Lombardy Home Owners Association NPC ta Lombardy Home Owners Association v Malebye and Another (2025/090421) [2026] ZAGPJHC 1254 (30 October 2026)

45 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Property Law — Homeowners' Association — Arrears in levies — Applicant seeking relief for unpaid levies and related charges from respondents, who admitted liability but contested the imposition of penalties — Court finding that the applicant's claims included duplicated interest and legal fees not properly substantiated — Relief granted only for amounts due without duplication.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this
document in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG


Case Number: 2025-090421






In the matter between:

LOMBARDY HOME OWNER’S ASSOCIATION N PC
T/A LOMBARDY HOME OWNER’S ASSOCIATION

Applicant


and


RAYMOND MALEBYE

First Respondent

HELLEN ELENKIE MALEBYE Second Respondent



_________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT
_________________________________________________________________
LINDEQUE, AJ
(1) REPORTABLE: No
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: No
(3) REVISED: Yes

30 October 2026
Signature Date

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[1] The applicant is the LOMBARDY HOME OWNER’S ASSOCIATION NPC
(LHOA), a non -profit company registered in terms of section 13 of the
Companies Act 1 (Companies Act) and governed by its M emorandum of
Incorporation (MOI), conduct rules, regulations and by-laws.
[2] The respondents are a married couple, who are the joint registered
owners of Portion 71 of Erf 1[ …], Paradiso, Lombardy Home owner’s
Association, Fountains 07 1, Via Firenze, Paradiso, Pretoria East (the
property), situated within the LHOA.
[3] It is common cause that the respondents are members of the applicant
and bound by the provisions of its MOI. The LHOA contends that the
respondents are in arrears in respect of levies, consumption charges and
ancillary amounts due to the LHOA.
[4] As a result of the alleged indebtedness, the LHOA seeks the following
relief against the respondents:
4.1 CLAIM A
4.1.1 Authorising the LHOA to terminate the supply of
electricity to the property ;
4.1.2 Authorising the sheriff to grant an electrician, appointed
by the LHOA, access to the property in order for the
electricity supply to the premises to be terminated; and
4.1.3 Prohibiting the respondents from tampering with any
installation or removal by an electrician or reconnecting
the power supply to the property.
4.2 CLAIM B

1 71 of 2008.

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4.2.1 Authorising the LHOA to limit the water supply to the
property to the amount of 6000 litres per month and
installing a prepaid water meter in the property unless
and/or until the respondents make payment of the full
arrear amount due and owing to the LHOA;
4.2.2 Authorising the sheriff to grant a contractor, appointed
by the LHOA, access to the property in order to limit
the water supply and install the prepaid water meter;
and
4.2.3 Prohibiting the respondents from tampering with the
installation or reconnecting an unlimited water supply
to the property.
4.3 CLAIM C
4.3.1 Pertaining to the respondents’ access to the
Association, to authorise the LHOA to disconnect the
respondents’ remote and/or tag access and/or
biometric access to the Association, until such a time
as the respondents have made full payment of the
arrear amounts due to the LHOA.
4.4 CLAIM D
4.4.1 Ordering the first and second respondents to pay jointly
and severally to the LHOA the amount of R 479 369.08
for unpaid levies, electricity, water consumption and
related monthly charges together with interest thereon
at the prime interest rate of plus 3% per annum,
compounded monthly in arrears.

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4.4.2 At the outset of the hearing, M r Smith, counsel on
behalf of the LHOA informed the court that the amount
claimed has to be reduced by R59 399.90 as a result of
a court order granted by Liebenberg, AJ on 23
September 2025, wherein inter alia the property was
declared specially executable and judgment was
granted against the respondents in the amount of
R59 399.90.
4.5 CLAIM E
4.5.1 That the respondents pay the costs of the application
on the attorney and client scale.
[5] The respondents contend that clause 4.11 of the MOI subjects members
to autocratic rule by the LHOA as it gives the right to the LHOA to impose
financial penalties and penalty levies on members who are in
contravention of the rules and or their obligations as members of the
LHOA, irrespective of whether those rules and or obligations are set out
in the MOI and or whether such obligations are imposed upon members
pursuant to a resolution successfully passed at a meeting of the LHOA.
[6] The respondents admit that they are liable to pay levies, consumption
charges and ancillary amounts , but “only to the extent that same are not
subject to unexplained financial and arbitrary financial penalties ”.
[7] The LHOA’s MOI adopted by the directors of the company in accordance
with section 13(1) of the Companies Act provides inter alia as follows:
“CLAUSE 4: POWERS OF THE ASSOCIATION
4.1 The Company has all of the legal powers and capacity of an
individual for purposes of carrying out its object, except to the

