IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Reportable
Of interest to Judges
Circulate to Magistrates and Regional Magistrates
Case no: HC 35/2026
Case no (court a quo): KLD1150/2026
In the matter between:
THE STATE
and
USUALDO ZUNGUZA ACCUSED
Coram: Petersen J et Reddy J
Date received: 26 October 2026 (Petersen J)
Date considered: Special review in chambers; no oral hearing.
Delivered: 3 November 2026
Summary: Criminal procedure - automatic review under s 302 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 not engaged where the sentence imposed does not
exceed three months and the accused was legally represented - proceedings
nevertheless reviewable under s 304(4) of the Act - contravention of s 49(1)(a)
of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 - a magistrate’s court has no power to order
the deportation of an illegal foreigner, which vests in the Director- General and
immigration officers under ss 32 and 34 of the Immigration Act - S v Cuna not
followed and S v Hashim followed - deportation order set aside - sentence of
imprisonment resting on irrelevant considerations and double-counting of an
element of the offence set aside and substituted with a wholly suspended sentence
on conditions.
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2
REVIEW JUDGMENT
PETERSEN J (REDDY J concurring):
Introduction
[1] The accused, Mr Usualdo Zunguza, a Mozambican national, pleaded guilty
in the magistrate’s court for the district of Matlosana, held at Klerksdorp, to a
contravention of s 49(1)(a) of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 (‘the Immigration
Act’). On 23 September 2026, the magistrate sentenced the accused to ninety (90)
days’ imprisonment and, in addition, ordered that he be deported on completion
of the sentence.
Issues arising
[2] The matter was submitted to this court as an automatic review. It is,
however, not a matter envisaged as an automatic review in terms of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (‘the CPA’) . There are three issues that arise on a
perusal of the papers. The first is whether the proceedings are properly before this
court. The second is whether a magistrate’s court has the power to order the
deportation of a person convicted under s 49(1)(a) of the Immigration Act. The
third is whether the sentence of ninety ( 90) days’ imprisonment is a suitable
sentence which withstands scrutiny on the reasoning employed by the magistrate.
The three issues are dealt with in that order, after a short synopsis of the record
of proceedings. The accused has been in custody since his arrest on 28 August
2026. The matter calls for a prompt decision, and it is accordingly dealt with on
the papers without query to the magistrate concerned.
Background
[3] The accused was arrested at or near Klerksdorp on 28 August 2026. He
appeared on 31 August 2026 and was remanded in custody without bail for legal
aid arrangements and copies of the papers. On 15 September 2026, the matter was
remanded to 23 September 2026 for his first appearance in the trial court. On 23
September 2026, the accused, represented by Ms Mokwena of Legal Aid South
Africa, appeared before Mr Vermaas, an additional magistrate. The charge,
framed under s 49(1)(a) read with ss 1, 9(3)(a), 9(3)(b), 9(4), 9A, 31, 32, 34 and
framed under s 49(1)(a) read with ss 1, 9(3)(a), 9(3)(b), 9(4), 9A, 31, 32, 34 and
43 of the Immigration Act, alleged that he had entered and remained in the
Republic without a valid passport, visa or permit and not through a port of entry.
The prosecutor put the charge as one under s 49(1) (a) but also described it as a
contravention of ‘section 41(1) (a)’. The significance of this apparent
misdescription is considered below.
3
[4] The accused pleaded guilty. Ms Mokwena read into the record a statement
in terms of s 112(2) of the CPA, which was received as Exhibit A. In the
statement, the accused admitted that he is a Mozambican citizen, that he entered
the Republic in about February 2026 other than through a port of entry, that he
had no passport, visa or permit, that he knew his conduct was unlawful and
intended to contravene the law, and that he regretted his actions. The State handed
in, without objection, an affidavit by an immigration officer, Mr Tshepo Victor
Phatsoane, to the effect that no record of the accused could be found on the
Movement Control System, Exhibit B. The State accepted the plea and the
magistrate found the accused guilty as charged under s 49(1) (a) of the
Immigration Act.
[5] No previous convictions were proved, and the accused was sentenced as a
first offender. Ms Mokwena informed the court that the accused is 30 years old,
unmarried, without dependants, had a Grade 10 education, earned about R200 per
week selling fruit and vegetables, was remorseful, and had pleaded at his first
appearance before the trial court. Ms Mokwena requested a fine and informed the
court that the accused had been informed that he would be deported and that the
accused consented to deportation. The prosecutor requested direct imprisonment
and ‘a formal order for deportation’.
