African National Congress Youth League and Another v Independent Electoral Commission of UNISA and Others (2026/184797) [2026] ZAGPJHC 1257 (1 November 2026)

45 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Administrative Law — Review of election proceedings — Applicants challenging the validity of the National Student Representative Council elections at Unisa — Allegations of procedural unfairness and lack of jurisdiction raised by respondents — Court finding that the applicants were denied the opportunity to respond to evidence presented by the IEC — Jurisdiction established based on historical areas of jurisdiction — Review application upheld, and election results declared invalid.

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA



IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG


Case Number: 2026-184797




In the matter be




In the matter between:


AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS YOUTH LEAGUE
(ANCYL)
First Applicant
SOUTH AFRICAN STUDENTS CONGRESS (SASCO) Second Applicant

and

INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF UNISA First Respondent
INDEPENDENT ELECTION TRIBUNAL OF UNISA Second Respondent
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH AFRICA (UNISA) Third Respondent
THE VICE-CHANCELLOR, UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Fourth Respondent
ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS¶ YOUTH COMMAND
(EFFYC)
Fifth Respondent
UNISA LAW STUDENTS ASSOCIATION (ULSA) Sixth Respondent
MK STUDENTS¶ MOVEMENT (MKSM) Seventh Respondent



(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
______________ _ ____
DATE SIGNATURE

JUDGMENT

WENTZEL -THOMPSON J

Introduction

[1] This is an urgent review concerning the election of the executive committee of
the National Student Representative Council (NSRC) of the University of South
Africa (Unisa). The election took place at a National Congress held at the
Kopanong Conference Venue, Ekurhuleni, on 24 June 2026. The applicants, two
student formations, lodged a dispute against the outcome. The Independent
Election Tribunal of Unisa (the IET) dismissed it in a written ruling dated 10 July
2026.
[2] The applicants¶ central complaint is that the IET decided the dispute on a version
and evidence presented by the Independent Electoral Commission of Unisa (the
IEC) in their absence, which they were never shown and to which they were
never permitted to reply, although they had asked in writing to be allowed to do
so. They also attack the conduct of the election itself.
[3] The first to fourth respondents (the respondents) opposed the application. They
contend that this court lacks jurisdiction, that the point is res judicata, that review
proceedings cannot be brought urgently, that the matter is not urgent, that
several prayers are incompetent, and that no ground of review is made out.
[4] The fifth to seventh respondents did not oppose the relief sought.
BACKGROUND
[5] Student governance at Unisa is regulated by the SRC Constitution and the
Electoral Policy, both approved by Council on 23 November 2017. Regional SRC
elections were conducted online in April 2026. The National Congress then
convened on 24 June 2026 to elect, among others, the nine NSRC executive
portfolios listed in clause 5.3.1 of the SRC Constitution. Clause 3.2.3 provides
that the National Congress elects by secret ballot nine NSRC members

constituting the executive committee ³as elected and presented by
organisations´.
[6] According to the report of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in
Africa (EISA), which administered the ballot, 90 voting delegates signed the
attendance register. Nominations were taken from the floor. The contested
portfolios of President and Deputy President were each won by the EFFYC
candidate by 46 votes to 44 against the SASCO candidate. The Secretary -
General (ULSA) and Treasurer -General (EFFYC) were declared elected
unopposed. No nominations were recorded for the remaining five executiv e
portfolios.
[7] It is common cause that the applicants ¶ delegates left the venue during the
proceedings. The parties differ on why and when. The applicants say they
withdrew in protest after their objections to ballot secrecy and credentials were
ignored. The IEC says they walked out without stating any objection after losing
the Deputy President ballot. Clause 3.1.6 of the SRC Constitution provides that
the withdrawal of an individual or organisation does not preclude the National
Congress from being legally constituted.
[8] On 25 June 2026 the applicants, together with MKSM, lodged a formal electoral
dispute with the IET under clauses 11 and 12 of the Electoral Policy. They
alleged, among other things, that the IEC lacked independence; that credentials
were not transparently verified; that the secrecy of the ballot was compromised
because delegates kept mobile phones and photographed marked ballots; that
objections were not recorded or resolved; that observers were improperly
removed; that a nomination of Mr Gift Nkuna was ignored; and that only four of
the nine executive portfolios were filled.
[9] The IET heard the parties separately. The applicants addressed the tribunal on
the morning of 9 July 2026 in the absence of the IEC. On the same day , the
applicants wrote to the tribunal asking, among other things, for the IEC ¶s

applicants wrote to the tribunal asking, among other things, for the IEC ¶s
presentation schedule, the deadline for the IEC ¶s written submissions and
evidence, and ³confirmation that we will have an opportunity to respond to any
evidence or submissions presented by the IEC´.

[10] Later that day, the IEC presented its case to the tribunal in a recorded Teams
meeting, in the applicants¶ absence. Its chairperson, Dr Mpya, addressed each
allegation. He referred to a six-page credentialing report and other evidence,
which he undertook to submit after the hearing. The tribunal chairperson asked
him to submit ³the presentation as well as all the evidence that you have shared
and any additional ones that you could not present´. Dr Mpya himself asked for
a right of reply to any new evidence from the complainants, observing that ³it may
not look nice if there¶s a ruling on the basis of something that we¶ve never had
an opportunity to answer to´. The chairperson assured the IEC that any additional
material implicating it ³will also be shared with [the IEC] so that you can respond
before the tribunal makes a final and binding decision ´. The applicants were
given until the end of 9 July to submit their evidence. It did not submit any
evidence.
[11] The IET delivered its ruling the next day, 10 July 2026. It dismissed the dispute,
confirmed the results as valid and binding, and directed that the elected office
bearers continue in office. It recorded that it had considered the objection
documents, the governing instruments, and ³the submissions made by the
Applicants and the Respondent´. The ruling was signed by the chairperson, Prof
Mudau, with Dr Twabu, Mr Matsoso and Ms Mhluzi concurring. It is common
cause that Dr Twabu, Mr Matsoso and Ms Mhluzi attended the National Congress
as observers.
[12] It is not disputed that the applicants were never furnished with the IEC ¶s
presentation, its credentialing report, or any of the material the IEC submitted
after the hearing, and were never invited to reply to it.
[13] On 12 July 2026 the applicants wrote to the University Council asking it to
intervene. They received no substantive response. On 31 July 2026 they
launched two applications: this review (case 2026 -184797), set down for 6

launched two applications: this review (case 2026 -184797), set down for 6
October 2026, and an urgent application for interim relief pending the review
(case 2026-185133), set down for 11 August 2026. On 21 August 2026. Nel AJ
dismissed the interim application, ordering that ³the Gauteng Division of the High
Court (Johannesburg) does not have jurisdiction to determine the Application´.

