SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private det ails of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Reportable/Not reportable
Case no: 2026-209737
In the matter between:
RODPAUL CONSTRUCTION (PTY) LTD Applicant
t/a RODS CONSTRUCTION
and
CITY OF CAPE TOWN First Respondent
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT BID Second Respondent
ADJUDICATION COMMITTEE
CITY OF CAPE TOWN
THE CITY MANAGER, CITY OF CAPE TOWN N.O. Third Respondent
RAPID BUILDERS AND Fourth Respondent
CONTRACTORS (PTY) LTD
Heard: 21 October 2026
Delivered: 3 November 2026
Summary: Application for urgent interim interdict precluding the implementation of a
decision of the first respondent to award a tender to the fourth respondent - No case
made out for urgency applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm - No
exceptional circumstances justifying restraint of public power.
ORDER
1. The application is dismissed with costs, including costs of two
counsel where employed, on the Scale C and B.
_________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_________________________________________________________
NDITA, J
[1] This is an urgent application for interim relief interdicting the
Second, Third and Fourth Respondents from taking any further steps in
connection with the Tender advertised by the F irst Respondent (“the
City”) for the construction of a Public Safety Training College , including
Additions and Alterations to the existing Facility (“the college”), pending
a review of the decision in terms of Part B of the Notice of Motion,
awarding the Tender to the Fourth Respondent. It is undisputed that the
Applicant’s application was found to be ‘unresponsive’ due to failure to
comply with the terms of the Tender. More specifically, the Applicant
seeks relief couched in the following terms:
“2. Pending the final determination of the relief in Part B (including any
appeal) the First, Second, and Third Respondents are restrained from:
2.1 concluding, signing or countersigning any contract or Form of Offer and
Acceptance with the Fourth Respondent pursuant to Tender 9[...], if not
already signed:
2.2 issuing any letter of acceptance, purchase order, works order,
commencement Instruction, notice to proceed or site -
handover/possession instruction to the Fourth Respondent;
2.3 permitting the Fourth Respondent or any subcontractor to establish on
site or to commence or continue any works pursuant to Tender 9[...];
2.4 accepting any performance guarantee, or making any payment or
incurring any contractual liability pursuant to Tender 9[...];
2.5 taking any further step to implement the decision to award Tender
9[...].”
Factual background
[2] On 27 November 2025, the First Respondent placed an
advertisement in the local press inviting Tenders from suitably qualified
contractors for the construction of the college with the closing date on 12
December 2025. The nature of the Tender is described in these
proceedings as being pivotal to the provisioning of safety and security
within the City. The Tender is a lumpsum contract in the amount of
R151 474 269 ,23 (excluding VAT) an R174 195 409.62 (including VAT),
subject to contract price adjustments. C lause C 2.1.4.7 provides as
follows:
“C.2.1.4.7 Good standing with Bargaining Council
Only those Tenders submitted by Tenderers who are in good standing with
the Building Industry Bargaining Council (BIBC) at the time of the Tender
award will be declared responsive. Tenderers must attach such proof to the
schedule titled Declaration in respect of Compliance with Labour Legislation
or obtain upon being requested to do so in writing and within the period
contained in such a request, failing which their Tenders will be declared
unresponsive.”
[3] In line with clause C 2.1.4.7 the Applicant was required to submit
with the Tender documents a letter of good standing from the BIBC ,
however, the Applicant attached to its bid a certificate of registration with
the BIBC. The certificate of registration expressly states that:
“This certificate merely confirms that the holder is registered with the BIBC as
an employer and does not indicate any decree of compliance competency or
capability.”
[4] It is common cause that the Applicant passed the functionality test
with the highest score among all the Tenderers and was recommended
for the granting of the Tender. At that stage, the B id Evaluation
Committee (“BEC”) treated the Letter of Good Standing as a post -
recommendation, pre-award verification step. As earlier alluded to, the
BEC on 25 February 2026, recommended the Applicant for award and
resolved that basic due diligence be conducted on the Applicant as the
recommended bidder. The deadline for a response for the letter of good
standing was 27 February 2026. By 26 February 2026, the Applicant
furnished the BIBC Certificate for Tendering and Quotation Purposes
only and explained that it was registered with BIBC but had not yet
secured a Western Cape project generating contributions, it undertook to
obtain a full Letter of Good Standing on award and commencement and
expressly invited the City to raise any concerns.