[6] The magistrate imposed a sentence of ninety (90) days’ imprisonment and
ordered deportation on expiry of the sentence, relying on S v Cuna 1 and a
decision of this Division in S v Chivabo.2 The written verbatim court order, in the
Klerksdorp template, provides that on completion of the sentence ‘his
DEPORTATION IS ORDERED’ and that the order ‘SHALL NOT BE
EXECUTED IF THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF HOME AFFAIRS ACT IN
THE PRESCRIBED MANNER IN TERMS OF SECTION 32(1) ACT 1 3 OF
2002 WITHIN 30 DAYS’.
The first issue arising: Is this an automatic review?
[7] Section 302(1)(a) of the CPA subjects a sentence of a magistrate’s court to
[7] Section 302(1)(a) of the CPA subjects a sentence of a magistrate’s court to
automatic review in the ordinary course only where the sentence falls within the
categories it lists. For a magistrate of the rank held by Mr Vermaas, who was
appointed to the rank on 1 October 2021 and therefore has less than seven years’
service, the relevant category is imprisonment exceeding three months. Section
302(3)(a) in addition confines review under that section to cases in which the
accused was not legally represented. Neither requirement is met that would render
the sentence subject to automatic review. A sentence of ninety ( 90) days’
imprisonment does not exceed three months, and the accused was represented by
legal aid at the hearing at which he was convicted and sentenced. The matter is
1 S v Cuna 2022 JDR 3738 (GP) para 3.1.16.
2 S v Chivabo [2024] ZANWHC 156; 2024 JDR 2772 (NWM) para 3.
4
therefore not an automatic review on either basis. The J4 certificate does not
explain why it was transmitted to this court. The remarks column is blank, and
there is no memorandum from the magistrate or the Senior Magistrate, which this
court has in the past placed much emphasis on.3
[8] The absence of an automatic review does not exclude this court’s power to
intervene. Section 304(4) of the CPA confers the same reviewing powers where
a sentence is not subject to review in the ordinary course, and it is brought to the
notice of the court or a judge that the proceedings were not in accordance with
justice. In S v Zaanazo4 this court, per myself and Reddy J, applied that provision
to proceedings falling outside ordinary automatic review. It is unnecessary to
invoke a separate source of jurisdiction in the present matter.
[9] The deportation order raises a question of legality which warrants
consideration under s 304(4) of the CPA. The powers in s 304(2)(c) of the CPA
include setting aside an incompetent order and substituting the sentence which
ought to have been imposed. Ordinarily, s 304(2)(a) of the CPA requires a
statement from the trial judicial officer. Its proviso permits the record to be placed
before the reviewing court without that statement where the conviction or
sentence is clearly not in accordance with justice and delay may prejudice the
accused. The magistrate’s reasons are recorded in the transcript. For the reasons
below, the deportation order is incompetent, and the choice of imprisonment was
materially misdirected. The accused remains in custody. Further delay to obtain
a response would prolong the prejudice, and the proviso is accordingly invoked.5
The conviction
[10] The reference to ‘section 41(1) (a)’ in the charge as put and in the
transcribed plea statement is a misdescription. Section 41 deals with the
identification of illegal foreigners and the production of documents. The offence
identification of illegal foreigners and the production of documents. The offence
is created by s 49(1)(a). The charge sheet, the annexure to it, the signed s 112(2)
statement and the magistrate’s finding all refer to s 49(1)(a), and the factual
allegations in the charge and the admissions in Exhibit A match the elements of
that offence. The accused, who was represented, understood that he was charged
with entering and remaining in the Republic unlawfully. He suffered no prejudice
since the admissions cover every element of the offence.
3 S v Mokwena [2024] ZANWHC 28 para 10; S v Tseko [2023] ZANWHC 195; 2024 (1) SACR 208 (NWM)
paras 2-3; S v Chauke [2026] ZANWHC 207 para 3.
4S v Zaanazo [2023] ZANWHC 221; 2023 JDR 4477 (NWM) para 3.
5Zaanazo above fn 4 (compare fn 31).
5
The second issue arising: The deportation order
The competing lines of authority
[11] The magistrate followed Cuna, in which the Gauteng Division held that a
trial court convicting a n illegal foreigner of an offence under s 49(1)(a) of the
Immigration Act ‘must in addition make an order for her or his deportation’.6 The
relevant passage in Cuna relied on by the magistrate reads as follows:
‘The Immigration Act provides that a person who has contravened Section 49(1)
thereof shall, on conviction, be liable to a fine or to imprisonment not exceeding two
years. It is our view that, once an accused has been found guilty in terms of Section
49(1) and sentenced either to a fine or imprisonment, the trial court must in addition
make an order for her or his deportation.’