The applicants requested reasons. None had been furnished when this matter
was argued.
[14] In the review, the respondents filed the Rule 53 record on 21 August 2026. The
applicants filed an amended notice of motion and a supplementary affidavit on
31 August 2026. The respondents answered on 30 September 2026, the
applicants replied on 1 October 2026, and both sides filed heads of argument.
The matter was fully argued on 7 October 2026.
[15] As amended, the notice of motion seeks:
(1) urgent enrolment under Rule 6(12);
(2) the review and setting aside of the National Congress elections under section
6 of PAJA, alternatively the principle of legality;
(3) a declaration that the IET¶s ruling of 10 July 2026 is inconsistent with section
33(1) of the Constitution and unlawful and invalid;
(4) a declarator that vacancies may only be filled after candidates are elected by
the National Congress;
(5) an order directing the IEC and Unisa to reconvene the National Congress
within 90 days;
(6) an interim SRC pending the rerun; and (7)±(8) costs.
JURISDICTION
[16] The respondents contend that, by Government Notice 7648 of 2 July 2026 (GG
54935), this local seat ceased with effect from 1 July 2026 to have concurrent
jurisdiction with the main seat in Pretoria. They submit that the relevant
administrative action is the IET¶s ruling, which was taken in Pretoria, where the
administrator is based and where its adverse effects are felt. Relying on Thermo
Radiant Oven Sales (Pty) Ltd v Nelspruit Bakeries (Pty) Ltd 1and Doctors for Life
International v Speaker of the National Assembly,2 they argue that jurisdiction is
1 1969 (2) SA 295 (A) at 310D-E 2 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) at para 57

determined when proceedings are instituted, so that the later order in Pretoria
Society of Advocates v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development,3 on
which the applicants rely, cannot assist them.
[17] I accept the respondents¶ premise that jurisdiction is determined as at the date
on which proceedings are instituted, namely on 31 July 2026. That does not end
the enquiry. The question is what the legal position was on that date, and the
answer depends on the effect of the order of 28 September 2026. That order,
whose existence and terms are not disputed, reviewed and set aside GN 7648,
and directed that the historical areas of jurisdiction of the main seat and the local
seat of this Division continue to apply.
[18] The respondents submit that the order is not retrospective and that, absent a
fresh notice by the Minister, it does not restore the previous areas of jurisdiction.
I do not agree.
[19] An invalid administrative act exists in fact, and may have legal consequences,
until it is set aside by a court. 4It would therefore not be accurate to treat GN 7648
as pro non scripto from the outset for all purposes; until 28 September 2026 it
had to be treated as valid, and parties and courts were obliged to act on it. Once
it is set aside, however, the setting aside ordinarily operates retrospectively.
[20] Invalidity is objective; a court's declaration describes a pre-existing state of affairs
rather than creating it.5 The corrective principle requires that the consequences
of invalidity be reversed where they can no longer be prevented. 6 Acts that
depend for their validity on the invalid act fall with it, ³irrespective of whether those
acts were performed before or after the court order ´.7 A court may limit the
retrospective effect of its order under section 172(1)(b)(i) of the Constitution or
section 8(1) of PAJA. But it must do so in its order. Absent such a limitation, act
that is set aside is treated as never having had legal effect.

that is set aside is treated as never having had legal effect.
3 case 2026-217318, order of 28 September 2026 4 (Oudekraal para 26; MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd 2014 (3) SA 481
(CC) paras 101±106)
5 Ferreira v Levin NO 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC) at paras 27-28 6 AllPay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social
Security Agency (No 2) 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC) at para 30 7 Seale v Van Rooyen NO 2008 (4) SA 43 (SCA) at paras 13-14

[21] Three features of the order of 28 September 2026 are decisive. First, it contains
no limitation of its retrospective effect. On the contrary, paragraph 2 directs that
the historical areas of jurisdiction ³continue´ to apply. That is the language of
continuity, which presupposes that those areas were never validly displaced.
[22] Second, the submission that only the Minister may determine areas of
jurisdiction misconceives the effect of the order; the court did not determine new
areas- GN 7648 itself withdrew Government Notice 408 of 29 March 2018, which
had determined the areas of the Gauteng Division and its seats (paragraph 1(b)
of GN 7648). That withdrawal depended for its effect on GN 7648. When GN
7648 was set aside, the withdrawal fell with it, and the Minister¶s own earlier
determination applies again. No fresh notice is required for that determination to
operate.
[23] Third, Thermo Radiant does not assist the respondents: It fixes the date at which
jurisdiction is assessed; it does not prescribe the law applicable on that date. The
rule protects a litigant against losing jurisdiction because of later events; it does
not require a court to give effect to a notice that a competent court has since set
aside without limiting the retrospective effect of its order.
[24] It follows that, as at 31 July 2026, this division of the Gauteng Division had its
historical areas of jurisdiction, including its concurrent jurisdiction. The
respondents do not dispute that, on that footing, the matter falls within this court¶s
jurisdiction as Kopanong, in Ekurhuleni, and the applicants¶ addresses are within
its historical area. This conclusion does not conflict with the order of Nel AJ. On
21 August 2026 GN 7648 had not been set aside, and the court was bound to
give effect to it.8 That order stands in its own case. My finding concerns a different
application and the legal position as it has since been clarified.