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extent that a juristic person is incapable of exercising any such
power or having any such capacity …
4.5 Shall enter into agreements for the provision of any services with
any competent authority or any other third party, inter alia
including the provision of access to the Township, water,
electricity and sewerage services to the Association and where
required to supply such services to the various Members of the
Association.
4.9 The right to impose Levies upon the Members of the Association
for the purpose of meeting all the expenses that the Association
has incurred or to which the Directors reasonably anticipate the
Association will incur in the attainment of the objects of the
Association or the pursuit of its business.
4.10 The right to impose Rules and Obligations on Members and
Residents.
4.13 In general, do all such things and perform all such acts as may be
necessary or expedient to ensure that the Township is developed
and maintained in the interests of all Members thereby ensuring
that the Township will be and remain one of premier status.
CLAUSE 5: MEMBERSHIP OF THE ASSOCIATION
5.8 Every Member is obligated to comply with:
5.8.1 the provision of this Memorandum and any Rules or
Obligations passed by the Association in terms hereof;
5.8.2 any Agreement concluded by the Association insofar
as such Agreement may directly or indirectly impose
Obligations on a Member in its capacity as a Member;

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5.8.7 pay all or any levies, financial penalties, penalty levies,
special levies and other dues as contemplated in the
governing documents of the Association as well as
interest of arrears on the due date for payment thereof;
CLAUSE 6 : FINANCIAL AND LEVIES
6.1 The Board shall from time to time impose levies upon the
Members for the purposes of meeting all expenses which the
Association has incurred in addition, the Board shall at their own
discretion apply an annual interim levy increase up to 5% (five)
per cent at the beginning of every new year …
6.10 The annual Levies shall be payable in equal monthly instalments,
due in advance of the first day of each and every month.
6.12 Members shall be liable for and shall pay interest on any debt due
and payable to the Association (including but not limited to any
arrear Levies of whatsoever nature) , such interest to be
calculated monthly in advance at the Prime rate plus 3 (three per
cent) per year from the due date, to date of actual payment, both
days included.”
[8] The prime rate is defined in clause 1.1.31 of the MOI as “the prime
overdraft rate levied by the Company’s bankers from time to time.”
[9] On 27 March 2024 the LHOA adopted a Credit Control Policy Addendum
(hereinafter “CCPA”) to its credit control policy, which addendum was
initially approved at the Annual General Meeting of the LHOA held on 24
February 2024 by means of a special resolution with 92% of members
present voting in favour thereof.
[10] Clause 5 of the CCPA provides as follows:

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“5. RESTRICTION OF ACCESS TO THE HOA AND RESTRICTION OF
AMENITIES FOR DEFAULTERS”
5.1 The HOA is empowered to approach a competent Court for an
order to temporarily suspend or restrict certain privileges of
defaulters, or their Tenants;
5.2 Neither defaulters nor their Tenants can claim to enjoy to the
same privileges than compliant Members until he/she/they have
paid every levy contribution, financial levy, penalty levy, interest
on arrears, and/or any other debt which may be due and payable
to the Association from whatsoever cause arising;
5.3 The order reference d hereinabove may include inter alia the
following relief:
5.3.1 the defaulter’s electricity supply be disconnected;
5.3.2 the defaulter’s water supply may be limited;
5.3.3 the Defaulter’s remote and/or tag- access and/or
biometric access to the HOA may be temporarily
suspended;
5.4 Notwithstanding anything to the contrary hereinabove, the HOA may
seek such additional prayers for relief as the HOA deems fit; and
5.5 The costs of any such actions shall be recovered from the defaulter,
on an attorney and own client scale, as per the invoice rendered from the
HOA’s attorney, and the costs associated therewith will be loaded directly
to the defaulter’s levy statement as a contribution due and payable
immediately.”
[11] The respondents do not place the adoption of the CC PA in issue.