The view in Cuna was followed in Maphosa v S7 and in later decisions, and was
cited to the magistrate as binding in this Division. It is important that this
Division’s own position on this issue be reflected accurately since the magistrate
placed reliance on it. In Chivabo , which I authored and in which Reddy J
concurred, the accused had been sentenced on a s 49(1) charge and the first
sentence included a deportation order under s 34(6) of the Immigration Act. The
review was brought by the Senior Magistrate on the strength of Cuna. This court
nevertheless set the proceedings aside on a different ground, namely a gross
irregularity arising from two unexplained and inconsistent sentences and the
absence of a proper record.
[12] To clarify what was decided in Chivabo and the treatment of Chivabo
subsequently thereto requires more than identifying the ground upon which those
proceedings were set aside. Paragraph 12 of Chivabo stated emphatically that the
magistrate was bound by the Gauteng decisions concerning deportation following
conviction under s 49(1). Read with its discussion of Cuna and Maphosa, that
statement was capable of conveying that this Division endorsed the proposition
statement was capable of conveying that this Division endorsed the proposition
that a deportation order had to follow conviction and sentence. Magistrates could
reasonably have understood it in that way.8 That understanding therefore cannot
fairly be attributed simply to a misreading by magistrates. The language
employed by this court contributed to it. This is particularly important because
the present court comprises the same judges who decided Chivabo . It is
incumbent upon us to clarify the scope of that decision and the guidance which
its reasoning conveyed.
[13] The binding basis of the disposition in Chivabo was the gross irregularity
arising from the deficient record and unexplained inconsistent sentences imposed.
The question of deportation was expressly regarded as academic. The observation
concerning the obligation to follow the Gauteng decisions nevertheless conveyed
6Cuna para 3.1.16, quoted in Chivabo para 3.
7Maphosa v S [2021] ZAGPPHC 84 para 29, as quoted in Chivabo para 9.
8Chivabo above paras 11 and 12.
6
an endorsement which requires correction. Having now examined the statutory
scheme and the competing authorities, this court no longer endorse s that
observation insofar as it conveyed that a magistrate was obliged to order
deportation. S v Masinge9 likewise recorded a deportation order without deciding
its statutory competence.
[14] The Full Court in S v Hashim10, likewise understood Chivabo as endorsing
the requirement to make a deportation order, while noting the absence of an
independent examination of its statutory foundation. The present judgment
supplies that examination. The conclusion reached below is that conviction under
s 49(1) (a) does not confer a power to order deportation. Neither Chivabo’s
observations nor the accused’s consent can supply that missing statutory
authority. The point has now been decided in a diametrically opposite direction
by a Full Court of the Western Cape Division in Hashim, a review heard together
with five related matters. Kantor AJ, with Henney and Slingers JJ concurring,
held that a magistrate’s court has no power to order deportation. It reached that
conclusion after considering the source of a magistrate’s powers, the sentencing
provisions of the CPA, and the structure of ss 32 and 34 of the Immigration Act,
and it declined to follow Cuna and the decisions that followed it. It approved
Rugave v S,11 in which the Limpopo Division had come to the same conclusion it
did, in 2016.
The Directive of the Judge President of the North West Division
[15] On 9 September 2026 the Judge President of this Division issued Directive
No 2 of 2026 to the magistrates of this Division, concerning deportation orders
following a conviction under s 49(1)(a) of the Immigration Act. The directive
records the decision in Hashim , reminds magistrates that this Division’s own
decision in Chivabo stands, and states that the question whether Chivabo should
be reconsidered in light of Hashim will be referred to a Full Court of this Division.
be reconsidered in light of Hashim will be referred to a Full Court of this Division.
The Directive describes itself , with the operative direction with effect from 15
September 2026, as follows:12
‘This directive is administrative guidance issued pending that determination. It
is not, and is not intended to be, a judicial ruling overruling Chivabo.
With effect from 15 September 2026, magistrates of this Division are directed,
as a matter of prudent case management pending the outcome of the referral
described in paragraph 2, not to make an order for the deportation of an accused,
nor any ancillary order purporting to direct or facilitate deportation, upon
9 S v Masinge [2025] ZANWHC 151; 2025 JDR 3581 (NWM) para 4.
10S v Hashim; S v Mbanza; S v Mkwana; S v Samba; S v Kome; S v Islam (Review) [2026] ZAWCHC 467; 2026
JDR 4123 (WCC) at para 72.
11Rugave v S [2016] ZALMPPHC 18 paras 7-8.
12Judge President’s Directive No 2 of 2026: Deportation orders following conviction under section 49(1)(a) of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002, dated 9 September 2026, paras 2-3.
7
convicting that accused of contravening section 49(1) (a) of the Act. The
template order presently in use, which cites Cuna, should not be used.’
