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[2026] ZAEQC 7
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Mokobane v Gauteng Department of Education (145324/2024) [2026] ZAEQC 7 (30 October 2026)
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IN THE EQUALITY COURT
AT THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE NUMBER:
145324-2024
(1) REPORTABLE: YES
/ NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED: YES/NO
In
the matter between:
-
EVELYN
KEDIBONE MOKOBANE
Applicant
and
GAUTENG DEPARTMENT
OF
EDUCATION
Respondent
This
Judgment was handed down electronically and by circulation to the
parties’ legal
representatives
by way of email and shall be uploaded on Caselines. The date for hand
down
is deemed to be on
JUDGMENT
MALI J:
Introduction
[1]
The applicant, Ms Mokobane, instituted a
complaint in terms of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of
Unfair Discrimination
Act 4 of 2000 ("PEPUDA"). She alleges
that the respondent unfairly discriminated against her following a
sexual harassment
complaint she lodged on 11 October 2022 against Mr
Seabi, who was her manager at the relevant time.
[2]
The first respondent is the government
department that employed both the applicant and Mr Seabi. According
to the applicant, Mr
Seabi made sexual remarks and advances towards
her, despite her having made it clear that such conduct was
unwelcome.
[3]
The applicant seeks the following relief.
3.1 An
order directing the respondent to restart the disciplinary process
afresh before an independent panel with expertise and
knowledge in
sexual harassment;
3.2 An
order that consequent management be implemented against senior
managers (the Director: Transformation and the Director: Labour
Unit)
who, she alleges, were biased, unethical and acted
unconstitutionally;
3.3 An
order that senior managers who ignored her numerous requests for
transfer (the Director: Gauteng West District, Tshwane Region,
and
the Director: HR, Head Office) be held accountable;
3.4 An
order that the respondent compensate the applicant for exposing her
and her partner to major depression, for which they have
undergone
prolonged treatment.
[4]
In essence, the applicant's complaint
concerns her dissatisfaction with the manner in which the respondent
handled the matter after
she reported the alleged sexual harassment.
In particular, she challenges the respondent's decision not to place
Mr Seabi on precautionary
suspension, which she contends allowed him
to interfere with witnesses.
[5]
Mr Seabi was not suspended. Instead, the
employer conducted a preliminary investigation while he remained at
work. The applicant
alleges that this afforded him an opportunity to
collude with another alleged victim. According to the applicant, a
witness overheard
their conversation and reported the matter to
labour officials, but no action was taken. She contends that the
employer's alleged
bias and inconsistent treatment violated her
rights and amounted to unfair discrimination.
The Point in Limine
[6]
The respondent raised a point in limine,
contending that the applicant's case arises from allegations that the
respondent failed
to properly investigate a sexual harassment
complaint and to take appropriate disciplinary action against Mr
Seabi. The respondent
argues that these issues arise within the
employment relationship and therefore fall within the ambit of labour
law.
The Applicable Legal
Framework
[7]
Clause 7 of the Code of Good Practice on
the Prevention and Elimination of Harassment in the Workplace, issued
under the
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998
and gazetted on 18 March
2022 ("the Code"), is relevant.
[8]
Section 5
of the Code provides that sexual
harassment of an employee is a form of unfair discrimination and is
prohibited on the grounds
of sex, gender or sexual orientation.
Same-sex harassment can amount to discrimination on the basis of sex,
gender or sexual orientation,
and gender-based harassment is likewise
prohibited.
[9]
Clause 7.3.1 of the Code provides that
harassment on prohibited grounds which does not arise out of an
employment policy or practice
is prohibited by PEPUDA. While PEPUDA
generally regulates harassment and discrimination
in
society
, it also covers harassment and
discrimination in the workplace or world of work under certain
circumstances. This will be the case
where:
9.1
the harassment occurs because of the conduct of somebody who is not
an employer or employee — for example, the harassment
of an
employee by a client, customer, independent contractor, an employee
of a different business, or any other member of the public;
9.2
the harassment occurs within the world of work but outside the
control of the employer — for example, while an employee
is
commuting on public transport;
9.3 a
complaint of harassment is received from a client, customer or other
member of the public that an employee has harassed them;
and
9.4
the victim of harassment is a worker who falls outside the definition
of an employee in the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995
("the
LRA").
[10]
Clause 7.4 of the Code requires that sexual
harassment policies should substantially comply with the provisions
of the Code and
include, at a minimum, statements to the effect that:
10.1
sexual harassment is a form of unfair discrimination on the basis of
sex and/or gender and/or sexual orientation, which infringes
the
rights of the complainant and constitutes a barrier to equity in the
workplace;
10.2
sexual harassment in the workplace will not be permitted or condoned;
10.3
complainants in sexual harassment matters have the right to follow
the procedures in the policy, and appropriate action must
be taken by
the employer;
10.4
it is a disciplinary offence to victimise or retaliate against an
employee who, in good faith, lodges a grievance of sexual
harassment.
[11]
Section 7 of the Code provides for dispute
resolution as follows:
"Should
a complaint of alleged sexual harassment not be satisfactorily
resolved by the internal procedures set out above, either
party may,
within 30 days of the dispute having arisen, refer the matter to the
CCMA for conciliation in accordance with the provisions
of section
135 of this Act. Should the dispute remain unresolved, either party
may refer the dispute to the Labour Court within
30 days of receipt
of the certificate issued by the commissioner in terms of section
135."
