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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL LOCAL DIVISION, DURBAN
CASE NO: 2026-077349
In the matter between:
SUPALIFT TRADING CC APPLICANT
and
STANLEY DONNER RESPONDENT
ORDER
The following order is granted:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is directed to pay the costs of the application on scale B, such
costs to include the costs of senior counsel where so employed.
JUDGMENT
Pitman J
[1] Supalift Trading CC is the applicant in this sequestration application against
Stanley Donner, the respondent. The basis of the application rests upon a debt of
R2,4 million allegedly due and payable to it by the respondent pursuant to loans
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advanced to him. The material basis of the respondent’s defence is that he,
personally, did not borrow the money and does not owe it to the applicant. It was
money borrowed by his company, Abspec Specialised Trading (Pty) Ltd (“Abspec”),
of which he is the sole director. He therefore submits that he has a bona fide defence
to the claim for the debt and that the sequestration application ought accordingly to
be dismissed.
[2] The applicant’s heads of argument were drafted by senior counsel. At the
hearing, however, the applicant was represented by junior counsel, who submitted
that if the application was unsuccessful any costs order should not include the costs
of senior counsel, notwithstanding the fact that the respondent was represented,
both in respect of the heads of argument and the appearance at the hearing, by
senior counsel.
[3] Material common-cause facts, as appear from the affidavits, are the following:
a) The applicant’s deponent (Anton Russell) and the respondent had been
business acquaintances over the years.
b) In September 2024 R2 million was paid by the applicant into the bank account
of Abspec.
c) In March 2025 a further R400 000 was paid by the applicant into the bank
account of Abspec.
[4] For the applicant, Russell alleges that:
a) These payments were made because the respondent requested loans in his
personal capacity in those amounts.
b) The respondent agreed to repay them personally.
c) During negotiations about the repayment, which had not been forthcoming,
the respondent continued to acknowledge that he would make them when he
could.
d) The third loan payment was made because the respondent claimed he
needed medical attention and needed the money for that purpose.
e) The first two payments were paid into the Abspec account because that is
where the respondent said they should be paid.
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f) The third payment was made into the Abspec account because the
respondent said it should be done that way so that his wife did not discover
his medical issues.
g) During the negotiations regarding the repayment the respondent
communicated, inter alia, by WhatsApp, recording that he was not avoiding
his duty or obligation but awaiting certain funds. This, so Russell argues,
indicates an acceptance that he was personally liable.
h) In November 2025 Russell instructed the applicant’s attorney to prepare an
acknowledgement of debt (“AOD”) document recording the terms of the
agreement/s. This document was put up as an annexure.
i) The respondent refused to sign it but, so alleges Russell, at no stage disputed
his personal liability.
j) On 8 December 2025 the applicant’s attorneys delivered to the respondent a
letter of demand which was also put up as an annexure.
k) By indicating in writing that he could not pay the debt, the respondent had
committed an act of insolvency.
l) There would be an advantage to creditors and accordingly the respondent
should be sequestrated.
[5] Donner alleges in answer that:
a) All three loans were made by the applicant to Abspec and not to himself in his
personal capacity.
b) In consequence they were all paid into the Abspec bank account.
c) As a result, the sequestration application constitutes an abuse of process.
d) The loans were affected because, as he explained to Russell at the time,
Abspec required short-term working capital.
e) He never requested the loans for himself personally.
f) The money was not advanced to him personally.
g) All the money was in fact utilised in the business of Abspec.
h) The same applied to the additional R400 000. He denies the allegations that it
was for himself personally for medical reasons.
i) He explains the WhatsApp messages on the basis that he had at no stage
disputed Abspec’s liability and, because he was its sole director and
controlling mind, he referred to himself in the WhatsApp’s.
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j) The AOD correctly set out the initial principal debtor as Abspec and was
intended, as he read it, to include him as a surety. That supported his
allegation that the applicant considered Abspec to be the debtor.
k) He did not sign the AOD because it contained terms to which, as a surety, he
was not prepared to agree and made other allegations that were incorrect.
l) He admitted receiving the letter of demand.
[6] Counsel for the applicant, relying on the heads of argument already prepared
by silk, submitted that the alleged defence by the respondent, when analysed
against the WhatsApp’s, the AOD, the letter of demand, the say -so of Russell and
the lack of any direct challenges by Donner to allegations of his personal liability,
could not be accepted as a bona fide defence to the sequestration application.
[7] Counsel for the respondent argued to the contrary that the terms of the AOD
Russell commanded, the fact that all monies were paid into the Abspec bank
account, the fact that all monies were utilised for the business of Abspec, and the
contents of the letter of demand in fact supported Donner’s version to the extent, at
least, that the version was bona fide and established a bona fide triable defence.