[16] The directive is administrative guidance and does not bind the court. It does
not decide the question of law, and this judgment does not treat it as doing so.
The conclusion below rests on the principle of legality and on the reasoning in
Hashim, which ha s been independently considered. The directive nevertheless
bears on this matter in two respects. First, the accused was sentenced on 23
September 2026, eight days after the directive took effect, and the Klerksdorp
template order, which cites Cuna and which the directive says should not be used,
was used. The record does not show whether the directive had reached the
Klerksdorp bench by then, and no criticism of the magistrate is intended. Second,
the directive also makes provision for drawing pending automatic reviews to the
attention of reviewing judges. Although the present matter falls outside automatic
review, its determination rests independently on s 304(4):13
‘Where sentence has already been passed under section 49(1) (a) in a matter that
remains before this Division on automatic review in terms of sections 302 to 304
of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and has not yet been finalised, the Clerk
of the Court is directed to draw this directive and the Hashim judgment to the
attention of the reviewing Judge together with the record.’
The doctrine of stare decisis
[17] The magistrate relied on Cuna and on Chivabo. Cuna was cited to him as
being binding in this Division. Whether any of the decisions discussed above
binds this court, or is persuasive only, depends on the doctrine of stare decisis,
and the competing lines of authority cannot be weighed until its content is stated.
The doctrine is not a courtesy extended to courts of higher authority. In Camps
Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and
Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and
Another14 the Constitutional Court (CC) explained that:
‘The doctrine of precedent not only binds lower courts but also binds courts of final
jurisdiction to their own decisions. These courts can depart from a previous decision of
their own only when satisfied that that decision is clearly wrong. Stare decisis is
therefore not simply a matter of respect for courts of higher authority. It is a
manifestation of the rule of law itself, which in turn is a founding value of our
Constitution. To deviate from this rule is to invite legal chaos.’
[18] As to decisions of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), the Constitutional
Court in Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters
and Another15 held that:
13Judge President’s Directive No 2 of 2026: Deportation orders following conviction under section 49(1)(a) of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002, dated 9 September 2026, para 5.
14Camps Bay Ratepayers’ and Residents’ Association and Another v Harrison and Another [2010] ZACC 19;
2011 (4) SA 42 (CC); 2011 (2) BCLR 121 (CC) para 28.
15Ex parte Minister of Safety and Security and Others: In re S v Walters and Another [2002] ZACC 6; 2002 (4)
SA 613 (CC); 2002 (7) BCLR 663 (CC) para 61, quoted in Camps Bay para 29.
8
‘High courts are obliged to follow legal interpretations of the SCA, whether they relate
to constitutional issues or to other issues, and remain so obliged unless and until the
SCA itself decides otherwise or this Court does so in respect of a constitutional issue.’
There being no decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal or of the Constitutional
Court which determines the specific question whether a magistrate sentencing an
offender under s 49(1) (a) may order deportation, the vertical operation of the
doctrine therefore does not affect the decision in the present matter.
[19] The relevant decisions were delivered by differently constituted courts.
Cuna and Chivabo were each decided by two judges. Three judges decided
Hashim, and it is a Full Court within the definition in s 1 of the Superior Courts
Act. Nothing in this matter turns on the varying use of the expression ‘Full Bench’
in the judgments. The enquiry is whether the proposition relied on forms part of
a binding ratio decidendi. 16 A decision binding by reason of superior judicial
authority cannot be disregarded merely because the court considers it clearly
wrong. The latitude to depart from a decision of coordinate authority must not be
confused with a power to disregard a binding decision of a superior court. The
caution in Camps Bay applies throughout the enquiry. 17 On the established
approach, decisions of other Divisions are persuasive rather than binding on this
court. Their persuasive force lies in the cogency of their reasoning. There is no
need here to determine the broader debate concerning the consequences for
precedent of the establishment of a single High Court, because this court
independently finds the statutory reasoning in Hashim persuasive.
[20] Cuna does not bind this court merely because subsequent decisions have
followed it. Equally, Hashim does not prevail simply because it was decided by
a Full Court in another Division. The position in Chivabo has been explained
a Full Court in another Division. The position in Chivabo has been explained
above. The fact that a judgment can be sustained on one ground does not
automatically render another independently dispositive ground obiter. The
judgments in Camps Bay18 and Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Coast Municipality
and Others 19 require attention to whether each ground was central to the
resolution of the issue. The distinction here is that Chivabo expressly regarded
the deportation question as academic and did not determine it as an independent
basis for the order setting aside the proceedings. This judgment accordingly
preserves the ratio in Chivabo while expressly correcting the endorsement
conveyed by its observations concerning deportation.
16Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 s 1 (definition of ‘full court’).
17Camps Bay above para 30.