application and the legal position as it has since been clarified.
[25] Even if the order of 28 September 2026 had no retrospective effect, I would reach
the same conclusion on an independent ground. GN 7648 is said to have
removed this seat¶s concurrent jurisdiction over the main seat¶s area. It did not
remove this court¶s jurisdiction over causes connected with its own area. Section
1 of PAJA defines ³court´ to include a High Court within whose area the party
8Oudekraal at para 26

whose rights have been affected is domiciled or ordinarily resident, or the
adverse effect of the administrative action was, is or will be experienced. The
connecting factors are alternatives. The first applicant¶s regional office is at 54
De Korte Street, Braamfontein, and the second applicant's headquarters at 71
Ashwold Road, Saxonwold, both in Johannesburg; those averments are not
contradicted, and it is there that the ruling ¶s adverse effect on them is
experienced. The National Congress whose results the IET confirmed took place
in Ekurhuleni.
[26] The submission that the ruling was ³taken in Pretoria´ is in any event thin: the
IEC¶s hearing was conducted on Microsoft Teams, and the respondents do not
say where the tribunal members were when they deliberated or signed. I am
accordingly satisfied, on both grounds, that this court had jurisdiction when the
application was instituted.
RES JUDICATA
[27] The respondents contend that the question of jurisdiction was finally decided
between the same parties by Nel AJ on 21 August 2026, and that prayer 6
repeats prayer 3 of the dismissed interim application. They rely on National
Sorghum Breweries Ltd (t/a Vivo African Breweries) v International Liquor
Distributors (Pty) Ltd.9
[28] The plea of res judicata requires a prior final judgment between the same parties,
concerning the same cause of action and the same relief. Those requirements
are not met. Nel AJ decided a different application, under a different case
number, for different relief: an interim interdict and an interim caretaker
committee pending this review. The order is expressly confined to ³the
Application´ before that court. The present application is a final review of the IET
ruling. An order declining jurisdiction to grant interim relief is not a judgment on
the merits of the review.
[29] Insofar as the respondents' argument is really one of issue estoppel, the courts
apply that doctrine flexibly and case by case, and will not apply it where to do so

apply that doctrine flexibly and case by case, and will not apply it where to do so
9 2001 (2) SA 232 (SCA) at para 2

would cause unfairness.10 Two considerations weigh decisively against its
application here. First, no reasons have been given for the order of 21 August
2026, despite a timeous request. This court cannot know on which connecting
factor, if any, Nel AJ¶s conclusion rested, or whether the PAJA domicile factor
was argued. Issue estoppel cannot attach to an issue whose basis cannot be
identified. Second, GN 7648, the only basis on which a want of jurisdiction could
have rested, has since been set aside with retrospective effect. To shut the
applicants out of any court on the strength of an unreasoned interlocutory order
would be unjust.
[30] As for prayer 6, I decline it on the merits below and thus it is unnecessary to
decide whether it is barred as alleged by the respondents.
[31] Accordingly, the plea of res judicata is dismissed.
URGENCY AND THE RULE 53 OBJECTION
[32] The respondents submit that a review is by its nature unsuited to the urgent roll,
that Rule 53 prescribes its own timetable, and that Rule 6(5)(f) required the
applicants to obtain a date from the Registrar before setting the matter down.
They say the applicants, having failed to obtain interim relief, must now prosecute
the review in the ordinary course.
[33] I do not agree that a review can never be heard urgently. Rule 53(7) applies Rule
6, including Rule 6(12), to the set-down of review proceedings. The respondents¶
own heads accept that Rule 6(12) may apply where the impact of a public body¶s
decision requires urgent handling. Whether a review should be heard urgently is
a matter for the court¶s discretion on the facts. There is no rule that an applicant
who seeks interim relief, and fails, forfeits the right to ask that the main review
be expedited. Still less does that follow where the interim application failed on a
jurisdictional ground that was never explained.
[34] The purpose of Rule 53 is to ensure that the applicant, the respondent and the

[34] The purpose of Rule 53 is to ensure that the applicant, the respondent and the
court have the full record of the decision under review. That purpose has been
10 Smith v Porritt 2008 (6) SA 303 (SCA) para 10

achieved. The record was filed on 21 August 2026. 11 The applicants
supplemented their papers and amended their notice of motion with the benefit
of it.
[35] The respondents were entitled to complain about the truncation, and did so by
letter. The respondents filed a comprehensive answering affidavit with annexures
and a confirmatory affidavit from the IET chairperson. Both sides filed heads of
argument, and the respondents were represented by senior and junior counsel.
The respondents point to no fact they were unable to place before the court, and
no argument they were unable to make, because of the truncated time periods.
[36] The measure of an applicant¶s departure from the rules must be matched to the
degree of urgency. 12Here the departure was moderate. The application was
issued on 31 July 2026 for hearing on 6 October 2026, more than two months
later, precisely to allow the record to be produced. That is not an abuse of the
urgent roll. The Rule 6(5)(f) objection is part of the same complaint. Where a
matter is properly brought under Rule 6(12), the applicant may set it down on a
date of its choosing, subject to the court¶s control.
[37] The test for urgency is whether the applicants have set out explicitly the
circumstances which render the matter urgent, and why they cannot be afforded
substantial redress at a hearing in due course.13
[38] The IET ruled on 10 July 2026. The applicants brought the current application on
31 July 2026 and themselves selected a hearing date of 6 October 2026, more
than nine weeks later. A litigant able to wait nine weeks can apply for a
preferential date on the opposed role. The applicants did not explain why that
course was unavailable. Instead they enrolled the matter on the urgent role and
truncated the respondent time for answering under Rule 53(5)(b).
[39] I therefore find that the applicants have not established urgency justifying the
truncation of the Rule 53 time periods.

truncation of the Rule 53 time periods.
11 Jockey Club of South Africa v Forbes 1993 (1) SA 649 (A) at 660E-G 12 Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin 1977 (4) SA 135 (W) at 137F-138A 13 Rule 6(12)(b); East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZAGPJHC 196
at paras 6-9

