REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER: 27286/15
In the matter between:
OPPRESSED ACSA MINORITY 1 (PTY) LTD First Applicant
UP-FRONT INVESTMENTS 65 (PTY) LTD Second Applicant
UP-FRONT INVESTMENTS 64 (PTY) LTD Third Applicant
and
AIRPORTS COMPANY SOUTH AFRICA SOC LTD First Respondent
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA Second Respondent
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT Third Respondent
PYBUS THIRTY-FOUR (PTY) LTD Fourth Respondent
AIRPORTS MANAGEMENT SHARE INCENTIVE
SCHEME COMPANY (PTY) LTD Fifth Respondent
LEXSHELL 342 INVESTMENT HOLDING (PTY) LTD Sixth Respondent
TELLE INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Seventh Respondent
ADR INTERNATIONAL AIRPORTS
SOUTH AFRICA (PTY) LTD Eighth Respondent
G10 INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Ninth Respondent
Heard: 26-27 May 2025
Delivered: 02 November 2026
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) NOT REVISED.
…………..…………............. ……………………
SIGNATURE DATE
DATE
SIGNATURE
02 November 2026
2
J U D G M E N T
YACOOB, J:
INTRODUCTION
[1] The first and third applicants are minority shareholders in the first respondent
(“ACSA”). They, together with the second applicant, seek relief in terms of s 163
of the Companies Act (“the Act”), 1 declaring that ACSA and its majority
shareholder (the second and third respondents, “Government” and “the Minister”
respectively) have engaged in conduct that unfairly prejudiced them, and seeking
the purchase of their shares at a fair value determined in a specific manner. The
first to third respondents contend that the applicants have not shown that they
have been unfairly prejudiced, and that, in any event, the consequential remedy
sought cannot be granted.
[2] The first and second applicants brought the application on the basis that they
are, together with the fourth, seventh and ninth respondents, empowerment
shareholders in ACSA. After the application was issued, it emerged that a
transfer of shares from the third to the second applicant that had been requested
had not been effected by ACSA. An application was brought to join the third
applicant as a result, and this order was granted without opposition on 26 May
2026. At the time of hearing, the second applicant was not, and never had been
a shareholder, although it is unclear whether the process to transfer the shares
to it is still being pursued. Where I refer to the applicants, this means the first and
third applicants.
[3] Government is the majority shareholder of ACSA, holding 74.6% of its shares.
The Minister is the designated “Shareholding Minister” in terms of s 3 of the
Airports Company Act (“ACSA Act”),2 and, amongst other things, exercises the
rights attached to Government’s shares on its behalf. The remaining respondents
1 71 of 2008. 2 44 of 1993.
3
are minority shareholders.3 No relief is sought against them and they do not
participate in these proceedings. Where I refer to the respondents collectively,
this means the first to third respondents. I shall refer to the second and third
respondents collectively as Government, since they are not notionally separated
in the context of this case.
[4] All the shareholders other than Government4 procured shares in ACSA in 1998,
as part of the first phase of an intended divestment. The eighth respondent was
at the time majority owned by an Italian entity, and purchased its 20% of the
shares as a “strategic equity partner” (“SEP”). The applicants and the fourth,
seventh and ninth respondents procured their shares when they responded to
an invitation to so-called “empowerment” investors. All the shares transferred in
1998 were purchased at a price of R8.19 per share.
[5] The main disputes to be determined are, first, whether the applicants have
established conduct that engages s 163 of the Act, and secondly, if the first is
determined in their favour, what relief would be appropriate. There are also
certain “preliminary” issues raised by the respondents. Some of these issues,
although characterised as preliminary, can be determined more conveniently
within the main disputes.
[6] The applicants filed an amended notice of motion in 2023, in which they explicitly
sought the declaratory order, and amended the method of valuing the shares
sought as part of the consequential relief, but in my view not much turns on that
as it is based on the same fundamental case.
[7] Government contends that, by adding the declaratory order, the applicants
impermissibly change their case. However, as early as in paragraph 22 of their
founding affidavit, filed in 2015, the applicants make clear that their case is based
on conduct falling within s 163 (1)(a) and/or (b) of the Act. The last paragraph of
3 The fourth, seventh and ninth respondents procured their shares in the same circumstances as the
applicants did, described later in this judgment. The fifth and sixth respondents are shareholders as
part of a staff share incentive scheme, holding just over 1% of the shares, while the eighth respondent
holds 20% and is now owned by the Public Investment Corporation. 4 And possibly the fifth and sixth respondents.
4
that affidavit confirms this. The addition of a prayer for a declaratory order that
there has been such conduct does not change their case in any meaningful way.
[8] I set out first a summary of the facts as they emerge from the papers, before
dealing with the issues as set out above.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[9] The applicants’ claim of prejudice is based on the manner in which they came to
procure their shares, and various developments which shaped ACSA’s focus in
the following years, rather than one specific instance of alleged unfair or
oppressive conduct. It is therefore necessary to set out the history in some detail.
Much of the history is common cause and is a matter of public record. It is also
set out in the prospectus issued in June 1998 to invite applications for
investment, and that part of the contents of the prospectus, at least, is not in
dispute. The historical background is drawn primarily from the prospectus.
[10] Before ACSA was established, South Africa’s airports were run by the State, and
the land on which they were located, the buildings and other assets were owned
by the State.
[11] ACSA was established in 1993 in terms of the ACSA Act. The long title of the Act
at that time states that the Act is to
provide for the transfer of certain assets and functions of the State to a public company
to be established and for matters connected therewith.
The “assets and functions” were the airports and related assets and functions.
[12] The scheme of the Act at the time contemplated that the State would be the sole
shareholder of ACSA. This changed in 1998, when the Act was amended to allow
for other shareholders and in fact demonstrated that the intention at the time was
that, eventually, the State would cease to be the majority shareholder. As an
example of the changed perspective, the new long title provided that the Act is
to
5
provide for the establishment of a public company and the transfer of the State’s shares
in the company, to regulate certain activities at company airports; and to provide for
matters connected therewith.
[13] As set out above, shares were sold to the eighth respondent as an SEP, after a
competitive tender process. It purchased its 20 percent of the issued shares for
R819 million. The SEP also had the option to purchase another 10 percent of the
shares in the event of an initial public offering of shares on a recognized stock
exchange (an “IPO”), and to call for an IPO.
[14] The prospectus placed some emphasis on the introduction of the SEP. It stated
that the intention of introducing an SEP was to “significantly enhance the ability
of ACSA to improve its operations and financial returns and to achieve maximum
value for its shareholders”.5 Naturally the SEP also provided a not insignificant
cash injection. It was permitted to appoint directors, and it also provided expertise
in the form of personnel, training and technology. Part of its role was to assist
ACSA with the development of an IPO strategy. It also had certain veto rights,
including the right to veto significant capital expenditures outside an agreed
business plan. That the presence of the SEP was clearly intended to be relevant
to the decision of applicants for shares to invest is evident by the amount of
information provided about the SEP in the prospectus. The special rights of the
SEP were to endure until a date on which the Minister and the SEP ceased to
own a majority of the shares between them, or until 08 April 2008, whichever was
the earlier.
[15] The prospectus was issued on 8 June 1998, inviting applications from
“empowerment investors”.6 The prospectus set out in great detail the basis of the
invitation, the arrangements with the eighth respondent, and what the plan was
for ACSA’s commercial future. Although there is a dispute about the meaning
for ACSA’s commercial future. Although there is a dispute about the meaning
and weight of the contents of the prospectus as far as the future was concerned,
there is no dispute about the history as set out in the prospectus and what
information it provided to investors.
5 This is stated on page 5 of the prospectus. 6 The invitation is set out in para 3 of the “Salient Features” summary in the prospectus, and in more
detail in section 5 of the prospectus.
6
[16] According to the prospectus, the invitation for applications from investors was
part of the first stage of a two-stage divestment, with the intended second stage
to be an IPO. The invitation to empowerment investors was issued because
“Government is committed as part of the process of restructuring State assets to
the empowerment of historically disadvantaged persons”, 7 which was to be
achieved by inviting empowerment investors to apply to purchase up to ten
percent of the issued shares, and by transferring ten percent of the shares to the
National Empowerment Fund. It does not appear that this second step was taken.
[17] The prospectus invited applicants who qualify as empowerment investors to
apply for between one million and 25 million shares at a set price of R8.19 per
share, in multiples of one million shares. There was no negotiation of share price
and no possibility of purchasing a flexible number of shares. Stamp duty was
also applicable. Thus the minimum amount of money it would cost for an
empowerment investor to buy any shares would have been R8 210 475, and
purchasing any more shares than that could only happen in multiples of that
amount.
[18] The prospectus did include disclaimers: that no listing had been applied for, and
that the investment must be considered risky because the shares were unlisted
and not readily marketable.
[19] An applicant to be an empowerment investor would qualify if they were:
1. a South African entity with the majority of voting shares beneficially owned by
previously disadvantaged persons, or a South African union investment
company or South African worker retirement fund, and
2. had at least 25 beneficiaries.
If the applicant were a listed entity, its shareholding in ACSA could not exceed
25% of its total assets for as long as ACSA’s shares remained unlisted.
[20] The application required a statement that the applicant complied with all these
criteria and would continue to do so. Government and its advisors had the sole
7 Loc cit.
7
discretion to determine whether the applicant complied and was eligible to invest.
Government also retains the right to “requisition” any shares and return the
purchase price if there were false representations or if the conditions were
breached at any time. No applications were to be accepted from partnerships,
nominee companies or anyone other than empowerment investors.
[21] The prospectus also contained restrictions on empowerment investors:
1. they were not to record the value of the shares in their books at a value less
than R8.19 per share without written approval from Government;
2. they had no power to initiate an IPO or to sell any shares ahead of an IPO,
except back to Government with Government’s consent (although it is unclear
how shares could be sold back to Government without Government’s
consent);
3. shares that were pledged as collateral could not be released from collateral
in a way that allowed the pledgee to become the owner of the shares, except
where bankruptcy or receivership or similar occurred, and
4. save for shares actually sold in the IPO, no shares may be sold for twelve
months after the IPO.
[22] However, empowerment investors could sell all or part of their shares as part of
the IPO. They would also be given the opportunity to sell their shares if
Government decided to sell part or all of its shares to a third party before any
IPO, to the same third party and on the same terms.
[23] In addition to asserting that the introduction of the SEP was intended to help
ACSA increase financial returns and value for shareholders, as well as prepare
it for an IPO, the prospectus sets out ACSA’s business objectives and lists what
are called “future business opportunities”, although without specifying that these
would be pursued. It was also intended that there would be regular declaration
of dividends.
[24] The business objectives listed in the prospectus are:
8
1. to facilitate safe, secure and exciting airport services;
2. to maximise retail potential;
3. to develop and optimally utilise the property portfolio;
4. to develop innovative products and services, and to maximise service levels
through alliances and improved stakeholder relationships;
5. to play an active role in championing the aviation industry, and
6. to create a market- and consumer-oriented culture at the Airports.
[25] The prospectus makes clear that, at the time of its issue, most of ACSA’s income
came primarily from aeronautical sources, which are regulated by a Regulating
Committee. Among the future business opportunities, it was contemplated that
retail turnover and property income would be increased.
[26] As a result of this invitation to apply for shares, the applicants and the fourth,
seventh and ninth respondents became the holders of a total of 4.21% of ACSA’s
shares. The first applicant holds 1.4% (7 million) of the shares, while the
second/third applicant holds 0.4% (2 million). This application therefore is
concerned with 1.8% of ACSA’s shares. It is evident that the 10% target for
empowerment investment was not reached.