18Camps Bay above para 30.
19Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Coast Municipality and Others [2014] ZACC 24; 2014 (6) SA 592 (CC) para 62.
9
[21] A court that considers a binding decision to be wrong may not simply
disregard it. In Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu -Natal v Ndlovu 20 the
SCA deprecated that practice, saying of the decision in issue there, Mahlase, that:
‘[O]thers erroneously thought that they were at liberty to simply ignore the effect of
Mahlase on the basis that Mahlase’s correctness was at the very least open to grave
doubt. This, of course, was inconsistent with judicial comity and, most fundamentally,
the doctrine of stare decisis. This must be deprecated.’
[22] The Constitutional Court in Camps Bay21 pointed to the proper course:
‘If judges believe that there are good reasons why a decision binding on them
should be changed, the way to go about it is to formulate those reasons and urge
the court of higher authority to effect the change.’
The warnings by the SCA and CC as aforesaid require an accurate identification
of the ratio in Chivabo and a candid explanation of its observations. Both have
been addressed above. The referral contemplated by the directive remains a
matter for the Judge President and does not supply the legal basis for this
determination.
[23] No binding determination identified in these proceedings requires this
court to uphold the deportation order. The question must therefore be decided by
construing the legislation. Legality is the substantive principle governing the
existence of the asserted power. It is not an exception to the obligation to follow
binding precedent.
The source of the power
[24] A magistrate’s court is a creature of statute. It exercises the jurisdiction and
powers conferred on it by the Constitution and applicable legislation. Its
sentencing powers must accordingly have a lawful source . The principle of
legality, which binds every exercise of public power, including by courts, requires
that the power relied on be found in a law. The court in Hashim22 put the
conclusion plainly:
that the power relied on be found in a law. The court in Hashim22 put the
conclusion plainly:
‘As demonstrated above, there is no statutory basis for a magistrates’ court to order
deportation. In the absence of such a statutory basis, magistrates’ courts have no such
power.’
[25] Section 49(1)(a) creates the offence and prescribes a fine or imprisonment
not exceeding two years. It does not authorise deportation by the sentencing court.
Section 276(1) of the CPA lists the available punishments, subject to that Act,
other law and the common law. Deportation is not listed. Its absence from the list
is not, by itself, decisive of whether another statute authorises an ancillary order.
20Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu-Natal Pietermaritzburg v Ndlovu [2024] ZASCA 23; 2024 (1) SACR
561 (SCA) para 29.
21 Camps Bay above para 30.
22Hashim above para 46.
10
The further enquiry is whether such authority exists elsewhere. Hashim 23
considered that question, held that no statute confers the asserted ancillary power
and ultimately concluded that:
‘The source of the power in this regard is not to be found in the MCA or the CPA
(particularly section 276 thereof), but in other specific statutes.
…
There is no statute providing for deportation to be an ancillary order. Although it does
not have to be there, logic suggests that, if there were to be such a provision in a statute,
it would be located in the Act. As held above, it is not.’
[26] Although the decision of the Full Court in Hashim is persuasive only in
this Division and does not bind it, its reasoning is sound. A court may not make
an order which has not been sanctioned by law merely because it is convenient or
because the legislature might have been expected to approve it. The decision in
Rugave24, as approved in Hashim, expresses the same principle:
‘The two sections do not make a reference to the court having powers to deport a
foreigner. It is therefore impermissible for a court to impose an order not expressly
sanctioned by law.’
The scheme of the Immigration Act
[27] Sections 32 and 34 of the Immigration Act assign the deportation function
to the responsible immigration authorities. Section 32(2) of the Immigration Act
provides that an illegal foreigner shall be deported, while s 34 regulates the
exercise of that function and detention pending deportation. Those powers are
subject to constitutional and statutory safeguards. In Lawyers for Human Rights
v Minister of Home Affairs and Others25 and the subsequent Ex parte Minister of
Home Affairs and Others; In re Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home
Affairs and Others26, the Constitutional Court addressed the constitutional defects
in s 34(1) (b) and (d). Its supplementary order requires a detained person to be
brought before a court within 48 hours, subject to the first court day qualification,
brought before a court within 48 hours, subject to the first court day qualification,
and requires consideration of release on reasonable conditions. The section must
be read subject to those binding orders and any remedial legislation brought into
operation. It is therefore insufficient to describe judicial oversight only by
reference to a warrant extending detention beyond thirty (30) days. Section 34(5)
of the Immigration Act concerns a warrant to enforce an existing deportation
decision, and s 34(6) addresses removal of a person serving a prison sentence.
23Hashim above paras 79 to 82.
24Rugave, quoted in Hashim paras 74.
