Adv KD Magano
Bowman Gilfillan Inc., Pretoria
Adv H Maenetje SC together with
Adv B Lekokotla & Adv N Sakata
Attorney for the Second Resp0ndent: Malatji & Co Attorneys , Sandton
c/o Ditsela Attorneys , Pretoria
For the Third Respond e nt: Adv F Sny ckcrs SC together with
Adv I Currie Adv N Luthuli
076-66
076-66
Attorney for the Third Respondent: Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, Johannesburg
c/o Asger Gani Attorneys , Pretoria
For the Fourth Respondent: Adv A Cockrell SC together with
Adv J Davis
52
Attorney for the Fourth Respondent: Roodt Mkhabela Attorneys Inc., Westcliff