Lombard Insurance Company Ltd v Bonifacio (2026/018758; 2026/018792) [2026] ZAGPJHC 1252 (3 November 2026)

55 Reportability

Brief Summary

Insolvency Law — Sequestration applications — Applications for sequestration of Jorge and Sergio Bonifacio by Lombard Insurance Company — Claims based on failure to satisfy a court judgment of R100m — Bonifacios evading service of writs — Court finding that Bonifacios committed acts of insolvency as defined in the Insolvency Act — Sequestration orders granted against both respondents.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG


CASE NUMBER: 2026-018758

AND

CASE NUMBER: 2026-018792


DELETE WHICHEVER IS NOT APPLICABLE

1.REPORTABLE: YES
2.OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
3.REVISED: NO

3 NOVEMBER 2026 SNYCKERS AJ

In the matter between:

LOMBARD INSURANCE COMPANY LTD APPLICANT

and

JORGE ALEXANDRE DA COSTA BONIFACIO RESPONDENT


AND
In the matter between:
LOMBARD INSURANCE COMPANY LTD APPLICANT

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and

SERGIO RUI DA COSTA BONIFACIO RESPONDENT


JUDGMENT

Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ legal representatives by e-mail and uploading it onto the electronic
platform. The date and time for hand- down is deemed to be 10h00 on the
3rd of NOVEMBER 2026.


SNYCKERS AJ:

Introduction, context and these applications

[1] There are two separate sequestration applications before me, being heard
together. They arise from the same facts, with minimal differences that will be identified
below to the extent relevant. The applicant in both applications is the insurer Lombard.
The respondents in the two applications are the Bonifacio brothers, Jorge and Sergio.
[2] The matters arise from litigation to which Lombard and the Bonifacios were
parties, and judgments that issued from the litigation – a judgment in this court by
Strydom J handed down on 20 September 2020 1 and a judgment from the Supreme
Court of Appeal handed down on 24 February 2026. 2 The judgment by Strydom J made
an order against the Bonifacios, who had been joined as third parties by Lombard,

1 Case Number 20/4174.
2 Case Number 247/2023.

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under the provisions of Rule 13(1)(a). 3 This order was confirmed on appeal – the
Bonifacios’ appeal was dismissed.
[3] The nature of the order granted against the Bonifacios lies at the heart of this
matter. I revert to this below.
[4] The litigation arose in the context of construction for Eskom’s Kusile Power Plant.
A subcontractor of the main contractor was DBT. A subcontractor of DBT was TCP, a
corporate entity in which the Bonifacios had an interest. TCP had to provide DBT with a
performance guarantee. These guarantees are issued by institutions such as Lombard.
They allow the beneficiary (DBT) to call on the issuer (Lombard) to pay on the
guarantee upon the mere claim by the beneficiary that an event of default on the
contract in question had occurred. The liquid value of these guarantees is that the
issuer must pay on them, whether or not the claim that an event of default has occurred
is correct; this is the beauty of a so-called demand guarantee. There is an exception to
this absolute liability to pay, an exception which appears to be invoked more often than
the demands of the economy would like, and that is if the issuer can prove that the
guarantee was fraudulently called. If the beneficiary makes a default claim it knows to
be false, to induce payment on the guarantee, the issuer can set up this fraud as a
defence against payment.
[5] The issuer of performance guarantees (also called performance bonds) often, in
issuing the guarantee, turns to the party whose performance is at issue to provide it with
an indemnity in case the guarantee is called. In the present case, TCP provided such an
indemnity to Lombard in respect of the guarantee from Lombard it was providing to DBT
in terms of its contract. The Bonifacios were also indemnifiers in favour of Lombard.
Often the terms of the indemnity are as absolute, or even more absolute, than the terms
of the guarantee. Although the business of the issuer entails making a profit from

of the guarantee. Although the business of the issuer entails making a profit from

3 As pointed out in the Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, the proceedings in question were motion
proceedings, not trial proceedings, and the Third Party Notices ‘had to be modified, where required, to
provide for the proceedings being pursued on motion’, although Rule 6(14) provided that Rule 13 applied
to all applications – SCA judgment footnote 9.