[5] On 9 March 2026, the BEC convened the seventh meeting during
which it was recorded that it was agree d at the last BEC meeting to
request a basic due diligence on the recommended Tenderer, the
Applicant. The Applicant provided the Certificate of tendering. The
Applicant was still not in good standing because it did not have current
projects and did not make any contributions towards employee benefits
as prescribed in Clause C.2.1.4.7. The extract from the BIBC Certificate
for Tendering stated that the Applicant could not currently be issued with
a compliance certificate generated from the BIBC website because it
was at that time non -compliant on the system. For this reason, the
Certificate did not meet the requirements of Clause C.2.1.4.7.
[6] The record reveals that notwithstanding the recommendation for
award, the BEC declared the Applicant non -responsive on 20 April 2026
because of its failure to provide the requisite letter of good standing. The
minutes record the decision as follows: “ The BEC agreed with the legal
opinion and deemed Rodpaul Construction is non-responsive in terms of
clause C.2.1.4.7.”
[7] According to the Applicant, the BEC’s own earlier record (BEC 7, 9
March 2026), shows a contrary provisional view to the effect that the
deficiency (failure to provide a letter of good standing) “was through no
fault of the Tenderer”, the Applicant had “a very strong case … being
prejudiced”, and the exclusion would be discriminatory. It also shows
that t he legal opinion was sought “to provide the BEC comfort in the
direction it should proceed”.
[8] On 25 May 2026, the Second Respondent awarded the Tender to
the Fourth Respondent. Prior thereto t he Applicant made submissions
seeking condonation of its non -compliance, to no avail. I have already
indicated that the Applicant’s appeal to the relevant statutory body was
also unsuccessful. Thus, the present proceedings.
[9] The Applicant further avers th at as discernible for the grounds of
review, it enjoys good prospects in the review application (PART B of the
Notice of Motion), which tilts the balance of convenience in its favour.
Grounds of Review
[10] In seeking to review the decision awarding the Tender to the
Fourth Respondent, the Applicant raises the following grounds of review:
10.1 Failure to consider relevant material (s 6(2) (a) (iii).
Under this rubric, the Applicant states that the submission it
made on 12 August and its comparator were directly relevant
and provably received.
10.2 Abdication of discretion (s 6(2)(iv); legality)
The Applicant alleges that on BEC 8, the BEC simply agreed
with the legal opinion without independent evaluative
reasoning, having earlier held a contrary view;
10.3 Inconsistent treatment/ s 217.
According to the Applicant the City’s absence of the same
type of certificate in Tender 1[...] demonstrates that the
Applicant’s certificate was capable of satisfying the
requirement’s purpose, treating it as fatally deficient was
unequal and irrational.
10.4 Error of law/misconstruction (s 6(2)(d), (f)(i)
It is further alleged that the City applied clause C.2.1.4.7 as a
closing/valuation-stage bar, contrary to its express “time of
the Tender award” wording and its request -and cure -
mechanism.
10.5 Procedural Fairness (s 6(2) (c ) s 3)
The Applicant alleges that the City solicited the certificate,
formed an adverse view and excluded the Applicant without
reverting despite the Applicant’s express invitation to engage
and despite no competitive advantage arising from the
verification.
10.6 Irrationality/unreasonableness (s 6(2) (f) (ii)(h)
The Applicant alleges that the exclusion of the highest -
functionality, lower -priced Tenderer, whom the BEC found
blameless, was not rationally connected to the material
before the City.
The answering affidavit
[11] In response to the Applicant’s allegations, the City denies that a
proper case has been made for urgency and states that neither has the
Applicant made out the clearest of cases for the relief it seeks as it has
no reasonable prospects of success in the review proceedings; in short,
the Applicant has failed to meet the requirements for an interim interdict
against the City at every level.