[27] At some point, it is unclear when, it became clear that an IPO was not going to
happen in the foreseeable future. ACSA alleges that the decision to indefinitely
postpone the IPO was taken by the “majority shareholders”. Of course there is
only one majority shareholder, that is Government. ACSA also makes the
inconsistent allegation that ACSA itself does not intend to undertake an IPO (in
the context of asserting that the applicants can no longer be expecting an IPO
because it must be clear by now that ACSA does not intend undertaking an IPO).
[28] It is unclear from ACSA’s affidavit, then, whether the IPO has simply been
indefinitely postponed, or whether there is in fact no intention that there will ever
be an IPO. Until Government filed its supplementary answering affidavit in
be an IPO. Until Government filed its supplementary answering affidavit in
December 2024, it was also unclear whether the decision was ACSA’s or
9
Government’s. Government, in its initial answering affidavit, does not disclose
who took the decision not to list, but criticises the applicants for not identifying
who took the decision.
[29] The position of the respondents, who would be expected to know what the facts
are, was initially surprisingly equivocal. It seems to me relevant that amendments
to the ACSA Act passed in 2020 and not yet implemented indicate that there is
no longer any intention that the State would divest its shares. Legislative
amendments being in the public domain, it is not improper to take notice of them.
However, that need was obviated by the concession in Government’s
supplementary answering affidavit in December 2024 that it was the Minister who
exercised her discretion not to list ACSA thro ugh an IPO. The date of that
decision is still not disclosed.
[30] Shares in the SEP were sold by the party who performed the function of SEP to
the Public Investment Corporation (“the PIC”), which is wholly owned by
Government, in 2005. It is common cause that a special dividend was declared
thereafter, apparently to encourage the PIC to purchase those shares. At that
time, no offer was made to the empowerment investors to permit them also to
exit.
[31] It is clear that there was never an intention for the PIC to perform the same
function as the SEP did, as it brought no expertise to the table, and clearly was
not going to assist ACSA with its commercial objectives and with readying itself
for an IPO or other divestment. It is equally clear that the sale of shares to the
PIC allowed an exit for the Italian shareholder without the inconvenience to ACSA
of a change in its own shareholding. The respondents contend that the PIC as
the current shareholder of the eighth respondent has the same rights as the SEP
did, but that is clearly not so, since those special rights, even if they survived the
sale of shares to the PIC, expired in April 2008.
sale of shares to the PIC, expired in April 2008.
[32] In any event, the PIC, being wholly owned by Government, would not have any
interest in exercising those rights which may hamper Government’s plans. The
exit of the SEP meant that there was no longer an outside party with the right to
influence ACSA’s policies and business plans, and there was no longer any entity
10
present whose interests were aligned with those of the empowerment
shareholders, which had the teeth to ensure those interests were not unduly
disregarded. It is not unreasonable to conclude that the empowerment
shareholders lost a safeguard that had been much vaunted in the prospectus.
[33] Although ACSA had entered into a Shareholder’s Compact with the SEP, and
later entered into one with Government, no agreement was entered into with the
empowerment shareholders.
[34] Dividends were not paid between 2007 and 2013. Instead, ACSA assumed debt
to fund infrastructure development, including building a new airport, King Shaka
International.
[35] It appears from a report prepared by Ernst & Young in 2012 that the decision to
focus on broader economic development rather than commercial results took
place at some point between 2003 and 2006, when “there was an increased
pressure for [ACSA] to be involved in an economic development role, particularly
in improving airport infrastructure ahead of the 2010 Football World Cup” (which
was awarded to South Africa in 2004). The Ernst & Young report states that the
SEP exited its investment in 2005 following ACSA’s change in strategy, when
the shares in the eighth respondent were sold to the PIC. This cannot be
coincidental, since the SEP’s veto right appears to have the potential of directly
affecting ACSA’s ability to assist in Government’s World Cup project.
[36] According to the Ernst & Young report itself, it was apparently produced in order
to assist Government to decide what to do about the empowerment investors.
ACSA, however, alleges that the report was produced to formulate possible
options to “potentially restructure the empowerment shareholding” in ACSA.
ACSA denies that it decreased focus on financial returns in favour of an
economic developmental role. It denies that it does not act in the best interests
of the company and denies that it is not run with a commercial objective .
of the company and denies that it is not run with a commercial objective .
However, it also agrees that the capital expenditure for which loans were taken
“was in part necessary for the hosting by South Africa of the 2010 Soccer World
Cup”. It is unclear how this “necessity” was in the best interests of the company,
or who made the decision that it was necessary. That the decision may have
11
been in the political best interests of the majority shareholder, demonstrates how
the commercial interests of the company and the interests of the majority
shareholder were diverging.
[37] At the same time as denying that it began focusing more on an economic
developmental role, ACSA aligns itself with a statement by the Minister made in
2013 that ACSA is important for social and economic development in the
Republic, and that the “Shareholders’ objectives must work with those of the
ACSA Board for [the] national interest”. According to ACSA this was part of the
reason for a “decision not to go for the public listing”.
[38] ACSA also alleges that business decisions are taken, not by the shareholder, but
by the Board. ACSA contends that statements made by the shareholder
representative, the Minister, are therefore irrelevant. It is unclear then what the
relevance of the Minister’s 2013 statement is. It is also unclear how it came about
that the shareholder took the decision that the listing be what ACSA describes
as “indefinitely postponed”.
[39] Also in 2013, ACSA adopted its Memorandum of Incorporation, which also
includes restrictions on the sale of shares. That is not a substantive change,
since the shares were already restricted from being freely traded. Nevertheless,
it is necessary to note that the MOI was only adopted 15 years after the
applicants procured their shares, and any reliance on its terms by the
respondents must be seen in that context. The Court has not been favoured with
copies of the Articles or Memorandum of Association that preceded the 2013
MOI, apart from some excerpts of the Articles which were annexed to the
prospectus.
[40] In 2013, the majority of the empowerment investors made an offer to ACSA that
it purchase their shares for R23.05 per share. This offer was rejected, because
the Board had obtained a valuation of R10.36 per share. A further valuation was
conducted by Deloitte leading to an offer in August 2014 to buy the shares for
conducted by Deloitte leading to an offer in August 2014 to buy the shares for
R12.87 per share plus a dividend of R0.60 per share, subject to all minority
shareholders accepting the offer. ACSA and Government contend that this offer
was reasonable and that therefore the applicants cannot seek relief in terms of s
12
163. The offer was rejected, and there was some back and forth among the
parties about what a reasonable price might be. According to Government, the
Minister made a decision on 16 January 2015 that the shares must be bought by
ACSA for R22 per share, and that a two-year dividend holiday should be declared
to help pay for this. However, no offer was made to the applicants on that basis.
It appears to be common cause that the decision of the Minister was never
conveyed to the applicants outside these proceedings. This application was
instituted in July 2015.
[41] When the application was initially to be heard, on 1 August 2017, an order was
made by agreement between the parties. In terms of that order, ACSA was
directed to purchase the applicants’ shares, at a price determined by a referee.
The order required the referee to adjust the value for oppressive conduct, and
left the determination of what oppressive conduct was entirely to the discretion
of the referee. A valuation was obtained from Riscura in accordance with the
order, and when the applicants made application in 2018 for an order that the
valuation be adopted, ACSA opposed it and brought a counter application for a
determination that the shares be bought at a different value, on the basis of a
valuation by another expert, Professor Wainer.
[42] The application and counter-application were then left in limbo when ACSA and
the Government brought an application to rescind, alternatively for leave to
appeal, the 1 August 2017 order. The rescission application was successful and
was confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in April 2022. Thereafter, in 2023,
the applicants filed supplementary affidavits and renewed the application, finding
themselves in essentially the same position they had been in five years earlier.
THE ISSUES
[43] The applicants claim that the failure to list ACSA, combined with what they claim
is a change in ACSA’s focus from ACSA’s commercial interests to broader
is a change in ACSA’s focus from ACSA’s commercial interests to broader
economic development in the country, in the context of the manner in which they
obtained their shares and the contents of the prospectus, has had a prejudicial
effect on them, which brings them within the ambit of s 163 of the Act. Part of the
13
prejudice they claim is that returns on their investments have not been enough
to service the debt with which they procured the shares. The manner in which
ACSA is run also means that the shares are even less marketable than they
would have been at the time they were procured. The applicants also cite three
specific examples of decisions made by or for ACSA that, according to them ,
have resulted in prejudice, and which also demonstrate that ACSA’s priority is
not a commercial one. These are: the various decisions of the Regulating
Committee regarding aeronautical revenue; the development of King Shaka
International Airport (“KSI”), and ACSA’s investment in São Paulo airport.
[44] The respondents contend, amongst other things, that there was no guarantee
that ACSA would be listed, that there has been no change in ACSA’s focus, and
that there is nothing prejudicial that engages s 163. They also contend that, even
if the court finds that a case has been made out to engage s163, the remedy
sought cannot be granted. ACSA contends that the applicants have no claim
because they rejected a reasonable offer, while Government contends that the
applicants have no basis for this application because of the Minister’s decision
that their shares must be bought for R22 per shar e. Government also raises
various separation of powers and constitutional issues in opposing the relief
sought.
[45] Before I delve into the specifics, I set out the applicable law.
SECTION 163 OF THE COMPANIES ACT
[46] The parties do not differ in any substantial way on what s 163 means and what
the requirements are for relief in terms of the section. Unsurprisingly, they differ
fundamentally on the result of applying those principles to the facts before this
court.
[47] Section 163 provides:
163. Relief from oppressive or prejudicial conduct or from abuse of separate
juristic personality of company.—
(1) A shareholder or a director of a company may apply to a court for relief if—
14
1. any act or omission of the company, or a related person, has had a result that
is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of,
the applicant;
2. the business of the company, or a related person, is being or has been carried
on or conducted in a manner that is oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that
unfairly disregards the interests of, the applicant; or
3. the powers of a director or prescribed officer of the company, or a person
related to the company, are being or have been exercised in a manner that is
oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to, or that unfairly disregards the interests of, the
applicant.
(2) Upon considering an application in terms of subsection (1), the court may make
any interim or final order it considers fit, including—
(a) an order restraining the conduct complained of;
2. an order appointing a liquidator, if the company appears to be insolvent;
3. an order placing the company under supervision and commencing business
rescue proceedings in terms of Chapter 6, if the court is satisfied that the
circumstances set out in section 131 (4) (a) apply;
4. an order to regulate the company’s affairs by directing the company to amend
its Memorandum of Incorporation or to create or amend a unanimous
shareholder agreement;
5. an order directing an issue or exchange of shares;
6. an order—
9. appointing directors in place of or in addition to all or any of the directors
then in office; or
(ii) declaring any person delinquent or under probation, as contemplated in
section 162;
(g) an order directing the company or any other person to restore to a shareholder
any part of the consideration that the shareholder paid for shares, or pay the
equivalent value, with or without conditions;
(h) an order varying or setting aside a transaction or an agreement to which the
company is a party and compensating the company or any other party to the
transaction or agreement;
transaction or agreement;
(i) an order requiring the company, within a time specified by the court, to produce
to the court or an interested person financial statements in a form required by
this Act, or an accounting in any other form the court may determine;
(j) an order to pay compensation to an aggrieved person, subject to any other law
entitling that person to compensation;
(k) an order directing rectification of the registers or other records of a company; or
(l) an order for the trial of any issue as determined by the court.