25 Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs and Others [2017] ZACC 22; 2017 (5) SA 580 (CC)
para 73.
26 Ex parte Minister of Home Affairs and Others; In re Lawyers for Human Rights v Minister of Home Affairs and
Others [2023] ZACC 34; 2024 (2) SA 58 (CC) para 25; Hashim footnote 6.
11
Neither confers a sentencing power to order deportation. Hashim27 explained the
allocation of the administrative function as follows:
‘35. Section 34 of the Act regulates deportation. It vests the power to deport in
immigration officers and only they have the power to deport. The definition of
immigration officer does not include magistrates. Section 34 (1) of the Act
empowers an immigration officer to arrest illegal foreigners, deport them and
detain them pending deportation. The entire scheme and structure of section 34 is
premised on an immigration officer exercising the deportation power. This, in my
view, is compatible with the act of deportation being an administrative act.’
…
37. It is apparent from the provisions of section 34(1) that an immigration officer
has the following powers in respect of an illegal foreigner:’
‘37.1. to arrest;’
‘37.2. to detain pending his or her deportation;’
‘37.3. to deport.’
[28] Where Parliament has assigned a power to a particular functionary and has
surrounded it with procedural safeguards, a court should be slow to read into its
own jurisdiction a parallel power that bypasses those safeguards. Deportation by
court order would displace the immigration officer’s decision, remove the
statutory safeguards, and deprive the foreign national of the administrative review
and appeal rights which the Immigration Act provides. Section 34(6) of the
Immigration Act is no answer. It regulates what happens to a deportee who is
serving a sentence. It does not say who orders deportation. A court sentencing a
person under s 49(1)(a) of the Immigration Act therefore performs its function
when it imposes a lawful sentence. What follows is for the Director-General and
immigration officers.
Cuna
[29] T he rejection of the conclusion in Cuna by Hashim is well -founded.
Section 34(6) of the Immigration Act regulates the position of a person already
liable to deportation who is serving imprisonment. It does not create a power for
liable to deportation who is serving imprisonment. It does not create a power for
a criminal court to order deportation. Administrative convenience cannot fill that
statutory gap. The essential reasoning in Hashim is that courts must apply the law
and may not assume an executive power which the legislature has not conferred.28
Consent and practicality
[30] Two further matters require mentioning in passing. The first is the
accused’s consent. Ms Mokwena told the magistrate that the accused consented
to deportation. Consent cannot cure the absence of a power. The jurisdiction and
powers of a court are a matter of law, and they cannot be created or enlarged by
27Hashim above paras 35 to 37.
28Hashim above paras 63 to 66; paras 68 and 76;
12
agreement of the parties. The second is the practical difficulty that weighed with
the magistrate. The magistrate recorded that Home Affairs officials are not
readily available to the court, and that he had been told that the Department of
Correctional Services is reluctant to receive sentenced foreign nationals unless
there is a deportation order. These are real administrative problems, and the
magistrate was right to escalate them to the Senior Magistrate. But a difficulty of
that kind cannot supply a power which the law does not give. The place to solve
it is in the relationship between the Department of Justice and Constitutional
Development, the Department of Correctional Services and the Department of
Home Affairs, not in the sentencing orders of a magistrate’s court.
Conclusion on the deportation order
[31] The magistrate’s order directing deportation on completion of the sentence,
and the written order giving effect to it, were made without statutory authority
and must be set aside. That conclusion does not prevent the responsible
immigration authorities from dealing with the accused in accordance with the
Immigration Act, subject to the Constitution and all applicable procedural
safeguards.29 For the avoidance of doubt, a magistrate sentencing an accused for
contravening s 49(1)(a) must not add an order directing deportation merely as a
consequence of that conviction. This does not affect the court’s distinct functions
concerning immigration detention under the applicable legislation and binding
constitutional orders.
[32] This is a point on which a decision of this D ivision would be of value to
the magistrates who sit under its supervision and the functionaries of the relevant
government Departments. It is therefore apposite that a copy of this judgment be
sent to the Chief Magistrate and Senior Magistrate, Klerksdorp, for circulation to
the magistrates of the various districts in the North West Province; and to the
the magistrates of the various districts in the North West Province; and to the
Regional Court President, North West Province for circulation to region al
magistrates in the Division. It would be prudent to bring the judgment to the
attention of the Directors-General: Justice and Constitutional Development,
Home Affairs and Correctional Services.
The third issue arising: The sentence
[33] The offence carries a fine or imprisonment not exceeding two years. No
minimum sentence applies. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion,
and a court of review will interfere if the discretion was not properly exercised,
which is the case if a material misdirection vitiates the sentence or if it is
disturbingly inappropriate. The magistrate correctly identified the triad of the
nature of the offence, the personal circumstances of the offender and the interests
29Hashim above para 83.