[12] With regard to urgency, the City avers that the Applicant has not
pleaded any facts in its founding papers which show that it cannot be
afforded substantial redress in ordinary course. Moreover, so further
contends the City, the Applicant states in the founding affidavit that “if
the contract is concluded and implemented, third party rights may be
affected”, which does not constitute a ground for urgency.
[13] According to the City, the Certificate produced by the Applicant did
not meet the threshold of what was required under clause C.2.1.4.7 as it
merely confirmed registration with BIBC something that was inadequate
purpose of the Tender award.
[14] On 9 March 2026, the BEC convened the seventh meeting during
which it was recorded that it was agree d at the last BEC meeting to
request a basic due diligence on the recommended Tenderer .
Furthermore, the BEC noted concerns there might be risks of audit
queries and adverse findings from the Auditor -General in the event that
the Tender was awarded to the Applicant on the basis of the Certificate
of Tendering.
Urgency
[15] This matter was in the motion court urgent roll but due to its
voluminousness it could not be heard and was then postponed to 21
October 2026, and the question of urgency was reserved. It considering
urgency, it must be accepted that the Applicant was o bliged to comply
with section 7(2)(a) of Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000
(“PAJA”) and exhaust internal remedies. To this end, the internal appeal
was concluded and dismissed on 21 August 2026, and the present
application was launched on 28 August 2026. In my view, the Applicant
therefore moved with the requisite haste in launching this application.
[16] Regarding urgency, Rule 6(12)(b) of the Uniform Rules of Court
provides that in every affidavit filed in support of any application under
Rule 6(12) (a), the applicant must set forth explicitly circumstances
which it avers render the matter urgent and the reasons why it claims it
could not be afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course.
[17] The import of the rule is explained by Notshe AJ, in East Rock
Trading (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and
Others (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) thus;
“[5] The issue of whether a matter should be heard as an urgent application is
governed by the provisions of 6(12)(b) of the Uniform Rules. The aforesaid
subrule allows the court or a Judge to dispense with the forms and service
provided for in the rules and dispose of the matter at such time and place in
such manner and in accordance with such procedure as to it seems meet. It
further provides that in the affidavit in support of an application the applicant ‘.
“. . . shall set forth explicitly the circumstances which he avers render the
matter urgent and the reasons why he claims that he could not be afforded
substantial redress at a hearing in due course.
[6] The import thereof is that the procedure set out in rule 6 (12) is not there for
the taking. An applicant has to set forth explicitly the circumstances which he
avers render the matter urgent. More importantly, the Applicant must state the
reasons why he claims that he cannot be afforded substantial redress at a
hearing in due course. The question of whether a matter is sufficiently urgent
to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application is underpinned by the issue
of absence of substantial redress in due course. The rule allows the court to
come to the assistance of a litigant because if the latter were to wait for the
normal course laid down by the rules it will not obtain substantial redress.”
[18] Flowing from the aforegoing principles, the crucial test is whether,
[18] Flowing from the aforegoing principles, the crucial test is whether,
if the matter were to follow its normal course as laid down by the rules,
an applicant will be afforded substantial redress. In paragraph 13 of the
founding affidavit, the Applicant advances the reasons for urgency and
states that:
“Substantial redress in due course will not be available if the contract is
concluded and implemented, third party rights, public expenditure and
completed works will substantially undermine the efficacy of the review.”
Plainly, the issue of third party rights and public expenditure are
irrelevant considerations in assessing urgency. The Applicant has failed
to provide any reasons why it will not be afforded substantial redress in
due course. Thus, no case has been made out for urgency, and the
matter falls to be struck off the roll. Furthermore the Constitutional Court
in National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance
and Others (CCT 38/12) [2012] ZACC 18, 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC), 2012
(11) BCLR 114 (CC) (20 December 2012) at para [50] , held that the
right to review impugned decision s does not require preservation
pendente lite, and there are no allegations made in relation to malice or
abuse on the part of the City which may impact on the rule of law or
public purse that would have warranted an urgent intervention by the
Court. Nonetheless, I proceed to assess the merits as the matter was
fully argued.