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issuing guarantees, such indemnities avoid a situation for the issuer where it has to pay
on the guarantee but cannot have recourse to those responsible for its having to pay.
[6] In the instant case, DBT called on the guarantee. Lombard resisted paying on it
and raised the fraud defence. The fraud defence related to the question whether , to the
knowledge of DBT, certain take-over certificates had been issued in the project that had
the effect of reducing the amount owing by TCP, yet DBT still called on the full amount.
To establish this defence, Lombard was relying on TCP. So , there was litigation on
whether Lombard was liable to pay on the guarantee. DBT was the applicant and
Lombard the respondent (it was on motion). Lombard as respondent issued various
third party notices under Rule 13(1)(a), inter alia against the Bonifacios – seeking an
indemnification from them as contemplated in the Rule, should it be liable to DBT. The
basis for the indemnification right was the indemnity each Bonifacio had provided to
Lombard on the TCP bond to DBT.
[7] The claim by DBT against Lombard was for some R128m. The Bonifacios did not
file any affidavits to defend against the third party indemnification asserted against them
by Lombard. They sat back and allowed Lombard (and TCP) to do the running.
[8] TCP in the meantime was wound up. Its opposition to the DBT application ended.
Lombard decided it was best to settle with DBT – so it settled DBT’s claim by agreeing
to pay R100m instead of the claimed R128m. A fter the settlement with DBT, Lombard
continued against the third parties on the basis of their indemnities. As the SCA pointed
out, the t hird party proceedings had life independent of the main claim between DBT
and Lombard.4
[9] The Bonifacios now sought to file affidavits resisting the Lombard claim against
them on their indemnities. After contested condonation proceedings (given that they had

them on their indemnities. After contested condonation proceedings (given that they had
been entitled to file affidavits from the start and had elected not to do so) , they were

4 SCA para 24, with reference to ABSA Bank Ltd v Boksburg Transitional Local Council 1997 (2) SA 415
(W).

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allowed to file answers. Their defences to the claim against them were many. Several of
them turned on the fact that Lombard had now settled with DBT. For various reasons, it
was contended that they should not be liable on the indemnities in the circumstances. I
revert below to this alteration in the character of the claim against them, as it formed
part of the debate relating to the nature of the order that was ultimately granted against
them. Suffice to say all the Bonifacio defences were dismissed, by Str ydom J and again
in the SCA. They were liable on the indemnities, settlement or no settlement. The basis
for their liability remained the same – the indemnities. The amount was reduced by the
settlement, but the settlement did not provide them with a defence to the strong terms of
the indemnities they had signed.
[10] The relevant order by Strydom J read as follows:
74.1 The Seventh and Eighth Third Parties are declared to be liable, jointly and
severally, the one paying the other to be absolved, to the First Respondent in the
amount of R100m together with interest thereon at the rate of 2% above the
prime overdraft rate charged by ABSA Bank from time to time, calculated from
date of demand being 15 January 2020 to date of payment.
…
74.3. The Seventh and Eighth Third Parties are jointly and severally, the one
paying the other to be absolved, to pay the costs of the First Respondent on the
scale as between attorney and client, s uch costs to include the cost of two
counsel where employed.”
[11] The relevant SCA order read as follows:
“The appeal is dismissed with costs, such costs to include the costs of two
counsel, where so employed.”

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[12] Once the appeal was dismissed, Lombard had writs issued on the strength of the
judgment, in July and September 2024.
[13] Attempts to execute on the writs resulted in successive sheriff’s returns of non-
service, as the sheriff was unable to serve on either brother:
[14] In relation to Jorge,
14.1. the first attempt to serve the writ was at 9B Bothma Rd Bedfordview, and the
return indicates that Jorge was ‘ unknown at the given address, as informed
by Mrs Annamarie Maskita the occupier who owns all the assets here’;
14.2. successive subsequent attempts (three in one week in October 2024) were
then made to serve at another address in Bedfordview, namely Unit […] of a
complex known as A […] – and the premises were found locked on each
occasion and neighbours could not confirm whether Jorge ‘ was still residing
at given address’.
[15] In relation to Sergio, the identical efforts were made and identical results
achieved at the identical addresses.
[16] The founding affidavit in the case of Jorge explains that the first address was the
domicilium address and the second the residential address appearing from a Windeed
search. In the case of Sergio, the founding affidavit says the first address was t he
residential address and the second an alternative residential address according to a
Windeed search.
[17] These applications for sequestration of Jorge and Sergio were then launched.