[40] This finding does not, in my view, require that the matter be struck from the roll:
Striking a matter for want of urgency is the usual consequence; but it is not
automatic; the court contains a discretion.
[41] In applying it, I have had regard to the fact that by the time the matter was heard
by me, the Rule 53 record had been filed, the applicants had supplemented their
case, the respondents had answered fully with the assistance of senior and junior
counsel, replying papers and heads of argument had been delivered, and the
matter was argued in full. Striking it from the roll now would achieve nothing but
delay and duplicated costs. The same papers would be re-enrolled, and another
court would decide the same issues on the same record months later. In those
circumstances, the interests of justice favour deciding the matter now, provided
the applicants show a real basis for expedition. In my view they do, for the
reasons that follow.
[42] The respondents argue that the only reason advanced is the two-year term of
office, that the ordinary roll does not take two years, and that if the applicants
succeed in due course, a fresh election will give the new office bearers a full two-
year term, so the applicants suffer no prejudice.
[43] The last argument cannot be correct as the applicants¶ complaint is not only
about the term of the successful candidates; it is that the student body of a public
university is presently governed by a national executive whose election was
confirmed in a procedurally unfair process, and that the applicants were denied
a fair hearing of their dispute. Every month in which that state of affairs continues
is a month of a two-year term that cannot be recovered. The NSRC exercises
representative functions on university structures on behalf of all students now.
The prejudice is therefore not merely that of the applicants¶ candidates; it is that
of a student electorate whose representatives¶ mandate is in genuine doubt.

of a student electorate whose representatives¶ mandate is in genuine doubt.
[44] Nor is it an answer that the ordinary opposed roll does not take two years. On
the respondents¶ own approach, the review would only be enrolled after the full
Rule 53 timetable and an allocation by the Registrar, followed by the delay
inherent in judgment and any appeal. A remitted rehearing before the IET would
then follow. By that stage a substantial part of the term would have run, and any

relief would be of diminishing practical value. Election disputes are, by their
nature, matters in which delay is itself a form of denial of relief.
[45] I do not accept the respondents¶ contention that the matter cannot be urgent
because the interim application was dismissed. Nel AJ ¶s order rests on
jurisdiction, not on a finding that the matter lacked urgency. The order says
nothing about urgency, and no reasons have been given.
[46] The respondent have not suffered any prejudice. First, they sought and were
granted an extension of the truncated periods afforded to it, and then delivered
their affidavit 12 days after it expired. Second, they have answered every ground
of review fully and have not said it that they needed still more time in order to do
so.
THE MERITS
[47] The respondents contend that the election is not ³administrative action´ under
section 1 of PAJA, that the dispute was referred to the IET, whose ruling is final
and binding under clause 11.5 of the Electoral Policy, and that the court¶s function
is to review the ruling, not to rehear the election dispute. I agree with the last two
propositions.
[48] The parties chose, and the university¶s rules prescribe, a dedicated forum for
election disputes. The applicants invoked it. The IET¶s ruling, once given, exists
in fact and has legal consequences until set aside by a court.14 The proper object
of review is therefore the IET¶s ruling. The conduct of the election is relevant as
the subject matter of that ruling, but it is not for this court, on contested affidavits,
to decide afresh whether the election was free and fair. That would usurp the
function the Electoral Policy gives the IET.
[49] Unisa is a public higher education institution established under the Higher
Education Act 101 of 1997. The Electoral Policy and SRC Constitution are
Council-approved instruments. The IET exercises a public power, under those
instruments, to decide disputes about who will represent the university¶s students

instruments, to decide disputes about who will represent the university¶s students
on its governance structures, and its ruling is final and binding. Its decision
14 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 (6) SA 222 (SCA) at para 26

adversely affects the rights of the student formations that participated, and has
direct external legal effect. In my view, it is administrative action under PAJA.15
Even if it were not, the principle of legality would apply to the exercise of that
public power. The respondents did not seriously contend otherwise. Their point
is that the grounds pleaded do not engage PAJA, a matter I deal with below.
[50] The respondents further submit that prayer 3 seeks only a declaration of
inconsistency, not an order setting the ruling aside. That is too formalistic; prayer
3 asks the court to declare the ruling ³LQFRQVLVWHQWn ZLWKn VHFWLRQn h3«n DQGn
therefore unlawful and invalid´. Under section 172(1)(a) of the Constitution, a
court deciding a constitutional matter must declare conduct inconsistent with the
Constitution invalid to the extent of its inconsistency. Section 8(1) of PAJA, and
section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, then empower the court to make any order
that is just and equitable, including setting aside and remittal. The respondents
knew exactly what case they had to meet: their answering affidavit and heads
deal fully with the alleged procedural unfairness and with remittal as the ordinary
remedy. No prejudice arises from treating prayer 3 as a challenge to the validity
of the ruling, and I do so.
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: THE DENIAL OF A RIGHT OF REPLY
[51] This is the decisive ground. Section 3(1) of PAJA requires administrative action
that materially and adversely affects rights or legitimate expectations to be
procedurally fair. Section 3(2)(b) sets out the minimum content of fairness, which
includes a reasonable opportunity to make representations. Section 3(3), on
which the respondents rely, makes some further elements discretionary,
including the opportunity ³to present and dispute information and arguments´ and
to appear in person. But it does not dilute the mandatory requirement of a
reasonable opportunity to make representations under section 3(2)(b).