15
(3) If an order made under this section directs the amendment of the company’s
Memorandum of Incorporation—
(a) the directors must promptly file a notice of amendment to give effect to that
order, in accordance with section 16 (4); and
(b) no further amendment altering, limiting or negating the effect of the court order
may be made to the Memorandum of Incorporation, until a court orders
otherwise.
(4) . . . . . .
[48] The applicants refer to a surfeit of comparative law on similar shareholder
remedies. Although the approach of courts in other jurisdictions is interesting, I
do not think it adds much to what I must consider. The principles are not
substantially different, the parties do not differ in any real way on the principles
that should be applied, and, as often happens, the outcome in this case is
determined by the specific facts before me.
[49] It can be seen that s 163 (2) provides for a wide range of possible remedies, and
gives a court the discretion to make any order that is fit. However, the court may
only assume that power if it finds that the circumstances described in s 163(1)
exist.
[50] ACSA describes the question whether there is conduct that falls within s 163(1)
which has a result described in s 163(1) as a jurisdictional issue, without which
the jurisdiction of this court to provide relief is not engaged. It insists that this is
not part of the consideration whether a case is made out, but rather a preliminary
point. While I agree that relief may only be granted if the court finds that there
has been the kind of conduct and the kind of consequences described in the
section, I disagree that this is properly conceptualised as a preliminary point or
that it should be determined as one. It must, of course, be determined before the
possibility of any relief is considered.
[51] For a court to find that s 163 is engaged, there must be an act or omission by the
company, a related person, a director or a company officer, that is oppressive or
company, a related person, a director or a company officer, that is oppressive or
unfairly prejudicial or unfairly disregards the applicant’s interests, or the business
of the company must be or have been conducted in a manner is oppressive,
16
unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly disregards the applicant’s interests. In the interests
of brevity I shall describe the proscribed conduct as conduct that is unfairly
prejudicial, but this should not be construed as limiting the enquiry.
[52] The question of who is a related person is dealt with in s 2 of the Act. For
purposes of this case, a related person is someone who exercises control of
ACSA,8 through control of the majority of voting rights,9 has the right to appoint
directors who control a majority,10 or has the ability to materially influence the
policy of ACSA in a comparable way.11 It cannot be disputed that, since
Government is the majority shareholder and exercises its rights through the
Minister, both Government and the Minister are related persons as
contemplated. An act or omission of ACSA, Government, or the Minister, or any
combination thereof, which is unfairly prejudicial, or has an unfairly prejudicial
effect, would entitle the applicants to relief.
[53] The manner in which conduct must be considered to determine whether it is
unfairly prejudicial is canvassed in detail by the SCA in Technology Corporate
Management (Pty) Ltd and Others v De Sousa and Others (“TCM”).12 Although
that case deals with the predecessor of s 163 (s 252 of the Companies Act, 61
of 1973) the principles remain the same. The SCA takes the same view in Grancy
Property Ltd v Manala and Others (“Grancy”).13 The only relevant difference is
that s 252 dealt with unfairly prejudicial acts of the company itself, while s 163
deals with unfairly prejudicial acts of the company or a related person.
Incidentally, the SCA in TCM agrees with my view regarding different
jurisdictions, commenting that “there is little practical difference between” them.14
[54] It must be noted that s 163, on which this application is based, was only
promulgated in 2008, well after some of the conduct complained of took place.
promulgated in 2008, well after some of the conduct complained of took place.
8 In terms of s 2(1)(b) of the Act. 9 Section 2(2)(a)(ii)(aa). 10 Section 2(2)(a)(ii)(bb). 11 Section 2(2)(d). 12 2024 (5) SA 57 (SCA) 13 2015 (3) SA 313 (SCA) para 22. 14 TCM ibid para 83.
17
However, all parties confined pleadings and argument to s 163 and there is no
need to consider whether it should in fact have been s 252 that was relied on.
[55] The relationship between a company and its shareholders, as well as the
relationships between shareholders, is contractual, and is based on its
memorandum of incorporation.15 It is well established as a basic principle of
South African company law that a person becoming a shareholder in a company
does so on the basis that they are bound by the decisions of the majority of
shareholders, as long as they are taken in a lawful manner, and even where the
decisions may prejudice a particular shareholder, because the “principle of the
supremacy of the majority is essential to the proper functioning of companies”.16
[56] Legislative provisions such as s 163 provide exceptions to this principle, which
provide some relief, in very specific and constrained circumstances, to minority
shareholders, softening the effect of the majority rule. Section 163, in particular,
provides some remedy for decisions, acts or omissions which may be entirely
consistent with the law in general and the company’s memorandum of
incorporation and other binding precepts, but which nevertheless have an
unfairly prejudicial effect on the minority.17 This is why conduct which is alleged
to fall within s 163(1) must be examined carefully and a court must be wary of
interfering with the decisions of the majority, or of imposing minority rule which
would be unfair in a different way. That being said, a court must also not unduly
limit the manner in which 163 is applied. The extensive remedy is there to provide
an equitable response to an unfair disregard of the minority shareholder’s
interests,18 and being too rigid in evaluating whether the shareholder has
interests that have been unfairly disregarded may neutralise the equitable nature
of the remedy. Again, the primary determining factor is whether any disregard of
any interest was unfair.
any interest was unfair.
[57] Where the complaint is about an act or omission, it must have an unfairly
prejudicial effect, and where it is about the manner in which the company is run,
the result must still be an unfairly prejudicial effect, but a pattern of conduct is
15 Ibid para 75. 16 Sammel and Others v President Brand Gold Mining Co Ltd 1969 (3) SA 629 (A) at 678G-H. 17 TCM ibid para 82. 18 Grancy ibid para 26.
18
involved, rather than a single act or omission.19 What is important is the effect,
and not whether the unfair prejudice was deliberate. Even inadvertent prejudice,
if unfair, can entitle an applicant to relief in terms of the section.20
[58] The question whether there has been an unfairly prejudicial effect is difficult to
define, because in each case, it depends on the specific facts. 21 The mere
inability to dispose of shares, where there was already a restriction on transfer of
shares, while prejudicial, is not necessarily unfair.22 The disaffected locked in
shareholder should not be able to use s 163 to “rewrite the terms on which the
parties agreed to conduct the company”.23 An offer to buy shares at fair value
may cure any unfairness.24
[59] It is clear from the section itself and the authorities, that an allegation that the
decisions at issue were made in the ordinary course of business, that they were
entirely legitimate decisions, and that there was no malice or deliberate attempt
to prejudice the minority shareholders, do not insulate a company or related
persons from a finding that there has been an unfair act or omission, or the
company has been run in a manner that has been unfair, which resulted in unfair
prejudice to the minority shareholders. Thus the assertions by the respondents
that all the decisions made were legitimate, and that there was no intention to
prejudice the applicants, do not assist them.
THE PROSPECTUS
[60] In order to determine whether there has been any unfair prejudice, and also in
order to determine any appropriate remedy, it is necessary to ensure that the
compact between the parties as shareholders of the company is not disrupted.
The reasons for this should be clear in the context of what I have set out above.
19 TCM ibid para 79. 20 TCM ibid para 80; Grancy ibid para 27. 21 TCM ibid para 81. 22 Ibid para 97. 23 Ibid para 99. 24 Ibid para 108-109.
19
[61] Both respondents contend that the applicants are attempting to avoid the
consequences of an agreement they entered into when they applied to purchase
shares. They make bald assertions about what the agreement does not contain,
and about how the agreement cannot be rewritten by the court. However, there
is little, if any, evidence of what the contents of the agreement are. The
respondents’ contentions are problematic, since, unlike the situation with the PIC
and Government, there is no shareholders’ compact with the applicants, and the
articles of association and memorandum of association that existed at the time
are not before the court.
[62] The applicants contend that the prospectus is therefore the only document that
contains information about the terms and conditions relevant to their
shareholding. The respondents’ position is that the contents of the prospectus
are not binding, but they do not suggest what other source there might be which
would regulate the relationship between ACSA and the minority shareholders.
The court is then left with the prospectus, as well as the ACSA Act.
[63] Government submits that the prospectus is not something it is responsible for,
as it was issued by ACSA not Government. In my view that is a cynical avoidance
of responsibility and of constitutional imperatives to act in accordance with the
values set out in section 195 of the Constitution, on which Government relies to
avoid any responsibility it may have towards the applicants. It is clear that the
prospectus was issued in furtherance of Government’s plan, and that the Board
took the steps it did in furtherance of the wishes of its main shareholder.
Certainly, in ordinary commercial situations, shareholders are not usually
responsible for the contents of documents issued by the Board. But as
Government itself points out, ACSA is not an ordinary commercial company, and
this was not an ordinary commercial situation.
this was not an ordinary commercial situation.
[64] The prospectus was issued specifically to facilitate the next step in Government’s
plan for ACSA, and it is consistent with the amendments that were made to the
ACSA Act in preparation for the sale of shares and also an eventual divestment.
It was issued in pursuance of Government’s economic empowerment agenda. It
makes statements on Government’s behalf, such as “Government reserves the
right to scale down applications”. There can be no doubt that Government and
20
ACSA were acting ad idem when the prospectus was issued and the shares
made available for empowerment investors.
[65] In the specific circumstances of this case, then, I am satisfied that Government
cannot avoid responsibility for the contents of the prospectus, and that if I find
that any weight can be placed on the prospectus in determining the applicants’
claim, the resulting obligation would apply equally to ACSA and Government.
[66] The prospectus is also relevant to the fairness of the decision to either postpone
the IPO indefinitely or not to undertake one at all. ACSA and Government seek
to split responsibility for the prospectus and the failure to continue with the IPO,
with the party responsible for the prospectus not being the party responsible for
the IPO, and vice versa. This does not help them avoid responsibility towards
the applicants. Even if Government took the later decision and was not
responsible for the content of the IPO, it took that later decision fully aware of the
contents of the Prospectus and the context in which ACSA and Government
invited the empowerment investors to apply for shares. Similarly, even if ACSA
did not take the decision to not embark on an IPO, it did not object to the
cancellation or postponement of the IPO. In any event, both would therefore be
responsible for any resulting prejudice.
[67] ACSA contends that a prospectus is not a binding document but simply an
invitation to treat. It cites a number of academic writers in support of this
contention. These however deal with the status and nature of a prospectus
generally. I do not take issue with what they set out as a general proposition, but
the contention is in any event a red herring.
[68] Firstly, the prospectus at issue includes the offer that was made. The offer is not
contained in any other document. Secondly, the invitation cannot be described
as an invitation to treat but an invitation to apply on prescribed terms. There is
no possibility of negotiation.
no possibility of negotiation.
[69] Thirdly, the prospectus is required to include all relevant information for a
prospective investor. The respondents cannot pick and choose what of the
information contained in the prospectus is to be considered more relevant. The
disclaimers cannot have more weig ht than the other information that was
21
included, or the way in which the information was articulated. All the information
in the prospectus was put there because it is relevant, and because it was
intended to present an attractive prospect to previously disadvantaged investors,
even if there was risk resulting from investing in unlisted shares with limited
liquidity.
[70] The clear intention of the prospectus was to inform prospective investors that
they were being offered the opportunity to benefit from ACSA’s intended
commercial development. The investment was not, according to the prospectus,
for the purpose of raising capital for ACSA. It was to empower historically
disadvantaged persons who became investors. There is no other way of
empowering those persons other than making sure that ACSA was run in a way
that was likely to result in reasonable returns, either by way of dividends or by
way the sale of shares. The restriction on the sale of shares meant that the IPO
was the real carrot that was provided to empowerment investors. This was not a
run-of-the-mill commercial investment, nor was it presented as one. The
respondents’ attempts to cast it as simply that can hold no water.