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[18] The Notice of Motion in each application for sequestration states, “in accordance
with section 9(3)(a) of the insolvency Act”, the following:
“iii. The claim is based on a judgment handed down against the Respondent, in
favour of the Applicant, in the amount of R100m….
iv. The debtor has committed an act of insolvency by failing to satisfy a court
judgment granted.”
[19] The founding affidavit in each case goes a little further. In each case, the affidavit
says the following:
“Moreover, the Respondent has committed an act of insolvency as envisaged in
terms of sections 8(a) and (b) of the Insolvency Act, in that the Respondent is
actively evading the Applicant and has departed from his dwelling/s or otherwise
absents himself, w ith intent by so doing to evade or delay the payment of his
debts and the Respondent has failed to satisfy a judgment granted against him
on 20 September 2022.
The aforesaid conduct appears from the fact that despite the Sheriff of this
Honourable Court has been unable to find the Respondent and his publically [sic]
known addresses as mentioned above.
A copy of the aforementioned judgment which gives rise to the Applicant's
liquidated claim against the Respondent is attached hereto marked "FA3.
Additionally, is it just and equitable for the Respondent to be placed into final,
alternatively, provisional sequestration.”

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[20] I should immediately note that the notion that a sequestration order can or should
be granted if it is “just and equitable” to do so appears to confuse the provisions of the
1973 Companies Act, 5 applicable to compulsory liquidations of companies under the
2008 Companies Act, 6 with the provisions of the Insolvency Act .7 Se ction 10 of the
Insolvency Act allows a court to grant a sequestration order when the petitioner has a
relevant debt owing to them, the debtor has committed an act of insolvency (these are
listed in section 8) “or is insolvent” , and there is reason to believe sequestration would
be to the advantage of creditors of the insolvent. I should also mention that the
insolvency referred to in section 10 of the Insolvency Act is what is known as factual
insolvency – a state where one’s liabilities exceed one’s assets, whereas section 345 of
the Companies Act is concerned with what is called commercial insolvency – an inability
to pay debts as and when due.
[21] Note that invocation of the act of insolvency in section 8( a) referred to in the
founding affidavit does not feature in the Notice of Motion where, in compliance with
s9(3) of the Insolvency Act, the “ failure to satisfy a court judgment granted” is identified
as the relevant act of insolvency on which the petition is based.
[22] It should also be noted that the act of insolvency set out in s8( b) is not a ‘failure
to satisfy a court judgment granted’. The relevant acts of insolvency referred to in the
founding affidavits set out in section 8(a) and (b) are stipulated as follows by the
Legislature:
A debtor commits an act of insolvency-

(a) if he leaves the Republic or being out of the Republic remains absent
therefrom, or departs from his dwelling or otherwise absents himself, with intent
by so doing to evade or delay the payment of his debts;

(b) if a court has given judgment against him and he fails, upon the demand of the

(b) if a court has given judgment against him and he fails, upon the demand of the
officer whose duty it is to execute that judgment, to satisfy it or to indicate to that

5 Act 71 of 1963.
6 Act 71 of 2008.
7 Act 24 of 1936.

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officer disposable property sufficient to satisfy it, or if it appears from the return
made by that officer that he has not found sufficient disposable property to satisfy
the judgment;