reasonable opportunity to make representations under section 3(2)(b).
[52] A reasonable opportunity to make representations means an opportunity to deal
with the case against one. This requires knowing what material the decision-
maker will rely on, at least in substance. This is the core of the audi alteram
15 see Calibre Clinical Consultants (Pty) Ltd v National Bargaining Council for the Road Freight
Industry 2010 (5) SA 457 (SCA) at paras 38-42 on the exercise of public power by bodies created
under private-law instruments

partem principle. In Administrator, Transvaal v Zenzile16 the court described the
right to be heard as a fundamental principle of fairness. In Joseph v City of
Johannesburg,17 the Constitutional Court explained that procedural fairness is
concerned with giving people an opportunity to participate in decisions that affect
them and to influence the outcome; a party cannot influence the outcome by
answering a case it has never seen.
[53] The respondents¶ answer rests on clause 11.4 of the Electoral Policy, which
permits the IET to determine its own procedure, and on Prof Mudau¶s evidence
that the IET heard the parties separately to keep order, that ³no request for a
right of reply was made by the Applicants during the proceedings´, and that under
the procedure adopted ³there was no expectation that either party would be
afforded an opportunity to respond to submissions made in their absence´.
[54] I accept that the IET may determine its own procedure, and that hearing parties
separately may be a sensible way to manage hostile situations. A power to
determine procedure, however, is a power to determine a fair procedure. It must
be exercised consistently with section 3 of PAJA and section 33 of the
Constitution. Hearing parties separately is not in itself unfair; what makes it unfair
is hearing them separately and then not disclosing to one side the substance of
what the other said and produced, before deciding against it.
[55] Three matters, in my view, are conclusive. First, Prof Mudau¶s statement that no
request for a right of reply was made is contradicted by the record the
respondents themselves filed. On 9 July 2026 the applicants wrote to the tribunal
asking whether they would ³be afforded an opportunity to respond to the IEC¶s
submissions before the Tribunal reaches its final determination´, and expressly
requesting ³confirmation that we will have a reasonable opportunity to respond
to any evidence or submissions presented by the IEC´. There is no indication

to any evidence or submissions presented by the IEC´. There is no indication
that the tribunal answered.
16 1991 (1) SA 21 (A) at 37C-F 17 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) at paras 42-47

[56] The respondents¶ version on this point is, to that extent, untenable on the papers
and can be rejected under the Plascon-Evans rule. 18Nor can the applicants be
said to have waived the right: they asserted it in writing before the IEC was heard.
[57] Second, the procedure was not applied even-handedly. When the IEC asked for
a right of reply to any new material from the complainants, recognising that ³it
may not look nice if there¶s a ruling on the basis of something that we¶ve never
had an opportunity to answer to´, the tribunal chairperson assured it that any
such material ³will also be shared with [the IEC] so that you can respond before
the tribunal makes a final and binding decision´. The applicants asked for the
same assurance in writing and received nothing. Prof Mudau¶s statement that
there was ³no expectation that either party would be afforded an opportunity to
respond´ is irreconcilable with the assurance the tribunal gave the IEC on the
record.
[58] Third, the IEC¶s undisclosed material was not peripheral; it was central to the
ruling. The IEC presented a detailed answer to each allegation and undertook to
submit, after the hearing, its presentation, a six-page credentialing report and
other evidence, which the tribunal asked for so that it could deliberate. The ruling,
delivered the next day, relies on the IEC¶s version on the critical issues. On the
secret ballot, it found that ³the evidence before the Tribunal indicates that the
Presiding Officer warned delegates against such conduct´ (paragraph 38). The
only source of that evidence is Dr Mpya¶s own presentation.
[59] On credentials and observers, the ruling adopts the IEC¶s account of seating,
accreditation and the absence of objections (paragraphs 10, 32-36, and 46). The
applicants had no opportunity to dispute any of it.
[60] The unfairness is underscored by the content of the IEC¶s presentation. On the
central complaint of ballot secrecy, Dr Mpya told the tribunal that ³everyone can

central complaint of ballot secrecy, Dr Mpya told the tribunal that ³everyone can
have their mobile phone at any time, including in the voting booth´. In this court,
he says on oath that ³no student was permitted to enter or vote in the voting
booth with a cell phone´.
18 Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 1984 (3) SA 623 (A) at 634E-635C

[61] I need not, and do not, decide which version is correct. The point is that the
applicants, had they seen the IEC¶s case, might well have exploited such matters
before the tribunal. The presentation also proceeded on the basis that the margin
in every contested portfolio was large enough that isolated irregularities could
not have affected the result. The EISA report records margins of 46 to 44 in a
90-member electorate for both the President and Deputy President. A reply on
materiality could have made a difference.
[62] The respondents submit that the applicants were themselves given until the end
of 9 July to produce evidence and did not do so. That is a matter going to the
weight of the applicants¶ case before the tribunal, not to whether the tribunal was
obliged to let them meet the IEC¶s case. A party¶s failure to support its own
allegations does not entitle the decision-maker to decide against it on material
the party has never seen. In any event, the applicants¶ letter of 9 July 2026 made
clear that they wished to finalise and formally submit their evidence once the
tribunal had clarified the issues and procedure, which it never did.
[63] It is no answer that the result might have been the same. Where a fundamental
requirement of fairness is breached, the court will not ordinarily speculate
whether the outcome would have been different; the breach itself vitiates the
decision, save perhaps where the result is truly a foregone conclusion. That is
plainly not this case. The tribunal itself recommended that the IEC strengthen
³ballot secrecy awareness; observer management; credential record-keeping;
and formal recording of objections´ (paragraph 65), the very matters in dispute.
[64] I conclude that the IET failed to afford the applicants a reasonable opportunity to
make representations, as required by section 3(2)(b) of PAJA, and that its ruling
is reviewable under section 6(2)(c) as procedurally unfair. It is likewise

is reviewable under section 6(2)(c) as procedurally unfair. It is likewise
inconsistent with section 33(1) of the Constitution. The ruling must be set aside.
REASONABLE APPREHENSION OF BIAS
[65] The applicants contend that three of the four tribunal members observed the
National Congress and then sat in judgment on it. The respondents answer that
bias is a section 6(2)(a)(iii) ground, not section 6(2)(c); that mere presence as an
observer does not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias under the test

