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[2026] ZAGPPHC 1265
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Ehlers and Others v Willemse (2024-094886; 2023-013850) [2026] ZAGPPHC 1265 (30 October 2026)
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IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
Case
No:
2024-094886
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED.
30
October 2026
In
the matter between:
ETTIENNE
EHLERS
YOLANDE
EHLERS
LEATILE
CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECTS CC
First
Applicant
Second
Applicant
Third
Applicant
and
SAN
MARIE WILLEMSE
First
Respondent
Case
No:
2023-013850
In
the matter between:
ETTIENNE
EHLERS
YOLANDE
EHLERS
LEATILE
CONSTRUCTION AND PROJECTS CC
First
Applicant
Second
Applicant
Third
Applicant
and
CHRISTO
BEKKER INC ATTORNEYS
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
H.R. GROENEWALD, AJ
Background:
[1]
The applicants seek an order
setting
aside the warrants of execution issued under the two case numbers
appearing above, alternatively staying execution pending
the final
determination of the underlying actions between the parties. They
invoke Uniform Rule 45A. The respondents oppose the
application.
[2]
A preliminary issue concerns the
applicants’ request for leave to introduce a further affidavit
and a transcript of evidence
given by Mr Christo Bekker (Bekker) in
separate proceedings. The affidavit was delivered approximately two
weeks before the hearing.
The respondents oppose its admission.
Although argument on this issue and the merits overlapped, they
require separate determination.
[3]
The parties have a protracted and acrimonious litigation history. The
applicants were
unsuccessful in an application for joinder and in
opposing an application for an interdict. Costs orders followed,
pursuant to
which the respondents caused warrants of execution to be
issued. The applicants seek to defer enforcement of those costs
orders
until the underlying litigation has been determined.
[4]
The applicants do not challenge the validity of the costs orders, nor
do they propose
to seek their rescission or reversal. Their case is
that execution would cause irreversible prejudice, that the
respondents are
adequately protected by an interdict relating to
immovable property, and that Bekker’s alleged conduct provides
grounds for
staying execution.
[5]
The respondents’ objection concerning the non-joinder of the
sheriff was not
pursued in argument. In view of the conclusion
reached below, it is unnecessary to determine that objection. The
respondents’
contention that the application constitutes an
abuse of process was advanced as part of their opposition to the
relief and their
submissions on costs.
I.
The further affidavit
[6]
Bekker is the deponent to the answering affidavit and the attorney
associated with
the second respondent. The applicants seek to
introduce a transcript of evidence he gave before Vuma J on 9 June
2026 in
Christo Bekker Incorporated v Raziserve (Pty) Ltd
,
case number 111982/2024, in this Division. They contend that his
evidence substantiates allegations already advanced in their
founding
papers concerning his handling of trust and other funds.
[7]
The respondents objected to the delay in bringing the evidence and
the incomplete
and insufficiently contextualised presentation of the
transcript. They submit that the applicants have not explained the
delay
in presenting it, and take issue with the context. The Court
also understood the objection to be that the applicants had not
adequately
explained the context thereof. They further submitted that
the Court should refrain from making findings concerning Bekker’s
conduct while judgment in those proceedings remains outstanding.
[8]
Only part of the transcript accompanied the further affidavit. The
Court was informed
that a second part had been uploaded to the
electronic case file during the week of the hearing. The applicants
nevertheless stated
that they did not rely on that portion. Its
presence on the electronic file does not, without an explanation of
its relevance and
context, resolve the difficulty created by reliance
on selected passages.
[9]
Rule 6(5)(e) permits the Court, in its discretion, to allow further
affidavits. The
ordinary sequence of founding, answering and replying
affidavits serves the orderly and fair determination of motion
proceedings.
A party seeking to depart from that sequence must show
good reason. The explanation for the late introduction of the
evidence,
its materiality, the stage of the proceedings and the
prejudice to the opposing party are relevant considerations. See
Hano
Trading CC v JR 209 Investments (Pty) Ltd
2013 (1) SA 161
(SCA) at [10]–[12].
[10]
The discretion must be exercised with due regard to the desirability
of deciding the dispute
on the relevant facts and to fairness to both
sides. The enquiry does not, however, end there. It is also necessary
to consider
whether admitting the evidence would materially assist in
determining the issues and whether its late introduction has been
satisfactorily
justified.
[11]
The applicants have not satisfactorily addressed those
considerations. In particular, they have
not adequately established
the material connection between the selected evidence in the separate
proceedings and the test applicable
to the present application for a
stay of execution. Their reliance on the transcript is principally
directed at substantiating
allegations of misconduct by Bekker. It
does not sufficiently explain how that evidence demonstrates an
improper purpose in the
enforcement of these costs orders or the
injustice said to follow from execution.
[12]
The lack of adequate context, the limited explanation for the late
tender of the evidence and
the failure to establish its materiality
weigh against its admission. I therefore decline to admit the further
affidavit and the
transcript tendered through it. This ruling entails
no finding on the truth of the allegations against Bekker or on the
issues
awaiting determination in the separate proceedings.
II.