[71] The manner in which the SEP’s involvement is described in the prospectus is
clearly intended to give some reassurance to the prospective investor, that there
was an experienced and skilled partner assisting ACSA with streamlining and
improving its operations and preparing for an IPO. Together with SEP’s rights to
request an IPO; its option to purchase further shares; its rights to nominate
directors, and its right to veto any expenditure that was not part of an agreed
business plan, this gave the prospect of some protection from the vagaries of a
single majority shareholder for prospective empowerment investors, who would
have no rights to affect the manner in which ACSA was run at all.
[72] It was suggested by the respondents that, because the word “development”
[72] It was suggested by the respondents that, because the word “development”
appears a number of times in the prospectus, this means that ACSA’s focus on
broader national economic development was always part of its objectives. This
is patently a fallacy. The “development” in the prospectus deals with ACSA’s
development as a company, developing its services, its properties and its
revenue. The difference from the requirement in s 195(1)(c) that public
22
administration be “development-oriented” is plain and ought not to need further
elaboration.
[73] In any event, there are many ways in which a state entity can be development-
oriented, and, as Government was at pains to point out, development is a policy
decision. The government of the time clearly was of the view that ACSA’s
development orientation would take the shape of economic empowerment for
employees, historically disadvantaged investors, and the National Development
Fund. It would also be found in the contribution the development of world-class
airports and services would have to the national economy and national profile.
All of this is evident from the prospectus, and, to an extent, the ACSA Act. The
contention that it ought always to have been evident that ACSA would be
required to act in the national interest above all else is no more than another red
herring.
[74] I am satisfied that the prospectus, read together with the ACSA Act, held out that
ACSA would be run on commercial lines, that there would be an IPO. Even
though the prospectus did not give a predicted date for the IPO, it is clear from
its overall scheme that it was expected to happen before the SEP’s special rights
expired in 2008. I am also satisfied that there is no other evidence of what the
compact with the empowerment shareholders includes, and that there is
therefore no prejudice to the company in relying on what was held out in the
prospectus.
[75] I must clarify, however, that in so doing I do not elevate the status of the
prospectus to a binding contract. Instead, it is simply a reflection of what was
understood at the time to be the case. Its contents were relevant to the decision
to invest, and a departure from what it envisaged may, depending on the manner,
nature and consequences of that departure, result in unfair prejudice for the
investors who decided to invest based on its contents.
[76] Government’s submissions that it is immune from claims based on the contents
[76] Government’s submissions that it is immune from claims based on the contents
of the prospectus therefore have no merit in the context of this case.
23
THE IPO
[77] In the context of the facts as they have been set out, it is patent that there is no
longer any intention on Government’s part of listing ACSA’s shares in an IPO.
The date of the decision has not been disclosed. But, since December 2024, it
is clear that there was a decision and that it was a decision of the Minister.
Government submits as part of its defence that the Minister was entitled to make
the decision. I accept that. That is not the enquiry.
[78] The respondents contend that the decision not to list is not unfair to the
applicants, because it was clear from the prospectus that no IPO had been
applied for. As I have already commented, this contention is disingenuous and
inconsistent with the very framework which underpinned the invitation to
empowerment investors. The IPO, or alternatively the sale of shares to a third
party of a commercially viable ACSA, was the ultimate goal of the exercise. This
is clear from the contents of the prospectus, the way in which the ACSA Act was
amended at the time, and from the rights and obligations of the SEP.
[79] The respondents are correct that the decision not to pursue the divestment/ IPO
plan is not in itself inherently unfair. However, the unfairness materialises when
the decision is combined with the failure to offer an exit to the empowerment
investors at the time when the decision was taken. It is a reasonable inference
that the decision was taken at some point before the exit of the Italian SEP. The
Minister appears to have already acknowledged the likelihood at a meeting in
2002. The failure to inform the empowerment investors, and to offer them a
similar exit, is in my view both unfair and antithetical to the avowed purpose of
their investment, that is, the economic empowerment of previously
disadvantaged persons. In the context where the investors had to stay invested,
the decision not to proceed with the intended IPO was unfair to them.
the decision not to proceed with the intended IPO was unfair to them.
[80] It is also submitted by the respondents that the failure to follow through with the
IPO cannot have been unfair or prejudicial to the applicants, because the IPO
would have diluted their shareholding, and the value of their shares. This is yet
another red herring. The dilution of the applicant’s shareholding would have been
neither here nor there where their shareholding does not give them any rights to
24
influence the company at all. The notional dilution of the value of their shares
which may accompany the issue of more shares in an IPO is not a dilution that
would have been considered unfair, since the risks associated with the IPO are
ordinary investment risks which are inherently part of the risks assumed by the
applicants, considering that the IPO was part of what they expected.
[81] As pointed out by the applicants, had the IPO taken place, there would have
been other safeguards put in place by the listing requirements, and their shares
would eventually, 12 months after listing, been entirely tradeable. The continued
presence of the SEP, which the applicants term an “anchor shareholder” would
be a safeguard, as would requirements for independent directors, and the need
to maximise shareholder value for shareholders unrelated to the majority
shareholder would mean that the “deviation” of focus in the manner in which it
has taken place, would not have been possible.
[82] Government also suggests that the obstacle to the applicants being able to sell
their shares is not the decision not to proceed with an IPO, but that the MOI
restricts the sale of shares and requires the applicants to get the Minister’s
consent. They suggest that even if there was an IPO, the applicants would not
be able to sell. This is a distortion of the interplay between the conditions
attached to the empowerment shares (as contained in the prospectus) and the
MOI. In any event, had there been an IPO, amendment of the MOI woul d not
only be likely but almost certainly necessary. And, significantly, after the twelve
months lock in period, the shares would have been freely marketable.
[83] Government submits further than the applicants have not sought the Minister’s
consent to sell shares, and therefore cannot complain. This is yet another
misarticulation of the problem. The applicant’s complaint is that there is no
market for the shares, rather than that the Minister doesn’t let them sell. Having
market for the shares, rather than that the Minister doesn’t let them sell. Having
the Minister’s consent would not change that.
[84] I am satisfied that the intention to apply for an IPO was one of the fundamental
legs of the invitation to invest, and the deviation from that intention was unfair in
the context.
25
[85] I am also satisfied that the consequence of that unfair conduct was unfairly
prejudicial to the respondents, as it locked them in in a manner that was never
contemplated, and prevented them from assuming the ordinary risks and benefits
that ought to have been associated with their investment.
THE CHANGE IN FOCUS
[86] The second basis of the applicants’ claim under s 163 is their contention that the
prospectus, together with the ACSA Act, also held out that ACSA would be run
on a commercial basis, that this intention has been abandoned, so that ACSA is
now run on the basis that it is a tool in achieving Government’s socio-economic
goals, and that this change was unfair and has had an unfairly prejudicial effect
on them.
[87] The respondents make mutually destructive submissions in this regard. On the
one hand, it is contended that there was no change because everyone knew, or
ought to have known, that ACSA as a state-owned company was obliged to feed
into Government’s development goals, and that there are numerous mentions of
“development” in the prospectus. On the other hand, it is contended that all of
ACSA’s business decisions have been commercially sound and there is no
decision that was taken that was inconsistent with a commercially run entity. In
argument, counsel for ACSA submitted that there had been no abandonment
from a commercial focus, but that there had been only a “deviation”, In any event,
so the argument goes, there was no undertaking of following a particular
commercial path, so whether abandonment or deviation, it makes no difference.
[88] Firstly, it is clear in the context of the facts as I have set them out that there was
a clear intimation to potential empowerment investors, who were the subject of
the invitation for which the prospectus was issued, that putting ACSA on a
commercial footing was a priority. It is also clear that this was emphasised in
order to encourage investment.
order to encourage investment.
[89] Second, as I have already pointed out, the use of the word “development” in the
prospectus and the ACSA Act does not assist the respondents. There are many
26
different kinds of development. Reference in the prospectus to one kind of
development does not mean that the investors ought to have known that ACSA
or the Government would consider themselves free to pursue any kind of
development. Nor does a general principle that certain decisions related to ACSA
must be taken in the public interest.
[90] The prospectus contains the words develop/ developing/ development in the
following contexts:
1. The ACSA property division, responsible for development and leasing of
airport infrastructure, retail sites, office space and other property (this is
mentioned twice, once in the summary and once in the main body).
2. The objects of the company including “acquisition, establishment,
development, provision, maintenance, management, control or operation of
any airport…”.
3. A reference to who is responsible for “property development”.
4. Plans had been developed to increase parking capacity at three airports.
5. Under business objectives, there is a reference to ACSA’s mission being to
manage and develop world-class airports. There is also a reference to two of
ACSA’s objectives being to “develop and optimally utilise” the property
portfolio; and to develop products and services.
6. A statement that the directors believed that there were “many opportunities
for ACSA to develop its business”; including “developing property” for
commercial use, and the use of unused land owned by ACSA for, inter alia,
suitable “demand driven developments” which “offer an opportunity to earn
an appropriate market based yield”.
7. The commitment of the SEP to assisting ACSA with “retail development”, and
“the development of an IPO strategy”.
27
8. In setting out ACSA’s human resources policy, a reference to a polcy that
covers “capacity building, training and development”. There is also a
reference to ACSA’s scheme to encourage the development of talent.
9. That one of the SEP’s two directors of ACSA was responsible for “business
development” at the Italian entity. The word also occurs in the various
biographies of ACSA’s then directors.
[91] The ACSA Act also refers to the concept of development, in s 4, which sets out
the objects of ACSA in the same terms as contained in the prospectus. It also
provides for the Regulating Committee to “develop” guidelines.
[92] The respondents rely too on s 195 of the Constitution, which, amongst others,
requires public entities to be “development-oriented”.
[93] The respondents’ “development” argument is disingenuous. There is a clear
difference between the commercial and institutional development contemplated
in the prospectus and the ACSA Act, and the development of the country in
accordance with Government policy. Section 195 of the Constitution also does
not help, firstly because a public entity can be “development-oriented” in many
ways (obviously the choice of how it is development-oriented is a policy-laden
one), but also because the manner in which ACSA was developed was intended
to have the outcome that ACSA was no longer a public entity.
[94] The respondents also rely on the fact that the ACSA Act requires the Regulating
Committee to deal with the questions within its purvey, that is the fees that may
be charged for aeronautical services, as well as the construction, lease or closure
of airports, in a manner that takes into account the public interest, to suggest that
this shows that ACSA’s focus was intended to be developmental, and there is no
change. The respondents submit further that the mere fact that ACSA’s
aeronautical business is subject to regulation is an indication that ACSA’s
primary focus must be the public interest.
primary focus must be the public interest.
[95] These arguments are a red herring. The aeronautical business is regulated
because ACSA is a monopoly, and also because it is a monopoly in a sector
which provides what may be considered to be essential services. But that does
28
not mean (a) that everything ACSA does is regulated or subject to national
development goals, nor (b) that that means that the public interest trumps
everything else in everything ACSA does, particularly in its property and retail
business, which are unregulated.25 It also does not mean that ACSA’s actions,
insofar as they affect the minority shareholders who contend they have been
unfairly prejudiced, are immune from scrutiny.
[96] It is clear that, at the time the prospectus was issued, the intention was that ACSA
would be “developed” into a commercially viable entity, and that the policy choice
that was made that was ACSA’s contribution to the development of the country
would be as a commercially viable airport operator, which would run airports that
would bring in economic advantages to the country as a whole. It is also clear
that that intention changed, or was deviated from, at some time before the SEP’s
exit. The exit of the SEP is both a result of that change or deviation and an
indication that it was happening.