[8] I approach the assessment of the matter on the basis of the following
principles.
[9] It has been settled since Badenhorst v Northern Construction Enterprises
(Pty) Ltd 1 that winding -up proceedings may not be used to enforce payment of a
debt whose existence is bona fide disputed on reasonable grounds. The liquidation
procedure is not intended to be used to enforce payment of a debt or to determine
whether a debt exists at all. This principle, known as the Badenhorst rule, has been
confirmed by the Appellate Division in Kalil v Decotex (Pty) Ltd 2 and is now treated
as a self-standing rule, independent of proof of actual abuse of the court process.
[10] The applicant is required to establish a prima facie case that the debt in fact
[10] The applicant is required to establish a prima facie case that the debt in fact
exists. Once it has done so the onus shifts to the respondent to show that the
1 Badenhorst v Northern Construction Enterprises (Pty) Ltd 1956 (2) SA 346 (T) at 347H–348C
2 Kalil v Decotex (Pty) Ltd 1988 (1) SA 943 (A) at 980C–D
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indebtedness is bona fide and reasonably disputed. Of application to both the
establishment that the debt in fact exists and, if it does, the defence raised against it,
the respondent need not prove that it is not indebted to the applicant . He need only
show that the indebtedness is disputed on bona fide and reasonable grounds. Bona
fides concern the respondent’s subjective state of mind, while reasonableness is
assessed objectively: whether the facts the respondent advances, if proved, would
constitute a defence in law. The threshold is low. The respondent need not prove his
defence on the probabilities . If the defence is not unreasonable and an absence of
bona fides cannot readily be inferred from the papers, the sequestration application
must fail, even if it otherwise appears that the respondent is unable to pay his debts.
[11] I have considered the other decisions referred to by both counsel. On the
material issues of this matter , it is not necessary that I deal with any of them
specifically.
[12] Whilst being mindful of the fact that I am not required to determine the dispute
for purposes of this application, a number of facts are materially relevant, in my view,
to a determination of the bona fides , and possible sustainability, of Donner’s alleged
defence.
[13] Russell says he instructed his attorneys to draft an AOD “recording the terms
of our agreement”. The AOD drafted by his attorneys on his instructions incorporates
a written suretyship agreement for signature by Donner. Th ose documents describe
the “debtor” as Abspec.
[14] The letter of demand states, inter alia, “… our client advanced three separate
tranches to you and/or Abspec…”
[15] A reading of these two documents can only lead to a conclusion that the
applicant was of the view that the money had been lent to Abspec, being the
“debtor”, or, at best for the applicant, that the applicant was not sure to whom it had
lent the money.
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[16] In my view there is nothing inherently improbable about Donner’s explanation
about why the WhatsApp messages did not constitute an acknowledgement of
personal liability. Again I emphasise that it is not my responsibility to determine that
issue but simply to decide whether, in all the circumstances, such explanation is
bona fide and based on reasonable grounds.
[17] As I have indicated, it is common cause that all payments were made into the
bank account of Abspec. They were made by the applicant (a company) and not by
Russell in his personal capacity which may have supported the “personal basis ”
argument regarding the transactions.
[18] In the result I am of the view that the facts in this application overwhelmingly
support a conclusion that the respondent has established a bona fide, and based on
reasonable grounds, triable defence to the claim by the applicant.
[19] As regards the issue of costs, both parties litigated , initially, utilising senior
counsel. Senior counsel argued for the respondent. There is no reason, in my
discretion, why that should not inform the costs order I make.
[20] I make the following orders:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is directed to pay the costs of the application on scale B, such
costs to include the costs of senior counsel where so employed.
_____________________
PITMAN J
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Case Information
Dates of hearing: 27 October 2026
Date of judgment: 30 October 2026
Counsel for Applicant: S Anderton
Instructed by: Richter Attorneys
Email: bernhard@richterlaw.co.za /
megan@richterlaw.co.za /
nicholas@richterlaw.co.za
Ref: AR005-26
Tel: 011 880 6737
C/O Geyser Du Toit Louw & Kitching Attorneys
Braehead Office Park
1 Old Main Road, Kloof
Ref: S932T
Email: andre@gdlkptn.co.za
Counsel for the Respondent: WN Shapiro SC
Instructed by: MacGregor Erasmus Attorneys Inc
First Floor, Bond Square
12 Browns Road
The Point
Durban
Tel: 031 201 8955
Ref: ABS2/0001
Email: justin@meattorneys.co.za /
lauren@meattorneys.co.za
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