The principles governing suspension of
execution
[13]
Rule 45A confers a discretion to suspend enforcement of an order.
That discretion must be exercised
judicially. The governing
consideration is whether real and substantial justice requires a stay
or whether injustice would otherwise
result. In
Van Rensburg NO
and Another v Naidoo NO and Others; Naidoo NO and Others v Van
Rensburg NO and Others
2011 (4) SA 149
(SCA) at [51]–[52],
the Supreme Court of Appeal recognised suspension where the
underlying causa is disputed or no longer
exists, or where execution
is employed for ulterior purposes.
[14]
In
Newnet
Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Sunshine Hospital v Road Accident Fund
[1]
[2025] ZASCA 19
at
[26]
–[27], the Supreme Court of Appeal
reaffirmed those principles and stated that an applicant seeking
relief under Rule 45A
must establish a prima facie right, a
well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if relief is refused,
a balance of convenience
favouring the order, and the absence of
another satisfactory remedy.
[15]
The respondents contend that the applicants’ acceptance of the
validity of the costs orders
is dispositive of the application. I do
not agree. A challenge to the validity of an order is not an
invariable prerequisite for
suspension of its enforcement. A stay
regulates execution and need not entail reconsideration of the merits
of the judgment. Nevertheless,
the applicants must establish
sufficient grounds for deferring enforcement of a judgment whose
validity they accept.
[16]
The costs orders remain binding. Their validity and the respondents’
entitlement to enforce
them are material considerations. Rule 45A
does not provide an opportunity to reopen matters finally determined
or to postpone
payment merely because the judgment debtor would
prefer to await the outcome of other litigation. The applicants must
place facts
before the Court demonstrating why a stay is required in
the circumstances of this case.
III.
The grounds advanced by the applicants
[17]
The applicants’ ground is expressed,
inter alia
in
paragraphs 7.8, 7.12 and 7.13 of the founding affidavit. They
describe the purpose of the application as the prevention of
irreversible prejudice pending the determination of the main action.
They assert that attachment would cause irreversible prejudice
to
them and their business, whereas the respondents would suffer no
prejudice because they already enjoy security under the interdict
over immovable property. They further rely on their alleged lack of
prior knowledge of the second respondent’s mismanagement
of
trust and other funds.
[18]
Those contentions require consideration of the anticipated outcome of
the pending litigation,
the effect of the alleged security, the
relevance of Bekker’s alleged conduct, and the evidence of harm
said to justify intervention.
IV.
The anticipated recovery and set-off
[19]
In argument, the applicants had difficulty identifying the basis upon
which the outcome of the
pending litigation would justify withholding
payment of the existing costs debts. Their contention was, in
substance, that success
in those proceedings might yield a favourable
costs order. When this was explored, they initially suggested that
set-off would
follow, although they subsequently sought to
characterise their case differently.
[20]
To the extent that the applicants rely on set-off, the difficulty is
that they have not established
an existing reciprocal debt capable of
extinguishing the respondents’ costs claims. A possible future
costs award depends
upon the outcome of litigation and the terms of
any order ultimately made. It does not constitute a current and
established counterclaim
capable of extinguishing the existing costs
debts by set-off.
[21]
In
Cooper v Feinstein
[2005] ZAWCHC 28
at
[16]
–[19],
the Court considered the disputed basis for set-off, the relevance of
interdict principles and the circumstances governing
a stay. The
judgment recognises that there is no inflexible rule and that the
enquiry depends on the facts. It does not support
the proposition
that the mere pendency of further litigation entitles a debtor to
withhold payment under an existing costs order.
[22]
The applicants’ anticipated recovery is uncertain. Whether
their contention is described
as prospective set-off or as a reason
for postponing payment, it does not, without further facts
establishing injustice, justify
a stay. Their additional grounds of
prejudice and alleged misconduct must therefore be assessed
separately.
V.
The alleged security
[23]
The applicants contend that the interdict relating to immovable
property provides the respondents
with security for capital and
costs, whereas the applicants enjoy no equivalent protection. The
respondents submit that Rule 45A
is not a mechanism for obtaining
security for costs.
[24]
The existence of adequate protection for the respondents is relevant
to the balance of convenience.
It does not, however, establish that
execution would cause the applicants irreparable harm or substantial
injustice. Even accepting,
in the applicants’ favour, that the
respondents are adequately secured, the applicants must still
establish a sufficient
basis for suspending enforcement. The absence
of corresponding security in their own favour does not, by itself,
supply that basis.
VI.
The allegations concerning Bekker
[25]
The applicants place considerable emphasis on Bekker’s alleged
actions and motives. Their
allegations concern his conduct before
judgment and, in material respects, before the litigation commenced.
The respondents contend
that these allegations do not justify staying
execution.
[26]
A distinction must be drawn between allegations of misconduct in the
parties’ earlier dealings
and facts showing that the present
execution process is being employed for an ulterior purpose. Earlier
conduct is not necessarily
irrelevant merely because it predates
judgment, but it cannot be equated with conduct in the execution
process. Its significance
depends upon whether it establishes the
requisite connection to the execution now sought to be restrained or
to the injustice that
execution would cause.