[97] It is equally clear that, at the time, ACSA’s commercial development was
intended to progress in tandem with what can be called public interest
considerations, but that the priorities changed so that the public interest
considerations and development in a “development of the country” sense
became the overriding objective.
[98] This is significant because, ordinarily, the interests of a majority shareholder
would be aligned with those of the company’s commercial success, so that there
is no intrinsic conflict between the interests of the majority shareholder and those
of the company, and by extension, minority shareholders. That is not the case
here, where the majority shareholder’s interests are focused elsewhere, and the
majority shareholder has decided to use the company as a tool in pursuance of
those other interests (as legitimate and laudable as that might be in the context
those other interests (as legitimate and laudable as that might be in the context
of national development). The clearest demonstration of this is contained in the
shareholder compact concluded between ACSA and the Minister in February
25 The property and retail business is not entirely unfettered, the manner in which ACSA currently
operates means that if ACSA makes too much from that side of the business, the Regulating Committee
compensates for it in the next determination of the aeronautical fees.
29
2015. That document shows clearly that the ACSA contemplated in the
prospectus has not come to exist and is no longer on the cards.
THE REGULATING COMMITTEE
[99] One of the examples on which the applicants rely for a finding that ACSA has
departed from its commercial path is the allegedly prejudicial setting of tariffs for
aeronautical services by the Regulating Committee which is tasked with setting
those tariffs by the ACSA Act.26 The contention is that the Regulating Committee
is controlled by the Minister, and therefore its decisions are something that the
Minister is responsible for. Where its decisions were prejudicial to ACSA’s
commercial success, this too is something the Minister is responsible for and
these decisions therefore are part of the unfair conduct by the Minister that
contributes to the unfair prejudice experienced by the applicants.
[100] There is no merit in these contentions. The Minister’s oversight of the Regulating
Committee is entirely separate to the Minister’s functions as Shareholder
Representative. Ministers, as members of the national executive, are required to
fulfil various separate functions, and what they do in one capacity does not,
without more, lead to consequences for their other capacities.
[101] Further, it is clear from the scheme of the ACSA Act that the Regulating
Committee is independent and makes is decisions in a manner that is
legislatively regulated. Even if I do not accept the respondents’ argument that the
applicants must review the Regulating Committee’s decisions if they take issue
with them, the Regulating Committee is still a separate entity and ought to have
been joined, if its actions were going to be interrogated for their effect on the
applicants.
[102] In my view, it would be inappropriate to enquire into the Regulating Committee’s
decisions when the Regulating Committee is not here. I therefore do not consider
that particular issue any further.
26 In terms of sections 11 and 12 of the ACSA Act.
30
KING SHAKA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
[103] Another of the examples that the applicants rely on to show that there was no
longer a commercial focus, but rather a focus on a national developmental
agenda, is the decision to build KSI in haste for the 2010 World Cup, when there
was not enough money for it, and the development at that time was not planned
for in advance, which resulted in large amounts of debt being assumed, and the
cessation of dividends for a number of years.
[104] The respondents rely on the provisions of the ACSA Act, which require that the
construction, lease and closure of airports must take place in the public interest.
That is the case. But that does not mean that the decision to build KSI at the time
and in the circumstances in which it was done was not also inconsistent with the
commercial interests of ACSA, and with the representations made in the
prospectus and the ACSA Act.
[105] It is common cause that the KSI decision was taken because it was considered
by Government to be necessary for the 2010 World Cup. The respondents
suggest that this is sufficient to insulate it from further examination. It is not,
because the question here is not whether the decision was otherwise lawful or
legitimate. The question is whether it was, at the time, commercially inconsistent
with the representations made in 1998, and whether it was then unfair to the
applicants.
[106] The decision was taken by Government, and not by ACSA. It was announced by
the Minister before the board had taken the decision The reports relied on were
produced in 1973, 1981 and 2003, and are simplistic to say the least, showing
that the decision was expedited for Government’s own purposes without doing
the kind of analysis that would have been done had ACSA been acting as a
commercial entity. The project was debt funded and went far over budget. Again,
this was inconsistent with ACSA acting as a commercial entity.
[107] It must be emphasised that the question is not whether the KSI project was
[107] It must be emphasised that the question is not whether the KSI project was
beneficial for the country in the long run, whether it was necessary for the 2010
31
World Cup, or whether it was in the public interest. Assuming for present
purposes that the answer to all these questions is yes, it is simultaneously clear
that the decision was not taken in pursuance of the commercial health of ACSA.
In fact, the applicants have demonstrated that the development of KSI at the time
and in the manner in which it happened, was not commercially appropriate. This
is particularly the case because the decision was taken by one shareholder in its
own interest, and rather than providing funds for the implementation of the
decision, the shareholder required ACSA to find the funding for it through debt.
[108] For the reasons already set out above, in the context of the way in which ACSA
sought empowerment investors and what was held out to them, the decision was
unfair to the applicants.
[109] It is in my view clear enough already that the applicants have established that
there was a change of focus in how ACSA is run, which was unfair to them. The
applicants also rely on ACSA’s investment in São Paulo airport as an example
of a tendency to take decisions that have other priorities than the commercial
growth of ACSA. The issues raised by applicants are cited as examples of a
general trend in conduct. They are not relied on as specific acts which fall foul of
s 163.
[110] I consider it unnecessary then to scrutinise each example. Suffice to say that the
respondents do not provide any evidence other than a bald assertion that the
decisions are commercially sound and legitimate. Commercial soundness is
obviously a matter for evidence, and legitimacy is, for purposes of the enquiry in
this case, irrelevant.
[111] I am satisfied that the applicants have established that the respondents have
abandoned or deviated from the intention to run ACSA in a manner that place its
commercial viability at the forefront, and rather have used it as a resource in
Government’s plans for the country. I am satisfied also that this was, in the
Government’s plans for the country. I am satisfied also that this was, in the
context, unfair to the applicants.
32
UNFAIR CONDUCT
[112] In summary then, the unfair conduct that I have found established by the
applicants is that the investments were sought on the basis that this was an
opportunity for empowerment that would come to fruition when there was an IPO
of a company that was going to be placed on a commercial footing, that no IPO
was undertaken and that the objective of placing the company on a commercial
footing was either abandoned or deviated from.
[113] The applicants contend, in response to the respondents’ submission that there
is no claim under s 163 because the applicants refused an offer made in August
2014 for the purchase of the shares at R12.87 per share, that this was not a fair
offer and that this therefore does not ameliorate the unfair prejudice they
suffered. I deal with this offer later in this judgment.
[114] The applicants do not otherwise rely on the absence of an offer to buy them out.
Nevertheless, I am constrained to note that the unfairness of the respondents’
conduct, in my view, rests very much on their failure to consider the
empowerment shareholders at the same time as the SEP’s exit was being
facilitated, and their failure to facilitate a si milar exit for the empowerment
shareholders at the same time. As I set out above, it is unavoidable to conclude
that the SEP’s exit was facilitated at the time when the “deviation” was beginning
to be implemented, and for obvious reasons.
[115] For those same reasons, it was unfair not to inform the empowerment
shareholders of developments and to offer them an exit too. The failure to do so
resulted in the later decisions being unfair to the empowerment investors who
were then locked into a company that was not following the path that had been
represented to them, and which they had no way of influencing.
[116] This is not a simple question, as submitted by the respondents, of an investor
dissatisfied with its investment. This is a question of an investor investing on the
dissatisfied with its investment. This is a question of an investor investing on the
basis of certain representations, there being no other basis evident on which the
investors could have invested, and those representations being abandoned to
pursue interests which are not related to the commercial growth of the company.
33
UNFAIR PREJUDICE
[117] The unfair prejudice cited by the applicants is primarily that their shares are now
illiquid, they are locked in and cannot sell their shares, and that the shares are
significantly devalued because of the change in focus. The applicants also claim
that they have been unable to service the debt which they incurred to purchase
the shares, but that is not the main basis on which they claim unfair prejudice.
[118] The respondents’ rebuttal of the conclusion that the applicants suffered unfair
prejudice is that any prejudice was due to ordinary risks of investment and was
not unfair. They also suggest that the applicants cannot now claim unfair
prejudice, because they rejected the offer made in 2014.
[119] In my view the prejudice to the applicants that has resulted from the respondents’
choices regarding ACSA has been established. They find themselves in an
impossible situation. The unfairness of that prejudice is also evident from my
analysis above.
[120] With regard to the contention that the prejudice is simply the result of the ordinary
risks of the investment, that is clearly not the case. Had there been devaluing
which resulted from the trading of the shares on a listed exchange, that would
have been a result of the ordinary risks of investment. Had ACSA been run in a
manner consistent with the intentions outlined in the prospectus, and the
applicants had nevertheless suffered losses, that too would have been a result
of ordinary risks of investment, and could not be counted as unfair prejudice. But
that is not what happened. I do not need to repeat what did happen, I have
already set it out at length.
WAS THERE A FAIR OFFER?
[121] The question of whether the offer made in August 2014 to buy the shares at
R12.87 per share ameliorates any unfair prejudice, or obviates the applicants’
claim depends on whether the offer was fair. A fair offer that was refused would
34
demonstrate that the respondents have not acted unfairly, and that any prejudice
was not unfair because the applicants had the opportunity to avoid it. The
existence of a fair offer is also particularly relevant in this case because the
ultimate relief sought by the applicants is that they are bought out at a fair price,
and if they unreasonably rejected a fair offer, there would be merit to the
respondents’ submission that the applicants are attempting to obtain an unfair
windfall.
[122] The authorities also acknowledge that an offer to buy shares at fair value may
cure unfairness.27 But, naturally, the existence of an offer that was refused is not
an absolute bar to relief in terms of s 163. Both the intrinsic fairness of the offer
(with regard to value and conditions), and the reason for refusal may mean that
the offer does not cure unfairness or that the refusal does not preclude relief. As
the SCA held in Bayly v Knowles:28
… the failure of a minority shareholder to accept a reasonable offer for his shares
and leave the company in the hands of the majority is, at least, strong evidence of a
willingness to endure treatment which is prima facie inequitable despite the choice of a
viable alternative. If that is so it would not ordinarily behove him to continue to complain
about oppression. The rule, however, cannot be absolute. In Re Data Online
Transactions (UK) Ltd [2003] BCC 510, for example, it was held reasonable for a
petitioner to refuse an otherwise acceptable offer where there was not a reasonable
prospect that the offeror would be able to meet the financial commitment involved. One
can conceive of cases where the offer, although reasonable, may be so tainted by bad
faith or ulterior motive as to excuse non-acceptance.29
[123] The applicants contend that the offer was not a fair offer because
1. it was conditional on being accepted by all empowerment shareholders, and
they cannot be penalised for it not having been accepted because all the
they cannot be penalised for it not having been accepted because all the
empowerment shareholders rejected it;
2. the price was not based on a fair valuation, and
27 TCM ibid para 108-109. 28 2010 (4) SA 548 (SCA). 29 Ibid para 24.
35
3. the price offered impermissibly applied a minority discount.
[124] It is plain that the refusal of the offer by all empowerment shareholders means
that the applicants’ refusal of the offer cannot be held against them in these
proceedings. Even if they had accepted it, their acceptance would not have been
valid. The offer was therefore not one that stands in the way of relief in terms of
s 163.