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Quantum of arrears
[12] The LHOA contends that at the date of preparing the application, the
respondents were indebted to the LHOA in the amount of R 1 403 789.63.
It attached the respondents’ latest levy statement to the founding affidavit
showing the aforesaid amount to have been due on 1 June 2025 as
annexure “FA7”.
[13] The LHOA also avers that it obtain ed two other judgments against the
respondents, namely a judgment in Tshwane Central Magistrate’s Court
for the amount of R 297 691.61 on 16 March 2020 and a judgment in this
court under another case number in the amount of R 626 728.94 on 4
June 2024.
[14] The LHOA then aver s that the judgment, obtained in this court on 4 June
2024, was for amounts due and owing to it as on 1 February 2025, less
the first judgment amount obtained on 13 March 2020 and that it is vital to
highlight that this application is premised upon amounts due and owing to
the applicant from 1 February 2025 to date of the affidavit.
[15] Annexure “FA7”, the copy of the respondents’ latest levy statement starts
on 1 January 2024 and includes a multitude of items such as charges for
electricity, water, sanitation, levies, interest , legal fees as well as an
amount of R 925 519.97 described as “ Debtor’s Take On Balance As per
Lombardy 31/12/2023 02”.
[16] It is clear from the LHOA’s affidavit that it is claiming the amounts due
from 1 February 2025 on annexure “FA7”, which are monthly charges for
electricity, water, sanitation, levies as well as l egal fees charged on
several dates with different reference numbers . The amounts claimed on
annexure “FA7” also includes charges for interest on the total running
outstanding amount from 1 January 2024 inclusive of a “Debtors Take On

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Balance As per Lombardy 31/12/2023 02” of R 925 519.97” and not only
in respect of the charges from 1 February 2025.
[17] The LHOA was granted orders for the payment of interest by the
respondents in respect of the previously obtained judgments referred to
above. In the judgment obtained in the Pretoria Magistrate’s Court, it was
granted interest on the judgment amount of R 297 691.61 “at prime rate
plus 3% per month calculated from 01 November 2019 to date of final
payment”. In the judgment obtained in this court for R 626 728.94 in 4
June 2024 it was granted interest at the prime interest rate at plus 3% per
annum, compounded monthly in arrears supposedly from the date of
judgment, namely 4 June 2024. It is not clear to me what “prime rate ” or
“prime interest rate” the two judgments refer to.
[18] Furthermore, there is the third judgment granted against the respondents
in this court by Liebenberg AJ on 23 September 2025 for R 59 399.90
with interest on the said amount of 13,5% per annum from 27 August
2024 to which Mr Smith referred the court at the inception of the hearing.
[19] It is therefore evident that the applicant’s papers in respect of the amount
claimed is contradictory in that the LHOA avers that the judgment of 4
June 2024 was obtained for amounts due to it as on 1 February 2025 ,
which is not possible.
[20] Furthermore, it is evident from the levy statement, annexure “FA7”, that
the interest charges are in respect of the total amount allegedly due to the
LHOA, which includes the three judgment amounts referred to above as
well as the orders in respect of the interest payable thereon .
[21] These judgment amounts as well as the interest payable in respect
thereof have to be collected by means of the normal execution process in
respect of court judgments.

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[22] I therefore find that by adding the interest due in respect of those
judgments onto the respondents’ levy statement, annexure “FA7”, and in
seeking judgment in respect thereof in these proceedings that the LHOA
duplicated parts of the same debt and that it is not entitled to claim such
duplicated interest in these proceedings.
[23] The legal fees charges from 1 February 2025 on the levy statement ,
annexure “FA7”, have different reference numbers and seems to be in
respect of the previous legal proceedings which resulted in judgments
against the respondents with orders as to the payment of costs. Once
again, the legal costs for the previous legal proceedings should be
recovered in the execution process for the specific judgments.
[24] Even if the legal costs charged on annexure “FA7” are in respect of new
legal costs incurred, there is no indication that such costs have been
agreed between the parties or taxed.
[25] As far as the CCPA provides that legal costs shall be recovered from a
defaulter on an attorney and own client scale as per the invoice rendered
from the LHOA attorney and that the costs associated therewith would be
loaded directly to the defaulter’s levy statement as a contribution due and
payable, such provision cannot deprive a member of the opportunity to
challenge the costs claimed.
[26] These provisions saddle the members of the LHOA with charges they had
no opportunity to scrutinise or challenge, which creates the potential
danger that the LHOA and its attorneys may inflate accounts without any
oversight.
[27] Even if clause 5.5 of the special resolution of 24 February 2024 could be
interpreted to authorise debiting members’ accounts with whatever
amounts are reflected in an attorney’s invoice, such rule has the potential
to operate unfairly against the members. The members have no direct