[23] T he notice of motion, read generously, is referring shorthand to the act of
insolvency set out in s8(b).
[24] In argument before me, Ms Mitchell, who appeared for Lombard, sought to make
out a case on s8(a) as well as s8(b). Mr Mastenbroek, who appeared for the Bonifacios,
submitted that Lombard should be confined to the act of insolvency it expressly
identifies for purposes of s9(3) in its Notice of Motion. I have some sympathy for Mr
Mastenbroek’s submission. Nevertheless, despite its absence from the notice of motion
where the relevant act of insolvency is expressly mentioned for the purposes of
compliance with s9(3)(v), had a case under s8( a) been made out properly in the
founding affidavits, I would probably have allowed it to form the basis for an order as the
act of insolvency invoked under s10.
[25] But the unsuccessful efforts of the sheriff to serve the writs, as set out in his
returns, come nowhere near to making out a case under section 8(a), in my view.
[26] Jorge, in his answer, says his residential address is Unit 4[…] Corner of v […]
d[…] L[…] & S […] Rds, Bedfordview, and not Unit […] A[…] , which is Sergio’ s
residential address. He says that, on the first attempt to serve, he would have been at
his place of work, and his housekeeper, Annabela, would have attended to the doorbell
call. As for the other attempts at Unit […] A[…], that is Sergio’s residential address, not
his. In reply, this is simply denied, and one is told ‘the sheriff’s returns of service
constitute prima facie evidence on the attempts made to execute the writ of execution’.
[27] Sergio, in his answer, says both his domicilium and residential addresses are
Unit […] A[…], and that his business address is in Meadowdale. He would have been at

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work, not at the A […] address, on all occasions of attempted service. The gated estate
is access controlled by security guards, who grant access only when residents give
permission. “Therefore, I would have been notified of any attempted service”. In reply,
the reply to Jorge’s answer in this regard cited above is repeated verbatim.
[28] I have some difficulty in reading the relevant sheriff returns as being nulla bona
returns on the strength of which s8( b) may be triggered. All one has, in reality, are
unsuccessful attempts to serve writs of execution on the Bonifacios. They were never
asked to point out any assets to satisfy the writs and never failed to do so upon
demand. This was not a point taken by Mr Mastenbroek , who appeared content to treat
the returns as if they were nulla bona returns of the kind envisaged in s8(b).
[29] For purposes of this application, I shall assume in Lombard’s favour that the
returns in question may be regarded as nulla bona for the purposes of section 8(b).
[30] This brings me to the nub of the dispute before me.
[31] The Bonifacios adopted the attitude that the writs were invalid. They said that the
judgment of Strydom J was a declarator only, of the kind one sought and got in a joinder
under Rule 13(1)(a). This declarator, that the Bonifacios were liable to indemnify
Lombard, was not a money judgment ordering the Bonifacios to pay anything, and no
writ of execution could be issued on the strength of this judgment. The writs,
accordingly, fell to be set aside.
[32] In answer to the sequestration applications, each Bonifacio brought a counter -
application to stay the sequestration proceedings pending an application each had
instituted to have the writs set aside. The set aside application was brought as an
‘interlocutory’ in the original litigation, under the same case number as yielded the
Strydom J judgment. A date for the hearing of the set -aside application has in the
meantime been obtained, for February 2027.

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[33] There followed a paper skirmish on what was properly before the court hearing
the sequestration application. Lombard said the stay should not be considered. The
Bonifacios in effect said only the stay should be considered.
[34] After perusal of the papers, I notified the parties along the following lines –
34.1. It appeared impossible to determine the sequestration applications without
determining the stay application. It appeared in turn impossible to
determine the stay application without considering the merits of the set -
aside application.
34.2. The set-aside application seemed to turn exclusively on a crisp question of
law – whether the judgment of Strydom J could properly yield writs of
execution. If the point is good, it is good for purposes of the sequestration
applications. If it is bad, there would be no point in holding up the
sequestration applications and staying them to have this point serve
before a court in February.
[35] Both Ms Mitchell and Mr Mastenbroek accepted the above propositions before
me.
[36] Demands for a condonation application in relation to the late filing of answering
papers fortunately did not survive the commencement of the application.
[37] In resisting the applications, Mr Mastenbroek relied on his point relating to the
nature of the judgment. He also asked the court to exercise its discretion against
sequestration, based essentially on the cogency of defences the Bonifacios had
unsuccessfully advanced before Strydom J and the SCA.
Writs and judgments – assess the former; respect the latter