[125] However, taking into account that a valuation by Deloitte in July 2014 valued the
shares at between R11 and R22 per share as at 31 March 2014 , the 2014
financial statements put net asset value at R25.37 per share, and mere months
later the Minister was of the view that the shares should be bought at R22 per
share, which is Government’s version, it is unclear how the price offered could
be considered to be a fair price. The respondents contend that the applicant
provides no basis on which it can be concluded that the price offered was unfair,
but on the respondents’ own version it is difficult to conclude that the price was
not unfair.
[126] According to the report by Mr Harman annexed to ACSA’s first answering
affidavit, the offer price was arrived at by taking the mid -price of the Deloitte
valuation and then deducting a 38% minority and marketability discount. The
applicants contend that this was not justified as they would not have had to suffer
such a discount if their shares were sold in the IPO or later on a stock exchange.
[127] To the extent that the share price offered to the empowerment shareholders was
arrived at with the application of a minority discount, the applicants rely on Geffen
and Others v Martin and Others 30 as a basis for their submission that the
application of the discount disqualified the offer from being fair. In that judgment,
Davis J set out principles applicable to what a reasonable offer is , based on
guidelines articulated by Lord Hoffman in O'Neill and another v Phillips and
guidelines articulated by Lord Hoffman in O'Neill and another v Phillips and
others.31 Regarding what a fair value is, it “would ordinarily be the value which
30 [2018] All SA 21 (WCC) para 34. 31 [1999] 2 All ER 961 (HL).
36
represents an equivalent proportion of the total issued share capital without a
discount for being a minority holding.”32
[128] The application of a minority discount would not, on that basis, automatically
result in any offer being unfair. However, Lord Hoffman comments that the
“existing practice” in such matters is not to apply a discount unless there are
special circumstances which justify doing so, and “it will seldom be possible for
the court to say that an offer to buy on a discounted basis is plainly reasonable”.33
[129] Although the applicants rely on the unfairness of the price in their written heads
of argument, at the hearing that reliance was disavowed, and the applicants
emphasised that the unfairness on which they rely is only that, because of the
condition that all empowerment investors must agree to sell, and because the
other empowerment investors decline the offer, the offer was never open to them
to accept even if they wanted to. The question of the application of a discount
will therefore be considered when I deal with the appropriate remedy.
[130] Although the fairness of the price is open to doubt, I do not then need to
determine it one way or the other, since I agree that the applicants could not have
accepted the offer when the other investors declined it, so that there was no
reasonable or fair offer that obviates relief in terms of the section.
REMAINING POINTS RAISED BY THE RESPONDENTS IN DEFENCE
[131] The remaining points raised by the respondents in opposition to the applicant’s
position engaging s 163 include:
1. The applicants are not entitled to relief under s 163 because the Minister took
a decision that the shares must be purchased for R22 per share and that
decision has not been set aside.
2. The applicants have not proven that they are empowerment shareholders.
32 Geffen ibid para 34. 33 O’Neill ibid at 975c-e.
37
3. The applicants have other remedies available to them.
4. Section 48 of the Companies Act precludes the relief sought.
5. The applicants’ delay in pursuing these proceedings prejudices the
respondents.
[132] I deal with these in turn.
THE MINISTER’S DECISION
[133] Government submits in its initial answering affidavit that the Minister made a
decision in January 2015 that the applicants’ shares should be bought by ACSA
at R22 per share, that the decision is rational and that the decision is still extant.
It contended that there was no contention that that decision was irrational, and
that the proper course was to review that decision, rather than bring this
application.
[134] This argument appears to have been abandoned, as there was no mention of it
in argument. The abandonment is appropriate. The decision was neither
conveyed to the applicants nor implemented. It therefore had no external effect
and could neither be enforced nor reviewed. I pause to note that it is interesting
that, even after the institution of the application, rather than make an offer in
accordance with the decision, the respondents opposed the application partly on
the basis that there was a decision already.
EMPOWERMENT STATUS
[135] ACSA argues that the applicants have not provided any proof of “empowerment
status”, and that the claim that they are “empowerment” shareholders is only a
“strategic ploy”. However, it is common cause that the shares were purchased
as a result of applications a ccepted in response to the invitation for
empowerment investment. The prospectus set out specific criteria for
38
empowerment investors, and made it clear that applications would only be
considered from those who fulfilled the criteria.
[136] According to ACSA, the applicants’ failure to disclose whether they still comply
with these criteria is damning. I cannot see how it is. That would not change the
circumstances under which the shares were made available, or the purpose of
their sale. It would also not change the fact that the holders of those shares are
now locked into an arrangement that was not of their choosing, which they could
not have reasonably predicted, and which is unfair.
[137] The Ernst & Young report in 2012 seems to show that the first applicant’s
empowerment investors had already sold out to another entity which may not
comply with the empowerment requirements. However, that issue was not fully
ventilated before me and I do not consider it appropriate to penalise the first
applicant as that development does not change the fundamental facts.
THE AVAILABILITY OF OTHER REMEDIES
[138] Government suggests that the applicants have other remedies at their disposal
and therefore should not be permitted to succeed. These include enforcement of
the alleged IPO promise and the review of Regulating Committee decisions.
[139] There is nothing that compels the applicants to exhaust all other possible
remedies before approaching the court in terms of s 163. These include public
law remedies such as review of the various decisions of the Minister and the
Regulating Committee, or an application to compel an IPO on the basis of the
legitimate expectation, as well as the remedies in the Companies Act which
penalise false statements in the prospectus.
[140] As far as the public law remedies, are concerned, on Government’s own version
that each of the decisions complained of were legitimate, and insulated from
judicial interference because they are polycentric, value laden, policy decisions,
none of those remedies would succeed.
39
[141] Government decided to incorporate ACSA and make the Act applicable to it. It
had the opportunity to exclude the application of certain sections, and did not
exclude s 163. It cannot now say that s 163 should not be available, and that the
applicants are obliged to follow public law remedies. Government attempts
somehow to rely in support of this suggestion on the fact that this is not a situation
of private investors in a commercial company. That submission redounds against
Government rather than for it, because the investment was invited on the basis
that, eventually, it would be in a commercial company. The fact that it no longer
will be highlights the unfairness and prejudice to the applicants. In the specific
circumstances of this case, Government’s own unfair conduct cannot protect it
from the consequences of that conduct.
[142] As far as the remedies for false statements in the prospectus are concerned, that
is another deflection. The applicants do not contend that the statements were
false at the time they were made. The unfairness claimed is the decision to
change course. The applicants rely on the contents of the prospectus because
no shareholder’s compact was entered into with them.
[143] Government’s submission that other remedies are available to the applicants is
based on its own re-articulation of the applicants’ case. It is not open to it to do
that. The case pleaded by the applicants and the relief they seek must be
evaluated on their own merits, and not against the case Government would rather
meet.34
[144] In any event, s 163 is there to provide recourse where a shareholder suffers
unfair prejudice as a result of acts that may not, in themselves, be in bad faith,
illegitimate or unlawful. The situation in this case is in my view squarely within
the bounds of the mischief s 163 exists to relieve.
34 Makhanya v University of Zululand 2010 (1) SA 62 (SCA) paras 71 and 72.
40
SECTION 48 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 2008
[145] ACSA contends that the relief sought is incompetent because an order that
ACSA repurchase its own shares, which is prohibited in terms of s 48(2) of the
Act unless the requirements of s 46 are complied with. This deals with the
solvency and liquidity of the company once the shares are purchased.
[146] ACSA makes no case that, in fact, any repurchase of shares would lead to it
failing the solvency and liquidity test. It does not make any suggestion of what
value might be offered that is fair to the applicants and also satisfies the test.
This objection is, in my view, simply raised in an attempt to avoid any relief being
granted to the applicants.
[147] In any event, the question can be dealt with in a number of ways. The court could
order that the price be determined while taking the solvency and liquidity test into
account. The order could be that Government purchase the shares rather than
ACSA, or that the respondents bear joint and several responsibility for the
purchase of the shares. If the fair value arrived at does in fact result in a threat
to the solvency and liquidity, the court can be approached to assist in arriving at
a fair solution. The point is that a fair value must be fair to everyone, and invoking
s 48 at this point shows ACSA’s failure to engage bona fide with the predicament
in which the applicants find themselves.
DELAY
[148] In its supplementary answering affidavit, Government raises the delay between
the dismissal of the appeal of the rescission in April 2022 and the filing of the
applicants’ amended notice of motion as a basis on which it would be in the
interests of justice to dismiss this application. The point was not pursued in the
two sets of written argument filed, nor in oral argument.
[149] Nevertheless, it seems to me that in the circumstances of this case the delay was
not inordinate and a determinative resolution of the matter is in the interests of
not inordinate and a determinative resolution of the matter is in the interests of
justice while the mere dismissal for delay would not be.
41
REMEDY
[150] It is unclear why the respondents appear to be committed to keeping the
applicants locked in. Not only was there a failure to make an offer as determined
by the Minister in 2015, but there was no offer forthcoming after the ill-fated
Riscura valuation which led to the rescission of the order by agreement, not even
an offer based on the valuation obtained by ACSA from Mr Wainer in response
to the Riscura valuation. The respondents have obviously taken a decision that
ACSA will remain a State-Owned Enterprise, and that it will be a resource in
Government’s various policy agendas. I reiterate that of course they are entitled
to do so. But their failure to facilitate a reasonable and fair exit for the applicants
in these circumstances is unfathomable. Government cannot seek to avoid all
consequences of its decisions, even though it was entitled to take those
decisions. Section 163 exists precisely for the circumstance where a legitimate
decision leads to unfair prejudice for a shareholder who has no way of mitigating
that prejudice.
[151] The remedy sought by the applicants is that the respondents be ordered to
purchase the applicants’ shares in ACSA, at a value to be determined by an
independent expert. The applicants further seek an order regarding the method
of valuation and what should be included or excluded from consideration by the
expert.
[152] The respondents raise various objections to any order that they be ordered to
purchase the shares, but make no concrete submissions about what a just and
equitable remedy would be, if this court finds that a case was made out for relief
in terms of s 163.
[153] ACSA makes unsupported submissions that any order that the shares be
purchased, at a price using any valuation method, would (not may) jeopardise
ACSA’s financial stability and undermine its public function. It suggests that the
purchase of the shares is extraordinary relief for which no case has been made
purchase of the shares is extraordinary relief for which no case has been made
out and that more appropriate relief may be “improved transparency or
governance adjustments”.
42
[154] In the context of even the common cause facts, it seems to me that ACSA’s
submissions regarding the appropriate relief are inconsistent with ACSA’s plans
for the future, or with Government’s plans for ACSA. There is now a clear
intention for ACSA to be treated as an organ of state and for it not to have outside
shareholders. The suggestion that a court should then interfere in how ACSA is
governed in those circumstances may well amount to interference in government
policy matters beyond what is desirable. That the purpose of the interference is
the retention of investors who own such a small percentage of shares as to be
negligible, and who do not fit into ACSA’s future anymore, makes it even less
appropriate.
[155] The contention that buying out shareholding that amounts to less than two
percent at any reasonable price would result in financial disaster for ACSA is
risible. Naturally if the price is too high it would not be “fair value”, and any “fair
value” would have to be such that it did not completely derail ACSA. ACSA
however seems to take the view that any price at all would have this disastrous
effect, which is a submission that cannot properly be engaged with. The
submission is especially disingenuous in view of ACSA’s own contention in its
second answering affidavit that, after the expert’s valuation report is produced,
the court would retain discretion about the appropriate value at which the shares
should be purchased.
[156] In neither of its two answering affidavits does ACSA submit that the purchase of
the shares would not be just and equitable. The only issue taken with the relief
is the applicants’ proposed methods of valuation and the restrictions the
applicants seek to impose on the valuer . These are dealt with later in this
judgment.