Evaluation
[19] The requirements for an interim interdict are (a) a prima facie right
even if it is open to some doubt; (b) injury actually committed or
reasonably apprehended; (c) the balance of convenience; and (d)
absence of similar protection by any other remedy.
[20] What the Applicant seeks in Part B is the setting aside of the
award of the Tender to the Fourth Respondent and a reconsideration of
the matter. At the interim stage, the Applicant must show, on the basis of
a prima facie right an entitlement to have the contract and the preceding
Tender set aside. In terms of section 8(1) of PAJA, in proceedings for
judicial review a court may grant any order that is just and equitable,
including the granting of a temporary interdict or other temporary relief.
That said, it is a principle of our law that a court should preserve restraint
and only halt the exercise of statutory power in the “ clearest of cases”
and where a compelling, and exceptional justification is established. It
should exercise restraint before limiting or curbing the implementation of
a decision taken in the exercise of the public power, and that
considerations of public interest and of the constitutional distribution of
powers. ( National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling
Alliance and Others , supra, para [18]. The court at para [66] further
emphasised that “ a court must carefully consider whether the grant of
the temporary restraining order pending review will cut across or prevent
the proper exercise of a power or duty that the law has vested in the
authority to be interdicted, and must assess the real -world impact of the
interdict on the dissemination of public resources. Against this backdrop,
I turn to consider the various requirements of a temporary interdict with
more particularity,
A prima facie right
[21] The first question to be determined is whether the Applicant has
established a prima facie right to the interim stopping of the execution of
the Tender. The Applicant contends that the grounds of review constitute
a prima facie case. It must be accepted , as correctly contended by
Counsel for the Respondents that the Applicant, for the purpose of
interim relief had to demonstrate apart from the right to review and set
aside the impugned decisions, a prima facie right that is threatened by
an impending or imminent irreparable harm. I have already indicated
that the right to review the impugned decisions did not require any
preservation pendete lite . The Applicant may establish a prima facie
right by demonstrating prospects of success on review.
Irreparable harm
[22] It is well -established in our law that the test in regard to
apprehension of harm is objective; the question is whether a reasonable
man, confronted by the facts, would apprehend the probability of harm.
In Minister of Law and Order and Others v Nordien and Another (473/85)
[1987] ZASCA 24 [1987] 2 All SA (A) (26 March 1987) at para [8]
explained thus:
“Á reasonable apprehension of injury has been held to be one which a
reasonable man might entertain on being faced with certain facts. The
applicant to an interdict is not required to establish that, on a balance of
probabilities flowing from undisputed facts, injury will follow: he has only to
show that it is reasonable to apprehend that injury will result. However, the
test for apprehension is an objective one, this means that, on the basis of the
facts presented to him, the Judge must decide whether there is any basis for
the entertainment of a reasonable apprehension by the applicant.”
[23] In the founding affidavit, the Applicant contends that if the interim
relief is not granted , the implementation of the tender awarded to the
Fourth Respondent would “create contractual and third party rights, sink
public funds, and render effective relief substantially more difficult. This
averment hardly addresses the irreparable harm the implementation of
the Tender would have on the Applicant.
The Balance of Convenience
[24] According to the Applicant, the balance of convenience favours the
granting of the interim interdict inter alia because a short preservation
order pending an expedited review causes limited prejudice whilst
implementation of a potentially unlawful award causes greater and
potentially irreversible prejudice to the Applicant and lawful procurement.
According to the Applicant, the City has been aware of this dispute since
2026.
[25] In weighing the balance of convenience a court must also consider
the probable impact of the restraining order on the constitutional and
statutory powers of the state functionary or organ of state against whom
the interim order is sough t. The balance of convenience involves a
consideration of the prospects of success in the main proceedings – the
stronger the prospects of success with the review
No other satisfactory remedy
[26] In relation to whether it there was no other satisfactory remedy to
pursue but for the interdict, the Applicant merely states that it had
exhausted the internal remedies; only interim relief can preserve an
effective review. Given that the Applicant seeks to constrain statutory
power, the averment is grossly inadequate to justify such a restriction.