in President of the Republic of South Africa v South African Rugby Football
Union;19 and that the applicants knew of the members¶ attendance and did not
seek their recusal, so that they may not raise it now.20
[66] The mislabelling of the PAJA ground is not fatal; the facts were fully pleaded and
answered. On the substance, there is force in the respondents¶ waiver point. A
party aware of facts said to found an apprehension of bias should ordinarily raise
them at the first opportunity. I also accept that attendance as an observer does
not, without more, establish bias. Members who witnessed disputed events,
however, may be drawn into relying on their own impressions of contested facts,
impressions that the parties have no means of testing. That risk is heightened
where, as here, the tribunal decided against one party without disclosing the
material on which it relied.
[67] ,” WKXV” FRQFOXGH” WKDW” WKH” ,(7¶V” UXOLQJ” ZDV” SURFHGXUDOO\” XQIDLU” DQG” PXVW” EH” VHW”
aside, and that the just and equitable remedy is to remit the dispute for rehearing
by a newly constituted tribunal, before which the applicants will be furnished with
WKH”,(&¶V”case and afforded the opportunity to make representations in reply. I
decline to determine the validity of the election myself, and I decline the
remaining relief.
[68] ,Q” WKH” DSSOLFDQWV¶” KHDGV” RI” DUJXPHQW and in parts of its papers, it refers
interchangeably to the IEC and the IET. The two bodies are distinct: The IEC is
the electoral management body that ran the election (clause 5.1 of the Electoral
Policy for a Student Representative Council, the Electoral Policy). The IET is the
body that hears election disputes (clauses 11 and 12). The Electoral Policy, as
WKH”DSSOLFDQWV¶”RZQ”GLVSXWH”UHFRUGVd”GRHV”QRW”SHUPLW”WKH”,(&”WR”UHVROYH”IRUPDO”
election disputes itself. Any rehearing of the objection must therefore take place
before the IET, and the order is framed accordingly.

before the IET, and the order is framed accordingly.
[69] Because the ruling falls to be set aside on the ground of procedural unfairness,
it is unnecessary to decide whether a reasonable apprehension of bias is
19 1999 (4) SA 147 (CC) at para 48 20 Bernert v Absa Bank Ltd 2011 (3) SA 92 (CC) at para 69

established. The members¶ attendance is, however, relevant to the remedy, to
which I turn below.
THE REMAINING GROUNDS
[70] The applicants ask the court to set aside the Congress elections itself, order a
re-run within 90 days, declare how vacancies may be filled, and establish an
interim SRC.
[71] The applicants contend that the IET erred in law in holding that the election of
fewer than nine office bearers does not invalidate the results (section 6(2)(d));
that it ignored the evidence of ballot photography (section 6(2)(e)(iii)); and, in the
supplementary affidavit, that credentials were never adopted by the Congress,
that the Treasurer-General portfolio was wrongly treated as uncontested, and
that vacant portfolios could not lawfully be filled by deployment by email under
clause 9.2.2 of the SRC Constitution.
[72] I decline to grant the relief sought for the following reasons:
[73] First, the policy designate the IET as the body that resolves election disputes,
DQG”LW¶V”ruling is final and binding. Having set aside the IET¶s ruling for procedural
and fairness, the proper course is to return the dispute to that forum to be decided
fairly. It is not for the court to decide at first instance on contested facts. The relief
is final, and on the respondent papers the respondent version must prevail where
facts are disputed (Plascon Evans).
[74] On the respondentV¶ version, delegates were not permitted to take phones into
the booths, the Congress was paused and delegates warned when a concern
was raised, delegates were accredited, and no valid contested nomination for
WKH” GLVSXWHG” SRUWIROLR” ZDV” DSSURYHGa” 7KH” DSSOLFDQW¶V” RZQ” DFFRXQW” RI” WKDW”
nomination is inconsistent: Before the IET they said it concerned the Secretary -
General; before this court it says the Treasurer- General. On the record before

me, I cannot find the Congress materially irregular, and should not substitute my
own decision for the I(7¶Va21
[75] Second, the failure to fill all nine portfolios does not provide a proper ground of
review. The applicants contend that the Congress failed because fewer than five
portfolios were filled. The Policy does not support this view: Paragraph 9.2 of the
PROLF\”SUHVFULEHG”HOHFWLRQ”³by a simple majority vote´,”WKDW”LV”D”YRWLQJ”WKUHVKROGd”
not a minimum number of portfolios. Clause 3.1.6 of the SRC Constitution
provides that the withdrawal of an organisation does not prevent the Congress
from being legally constituted. The applicants withdrew of their own accord.
[76] Third, there is no basis for the declarator sought concerning the vacancies.
Whether paragraph 9.2.2 of the SRC Constitution permits the seats left unfilled
at the Congress to be occupied by alternatives is a genuine question of
interpretation. But it was not placed before the IE7a”7KH”SHUVRQ¶V”DSSRLQWHG”KDYH”
not been joined. The appointments are , in any event in interim, pending
regularisation at the first setting of the National Student Parliament. A declarator
in the abstract, affecting parties not before the court, would be inappropriate.
[77] Fourth, paragraph 14.1 of the Policy reserves to Council, in defined
circumstances, the power to constitute an interim SRC. The structure the
applicants propose would also displace the proportional allocation of seats. The
relief would usurp the function the institution¶s own rules assign to the Council
and not the court, and no case is made for the Court to interfere with this.
[78] Moreover, none the four elected office bearers and the alternates appointed are
joined to the current proceedings. This provides a further reason not to grant the
relief as they have a material interest i n the relief sought in the current
proceedings. The order I make does not disturb their positions; and they will be
entitled to notice of the rehearing.