[157] Government objects to an order that the applicants’ shares be bought by the
respondents on the basis that it would be “separation of powers insensitive”. The
respondents on the basis that it would be “separation of powers insensitive”. The
objection is based both on the resulting payment of public funds and on
“Government’s policy concerning its control and shareholding in ACSA”. This
submission was first raised in Government’s second answering affidavit, and
included verbatim in its written argument.
43
[158] Considering that what Government has disclosed to the court about its current
policy concerning its control and shareholding in ACSA is both rudimentary and
contradictory, it seems clear that this second objection is a grasping at straws
that must fall flat. All indications are that Government has changed its policy
about its shareholding in ACSA, does not intend to rid itself of its shareholding or
the complete control that it has reassumed, and intends to keep ACSA within its
fold. This is evident not only from Government’s affidavits and the courses of
action that have played themselves out over the last twenty-five odd years, but
also from the most recent (unproclaimed) amendment to the ACSA Act.
[159] Government purchasing the shares would have no effect on the control of ACSA
since the shares at issue come with no control. As far as Government’s policy
regarding shareholding is concerned, both Government and ACSA have made
much of the negligible size of the shareholding at issue. The repurchase of the
shares would have no real effect on whatever that undisclosed policy might be.
[160] In any event, the buy-out of the applicants’ shares is the least invasive remedy
that would alleviate the unfairness, as it would leave Government free to deal
with ACSA however it wished (subject to any objections the other shareholder
respondents may have). Any remedy that may come close to prescribing how
ACSA is run would cut deeper into the polycentric policy -laden core that
Government seeks to protect. The objection based on Government’s policy on
ACSA’s shareholding and control has no merit.
[161] The question of the payment of public funds is something that is relevant, but not
determinative. It does have an influence of what remedy may be fair to all parties.
It may also be accommodated in the determination of the fair value of the shares.
Government complains that the applicants have not placed evidence before the
Government complains that the applicants have not placed evidence before the
court about the effect of any purchase of shares on Government’s ability to
comply with its constitutional obligations. However, in my view, that is something
that Government must demonstrate since it is particularly in Government’s
knowledge. It is also something that can be referred to the court after the
valuation report is produced, in accordance with the submissions made by
ACSA.
44
[162] In its first answering affidavit, Government objects to an order that the shares be
bought by the company on the basis that the court has no power to order a buy-
back of shares outside of s 164 of the Companies Act. This contention was not
followed through in argument, and it has no merit . The authorities show that
courts have ordered that shares be bought, whether by the company ,35 the
majority shareholder,36 or even the majority shareholder,37 as a remedy in terms
of s 163. Certainly there is no reason to interpret s 163 as excluding such a
remedy. It permits a broad discretionary remedy and is only limited by what is
just and equitable in the circumstances.38 The court “may make any interim or
final order it considers fit”.39
[163] Government also contended in the first answering affidavit that s 217 of the
Constitution is applicable to the purchase of the shares, but it is not clear how.
This too was not pursued in argument.
[164] Government emphasises the separation of powers point with this ratio from
International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd
(“ITAC”):40
Where the Constitution or valid legislation has entrusted specific powers and functions
to a particular branch of government, courts may not usurp that power or function by
making a decision of their preference. That would frustrate the balance of power implied
in the principle of separation of powers. The primary responsibility of a court is not to
make decisions reserved for or within the domain of other branches of government, but
rather to ensure that the concerned branches of government exercise their authority
within the bounds of the Constitution. This would especially be so where the decision in
issue is policy-laden as well as polycentric.41
35 This possibility is not excluded by the SCA in De Sousa (above), even though it set aside the order of
the High Court. 36 For example, in McMillan NO v Potts and Others 2011 (1) SA 511 (WCC) (“McMillan”). 37 As was the case in Bayly v Knowles (above). 38 Off-Beat Holiday Club and Another v Sambonani Holiday Spa Shareblock Ltd and Others 2-17 (5) SA
9 (CC) para 27-28; Freedom Stationery (Pty) Ltd and Others v Hassam and Others 2019 (4) SA 459
(SCA) para 27. 39 Section 163(2) of the Companies Act. 40 International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC) 41 Ibid, para 95.
45
[165] It should go without saying that there is no possibility of any court usurping a
power or function entrusted by the Constitution or legislation to a particular
branch of government and imposing instead a decision of the court’s
“preference”. That implies arbitrary and injudicious decision making that is
inconsistent with the rule of law. The court must ensure that the branches of
government exercise their authority in accordance with the Constitution and
applicable legislation. The Constitution itself affirms that South Africa is founded
on values including “[s]upremacy of the constitution and the rule of law”.42 One
of the primary elements of the rule of law is that nobody is above the law, not
even Government. As the Constitutional Court put it in ITAC, Government must
“wield [its] power subject to the Constitution and the law”.43
[166] In that context, the mere ipse dixit of a member of government is no longer
sufficient to invoke judicial deference.44 Although the authorities deal with
administrative decisions and claims to keep information secret, the same
principles must apply to government conduct in general, which must be
consistent with the law and the Constitution, both when it acts as an ordinary
shareholder and when it acts as a political entity. Government cannot use
separation of powers as a general shield against consequences for its actions.
This is especially so when the application of the Act and its remedies comes
about as a result of Government’s own decision to make the Act applicable to
ACSA. Government also had the opportunity at the time to stipulate that s 163
would not apply to ACSA. It did not do so, and Government must now bear the
consequences of its own actions.
[167] If Government contends that a decision will impinge on the inviolable heartland
of executive decision-making,45 it must show the court how, and not simply recite
the legal position,46 or claim that the public interest or government’s powers and
the legal position,46 or claim that the public interest or government’s powers and
functions are implicated.47 In simple terms, he who alleges must prove , with
42 Section 1(c) of the Constitution. 43 ITAC, para 98. 44 Wingate-Pearse v Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Others 2019 (6) SA 196 (GJ)
paras 57-59 and the authorities referred to there. 45 Ibid, para 100. 46 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M&G Media Ltd 2011 (2) SA 1 (SCA) paras 19-
20. 47 Nxele v Chief Deputy Commissioner, Corporate Services, Corporate Services, Department of
46
reference to facts rather than “perfunctory conclusions ”.48 In both ITAC and
National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others
(OUTA),49 the party relying on separation of powers to require judicial deference
set out a clear case of how an order by the court would encroach on policy issues,
rather than simply making an assertion.
[168] In any event, this case is very different from ITAC, which dealt directly with policy
formulation and implementation, and in which the Minister put before the court a
detailed explanation of what goes into the policy formulation, and how it would
be affected by an order. Again, I emphasise that I deal now not with the decision
not to list ACSA, or the decision to prioritise ACSA’s role in the economic
development of the country, but with the remedy for the prejudice that I have
found has resulted for the applicants.
[169] Finally, there can be no real objection on Government’s part to it buying the
applicants’ shares, because the prospectus specifies that if the empowerment
investors want to sell their shares before any IPO, they may only sell them to
Government. The possibility was already foreseen at the time of the invitation to
invest, and it prevents any other sale by these investors. What the status of that
provision becomes when Government itself has decided there will be no IPO is
not the issue, particularly when sale of the shares to any third party in the context
of this case is not an option to be considered.
[170] Government’s and ACSA’s objections to an order that the applicant’s shares be
bought by them do not hold any water. The alternative remedies suggested by
them seem to me to be less fair to both sides, and also are more likely to overstep
the separation of powers principle than the share buy-out option.
[171] I am satisfied that an appropriate remedy is to order that the applicants’ shares
be bought, whether by Government or ACSA or a combination, and for a fair
be bought, whether by Government or ACSA or a combination, and for a fair
price. As observed by Hoffman J (as he then was):
Correctional Services & Others (2008) 29 ILJ 2708 (LAC) para 46. 48 President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v M&G Media Ltd 2011 (2) SA 1 (SCA) para 30. 49 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC)
47
It is almost always clear from the outset that one party will have to buy the other’s
shares and it is usually equally clear who that party will be. The only real issue is the
price of the shares.50
[172] This brings me to the next consideration regarding the remedy, and that is how
the shares are to be valued, or how a fair price is to be arrived at. The fairness
of the price has to take into account all the relevant principles, including the
prejudice suffered by the applicants and that the funds are public funds. It must
also shy away from allowing the applicants an undue benefit, or windfall.
VALUATION
[173] It appears on a consideration of the application as a whole that the fair value of
the shares is the most contentious issue. There have already been 5 vastly
differing valuations of the shares:
1. In 2014, a valuation by Vunani Capital for the purposes of buying back the
empowerment shares, using an undisclosed mandate letter for its frame of
reference, arrived at R10.36 per share as at 31 March 2013.51
2. In 2014, the Deloitte valuation based on ACSA’s financial reports and
Corporate Plan, as at 31 March 2014, arrived at a value of R18 to R22 per
share.52
3. In 2016, a valuation by Mr Greg Harman as at 30 September 2015, for
purposes of answering the first phase of this application, set the value at
R15.70 before applying a discount for minority shares and lack of liquidity, to
end at R11.70 per share.
50 Re a Company (No 004377 of 1986) [1987] BCLC 94 at 101, cited by Binns-Ward AJ (as he then was)
in McMillan ibid para 1. 51 This valuation was much lower than the valuations done by Vunani for earlier years, not because of a
decrease in value, but because Vunani applied different factors. The applicants’ expert notes an error
in calculation and suggests that the correct amount there ought to have been R11.07. 52 The middle of that range was used for the offer of R12.90 in 2014, after applying a discount of 38% for
minority and marketability.
48
4. In 2017, the Riscura valuation obtained in terms of the court order of 1 August
2017 valued the shares at R77.92 per share.
5. In 2018, a valuation by Professor Wainer in response to the Riscura valuation,
placed the value at R36.36 per share. ACSA had initially sought the use of
that value for the shares in its counter-application (although it does not appear
that an offer was made at that value).
[174] Other share prices for ACSA shares that can be found in the papers are the initial
R8.19 per share that all the 1998 investors paid; the R16.75 per share paid by
the PIC for shares in the eighth respondent; the offer from the majority of the
minorities to ACSA, in 2013, for ACSA to buy the shares at R23.05 per share,
and the unimplemented decision of the Minister in 2015, that the shares be
bought at R22 per share.
[175] The wide range of values demonstrate that assumptions applied and the choice
of factors to consider are vital to the outcome of the valuation process. The issue
is complicated by the need for the value to be fair to all parties. It must not result
in an undue windfall to the applicants. It must not be so high as to be punitive to
the respondents. It must also not prejudice ACSA unduly, or impact unduly on
the public purse. That said, the value must also remedy the prejudice that I have
found the applicants to have suffered, by having their interests essentially
ignored in decisions taken about and, to a lesser extent, by ACSA, and by not
having been offered a reasonable exit opportunity at a reasonable time.
[176] The parties disagree on what valuation method is appropriate, on what may be
taken into account by the valuer, and what the appropriate valuation date is. The
respondents contend that it is not for the court to specify the terms of reference,
however, they themselves provided certain terms of references for valuations in
the past. The applicants rely on authorities that show that it is not unusual for a
the past. The applicants rely on authorities that show that it is not unusual for a
court to specify what may be taken into account and how, particularly when those
factors may be part of or relevant to the oppression.53 Reference to the various
valuation reports shows that it is not only the particular method that makes a
difference, but the factors that are taken into account, and how they are taken
53 For example the detailed order made in McMillan.
49
into account. A clear indication of this is seen in the difference in the Vunani
report produced in 2013 for the purposes of the employee share scheme, and
the Vunani report in March 2014, in which the value of the company is
significantly lower. Mr Harman states that the difference does not emanate from
a real value change but from lower assumptions about revenue and growth
during the terminal period.