The Applicant's
Contentions
[12]
The applicant contends that her complaint
is not an ordinary labour dispute, but concerns systemic and
institutional discrimination
based on gender and the relative status
or ranking of officials in the employ of the respondent, falling
squarely within the ambit
of sections 6 and 8 of PEPUDA.
[13]
The applicant's cause of action, she
submits, is rooted in the respondent's failure, refusal or disregard
of constitutional rights
and the law, its failure to follow
prescribed due process, and an abuse of authority. She further relies
on the obligation of the
Member of the Executive Council ("the
MEC") to intervene in terms of his or her mandate.
Jurisdiction and
Section 20(3) of PEPUDA
[14]
Section 20(3) of PEPUDA requires the
presiding officer to determine whether the matter should be heard in
the Equality Court or
referred to "another appropriate
institution, body, court, tribunal or other forum (hereafter referred
to as an alternative
forum) which, in the presiding officer's
opinion, can deal more appropriately with the matter in terms of that
alternative forum's
powers and functions."
Analysis
[15]
The threshold question is whether the
conduct complaint constitutes discrimination on a ground recognized
by PEPUDA and whether
the Equality Court is the appropriate forum to
grant the relief sought.
[16]
The applicant's complaint, properly
construed, is not that Mr Seabi's conduct itself constituted
harassment occurring outside the
employment relationship or outside
the employer's control. Rather, the gravamen of her complaint is the
manner in which the respondent,
as her employer, responded to her
internal grievance: the decision not to place Mr Seabi on
precautionary suspension, the conduct
of a preliminary investigation
while he remained at work, the alleged failure to act on reports of
witness interference, and the
alleged bias and inconsistent treatment
by senior managers.
[17]
That conduct — the handling of an
internal sexual harassment complaint and the decision whether and how
to discipline an employee
— arises squarely out of an
employment policy and practice. It falls within the employment
relationship and is governed by
the Code and the
Labour Relations
Act. It
is not the kind of harassment contemplated by clause 7.3.1 of
the Code, which extends PEPUDA's reach to workplace harassment only
in the limited circumstances there identified — none of which
is present here.
[18]
[To the extent the complaint may lie
against the employer of both the applicant and Mr Seabi, the alleged
discriminatory conduct,
although framed as such, is essentially that
Mr Seabi was not suspended or disciplined. That, on its own, shows
the Court is concerned
with a labour issue, not discrimination on a
prohibited ground amenable to relief under PEPUDA. The fact that
labour law provides
for the resolution of disputes between employee
and employer does not make it any less systemic and institutional
discrimination
based on gender and the relative status or ranking of
officials in the employ of the respondent.
[19]
The relief sought confirms this
characterisation. The applicant seeks to restart a disciplinary
process, implement "consequent
management" against named
managers, hold managers accountable for ignoring transfer requests,
and receive compensation for
depression. These are remedies that lie
within the domain of labour law and the employment relationship. The
Equality Court is
not empowered to grant these remedies under PEPUDA,
which aims to eliminate unfair discrimination and promote equality,
not to
supervise an employer's internal disciplinary and managerial
decisions.
[20]
The applicant's reliance on
sections 6
and
8
of PEPUDA does not assist her.
Section 6
prohibits unfair
discrimination on the grounds listed in
section 1
, including sex and
gender.
Section 8
prohibits harassment on a prohibited ground.
However, the conduct complained of — the employer's alleged
failure to suspend,
investigate properly, or discipline — does
not, without more, constitute harassment or discrimination on a
prohibited ground
by the employer. The applicant's grievance is with
the adequacy and fairness of the employer's response, which is a
matter for
the labour-law forum.
[21]
The applicant's reliance on the MEC's
obligation to intervene likewise does not establish a basis for
Equality Court jurisdiction.
Political or executive accountability is
not a substitute for the statutory remedies available under the
labour-law framework.
[22]
The Code itself points to the appropriate
forum. Section 7 of the Code provides that where a complaint of
alleged sexual harassment
is not satisfactorily resolved by internal
procedures, either party may refer the matter to the CCMA for
conciliation and, if unresolved,
to the Labour Court. That is the
forum contemplated by the legislature for disputes of this nature.
[23]
It follows that the matter was not properly
brought to the Equality Court because no discrimination on any
identifiable ground supports
any relief the Equality Court may grant.
Conclusion
[24]
The Equality Court therefore lacks
jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's application and cannot
grant the relief sought. For
the reasons set out above, I do not have
discretionary powers set out in section 20 (3) of PEPUDA. I cannot
refer the matter to
another appropriate forum. It is for the
applicant to decide which course to take.
[25]
Accordingly, the respondent's point in
limine must be upheld.
Order
[26]
I therefore make the following order:
1.
The point in limine is upheld.
2.
The application is dismissed.
3.
The applicant is ordered to pay costs on Scale A.
N.P MALI
Judge of the High
Court, Johannesburg
Representative
Counsel for
Plaintiff:
Adv Madumise
Attorney for
Applicant:
Huntley Attorneys Inc
Counsel for the
Respondent:
L Kalashe
Attorney for
Respondent:
The State Attorneys
Hearing
Date:
20 February 2026
Delivery
Date:
30 October 2026