For example, the Applicant has not explained why a damages claim
would not be an adequate remedy, should the review court find for it in
Part B. As these are motion proceedings, the Applicant is obliged to
make its case in its founding affidavit. Whilst it may be so that damages
are not an assured or adequate substitute for effective public law relief,
that the Applicant failed make the averments relating to exceptional
circumstances that would justify a restriction of public power is fatal to
this application.
[27] Much was made about the prospects of success of the review on
the basis that the City abdicated its discretion and relied on a legal
opinion without evaluative reasons whereas it has a discretion to
condone non -compliance with the terms of the tender. In Overstrand
Municipality v Water and Sanitation Services South Africa (Pty) (Ltd)
[2018] ZASCA 50 para 50, the Court commenting on Millenium, Waste
Management1 and Dr J S Moroka and others 2 on the issue of
condonation of non -compliance with statutory requirements, the Court
said that:
“I am alert to the debate concerning the possible sufficiency of substantial or
adequate compliance with what, in conventional terms, is described as
mandatory requirements. One should also guard against invalidating a Tender
that contains minor deviations that do not materially alter or depart from the
characteristics, terms conditions and other requirements set out in Tender
documents. In the present case the non -compliance is not of a trivial or minor
nature.”
[28] Without delving much on the merits of the review, it must be stated
that the letter of good standing is central to the granting of the tender
and it is not immediately clear that in the exercise of its discretion the
City ought to have condoned the Applicant’s non -compliance. At best,
this is point is arguable and it cannot be said with certainty that the
reviewing court will in probability find for the Applicant. In my judgment,
the declaration of non-responsiveness is consistent with the discretion of
the Respondents.
[29] Insofar as irrationality or unreasonableness of the City’s decision
to exclude the highest -functionality, lower -priced tender, it is doubtful
that this ground of review may pass muster because the terms of the
tender were clear, the letter of good standing had to be presented in
1Millenium Waste Management (Pty) Ltd v Chairperson Tender Board: Limpopo Province & others
2008(2) SA 481 (SCA);
2 Dr J S Moroka Municipality & others v Bertram (Pty) Ltd & another [2013] ZASCA 186; [2014] 1 All
SA 545 (SCA)
order for the Applicant to be declared responsive. Likewise, the
contention that the BEC applied C.2.1.4.7 incorrectly raises serious
doubt about its sustainability of the because the express wording of the
aforesaid clause unequivocally makes the letter of good standing a
prerequisite for the awarding of the Tender. To the extent that clause
C.2.1.4.7 may be construed to be ambiguous in relation to whether City
prematurely excluded the Applicant on 20 April 2026, depends on the
construction of the clause, a fact which renders it arguable.
[30] The review ground of procedural unfairness is rooted on whether it
the City ought to have reverted to the Applicant after it became clear that
the latter was unable to present the requisite letter of good standing.
Again, it is not in my view, the clearest case of procedural unfairness.
Conclusion
[31] I have in this judgment held that the Applicant has not made out a
case for urgency and ordinarily, the matter should have been struck off
the roll but because it was fully argued, I considered the merits as well. I
have found that the Applicant has failed to establish a prima facie right to
the relief sought as it has failed to demonstrate that exceptional
circumstances exist that justify the restraint of the public power. It also
has not pleaded any facts on the basis of which a consideration of
whether the curbing of the City’s power could be found to be justified.
The Applicant also failed to place any facts demonstrating the
irreparable harm it will suffer , neither has it alluded to any facts showing
that it has no alternative remedy. In the circumstances, the application
must fail all levels.
Order
[32] In the result, the following order is issued:
[32.1] The application is dismissed with costs, including costs
of two counsel where employed, on the Scale C and B.
____________________
T C NDITA
Judge of the High Court
Appearances
For applicant: Advocate M Combrink
Instructed by: Neerajh Ghazi Attorneys obo De Waal Boshoff
For respondent: Advocate R Goodman SC with M Mokhaetsi
Instructed by: Cluver Markotter Attorneys