[177] Whether and to what extent the court determines or limits what a valuer may take
into account depends on the circumstances of the case. The court makes the
determination of what conduct was fair and therefore also of what a fair value will
be based on. Reference to the Riscura valuation, in which the determination of
what conduct was oppressive and how it must be accounted for was left to the
discretion of Riscura, is sufficient to demonstrate the perils of the court not
determining disputed parameters with sufficient clarity in the circumstances of
this case In my view Riscura’s manner of accounting for what it considered to
be oppressive conduct resulted in an unfair valuation, because it valued shares
on the basis of value that did not exist.
[178] The applicants’ preferred remedy is an order that the respondents acquire the
shares jointly and severally, at a price determined by using the price at which the
PIC purchased its shares in the eighth respondent in December 2005 (R16.75
per share), escalated to present day value by using ACSA weighted average cost
of capital (“WACC”) as set by the Regulating Committee each year, until the date
on which the valuation is undertaken, to be compounded annually on 31 March.
[179] In the alternative, the applicants seek the acquisition of the shares jointly and
severally by the respondents on the basis of a fresh valuation conducted by an
independent valuer appointed by agreement, with no procurement processes
followed, and based on the following:
1. A discounted cash flow (“DCF”) methodology, using an equity value over
1. A discounted cash flow (“DCF”) methodology, using an equity value over
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortisation (“EV/EBITDA”)
multiple valuation and a multiple of net asset value (“NAV”) as checks.
2. A valuation date of 01 August 2017.
50
3. No minority or marketability discount.
4. Excluding from the valuation the effect of specified “oppressive conduct”.
5. Escalating to present day value using the WACC
[180] It is the case that an actual sale value may be more useful in determining fair
value than notional values achieved by valuations which can be vastly different
simply by changing one assumption. However, against this advantage must be
ranged the circumstance that the only sale values are from 1998 and 2005, 38
and 21 years ago respectively. Since I have found that the fundamental basis of
the prejudice suffered by the applicants is the respondents’ failure to give them
the opportunity to exit at the time the SEP did, when it appears to me the decision
to change course must have been taken, the 2005 price would a sensible starting
point. The difficulty then is the appropriate escalation to be applied.
[181] The respondents submit that a share price from over 20 years ago cannot be a
relevant or appropriate place to start, partly because it is so long ago as to be
completely irrelevant. There is something in that, but it may be remedied by
applying the appropriate escalation. Another advantage of using the 2005 price
is that it would not require yet another expensive and extensive valuation
exercise from scratch. Naturally, however, if the 2005 price is unworkable, then
the exercise would have to be undertaken.
[182] The applicants submit that the appropriate escalation factor is the WACC as
determined by the Regulating Committee when performing its statutory functions.
The respondents object to this on the basis that the WACC calculated and
applied by the Regulating Committee was often higher than ACSA’s actual
performance, and that this would result in the overvaluation of the shares. The
applicants’ riposte is that this would compensate them for the prejudice they
suffered by ACSA not being run in a commercially soun d manner. As I have
suffered by ACSA not being run in a commercially soun d manner. As I have
already observed, over valuation is to be avoided, as it relies on value that is
simply not there, and would result in unfairness to ACSA and possibly an
improper strain on the public purse.
51
[183] ACSA and Government both submit that using the WACC is inappropriate
because ACSA’s actual returns were lower than the WACC. ACSA suggests the
imposition of interest instead, while Government makes no alternative
suggestion. Government’s interesting position is that, even if the Court finds that
there was conduct which engages s 163, and the applicants were prejudiced, the
application must still be dismissed because the methods of valuation proposed
by the applicants are not acceptable to Government. This attitude is not an
acceptable one. As a prime constitutional actor, Government should be taking a
facilitative approach and assisting the court to find a just and equitable solution,
rather than calling for dismissal of an application because it does not like the
applicants’ proposed solution.
[184] I am not satisfied that interest would be an appropriate way of escalating the
share price from 2005, as there is insufficient evidence before me to show that it
would be a sufficiently nuanced and fair escalation. Nor, as already indicated,
am I satisfied that using the WACC would be fair.
[185] This brings me to the second proposed method of valuation, set out above.
[186] The applicants propose that value of their shares be arrived at by means of
valuing ACSA in the manner set out above, which is the same method used by
most of the experts who have provided valuations in this saga, save for the
valuation by Professor Wainer in 2018. I can see no fundamental difficulty with
that as a general proposition.
[187] ACSA contends that there is no need for yet another expert report. Nor does it
suggest any other method of arriving at a value. Instead, it contends that there is
not sufficient evidence before the court to determine a value. It makes the
unusual submission that there is no real dispute, there are established
methodologies to value the company and the company’s financial statements are
transparent, and this can therefore be easily calculated. However, on ACSA’s
transparent, and this can therefore be easily calculated. However, on ACSA’s
own argument, it is an independent expert who will perform this calculation using
the established methodologies, some of which are those requested by the
applicants.
52
[188] ACSA also contends that if the court determines what is fair to be taken into
account, the expert will only be undertaking a mechanical exercise and there is
no point to that. This contention too is flawed. Firstly, on ACSA’s own argument,
it is the court that must determine what is fair. The court has a wide discretion.
The court is not an expert and cannot perform the calculations. It is, on the
authorities, as well as logically, entirely appropriate for the court to set
parameters for any calculation.
[189] Government makes the submission that certain methodologies were used to
value ACSA and therefore its shares in 1998 and again in 2005. It does not,
however, disclose what those methodologies are. Had it done so, it may well
have been appropriate to order that similar methodologies be used here. Again,
the court is somewhat constrained by the failure of Government to assist it in
coming to a fair, lawful, just and equitable decision.
[190] The applicants seek that the independent expert be appointed without following
procurement processes. I do not see that there is any basis for an order that the
independent expert be appointed without following procurement processes. If
Government is paying for the expert, no cogent reason is provided why it should
not follow the required processes.
[191] Government uses this request by the applicants as a reason why the whole of
the relief cannot be granted. Naturally that is not the case. Declining the prayer
for the expert to be appointed without procurement processes being followed is
the only logical result to that prayer being without basis.
[192] The applicants suggest that the appropriate date of the calculation should be 1
August 2017, and that it should be escalated from that date using the WACC.
The reasons for the suggestion are that previous order which was rescinded was
dated 1 August 2017, and the Riscura valuation and Prof Wainer’s valuations
dated 1 August 2017, and the Riscura valuation and Prof Wainer’s valuations
were both for that date; the applicants were not to blame for the failure of that
order, and that the applicants should not have to bear the brunt of the effect of
Covid-19 on ACSA. I disagree that those are valid reasons. I disagree in
particular that there is any basis on which applicants should be entitled to avoid
53
the effects of Covid-19. While any chosen date would probably be arbitrary, it
should have some reasonable basis.
[193] ACSA submits that 1 August 2017 is not an appropriate date. It submits, without
any reason, that the appropriate date is the date on which the application was
launched (29 July 2015), but at the same time does not agree about how
escalation should be calculated, and also wishes for the applicants not to have
the benefit of avoiding the effects of Covid-19. It does not make any submission
about how this would be achieved if the effective date is 29 July 2015.
[194] On balance, it seems to me that, taking into account the difficulties in finding an
appropriate factor for escalation, and that it is my view that the applicants should
not benefit by a value that is more than what exists, the appropriate date for
valuation is the most recent financial year end before the hearing. That is, 28
February 2025. It can then be escalated to the final valuation date by the
application of the applicable mora interest rate.
[195] As to the factors that should be taken into account, I have already indicated that
the prayer for oppressive conduct be accounted for cannot be granted. It would
lead to an unfair result and prejudice ACSA and the public purse unduly. While
the effect can be attenuated by the retention of dividends (as the Minister had
suggested in 2015) and allowing payment to the applicants to be made in
instalments (as the applicants suggested in the application to adopt the Riscura
valuation), it would still tip the balance unfairly.
[196] Nevertheless, I am satisfied that the applicants have made out a case that no
minority or marketability discount should be applied. Had there been an IPO and
the shares been sold on a registered stock exchange, whether at the time of the
IPO or a year later, there would have been no such discount. The vagaries of the
market may have resulted in a lower or higher value, but no discount would have
market may have resulted in a lower or higher value, but no discount would have
applied. The value should not, therefore, include a discount. Neither
Government’s nor ACSA’s objections to there being no discount have any merit.
[197] If the outcome of the exercise results in liquidity difficulties for ACSA that cannot
be remedied by the retention of dividends and appropriate contribution from the
major shareholder, it is still open to the respondents to approach the court and
54
place the necessary evidence before it to show that the value is not fair in the
circumstances. It is to be hoped, however, that the parties are able to agree about
what a fair value is in the context of the court’s findings and that does not become
necessary.
55
CONCLUSION
[198] On the basis of what I have set out above, it is appropriate to make an order that
ACSA and/ or Government, jointly and severally, be responsible for making good
the prejudice they have caused, and to purchase the applicants’ shares at a fair
value.
[199] The applicants seek costs on scale C. The manner in which ACSA and
Government have litigated led me to consider imposing a punitive costs order
but on reflection, it is not necessary to further encumber the public purse. I
therefore make an order for costs on the ordinary scale.
[200] I make the following order:
1. The first to third respondents have caused unfair prejudice to the applicants
as contemplated in section 163(1) of the Companies Act, 2008.
2. The first to third respondents, jointly and severally, are to acquire the
applicants’ shares in the first respondent at a fair value, to be paid in cash
within one month of the final valuation being made available to the parties.
3. An independent expert valuer is to be appointed by the first to third
respondents, subject to government procurement requirements, and taking
any reasonable objection by the applicants into account. The costs of the
valuation are to be borne by the first to third respondents, jointly and severally.
4. The appointed valuer shall value the applicants’ shares on a pro-rata basis,
without applying any discounts for minority shareholding or lack of
marketability of the shares, as at 28 February 2025, escalated to the date on
which the final valuation is made available to the parties by the application of
the mora interest rate.
5. The appointed valuer shall use a discounted cash flow methodology, and use
an EV/EBITDA multiple valuation and a net asset value valuation as cross-
checks, using comparable international companies to determine appropriate
multiples. Should the valuer consi der that addition methodologies are
56
necessary to cross-check the value for accuracy, that should be done and
reasons given in the valuation report.
6. The first to third respondents, and the applicants, are to provide all and any
information to the valuer that the valuer deems relevant, within 7 days of any
request by the valuer.
7. The parties shall be permitted to make representations to the valuer on the
basis of a draft valuation, before the final value is determined.
8. The final valuation shall be completed within six months of the valuer’s
appointment.
9. Should there be a need for further relief resulting from the valuation process,
or any collateral relief resulting from unforeseen circumstances, the parties
may supplement their papers and re-enrol this application.
10. The first to third respondents are to pay the costs of this application, including
costs of two counsel, on scale C.
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
representatives by email and uploading to the relevant online platform.
________________________
S. YACOOB
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
APPEARANCES
For the applicants: A Franklin SC and P Smith
Instructed by: Pinsent Masons, substituted by Stein Scop
Attorneys Inc on 1 October 2026
For the 1st Respondent: V Maleka SC, P Ngcongo and D Mutemwa
Instructed by: Edward Nathan Sonnenberg
For the 2nd and 3rd Respondents: G Marcus SC, A Hassim SC and D Sive
Instructed by: The State Attorney, Johannesburg