13
of society as the framework for his enquiry.30 The question is how the magistrate
applied it.
[34] The reasons disclose material misdirections. The magistrate treated the
accused’s undocumented status and the consequent inability to verify his identity
and date of entry as aggravating. The fact that an offender is undocumented
cannot, without an additional proved circumstance, be counted again a s
aggravation merely because it characterises the offence for which he is being
sentenced. No separate finding of deliberate concealment or deception was made.
More significantly, the magistrate inferred that the accused’s street vending had
deprived a South African citizen or lawfully documented foreign national of a job
opportunity. There was no evidence supporting that inference. General
unemployment and protests about illegal immigration cannot replace an
individual assessment of culpability or justify punishment intended to appease
public sentiment. The clearest misdirection appears in the reason for refusing a
fine. Home Affairs officials were unavailable, and payment of a fine would result
in release without resolution of the accused’s immigration status. Imprisonment
may not be chosen to hold an offender until administrative arrangements for his
removal can be made. That purpose falls outside the proper exercise of the
sentencing discretion.
[35] The magistrate acknowledged approximately a month in custody before
sentence, but the reasons do not demonstrate how that deprivation of liberty
affected the sentence selected. The accused was a first offender, pleaded guilty
and expressed remorse. His stated willingness to be deported did not confer
jurisdiction to order deportation, but formed part of the circumstances placed
before the sentencing court. A fresh assessment must take account of all custody
actually undergone, including imprisonment served after sentence. On the
recorded chronology, and assuming uninterrupted custody, the total period by the
recorded chronology, and assuming uninterrupted custody, the total period by the
date of this judgment is ap proximately 66 (sixty-six) days, including
approximately 40 (forty) days since sentence. The conclusion that further
imprisonment is unwarranted does not depend on that precise calculation. The
significance is the substantial deprivation of liberty already endured. A further
custodial term cannot be assessed as if sentence were being imposed immediately
after conviction.
[36] These misdirections were material to the choice of imprisonment over a
fine, and the proceedings in that respect were not in accordance with justice. The
sentencing discretion was vitiated. Remittal to the magistrate would serve no
30S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540G-H. S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862G-H; S v Matyityi 2011 (1)
SACR 40 (SCA) para 24.
14
purpose. In those circumstances, this court is at large to consider sentence afresh,
as the court held in Zaanazo31 where it stated:
‘30. In S v Malgas 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA), in the context of an appeal, stated as
follows in respect of the question of sentence:
“12 …Where material misdirection by the trial court vitiates its exercise of
that discretion an appellate court is of course entitled to consider the question
of sentence afresh. In doing so, it assesses sentence as if it were a court of
first instance and the sentence imposed by the trial court has no relevance.
As it is said, an appellate court is at large…”
31.This Court is therefore at large to consider sentence afresh. The imposition of
sentence is founded on the exercise of the principle of proportionality. In the exercise
of a sentencing discretion balance is key. It is trite when considering sentence that t he
Court considers the personal circumstances of the accused, the seriousness of the
offence and the interests of society. See S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A); [1969] 3 All SA
57 (A). The Court also remains mindful of the main purposes of punishment which
include deterrence, retribution, and rehabilitation.’
[37] A fine remains a lawful sentencing option, but the accused’s stated
earnings of about R200 per week call for caution before fixing one which he may
be unable to pay. Inability to pay a fine cannot itself justify imprisonment. His
limited means, first -offender status, plea and remorse, together with the
substantial custody already undergone, justify bringing further imprisonment for
this offence to an end. A suspended term supplies a prospective deterrent without
adding immediate custody to that already served. Ninety (90) days’
imprisonment, wholly suspended for three years on appropriately framed
conditions, is proportionate in these circumstances.
[38] A reporting condition must be connected to the offence and must not
[38] A reporting condition must be connected to the offence and must not
operate as a disguised deportation order. Hashim upheld a condition requiring an
offender to report to Home Affairs so that his presence could be dealt with
according to law. It expressly cautioned that its formulation was specific to that
case and should not be applied mechanically. The lawful outcome of the
administrative process remains for the competent authorities. Reporting is an act
within the accused’s control. Successful regularisation within a fixed period is
not necessarily so.32
[39] The conditions are accordingly adapted to the accused’s position. The
period allowed before the non-repetition condition applies will run from his actual
release from custody pursuant to this order. For these purposes, release means
actual release from det ention, whether criminal or immigration detention. The
reporting period will exclude any period of lawful detention, and reporting will
not be required if he has already lawfully departed or been removed from the
Republic before it expires. The accused must request and retain any written
31Zaanazo above paras 30 and 31.