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[38] Before considering the proper interpretation of the order of Strydom J, confirmed
by the SCA, it is appropriate to consider some founding principles.
[39] An important case in point is Sachs v Katz 1955 (1) SA 67 (T) at 72F -G. The
decision confirmed that a writ that purported to extend beyond the confines of the
judgment on which it was based could not be used to create an act of insolvency for
purposes of section 8(b). That means that, if the orders of Strydom J could not found an
entitlement to have writs of execution issued, then the writs that were issued cannot
competently create a nulla bona return for the purposes of section 8( b). I have no
reason to find the j udgment in Sachs to have been wrongly decided and I am
accordingly bound to follow it.
[40] Mr Mastenbroek wanted to take this further. He submitted, on the basis of law I
consider below, that a joinder under Rule 13(1)(a) could not competently result in a
money judgment against the relevant third party. He said if this was so, and if I were to
interpret the relevant order of Strydom J as anything other than a declaratory order of
liability, then the order of Strydom J was incompetently made and could be regarded as
a nullity. There is some authority for the proposition that a court order that is
incompetently made is a nullity. In Motala,8 the SCA held that a court order that had
purported to appoint judicial managers, when this was the function of the Master, could
be treated as a nullity by a subsequent court. This decision created some
understandable confusion regarding comity of courts, and it has since been made clear
that subsequent courts, even when faced with court orders they believe could not
competently have been granted, are nevertheless bound to respect them as court
orders if not set aside on appeal or rescission.9
[41] I have little hesitation in rejecting Mr Mastenbroek ’s invitation to assess the
competence of the Strydom J order, save in the limited respect of aiding in its proper

competence of the Strydom J order, save in the limited respect of aiding in its proper

8 The Master of the High Court (North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria) v Motala NO & Others 2012 (3) SA
325 (SCA)
9 See for example Municipal Manager OR Tambo Municipality & Another v Ndabeni 2023 (4) SA 421 (CC)
and the full court decision in Van Dyk & Another v Rhodes 2025 (4) SA 313 (GJ).

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interpretation. If I am persuaded that, on a proper construction of the order given by
Strydom J, it was a money judgment against the Bonifacios, then I shall treat it as such,
whether or not I believe it could not competently (or appropriately) have been given on
the strength of a Rule 13(1)(a) joinder. It is one thing to follow Sachs v Katz and not to
give effect to a writ that departs from the authority of the judgment on which it is based,
at least for the purposes of allowing it to create an act of insolvency. It is quite another
to adopt the attitude that, whatever the actual nature of the order of Strydom J, I should
ignore it to the extent that it does more than it should have done.
[42] Nevertheless, if the legal position is that joinders under Rule 13(1)(a) cannot
competently give rise to money judgments, then this would be a relevant factor in
interpreting the order, to the extent that there is any ambiguity in it, as more likely to be
in line with the legal position than contrary to it.
[43] It is therefore time to consider this question of law and the nature of the order of
Strydom J.
Rule 13(1)(a) orders and the order of Strydom J
[44] I have cited the order of Strydom J above. I can quickly get out of the way the
matter of the cost order. No costs have been taxed or agreed. This means that the cost
order against the Bonifacios cannot sustain a writ.10 Ms Mitchell correctly did not seek to
argue the contrary.
[45] The order reads like a declaratory order. On its face, that is what it is. It declares
the Bonifacios to be liable to Lombard in the amount of R100m, jointly and severally, the
one paying the other to be absolved. It specifically uses the declaratory form and term.
It refrains from ordering anyone to pay anything.

10 See for example Administrateur, Transvaal v JD Van Niekerk & Genote BK 1995 (2) SA 241 (A).

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[46] This is not surprising. The order was the result of a t hird party notice under Rule
13(1)(a). The third party notice sought a declarator of liability to indemnify. That is what
these notices do.
[47] Ms Mitchell sought to make something of the qualification “ the one paying the
other to be absolved’ as indicating a money judgment. This qualification simply
describes the joint and several nature of the declared liability. It does not alter the
declaratory nature of that declared liability to become an order to pay.
[48] Mr Mastenbroek relied on the view of the authors of Herbstein & Van Winsen,
who say the following in relation to Third Party Joinders under Rule 13(1)(a): 11
“As between the defendant and a third party whom the defendant has joined in
terms of rule 13(1)(a), all that can be claimed (where the relief empowered by the
Apportionment of Damages Act is not sought at the same time) is a declaratory
order apportioning the degree of fault between the various wrongdoers, no order
requiring the making of payment being competent. The defendant, having
obtained such a declaratory order, cannot execute upon it and will, if the third
party is recalcitrant, have to sue the latter specifically in terms of the Act.”
[49] The cases cited by the authors bear them out . The important decision is that of
Claassen J in IPF Nominees. 12 Claassen J draws a distinction between joinder under
Rule 13(1)(a) and joinder under Rule 13(1)(b). In the former case, joinder under Rule
13(1)(a), which includes the case where indemnification is sought (not only cases of
joint wrongdoers), the only order that can issue is a declarator. The cases cited by
Claassen J include cases where an insurer is held liable to indemnify. In the latter case,
joinder under Rule 13(1)(b), the joinder is broader – it is based on the fact that the
joining party seeks to join a lis between themselves and a third party to the main lis –

joining party seeks to join a lis between themselves and a third party to the main lis –

11 Dendy & Loots Herbstein & Van Winsen: The Civil Practice of the Superior Courts of South Africa 6th
Edition RS 3 2025 p7-61 to 7-62.
12 IPF Nominees (Pty) Ltd v Nedcor Bank Ltd (Basfour 130 (Pty) Ltd Third Party) 2002 (5) SA 101 (W).

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where the facts in the two lites are sufficiently similar to make this appropriate. In such
cases, the relief sought against the third party may include a money judgment.
[50] Ordinarily, and this is a relevant point for present purposes, the indemnification
right asserted against the third party under Rule 13(1)(a) is contingent upon a finding of
liability against the defendant issuing the third party notice. The indemnification is also
often contingent upon payment or discharge of the primary liability by the defendant.
The defendant is resisting the plaintiff’s claim (or the respondent resisting the
applicant’s claim), but in issuing the third party notice is saying “to the extent that I be
held liable on the plaintiff (or applicant)’s claim, you should declare the third party liable
to me”.
[51] This was the form that the t hird party notices issued against the Bonifacios took
in the instant case. Lombard was resisting the claim against DBT. Hence it was in the
main saying there was no liability by anybody to anybody. The third party notices sought
declaratory relief to the extent that Lombard were held liable to DBT.
[52] This changed when Lombard settled with DBT. Its liability to DBT had now
crystallised – and in the lesser amount of R100m. The settlement agreement was made
an order of court and Lombard was ordered to pay the R100m to DBT. The Bonifacios
now moved into action and filed answering affidavits in what had now become
proceedings purely on the t hird party notices, which remained unamended. In reply,
Lombard said it was no longer necessary for there to be a finding of liability against it
before the Bonifacios could be held liable, as the settlement had settled its liability. As
explained in the Strydom J judgment, the Bonifacios then argued that Lombard had
illegitimately sought to make out a different case against them in reply. Strydom J
rejected this:13

13 Strydom J para [19].

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“In my view, the cause of action against the Third Parties remained their liability
in terms of the Indemnity and the fact that the trigger event for payment changed
from a court finding liability in terms of the Guarantee to a settlement reached
between the parties to the Guarantee makes no difference.”
[53] The SCA upheld this reasoning and found that “[Lombard]’s claim throughout
remained based on the indemnity contract, not the settlement agreement. The only
impact of the settlement agreement was that the amount to be paid was reduced. When
the relevant terms of the settlement agreement were incorporated by the high court in
its order of 1 February 2021, the issue of the respondent’ s liability to DBT, including that
it was not affected by any fraud or any other defence as between the respondent and
DBT, had become res judicata.”14
[54] In respect of the argument that Lombard’s asserted right against the Bonifacios
as third parties had moved from a claim contingent to a finding that Lombard was liable
to DBT to a claim on the settlement without this contingency, the SCA rejected this
argument. It held the indemnity to found liability on the part of the Bonifacios with or
without a finding against Lombard and found that the settlement agreement “simply
quantified the amount of the claim”.15
[55] The reason all of this is relevant to the instant dispute is that Ms Mitchell sought
to argue that the shift from contingent liability to direct liability as against the Bonifacios
was decisive in altering what would have been a declarator in the order of Strydom J to
being a case that fell in the second category considered by Claassen J in IFP
Nominees, making the Strydom J order a money judgment.
[56] I struggle to follow this reasoning. Whatever the reason the Bonifacios were
declared liable to indemnify, and whether such liability was conditional and contingent or
unconditional, this could not alter the character of the order against them declaring them

14 SCA para [24].

14 SCA para [24].
15 SCA para [30].

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to be liable. Whether they are declared liable for as much as Lombard be ordered to pay
DBT, or instead liable in the amount of R100m as settled, does not have a bearing on
whether they are being declared liable or instead being ordered to pay.
[57] Ms Mitchell correctly submitted that, although the order on its face read as a
declarator, one had to read the order in the context of the judgment to interpret it
properly.16 But there is nothing about its purpose or context that transforms it into a
money judgment.
[58] Ms Mitchell referred also to the fact that the judgment of Strydom J twice
suggested the order sought and granted was for ‘payment’:
58.1. In para [2] of the judgment, Strydom J says “Lombard seeks an order for
payment against the Third Parties on the strength of an indemnity…”.
58.2. In para [71], Strydom says “Lombard asks for payment in the amount of
R100,000,000…”
[59] It must be remembered that the nature of the order to be issued was not at issue
before Strydom J. He was formally asked to issue a declarator, and he did so. The fact
that he loosely refer red to the prayer as seeking “payment” did no more than if he had
said something to the effect that “Lombard is in turn looking to the third parties to pay it”.
It did not directly address the nature of the order sought and granted. It did not convert a
declarator into a money judgment.
[60] Here the fact that the law is firm that Rule 13(1)(a) joinders must yield declarators
only and cannot yield payment orders is relevant. It places the order in the legal context

16 See Finishing Touch 163 (Pty) Ltd v BHP Billiton Energy Coal South Africa Ltd & Others 2013 (2) SA
204 (SCA) paras 13-14 and Electoral Commission v Mhlophe & Others 2016 (5) SA 1 (CC), para [33].

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in which it was given, to interpret what it was doing. 17 A declarator was formally sought.
A declarator was issued. That is what Rule 13(1)(a) allows. That is what Strydom J did.
[61] Ms Mitchell also submitted that the SCA interpreted the Strydom J order (which it
upheld) as one ordering payment, and that it said so in para [31]. But the last sentence
of para [31] in the SCA judgment dealt, not with the order against the Bonifacios, but
with the ‘order’ (in quote marks) against Lombard flowing from the fact that the
settlement agreement had been made an order of court:
“The settlement amount is the amount the high court ‘ordered’ the respondent to
pay.’
[62] This is no support for an interpretation of the Strydom J order against the
Bonifacios as an order to pay rather than a declaration of liability.
Consequence
[63] I therefore cannot find that the Strydom J order upheld in the SCA was anything
other than the kind of declaratory order that issues against a third party joined under
Rule 13(1)(a). This means that it could not sustain a writ. This in turn, on Sachs, means
the writs in question could not be used to embody acts of insolvency under s8(b). An d
since no other act of insolvency was established (the attempt to rely on s8(a) being bad,
as found above), there is no basis to order the (provisional) sequestration of the
Bonifacios.
[64] The case in the affidavits on advantage to creditors was thin. Given the
conclusion I reach, I need not determine this issue.

17 See the cases referred to in the previous footnote.

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[65] Mr Mastenbroek had another string to his bow. He submitted that if a case for
sequestration was made out, I should exercise my residual discretion against it. The
bases on which this submission rested were insufficiently different from the cogency of
the defences rejected in the SCA to be persuasive. As was the distinction that was
drawn between declaring the right and enforcing it. None of this , however, needs
determining given the conclusion I have reached on the writs and s8(b).
[66] In the circumstances, I make the following order in both cases:
“The application is dismissed with costs on scale C”.

_______________________________
SNYCKERS AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG JOHANNESBURG






HEARING

DATE OF HEARING : 27 October 2026

DATE OF JUDGMENT : 3 November 2026

APPEARANCES

APPLICANT’S COUNSEL : K Mitchell

APPLICANT’S ATTORNEYS : Frese Gurovich Attorneys, Johannesburg

RESPONDENT’S COUNSEL : R Mastenbroek

RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEYS : Christodolou & Mavrikis Inc, Johannesburg

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