entitled to notice of the rehearing.
[79] In any event, The complaints about credentials and vacancies were, on the
respondents¶ version, not part of the original dispute. Whether and to what extent
21 Trencon Construction (Pty) Ltd v Industrial development C Iorporation of SA Limited 2015 (5) SA 245
(CC)

the applicants may now raise them is for the tribunal to decide in the exercise of
its procedural discretion, fairly applied.
[80] Nothing in this judgment should be read as a finding that the election of 24 June
2026 was or was not free and fair, or that any of the alleged irregularities
occurred. Those are matters for the tribunal.
REMITTAL RATHER THAN SUBSTITUTION
[81] Under section 8(1)(c) of PAJA, having set aside administrative action, the court
may remit the matter for reconsideration, with or without directions. It may
substitute its own decision only in exceptional cases. In Trencon Construction
(Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd 22the
Constitutional Court held that remittal is the default position, and that substitution
requires that the court be in as good a position as the administrator to make the
decision, and that the decision be a foregone conclusion. Other relevant factors
include delay, bias or incompetence on the part of the administrator. The
overriding consideration is fairness to all concerned. The respondents accept
that remittal is the ordinary consequence of setting aside the ruling.
[82] Prayers 2 and 5, which ask the court to set aside the election itself and to order
a fresh National Congress within 90 days, would amount to substitution. They
would require this court to decide the electoral dispute on the merits, as the
tribunal of first instance. The conditions for that are absent. The facts about what
happened at Kopanong are seriously disputed on the papers, namely whether
phones were permitted in the booths, whether objections were raised, when and
why the applicants left, whether Mr Nkuna was nominated, and whether
credentials were properly verified. These disputes cannot be resolved on affidavit
in motion proceedings, least of all in favour of the applicants (Plascon-Evans,
above).
[83] Nor is the outcome a foregone conclusion. The Electoral Policy entrusts these

above).
[83] Nor is the outcome a foregone conclusion. The Electoral Policy entrusts these
questions to a specialised tribunal familiar with the university ¶s student
governance. Its ruling is final and binding precisely so that it can resolve such
22 2015 (5) SA 245 (CC) at paras 42-47

disputes quickly. The right course is to restore the applicants to the position they
should have been in, had they had a fair hearing before that tribunal.
[84] I note that the amended notice of motion does not contain a prayer for further or
alternative relief. But, the order I intend to make is narrower than and contained
within prayer three of the amended notice which seeks a declaration that the
IE7¶V”UXOLQJ”LV”XQODZIXO”DQG”LQYDOLGa”7KH”UHVSRQGHQW”DQVZHUHG”WKH”FRPSODLQW”LQ”
full and are not prejudiced.
[85] Courts have long recognised that remittal to a differently constituted body is
appropriate where the original decision-maker has shown bias, or where there
are grounds to fear that it will not bring an open mind to the matter.23
[86] I am of the view that a newly constituted tribunal is required, for three reasons:
First, the four members who decided the dispute have already expressed a firm
and reasoned conclusion on every issue; they would be asked to reconsider it in
light of a reply they declined to receive. However conscientious they may be, a
reasonable student body would doubt that the reconsideration was genuinely
open.
[87] Second, the chairperson has deposed in these proceedings to a version about
the applicants¶ request for a right of reply that the record contradicts. He has thus
become a partisan witness on a matter connected to the dispute.
[88] Third, three of the four members observed the National Congress. Even if their
attendance would not on its own have required recusal, their position as
witnesses to contested events makes them unsuitable to rehear a dispute in
which those events must now be fully contested. Fairness to all concerned,
including the fifth to seventh respondents whose positions depend on the
outcome, is best served by a panel whose impartiality is beyond reproach.
[89] The Electoral Policy, as I understand it, leaves the composition of the IET to the
university. The order will direct Unisa to constitute the tribunal afresh from

university. The order will direct Unisa to constitute the tribunal afresh from
persons who did not sit in the original hearing or attend the National Congress,
23 Livestock and Meat Industries Control Board v Garda 1961 (1) SA 342 (A) at 349G-H; Trencon at
para 47

and who are otherwise free of any association with the IEC or any of the
participating bodies.
DIRECTIONS FOR THE REHEARING
[90] The purpose of the remittal is to cure the unfairness found, not to prescribe how
the tribunal must decide. The directions are therefore confined to securing a fair
exchange of each side¶s case and a prompt decision. In particular:
a. The IEC must furnish the applicants with its full case as presented to the
IET: the presentation, the credentialing report, and every document and
item of evidence submitted to the IET after the hearing of 9 July 2026.
b. The applicants must be afforded the opportunity to make written
representations in reply and to submit evidence, including the material now
attached to their papers in this court. The IEC must then be afforded an
opportunity to respond to any new material.
c. The same must apply to the appointed four office bearers and the remaining
five office beares who were nominated to fill the alleged vacancies.
d. MKSM (the seventh respondent) was a co-complainant before the IET and
is entitled to participate on the same footing. The EFFYC (the fifth
respondent) and ULSA (the sixth respondent), whose office bearers¶
positions are at stake, must be notified and allowed to make
representations.
e. Whether to hear oral argument, and whether to hear the parties together or
separately, remains for the tribunal to decide. Whatever procedure it adopts
must ensure that each party knows, in substance, the case and material of
every other party, including the office bearers and the fifth to before the
tribunal decides.
f. The tribunal should determine the dispute expeditiously. I have set periods
that, in my view, allow a fair process without allowing the matter to drift.

[91] The results declared on 24 June 2026, and the NSRC constituted under them,
remain enforce pending the fresh ruling. The order I intend to make is to set aside
WKH”,(7¶V”GHFLVLRQ, not the election.
[92] The rehearing is confined to the dispute lodged on 26 th June 2026. Whether
further complaints, such as the filling of vacancies, may be entertained is for the
reconstituted tribunal to decide under the Policy.
THE POSITION PENDING THE REHEARING
[93] Setting aside the ruling does not, by itself, invalidate the results declared on 24
June 2026; those results were declared by the IEC, and their validity is the very
question that the tribunal must decide afresh. To leave the student body without
any national executive in the interim would be disruptive and contrary to the
interests of the students at large. The just and equitable course is that the office
bearers declared elected continue to hold office pending the determination of the
rehearing, without prejudice to the outcome. That order also answers prayer 6,
to which I now turn.
THE INTERIM SRC AND THE DECLARATOR SOUGHT
[94] Prayer 6 asks the court to direct Unisa to establish an interim SRC with one
member from each participating formation. I decline it. Chapter 12 of the SRC
Constitution reserves the power to constitute an interim SRC to the University
Council, acting through its Management Committee, on conditions the Council
determines. The court will not lightly take over a power the university ¶s own
instruments confer on Council, still less design the body ¶s composition itself.
Prayer 6 is also expressly premised on a re-run of the National Congress, which
I have declined to order. Given the order in paragraph [93], there is no leadership
vacuum to fill.
[95] Prayer 4 seeks a declarator that vacancies may only be filled after candidates
are elected by the National Congress. A declarator under section 21(1)(c) of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 is discretionary. I decline to exercise the

Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 is discretionary. I decline to exercise the
discretion in the applicants¶ favour now. The question is intertwined with the
issues that the newly constituted tribunal must decide.