32Hashim above paras 115–118 and order para 121.6.1.
15
acknowledgement provided, but his compliance will not depend on an official
issuing one. These conditions imposed under s 297(1)(b), read with s 297(1)(a)(i),
of the CPA require reporting rather than regularisation or deportation. The
conditions must be explained to the accused in a language he understands.
Antedating the substituted, wholly suspended sentence under s 282 is
unnecessary. The custody already undergone has instead been expressly weighed
in determining sentence.33
Irregularities in the record
[40] Several irregularities have been noted in the perusal of the papers, which
are brought to the attention of the Senior Magistrate for judicial quality assurance
and training purposes. None of these discrepancies affects the outcome. The
accused’s name appears as Zunguza, Zungusa and Osualdo in different
documents (record, pp 76-1, 76 -8, 76-30 and 76-37). The spelling on the typed
principal charge sheet has been employed in this judgment. The review cover
sheet and J4 certificate give the magistrate’s case number as KLD115/2026,
whereas the principal charge sheet and transcript give KLD1150/2026 (record,
pp 76-1 to 76-3 and 76-9). The charge sheet gives the accused’s age as 30 but the
Home Affairs affidavit gives a date of birth of 7 July 1997, which would make
him 29 (record, pp 76-3 and 76 -37). Pages 76-41 to 76 -52 of the bundle repeat
pages 76-29 to 76-40 without explanation. The J4 certificate has no remarks and
was not accompanied by any memorandum (record, p 76-2). These matters should
be corrected in future so that this court is not left to piece together why a matter
has been sent to it.
Conclusion
[41] Whilst the matter is not an automatic review, it has been dealt with as a
special review under s 304(4) of the CPA. The conviction is in accordance with
justice and is confirmed. The deportation order was made without power and is
set aside. The sentence was vitiated by misdirections and is replaced by a wholly
set aside. The sentence was vitiated by misdirections and is replaced by a wholly
suspended sentence on conditions adapted to the accused’s circumstances in
accordance with the principles explained in Hashim.
Order
[42] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The proceedings in S v Usualdo Zunguza, Magistrate’s Court for
the District of Matlosana, held at Klerksdorp, case no
KLD1150/2026, are reviewed in terms of s 304(4) of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
33 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 s 297(1)(b), read with s 297(1)(a)(i); Hashim para 118.1; Directive No 2 of
2026, paras 6.2 and 6.3.
16
2. The conviction of the accused of contravening s 49(1) (a) of the
Immigration Act 13 of 2002 is confirmed.
3. The order that the accused be deported on completion of his
sentence, and the written court order dated 23 September 2026
giving effect to it, are set aside.
4. The sentence is set aside and replaced with the following
sentence:
(a) The accused is sentenced to ninety ( 90) days’
imprisonment, wholly suspended for three years from the
date of this order on the following conditions:
(i) The accused is not convicted of an offence under s 49(1)(a)
of the Immigration Act 13 of 2002 committed after the
expiry of thirty ( 30) days from his actual release from
custody pursuant to this order and during the period of
suspension.
(ii) Within thirty (30) days of his actual release from custody
pursuant to this order, the accused shall report to the nearest
office of the Department of Home Affairs so that his
presence in the Republic may be dealt with in accordance
with law. In calculating that period, any peri od during
which he is lawfully detained shall be excluded. This
reporting condition does not apply if, before its deadline, he
has lawfully departed or been removed from the Republic.
He shall request written acknowledgement of reporting and
retain any ack nowledgement provided. Failure by an
official to issue it shall not, of itself, constitute a breach.
(iii) For purposes of these conditions, release means the
accused’s actual release from detention, whether criminal or
immigration detention.
5. The accused is to be released from custody forthwith unless
lawfully detained on another ground. The clerk of the magistrate’s
court shall arrange for this order and its conditions to be explained
to him in a language he understands and shall provide a copy to
his legal representative.
6. Nothing in this order authorises detention or deportation, or limits
the lawful powers of the Director-General of Home Affairs or an
immigration officer under the Immigration Act 13 of 2002,
immigration officer under the Immigration Act 13 of 2002,
subject to the Constitution and applicable judicial orders.
7. The Registrar is directed to forward a copy of this order and
judgment to the Chief Magistrate, Regional Court President, the
17
clerk of the magistrate's court, Klerksdorp, and the Senior
Magistrate, Klerksdorp, for circulation to the magistrates of the
various districts and regional magistrates in the North West
Division, the head of the correctional centre where the accused is
held, and the Directors-General: Home Affairs, Justice and
Constitutional Development and Correctional Services.
AH PETERSEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
I agree.
AREDDY
JUDGE OF THE IDGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG