IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case No:2025-150329
In the matter between:
CITICON PROJECTS (PTY) LTD Applicant
And
THE LUPHA ENTERPRISE KADIMA First Respondent
CORP PARTNERSHIP / JOINT VENTURE
THE OUDTSHOORN MUNICIPALITY Second Respondent
Neutral citation:
Coram: Mgengwana; AJ
Heard: 3 June 2026
Delivered : 5th November 2026
Delivered electronically: The judgment is handed down electronically
by circulating to the parties or legal representatives by email. The date for
the handing down of the judgment is deemed to be 30 October 2026.
Summary: Subcontracting – Liquidated monetary claim – Applicant
seeks Order compelling Second Respondent, who is not party to the
agreement between the Applicant and First Respondent, to make payment of
moneys owed by the Second Respondent to the First Respondent over to the
Applicant in the event of this Court finding that the First Respondent is
liable to pay the Applicant a specified amount of money – Whether Second
Respondent who has a duty to pay the First Respondent for work done as per
the written agreement should be ordered to pay Applicant instead of First
Respondent – Execution by a ttachment of indebtedness in terms of Rule
45(12) of the Uniform Rules of this Court.
_____________________________________________________________
ORDER
1. The Applicant’s application against the First and Second Respondents
is dismissed with costs, inclusive of the costs of the urgent application
and Senior Counsel’s costs on Scale C.
JUDGMENT
MGENGWANA, AJ
Introduction
[1] This is an application in which the Applicant is seeking an order in the
following terms against First and Second Respondent:
(a) That the First Respondent be ordered to immediately pay the amount
of R786 825.95 to the Applicant.
(b) That the Second Respondent be ordered to make payment to the
Applicant in the amount of R786 825.95 from the first monies due and
payable by the Second Respondent to the First Respondent in the
event of this Court granting the prayer above.
(c) Such further and/or alternative relief be granted to the Applicant
which this Court deems reasonable and appropriate under the
prevailing circumstances.
[2] According to the Applicant, the second prayer is premised on Uniform
Rule 45(12). According to the Applicant, the Second Respondent herein is
joined in this application by virtue of its interest in the subject matter and to
enable execution of any judgement granted against the First Respondent.
Should this Court grant judgment as prayed for in prayer one, the Applicant
will be entitled to execute against the Second Respondent by attaching its
indebtedness to the First Respondent in terms of Rule 45(12) of the Uniform
Rules of this Court . The relief sought against the Second Respondent is
accordingly contingent on judgment being granted against the First
Respondent.
Background
[3] On 28 January 2025, the First Respondent appointed the Applicant as
a subcontractor to carry out certain sealing works at Dysselsdorp Hoog
Reservoir (the Reservoir) under Contract TD 04/01/2024, Work Package B
(the Contract), after being appointed as the main contractor by the Second
Respondent for the broader works under the contract. The initial subcontract
was for an amount of R795 770.04 excluding VAT. On 7 March 2025, the
First Respondent requested the Applicant to submit a revised quotation for
additional sealing work to be performed on the Reservoir which then pushed
the subcontract value t o R1 416 377.04 excluding VAT. Letters of
Appointment in favour of the Applicant were issued for both of these
amounts on 28 January 2025 and 13 March 2025 , respectively, by the First
Respondent.
[4] Even though it is not clear what precipitated the contents of th e email,
on 24 June 2025 , the First Respondent addressed an email to Proper
Consulting Engineers (the Engineers) which was appointed by the Second
Respondent and acting as “Engineers” under General Conditions of Contract
and to Chris Swart of the Second Respondent in which the deponent to the
Founding Affidavit in support of this application was copied. The following,
among other things, was stated in the said email:
(a) That the First Respondent had appointed the Applicant on specific
scope of work that the Applicant priced for.
(b) That the Engineers and the Applicant had had their own discussions
without the First Respondent , wherein they agreed to increase the
Applicant’s scope of work.
(c) That the First Respondent was never party to those discussions.
(d) That the Applicant has a list of demands that the First Respondent
cannot meet as it is not the Second Respondent.
(e) That the Applicant has done work that it has never discussed with the
First Respondent before it did.
(f) That the Applicant has been receiving mandates directly from the
Engineers.
(g) That because the First Respondent does not know much about the
work that has been done with the authorisation of the Engineers, the
First Respondent cannot plan for Applicant’s payment within their
payment limits.
[5] In response to the email above, the Engineer s issued Site Instruction
029 instructing the First Respondent to, once again, amend the Applicant’s
Letter of Appointment to reflect a revised contract value of R2 446 141.26
including VAT. It should be noted that no Letter of Appoi ntment was issued
by the First Respondent in respect of Site Instruction 029. The date of issue
of Site Instruction 029 is 27 June 2025. Site Instruction 029 “authorized”
additional work in terms of the Applicant’s quotation CCP 02112 plus
various variation orders . On 30 June 2025 , the Applicant issued an invoice
to the First Respondent for additional work completed under Quotation CCP
02112 together with the scope executed in terms of Variation Orders B, C
and D. This invoice amounts to R786 825.95 including VAT and it is the
subject of this application.
[6] In its Answering Affidavit, the Second Respondent has averred that it
is uncertain whether the Engineers had authority to issue Site Instruction 029
and that this aspect is a subject of its investigation. In addition to this, the
Second Respondent averred in its Answering Affidavit that the Applicant
had invoiced for an amount of R2 353 988.14 and has only received an
amount of R1 567 162.19 from the First Respondent, which then leaves a
balance of R786 825.95.
[7] The Second Respondent further averred in its Answering Affidavit
that the person who is responsible at their Municipality for the issuing of any
variations was one Mr. Chris Swart (Mr. Swart) who held the position of
Senior Manager: Water and Sanitation Services. It was not known at the
time the Answering Affidavit was deposed to whether he authorised or
purported to authorise any variation order or revised scope of work for the
project which includes the issuing of Site Instruction 029 as this is also
under investigation.
Issues for determination
[8] Based on the a bove set of facts, this Court is enjoined to make a
determination on the following:
(a) Whether the First Respondent should be ordered to immediately pay
the Applicant an amount of R786 825.95 to the Applicant.
(b) If so, whether the Second Respondent’s point in limine should
succeed.
(c) If no, whether the Second Respondent should be ordered to pay to the
Applicant an amount of R786 825.95 from the first monies due and
payable by the Second Respondent to the First Respondent.
Parties’ submissions
[9] It has been noted by this Court that the Applicant’s submissions in
support of prayer one are scant, which is very unfortunate as this is the first
hurdle that the Applicant ha s to surmount before moving to the second
prayer.
[10] The Second Applicant has, however, submitted as follows:
(a) Despite the fact that First Respondent has to date not opposed the
application for judgment against it, the Court must still consider
whether a case has been made out by the Applicant for the grant of the
default judgment sought.
(b) Although the Second Respondent does not seek to make any
submission on behalf of the First Respondent, it is nevertheless
submitted that, in the Court considering whether the Applicant has
made out a case in its founding papers for the judgment sought against
the First Respondent in the amount of R786 825.95 , the following
must not be lost sight of:
(i) On its own version and founding papers, the Applicant states
that, after the issue of Site Instruction 029 to the First
Respondent, the First Respondent was instructed to amend the
Applicant’s appointment to a revised contract value of R2 446
141.26 (inclusive of VAT). If given effect to, this would have
been the second amendment to the Letter of A ppointment, as
between the Applicant and the First Respondent;
(ii) According to the first amendment to the Letter of A ppointment
dated 7 March 2025 , it was expressly provided that any
increases in the budget must receive written approval from the
First Respondent before the work being proceeded with;
(iii) What the Applicant did not disclose in its founding papers , was
that the Applicant’s Letter of A ppointment with the revised
contract value of R2 446 141.26 (inclusive of VAT), has to date
never been signed off as between the Applicant and the First
Respondent;
(iv) The failure to amend the Letter of Appointment calls into
question whether the Applicant indeed has any contractual
claim for payment from the First Respondent.
(c) The Second Respondent has made it clear in its answering papers that
it was required to prepare its answering papers, without any co -
operation from the First Respondent. However, it is clear that on the
face of the allegations contained in the Applicant’s founding papers
which require to be investigated extensively by the Second
Respondent (as appears from the Answering Affidavit), there are
certain material shortcomings which the Applicant ought to have
addressed and which cannot be disregarded when consideration is
given to the grant of the default judgment sought by Applicant against
the First Respondent, or for the purposes of considering whether the
relief sought by the Applicant should be granted against the Second
Respondent.
Case Law
[11] In Pillay v Krishna18 at 951 -2, a three-legged approach was stated as
follows with regards to burden of proof:
‘The first principle in regard to the burden of proof is … If one person claims something
from another in a Court of law, then he has to satisfy the Court that he is entitled to it. But
there is a second principle which must always be read with it … Where the person against
whom the claim is made is not content with a mere denial of that claim, but sets up a special
defence, then he is regarded quoad that defence, as being the claimant: for his defence to be
upheld he must satisfy the Court that he is entitled to succeed on it … But there is a third
rule, which Voet states in the next section as follows: “He who asserts, proves and not he
who denies, since a denial of fact cannot naturally be proved provided that it is a fact that is
denied and that the denial is absolute.’1[12]
[12] Harms DP stated the following in National Director of Public
Prosecutions v Zuma when dealing with factual disputes in motion
proceedings:
1 Pillay v Krishna 1946 AD 946 at 951-2
“Motion proceedings, unless concerned with interim relief, are all about the resolution of
legal issues based on common cause facts. Unless the circumstances are special they cannot
be used to resolve factual issues because they are not designed to determine probabilities. It
is well established under the Plascon-Evans rule that where in motion proceedings disputes
of fact arise on the affidavits, a final order can be granted only if the facts averred in the
applicant's (Mr Zuma’s) affidavits, which have been admitted by the respondent (the NDPP),
together with the facts alleged by the latter, justify such order. It may be different if the
respondent’s version consists of bald or uncreditworthy denials, raises fictitious disputes of
fact, is palpably implausible, far -fetched or so clearly untenable that the court i s justified in
rejecting them merely on the papers. The court below did not have regard to these
propositions and instead decided the case on probabilities without rejecting the NDPP’s
version.”2
Discussion
[13] As stated in the Applicant’s Founding Affidavit, the relief it seeks
against the Second Respondent is contingent upon this Court granting
default judgment against the First Respondent. So, the question that needs to
be answered first and foremost is whether the Applicant has shown on a
balance of probabilities that it is entitled to default judgment against the First
Respondent based on what is contained in its Founding Affidavit, the
Second Respondent’s Answering Affidavit, and the Applicant’s Replying
Affidavit.
[14] After reading these affidavits, the following becomes common cause:
2 National Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma 2009 (2) SA 277 (SCA) at par 26
(a) On 28 January 2025, the First Respondent appointed the Applicant
as a subcontractor to carry out certain sealing works at Dysselsdorp
Hoog Reservoir (the Reservoir) under Contract TD 04/01/2024, Work
Package B (the Contract), after being appointed as the main contractor
by the Second Respondent for the broader works under the Contract.
(b) The initial subcontract was for an amount of R795 770.04
excluding VAT.
(c) On 7 March 2025, the First Respondent requested the Applicant to
submit a revised quotation for additional sealing work to be performed
on the Reservoir which then pushed the subcontract value to
R1 416 377.04 excluding VAT.
(d) Letters of Appointment in favour of the Applicant were issued for
both of these amounts on 28 January 2025 and 13 March 2025
respectively by the First Respondent.
(e) These Letters of Appointmen t contained, inter alia, the following
clauses:
(i) Citicon Projects (Pty) Ltd (Applicant) is hereby selected as a
Sub-Contractor for the above-mentioned contract to proceed
with the works to a value of the amounts specified above VAT
Exclusive.
(ii) Any variations above this budget (being the amounts stated
in the Letters of Appointment ) must receive written approval
from Lupha Enterprise JV Kadima (First Responden t) prior to
proceeding.
(iii) Lupha Enterprise JV Kadima Corp will be responsible for
Payment to Citicon Projects (Pty) Ltd, and all invoices must be
addressed to Lupha Enterprise JV Kadima Corp. All payments
will be paid within 30 days after submission of an approved
invoice on completion.
(iv)You are requested to immediately contact Lupha Enterprise
JV Kadima Corp to start facilitating commencement.
(f) No Letter of Appointment was issued for an amount of
R2 446 141.26 by the First Respondent; therefore, Applicant’s work
was limited to the value of R1 416 377.04 Vat Exclusive. This is
despite the fact that there was Site Instru ction 029 issued by the
Engineers. This is so because the Le tter of Appointment makes it clear
that any variation of the stated budget of R1 416 377.04 must receive
written approval from the First Respondent and the Applicant has
neither averred in its Founding Affidavit that such written approval was
received by it from the First Respondent nor has it attached this written
approval to its papers.
[15] Lack of written approval for work amounting to R2 446 141.26 was
specifically averred in the Second Respondent’s Answering Affidavit but the
Applicant failed to deal with same in its Replying Affidavit . The Applicant
was also referred to an email from the First Respondent dated 24 June 20 25
wherein the First Respondent, inter alia, specifically averred that they had
appointed the Applicant based on a specific scope of work that the Applicant
priced for . Thereafter, the Applicant and the Engineers had their own
discussion which did not include the First Respondent wherein they agreed
to increase the scope of work of the Applicant. As a result of th e agreement
reached by the Applicant and the Engineers, the Applicant proceeded to do
work that was neither discussed with the First Respondent nor approved by
the First Respondent. In response to the email referred to above, the
Engineers simply gave the First Respondent instructions to issue another
Letter of Appointment based on Site Instruction 029. The averments
contained in the aforementioned email were never dealt with by the
Applicant in its Replying Affidavit . This Court must therefore accept that
some of the work that the Applicant’s claim is based on was not authorised
by the First Respondent and therefore the Applicant cannot claim payment in
respect thereof.
[16] Based on authorised work, the Applicant was entitled to an amount of
R1 628 833.60 (R1 416 377.04 + 15%) but was only paid an amount of
R1 567 162.19 according to annexure “FA5” which then leaves a difference
of R61 671.41 which could be a shortfall . However, the Second Respondent
has averred in its Answering A ffidavit that the Applicant has been overpaid
by an amount of R364 056.99 which is the difference between
R1 992 890.59 and R1 628 833.60. If confirmed, this would then mean that
the Applicant has no claim against the First and Second Respondent. The
issue of overpayment but not the quantum thereof has been conceded by the
Applicant in its Replying Affidavit.
[17] Therefore, based on the finding that some of the work done by the
Applicant was not authorised by the First Respondent and that the Applicant
has been overpaid by the First Respondent, this Court is not satisfied that the
Applicant has shown that it is entitled to default judgement in the amount of
R786 825.95 or in any amount against the First Respondent. This finding
having been made, this Court cannot order the Second Respondent to pay the
Applicant the amount of R786 825.95 or any amount, as this Order was
contingent on default judgement being granted against the First Respondent.
[18] In the result, the following order is made:
1. Applicant’s application against the First and Second Respondents is
dismissed with costs , inclusive of the co sts of the urgent application and
Senior Counsel’s costs on Scale C.
______________________________
TJ MGENGWANA
Acting Judge of the High Court
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant : Mr. H.J. de Wet SC
Instructed by : DC Robertson Attorneys Incorporated
: Mr. H. Prinsloo
For the Respondent: Mr. D.W. Gess SC
Instructed by : MD Dixon Attorneys