[96] The interpretive question was not before the IET at all on the respondents ¶
version. The party whose email deployment is impugned, MKSM, has not been
heard on it. A declarator in these circumstances would pre-empt the tribunal and
could be granted without the benefit of all affected parties¶ views. The applicants
are free to raise the issue before the tribunal, and before a court thereafter if
necessary.
COSTS
[97] The applicants have succeeded on the central issue in the case, the procedural
unfairness of the IET's ruling, and on every preliminary point the respondents
raised: jurisdiction, res judicata, irregularity and urgency. Those points took up a
substantial part of the papers and argument. But the applicants failed on most of
the substantive relief they sought, and on the relief they pressed hardest: the
setting aside of the election, a rerun within 90 days, an interim SRC and the
declarator on vacancies (prayers 2, 4, 5 and 6). Much of WKH” DSSOLFDQW¶V
supplementary and replying affidavits, and of their heads, was devoted to the
substantive relief.
[98] Costs are in the court¶s discretion, and the order should reflect the divided
outcome. In my view the fair order is that each party bear their own costs.
[99] The respondents¶ request for punitive costs is not granted as there is no basis
for it. The matter before me was plainly not simply a rehash of the interim
application.
[100] Indeed, applicants accuse the respondents of misleading the court by presenting
this application as a rehash of the interim application. The two applications were
patently distinct. I am not persuaded that the respondents set out to mislead.
7KH\” SODFHG” WKH” LQWHULP” QRWLFH” RI” PRWLRQ” DQG” 1HO” J-¶V” RUGHU” EHIRUH” WKH” FRXUWd”
which allowed the true position to be seen.
[101] I thus make no adverse finding against either side on this score.

[102] The applicants¶ request that costs ³include travelling expenses´ is now
academic. In any event, reasonable disbursements are recoverable on taxation
in the ordinary way.

ORDER
[103] In the result, I make the following order:
1. The application is heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12) of the
Uniform Rules of Court, and the applicants¶ non-compliance with the
forms, time periods and service provided for in the Rules is condoned.
2. The first to fourth respondents¶ points in limine of lack of jurisdiction, res
judicata and irregular proceedings are dismissed.
3. The ruling of the Independent Election Tribunal of Unisa (the second
respondent) dated 10 July 2026 under case number IET -
ANCYL/SASCO/MKSM-IEC/2026 is declared inconsistent with section
33(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and with
section 3 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000, and
is reviewed and set aside.
4. The electoral dispute lodged by the applicants and the seventh
respondent on 26 June 2026 is remitted to the second respondent for
rehearing and determination afresh by a newly constituted tribunal, on
the following terms:
4.1 Within 10 (ten) days of this order, the third respondent shall
constitute the tribunal for the purposes of the rehearing from
persons who (a) did not sit in the hearing of 9 July 2026 or sign
the ruling of 10 July 2026, (b) did not attend the National
Congress of 24 June 2026 in any capacity, and (c) are not
members or office bearers of the first respondent or of any student
organisation that participated in that National Congress. The third
respondent shall notify all parties in writing of the tribunal ¶s
composition.

4.2 Within 5 (five) days of the tribunal being constituted, the first
respondent shall deliver to the applicants and to the fifth, sixth and
seventh respondents copies of its written or electronic
presentation to the second respondent of 9 July 2026, its
credentialing report, and every other document, report, recording
or item of evidence it submitted to the second respondent in
connection with the dispute.
4.3 Within 10 (ten) days of receipt of the documents referred to in
paragraph 4.2, the applicants (and the seventh respondent,
should it elect to participate) may deliver to the tribunal and all
other parties written representations in reply, together with any
further evidence on which they rely, including the photographs
and confirmatory affidavits annexed to their papers in this
application.
4.4 Within 5 (five) days of receipt of the representations referred to in
paragraph 4.3, the first respondent, and the fifth and sixth
respondents should they elect to participate, may deliver written
representations in response to any new material.
4.5 The second respondent shall give written notice of the re-hearing
to the fifth to seventh respondents and to every person elected or
appointed to the NSRC since 24 June 2026, each of who is
entitled to make representations.
4.6 The tribunal may determine its own further procedure, including
whether to hear oral representations and whether to hear the
parties together or separately. It shall ensure that each party is
informed of the substance of all submissions and evidence placed
before it by any other party, and is afforded a reasonable
opportunity to respond, before it makes its determination.
4.7 Each party to the dispute shall be informed of, and afforded an
opportunity to answer, any material on which the tribunal
proposes to rely.

4.8 The tribunal shall deliver a written, reasoned ruling within 15
(fifteen) days of the last date on which representations may be
delivered under paragraph 4.4, or within such further period as
the parties may agree in writing.
4.9 The periods in this paragraph are court days. They may be
extended by written agreement of the parties or, failing
agreement, by order of this court on application.
5. Pending the determination of the rehearing in terms of paragraph 4, the
persons declared elected as office bearers of the National Student
Representative Council on 24 June 2026 shall continue to hold office.
This paragraph shall not be construed as a dete rmination of the validity
of the election or of any appointment made after it.
6. Prayers 2, 4, 5 and 6 of the amended notice of motion are dismissed.
7. Each party shall bear their own costs.

WENTZEL-THOMPSON J
Judge of the High Court
Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg
Appearances:
For the applicants: Mr J C Sambo (attorney with right of appearance),
instructed by J.C Sambo Attorneys Inc, c/o
Ramalivha Attorneys
For the first to fourth
respondents:
Adv F J Nalane SC with Adv V Sihawu, instructed by
Motalane Inc, c/o Thubakgale Attorneys Inc
For the fifth to seventh
respondents:
No appearance