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knowledge of the work done and cannot reasonably be expected to
assess the proportionality of the charges with only a line entry on the
statements they receive. 2 Taxation serves as a check on such practices.
[28] During the hearing of the application, Mr Bekker SC on behalf of the
respondents contended that on the papers the LHOA is only entitled to
the charges in respect of services and levies as from 1 February 2025 as
per annexure “FA7”. He further contended that if only those charges were
calculated that the respondents owe the LHOA the amount of R
58 285.24. The said amount excludes the charged legal fees and interest.
[29] I agree that the applicant is only entitled to judgment in respect of the
conceded R 58 285.24 in respect of services and levies as from 1
February 2025 in light of the inherent contradictions in the papers
regarding the date from which the charges are calculated as well as the
duplication of charges in respect of interest and possibly legal fees
already provided for in the t hree previous judgments alluded to above.
[30] In as far as the respondents contend that the CCPA and MOI provide for
penalties without a basis or framework how same is calculated, the
contention is not relevant in that the levy statement d oes not contain such
penalties and judgment will only be granted in respect of the amount
conceded on behalf of the respondents to be due and payable to the
LHOA.
The claims for termination of electricity and limit of water supply and access
[31] As set out above, the LHOA has adopted the CCPA as a special
resolution at an annual general meeting to provide that it may approach a
competent court for an order to temporarily suspend or restrict certain

2 Mannikin Close Body Corporate v Mrabalala and Others 2025 JDR 4216 (GJ) at paras 14 and
17. See also: Spartacus Body Corporate v Machubeng 2026 JDR 1200 (GJ) at paras 24-9.

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privileges of defaulters, which may include that the defaulter’s electricity
supply be disconnected, the water supply limited and remote access
disabled.
[32] In terms of clause 3.1 of the CCPA , persons who have any amounts due
and owing to the LHOA for utilities and or levies and have not paid such
amounts within a period of 30 days o n such amounts becoming due and
payable and who have not entered into a contractual acknowledgement of
debt and repayment arrangement with the LHOA to settle such
outstanding amounts, shall have the status of “ Defaulter” conferred on
them.
[33] Clause 6 of the CCPA provides that the LHOA shall be entitled to, in its
sole discretion, to appropriate any payment(s) received from a defaulter
as the LHOA deems appropriate and no purported allocation of payments
made by the defaulter shall be binding on the LHOA.
[34] The CCPA authorises the LHOA to seek the relief sought to have the
electricity disconnected or water limited not only pending payment of the
arrears in respect of electricity and or water specifically, but also in
respect of every levy contribution, financial levy, penalty levy, interest on
arrears and or any other debt which may be due and payable to the
LHOA from whatsoever cause arising according to clause 5.2 of the
CCPA.
[35] The formulation of the relief sought in claim A in the notice of motion
pertaining to the termination of the supply of electricity to the property will
have the effect of a final interdict for the termination of the supply of
electricity to the property as it does not provide for the electricity supply to
be reinstated upon payment of either the arrears in respect of electricity
or the full amount owing to the LHOA in respect of levies and other
charges.

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[36] In respect of claim B pertaining to the limitation of the supply of water, the
LHOA only seeks such limitation until the respondents make payment of
the full arrear amount due and owing to the applicant. Also i n this
instance, it appears as if “ the full arrear amount ” referred to is the full
amount owing as per the levy statement, annexure “FA7”, and not only
the arrears in respect of water.
[37] In respect of claim C, the LHOA is seeking that the respondents’ remote
and/or tag access and/or biometric access be disconnected until the
respondents have made full payment of the arrear amounts due to the
LHOA. As there is no separate charge for remotes and/or tag access
and/or biometric access on the levy statement, it is clear that the “ full
payment of the arrear amounts ” in respect of claim C means all the
amounts referenced in clause 5.2 of the CCPA.
The Authorities
[38] In Lion Ridge Body Corporate v Alexander (Lion Ridge ),3 the applicants
asked for judgment in respect of arrear levies, water and electricity
charges and in addition thereto for an order disconnecting the electricity
supply to the respondent’s units and an order limiting the water supply to
each unit to not more than 6 kilolitres per month, until the judgment
amounts were paid in full.
[39] Lion Ridge Body Corporate had not identified the source of its alleged
right to seek to disconnect or limit the respondent’s utilities and did not
allege that it ha d adopted a specific rule that empower ed it to disconnect
or restrict its member’s utilities to recover outstanding levies or that it set

3 2022 JDR 3057 (GJ) at paras 2-3.

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out the terms of an agreement it entered into with the respondent which
empowered it on breach to seek the relief sought. 4
[40] Wilson AJ (as he then was) held that:
“15. Thirdly, and probably most importantly, the relief that
Lion Ridge claims implicates a delicate web of constitutional rights.
These are the right against arbitrary deprivation of property (section
25(1) of the Constitution, 1996), , the right to sufficient water (section
27(1)(b) of the Constitution, 1996), the public law right to receive
electricity from a municipality, even where the electricity is transmitted
through an intermediary such as a landlord or a body corporate (see
Joseph v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC), para 47), and the
right of access to adequate housing (section 26 of the Constitution,
1996).
16 Relief limiting these constitutional rights is plainly incompetent
if it is not authorised by law. The form that law might take depends on
the facts of a particular case. In this matter, the very least that would
have to be established is a provision of the Sectional Titles Act, a rule
of the body corporate, or a term in an agreement that authorises the
relief Lion Ridge now claims. Lion Ridge does not allege any of this.
The instrument authorising the relief, where it exists, may itself have to
conform to constitutional requirements designed to protect the rights
implicated. However, since no authorising instrument is alleged in Lion
Ridge’s founding papers, I need not address that issue. ”5
[41] Lion Ridge dealt with a body corporate established in terms of the
Sectional Titles Schemes Management Act 6 (STSMA) as opposed to a

4 Id at para 7.
5 Id at paras 15- 16.
6 8 of 2011.

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HOA in this application. 7 There is no material difference between
Homeowners Associations and Bodies Corporate in terms of their objects,
activities and status. Homeowners Associations are obliged to provide
services to all of their members and in doing so they extend credit to all
home owners in their estates without the benefit for requiring security
therefore.8
[42] Body Corporate of B alboa Park v Skeyi and Another (Balboa Park )9 also
dealt with four unopposed applications where the bod ies corporate
sought to discontinue electricity and in one instance to restrict water
supply until certain arrear amounts owed to the bod y corporate had been
paid, whereafter those services would have been reinstated.
[43] Dippenaar, J agreed with Wilson, AJ’s judgment in Lion Ridge that there
was nothing in the S ectional Titles Act 10 (STA) or the STSMA and
management rules promulgated under it empowering a body corporate to
interfere with a member’s utility supply. 11
[44] Dippenaar, J further held that it is well established that the relationship
between a body corporate and its individual members , is based in
contract. The rules constitute an agreement on the one hand, the owners
inter se and on the other, between the owners and their body corporate,
resembling an arrangement between joint owners under the common law
in respect of the use and enjoyment of their joint property. 12
[45] That is also the position in respect of a Homeowners Association13.

7 Id at para 1.
8 Willow Waters Homeowners Association (Pty) Ltd v Koka NO & Others 2015 (5) SA 304 (SCA)
at para 27.
9 2024 JDR 1560 (GJ) at paras 1, 7 and 10.
10 95 of 1986.
11 Id at paras 19 and 36.
12 Id para 35.
13 Mount Edgecombe Country Club Estate Management Association II RF NPC v Singh and
Others 2019 (4) SA 471 (SCA) at para 19.

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[46] Dippenaar, J further held:
“The significant impact on the constitutional rights of a recalcitrant
member by the exercise of a termination power, further militates
against the construction of such power as being necessary. It is self -
evident that no management rules or conduct rules may conflict with
the Bill of Rights and the Constitution . It follows that the powers which
a body corporate may exercise, must also pass Constitutional
muster.”14
[47] In Body Corporate t he Straight v Katisi (the Straight)15 the body corporate
sought payment of R 107 940.63 in respect of arrear levies and electricity
charges and interest thereon as well as an order that the electricity supply
to the debtor be disconnected until the full arrear amount was paid.
[48] Windell, J granted the monetary judgment of R 107 940.63 and an order
authorising the applicant to engage the services of an electrician to
disconnect the electricity supply to the respondent’s unit , but only in the
event that the respondent did not pay the outstanding electricity charges
within 10 days of her order . She also ordered that the electricity supply
was to remain disconnected until the arrears in respect of the electricity
and the interest thereon was paid.16
[49] It is important to note that despite the fact that Windell, J granted
judgment for the payment of arrear levies and utilities due to the body
corporate in the amount of R 107 940.63, of which R 16 610.68 was in
respect of unpaid and arrear electricity consumption charges, 17 that she
only granted the order to interrupt the electricity to the respondent’s unit
until the respondent had paid the electricity charges and interest thereon .

14 Balboa Park para 50.
15 2025 JDR 0126 (GJ) at para 1-2.
16 Id at paras 3-6 and para 40.
17 Id at paras 17 and 40.

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The order granted was therefore not in respect of the payment of the full
amount of arrears as is sought in this application, which includes utilities
as well as levies and legal fees.
[50] Windell, J held that in Lion Ridge the basis for the authorisation of the
relief sought was not properly pleaded , but that in the Straight a tacit
agreement between the body corporate and the members laid the basis
for authorisation of the relief sought.18
[51] In this application the LHOA also lay a basis for the authorisation of the
relief sought in respect of the disconnection of the electricity, the
limitation of water supply and access to the LHOA if regard is given to the
CCPA.
[52] Windell, J further remarked that it was unclear why Dippenaar, J
expressed her doubts on whether an agreement between a body
corporate and the respective owners would survive constitutional muster
and might be ultra vires.19 She remarked that it is unclear why that is the
position in relation to Sectional Titles , which pays the owners accounts
due to an existing agreement, when a municipality may disconnect the
power of a non- paying owner upon written notice and a landlord may,
upon notifying a non -paying tenant, stop paying the municipality, who
could then disconnect the power. 20
[53] I agree with Windell, J that if members continue to benefit from electricity
without paying their due, that same is detrimental to the financial stability
of the body corporate or in this instance the LHOA and other owners. I
also agree that the disconnection of members’ supply of electricity can
operate or function as a preventative measure to safeguard other owners

18 Id at para 22 and 31.

19 Id at para 35, referring to Balboa Park above n 10 at paras 50 and 52.
20 Id at para 35 citing J oseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC)
paras 55, 61 and 63

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by ensuring that the financial responsibility is shared equally and
proportionally to avoid financial hardships and the repercussions
thereto.21 Further, this will put a body corporate or HOA in the position
where it will be able to cap its losses whilst it attempts to recover the
arrears.22 At the very least, the LHOA will be able to prevent the situation
from becoming worse, by preventing further electricity supply to the unit in
circumstances where the respondent s are not paying and avoiding the
risk of the municipality disconnecting the electricity supply to all the units
in the association.
[54] In Spartacus Body Corporate v Machubeng (Spartacus)23 Ossin, AJ
followed the same approach as Windell, J in the Straight in respect of the
disconnection of electricity supply.
[55] Ossin, AJ held with reference to Lion Ridge, Balboa Park and the Straight
that it appears that the assessment as to whether in a given situation an
electricity termination order is competent , is carried out with reference to
two enquiries. 24 The first enquiry considers the source of a body
corporate’s entitlement to seek authority to terminate electricity supply. 25
The second enquiry considers constit utional imperatives, mostly in favour
of the debtor, as against policy considerations, mostly in favour of a body
corporate and its members. 26 On this approach, the second enquiry
comes into play only if a body corporate identifies a valid basis and
source for its entitlement to seek authority to terminate electricity supply.
[56] I agree with Ossin, AJ that the termination of electricity supply with
reference to all arrears, not just arrear electricity charges and resumption
of supply upon payment of all arrears instead of arrear electricity charges

21 Id at paras 30, 37-9.
22 Id.
23 2026 JDR 1200 (GJ) at paras 66- 7 and 70.
24 Id at para 50.
25 Id.
26 Id.

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only, is both constitutionally problematic and extends beyond the
applicant’s immediate policy concern being its contractual obligation to
pay the municipality for electricity usage and obtain reimbursement for
that amount from its members. 27
[57] As a result, Ossin, AJ was prepared to authorise termination of electricity
supply, but again subject to payment of the arrear electricity charges only
and not the full amount of arrears which included the levies. This is the
same approach as that of Windell, J in t he Straight’s order as referred to
above.
[58] Clause 5 of the CCPA seems to suggest that the supply of electricity and
water as well as remote and/or tag access and/or biometric access to the
LHOA are “privileges” enjoyed by members . As referenced above, the
right to sufficient water is protected in section 27(1)(b) of the Constitution
and there is a public law right to receive electricity from a municipality,
even when the electricity is transmitted through an intermediary. 28
Furthermore the respondents have a right against arbitrary deprivation of
property (section 25(1) of the Constitution) and the right to have access to
adequate housing (section 26 of the Constitution) .
[59] In the notice of motion, the applicant does not seek the termination of
electricity or the restriction of water pending payment of the arrear
amounts in respect of electricity and water respectively but seeks
termination of electricity without any reservation and the limitation of
water pending payment of all arrear amounts, which include arrear levies
and legal fees.
The applicant’s averments

27 Id at para 87.
28 Joseph and Others v City of Johannesburg and Others 2010 (4) SA 55 (CC) paras 32, 40 and
47.

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[60] The LHOA contends that it has to mitigate its damages and that the only
way in which it can mitigate its damages regarding electricity
consumption and charges is through the disconnection of the electricity
supply to the property as the applicant is liable to the municipality for the
electricity consumption of the entire LHOA. This amount is recovered pro
rata from the members in terms of their individual consumption and where
a member fails to make payment to the LHOA of the amounts due, the
applicant is out of pocket by having already made payment to the
municipality of the non -compliant member’s consumption charges.
[61] The LHOA further contends that the respondent s’ non-payment
prejudices both the applicant and other compliant members of the LHOA,
who ultimately subsidizes the respondents’ consumption of electricity and
that it could lead to a situation where the applicant is no longer in a
position to subsidi ze non -compliant members’ consumption charges
which will lead to the municipality disconnecting the supply of electricity to
the LHOA as a whole, which would severely prejudice the compliant
members of the LHOA .
[62] The LHOA advanced the same contentions in respect of the limitation of
water, with the noticeable difference that it accepts that it is not entitled to
suspend the supply of water to the property in totality but contends that it
is entitled to an order limiting the supply of water to the minimum allowed
in terms of municipal bylaws and applicable legislation, being 6000 litres
per month.
[63] The applicant contends that in its heads of argument that the limitation of
the water supply will not infringe on the respondents’ constitutional rights
in terms of section 27 of the Constitution and that the limitation of 6000
litres per month is in accordance with the national standards required as
per the regulations relating to Compulsory National Standards and

21

Measures to Conserve Water .29 Regulation 3(1)(b) makes provision for a
minimum quantity of 25 litres per day or 6 kilolitres per household per
month.30
[64] The regulations referred to by the applicant were actually issued in terms
of the Water Services Act 31, which regulations were repealed and
replaced on 6 June 2025 by Government Notice 6292 in Government
Gazette 52814.
[65] Regulation 2(2) of the Compulsory National Water and Sanitation
Services Standards 32 provides that the minimum standard for basic water
services must consist of a minimum quantity of drinking water of 6
kilolitres per household per month. There are also additional
requirements regarding the flow and interruption of the flow of water.
[66] The LHOA contends that in respect of the remote and/or tag access
and/or biometric access, the LHOA makes use of a service provider who
in turn renders an invoice to the LHOA for the service and the LHOA in
turn recovers the cost of this invoice from its members pro rata. In the
premises it contends that the respondents should not be entitled to make
use of this access service without making payment of the amounts due
for these services.
[67] Mr Smith also submitted with reference to claim C, that by disconnecting
the respondents’ remotes and/or tag access and/or biometric access to
the HO that the effect thereof will be limited and it does not mean that the
respondents will be barred from their property. He further submitted from
the bar that the guards have instructions not to refuse the respondents
access to their property when making use of the visitor’s entrance.

29 Regulations Relating to Compulsory National Standards and Measures to Conserve Water GN
R509 in GG 22355 of 8 June 2001.
30 Id.
31 108 of 1997.
32 GN R6292 in GG 52814 of 6 June 2025.

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The respondents’ averments
[68] During argument Mr Bekker SC accepted on behalf of the respondents
that they are indebted to the LHOA for at least R 58 285.24, which
comprises of the total for electricity, water and levies without interest and
legal fees as from 1 February 2025.
[69] The respondent s make it clear in their answering affidavit that they do not
deny liability in toto, but that they dispute the amount owed to the LHOA.
[70] Even to the extent that the respondents admit with reference to a
recalculated annexure “FA7” uploaded during argument, that they owe
the LHOA the amount of R 58 285.24, it is not evident from the
recalculated annexure “FA7” exactly which amounts are due and payable
on the respondents’ version specifically in respect of electricity, water,
sanitation and levies as separate line items in that there is a payment
from the sheriff in the amount of R 13 874.86 made on 30 January 2025
as well payments in respect of water and electricity, water and sanitation
on 1 May 2025, which conflate the amounts.
[71] Mr Bekker SC submitted that the effect of the MOI and the CCPA
resolution is to establish regime of punitive measures to penalize
defaulting members which is in conflict with the Constitution and ultra
vires.
[72] He also submitted that there is a duplication in respect of interest charges
and legal fees on the levy statement and that it is not the function of the
court to be an accountant and examine the levy statement line by line and
item for item.
Evaluation
[73] As explained above I am not in a position to quantify the amount owing
from 1 February 2025 to date of the affidavit in respect of electrici ty only.

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It is therefore not possible to make an order for the termination of the
electricity supply until the arrears in respect of the electricity and interest
on such amount is paid as was done in the Straight and Spartacus cases
discussed above.
[74] Section 27 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to
have access to sufficient water. I am of the view that it is not correct to
equate every person’s right to have access to sufficient water in terms of
the Constitution to the minimum standard for basic water services in
terms of the Compulsory National Water and Sanitation Services
Standards.33
[75] Other than to recognise that access to water is a basic human right and
that the LHOA is not entitled to suspend the supply of water to the
property in total, the LHOA did not make out a case as required in section
36 of the Constitution that the infringement of the respondents’
constitutional rights would be justified in exercising the balancing act
which must be performed where fundament rights compete. No such
case had been made out in the LHOA’s founding papers other than by
way of reference to the LHOA’s contentions in respect of the
discontinuation of the supply of electricity as the applicant is out of pocket
to the detriment of itself and its members.
[76] I am therefore of the view that the applicant failed to make out a case for
the restriction of the water supply.
[77] The LHOA avers in its affidavit that the respondents’ access to the LHOA
will not be removed in its entirety, but rather that the respondents will be
forced to make use of the visitors’ access gate to gain access to the
LHOA. Again, the applicant seeks to place a restriction on a
constitutional right, namely that everyone ha s the right to have access to

33 Id.

24

adequate housing without the applicant doing an exercise in terms of
section 36(1) of the Constitution to show that the infringement of the
respondents’ constitutional rights would be justified in exercising the
balancing act which must be performed where fundamental rights
compete.
[78] The applicant does not explain what it means when it states the following
in its affidavit:
“It is further vital to point out that the R espondent’s access to the
Association will not be removed in its entirety, but rather that the
Respondent will be forced to make use of the visitors access to gain
access to the Association.”
[79] From the wording of the above it is clear that there will be some limitation
of access to the LHOA and by implication to the respondents’ residential
property where they reside and/or that the y will have to gain access at a
security control point w here someone may deny them access to their
property. The notice of motion also does not provide for any guardrails in
respect of the respondents’ access to the LHOA and their residential
property after disconnection of the respondents’ remote and/or tag
access and/or biometric access.
[80] I am therefore also of the view that the applicant failed to make out a
case for the restriction of the respondents’ access to the LHOA .

Order
WHEREFORE I make the following order:
1. Judgment is granted against the first and second respondents, jointly and
severally for:

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1.1 Payment of the amount of R 58 285.24 to the applicant;
1.2 Payment of interest on the amount of R 58 285.24 at the prime
overdraft rate of the applicant’s bankers charged from time to time
plus 3% from 25 June 2025, being the date of service of the
application, to date of final payment.
2. The respondents to pay the c osts of the application.



___________________________
I M LINDEQUE
Acting Judge of the High Court
GAUTENG DIVISION


Date of Hearing: 24 April 2026

Date of Judgment: 30 October 2026

APPEARANCES

For the Applicant: Adv R Smith
Instructed by: Heerschop Pienaar Attorneys

For the Respondents: Adv F Bekker SC
Instructed by: Malebye Motaung Mtembu Inc