[27]
The applicants have not established that connection. Their
allegations are principally directed
at Bekker’s handling of
funds and his conduct in other dealings. They do not sufficiently
demonstrate why enforcement of
these particular costs orders
constitutes an abuse of the execution process. An allegation that a
successful litigant previously
acted improperly does not, without
that connection, justify suspending an otherwise enforceable costs
order.
[28]
The relief is sought against both respondents, whereas the
allegations of misconduct are directed
principally at Bekker and the
second respondent. Asked to explain the basis for relief against the
first respondent, the applicants
relied on the second respondent’s
role as her attorney and agent. That relationship, without further
facts connecting the
alleged conduct to execution on her behalf, does
not establish grounds for staying execution. The applicants have not
sufficiently
explained why the allegations concerning Bekker justify
the relief sought against her.
[29]
It is unnecessary to determine the merits of the allegations against
Bekker. I make no finding
concerning his integrity, professional
conduct or handling of funds. The conclusion is confined to the
applicants’ failure
to show that those allegations establish
grounds for the suspension of execution in this application.
VII.
Harm and the exercise of the discretion
[30]
The applicants assert that execution will cause irreversible
prejudice to them and their business.
Those assertions are not
supported by sufficient evidence explaining the commercial
consequences of execution or the nature and
extent of the substantial
harm they apprehend. The Court is accordingly unable to conclude that
enforcement will produce the irreparable
harm or substantial
injustice upon which the application depends.
[31]
Those allegations identify the conclusion the applicants ask the
Court to reach. They do not
adequately establish the factual basis
for that conclusion. Nor does the alleged absence of prejudice to the
respondents cure that
deficiency. A balance of convenience favourable
to the applicants, even if assumed, does not itself demonstrate that
execution
would cause the injustice necessary to warrant
intervention.
[32]
In
Stoffberg NO and Another v Capital Harvest (Pty) Ltd
[2021] ZAWCHC 37
at
[27]
–[28], the Court weighed the protection
afforded to the creditor against the substantial consequences of
execution, while
cautioning that a stay is not available merely upon
a plea ad misericordiam. The discretion requires a sufficient factual
foundation.
On the evidence presented here, the applicants have not
established such a foundation.
[33]
The relief sought would also defer enforcement until the finalisation
of the underlying actions,
the duration of which remains uncertain.
The respondents’ entitlement to payment would consequently be
postponed for a potentially
substantial period. That consideration
reinforces the need for a properly substantiated case. It is not, by
itself, decisive: the
principal difficulty is that the applicants
have not established grounds warranting a stay at all, whether for
the period requested
or for a shorter period.
[34]
A stay necessarily delays the creditor’s exercise of rights
under the judgment. That consequence
cannot itself exclude relief
under Rule 45A. Equally, the discretion to regulate execution must be
exercised with due regard to
the binding force and finality of Court
orders. In this case, the uncertainty of the anticipated recovery,
the absence of a demonstrated
improper purpose in execution, and the
insufficient evidence of harm do not justify postponing enforcement.
[35]
The applicants have therefore failed to establish a sufficient basis
for suspending execution.
Their acceptance of the validity of the
costs orders does not preclude relief in principle, but the grounds
advanced do not justify
it on these facts. The case presented
likewise provides no basis for the principal relief sought, namely
the setting aside of the
warrants.
VIII.
Costs
[36]
Both sides seek punitive costs. The respondents also contend that a
costs order de bonis propriis
is appropriate against the applicants’
attorney, who is the second applicant’s father. The family
relationship does
not, without more, justify such an order. The
relevant enquiry concerns the attorney’s conduct of the
litigation, rather
than his relationship with a client.
[37]
Although the application is unsuccessful and the grounds advanced do
not justify the relief,
that does not, without more, establish mala
fides or warrant punitive costs. Rule 45A makes relief of this nature
available in
appropriate circumstances. Merely invoking it
unsuccessfully does not justify a punitive order. I am not persuaded
that the circumstances
warrant either punitive costs or an order de
bonis propriis. The ordinary rule that costs follow the result should
apply, both
to the application for leave to introduce further
evidence and to the substantive application.
Order
[38]
The following order is made:
1.
The application for leave to introduce the further affidavit and the
transcript tendered through it is dismissed
with costs.
2.
The application to set aside the warrants of execution, alternatively
to suspend execution, is dismissed with costs.
3.
The costs in paragraphs 1 and 2 include the costs of counsel on Scale
B.
H.R. GROENEWALD AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
Date
of hearing:
21
October 2026
Date
of judgment:
30
October 2026
For
the applicants:
S
Bester
Instructed
by:
Steve
Bester Attorneys
For
the respondents:
Adv
E Prophy
Instructed
by:
Johan
Nysschens Attorneys
[1]
Not
to be confused with
Road
Accident Fund v Newnet Properties (Pty) Ltd t/a Sunshine Hospital
and Another (616/2024) [2026] ZASCA 15; [2026] 1 All SA
482 (SCA)
(11 February 2026)