Zibi v Amahlubi Chairman's Foundation and Another (2481/2025) [2026] ZANWHC 283 (3 November 2026)

55 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Administrative Law — Authority to institute proceedings — Dispute regarding authority of traditional leader to represent juristic person — Applicant challenging validity of proceedings instituted by Foundation — Court determining necessity of oral evidence to resolve factual disputes regarding authority and compliance with Foundation's constitution — No finding made on validity of resolution or authority of traditional leader at this stage.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
Case Number: 2481/2025
In the matter between:
NQOBILE LUTHO ZIBI Applicant
And
AMAHLUBI CHAIRMAN’S FOUNDATION First Respondent
ABSA BANK LIMITED Second Respondent

In re:
AMAHLUBI CHAIRMAN’S FOUNDATION Applicant
And
ABSA BANK LIMITED First Respondent
NQOBILE LUTHO ZIBI Second Respondent

Coram: Matlhape AJ
Reportable:
Circulate to Judges:
Circulate to Magistrates:
Circulate to Regional Magistrates
NO
NO
NO
NO

the Foundation. The applicant consequently seeks declaratory relief, including
an order declaring the main proceedings a nullity.
[2] The first respondent opposes the application. It contends that Vulindlela is the
duly recognised Senior Traditional Leader of the AmaHlubi community and that
his authority to act on behalf of the Foundation is supported by a resolution
authorising the institution of the main application and the appointment of the
legal represen tatives. The parties’ competing submissions raise , inter alia,
questions concerning the distinction between traditional leadership and
authority to represent a juristic person, the requirements of Rule 7 as well as
the effect of the Foundation’s constitution.
[3] Having considered the parties’ respective submissions , it is necessary to
consider whether the matter should be referred for the hearing of oral evidence
in terms of Rule 6(5)(g) of the Uniform Rules of Court regarding the source of
authority pertaining to the proceedings by the Foundation.
Background
[4] The present dispute arises against the background of a disagreement
concerning succession and traditional leadership within the AmaHlubi
community. Although the succession dispute is not directly before this Court for
determination, it provides the context in which the present proceedings were
instituted. According to the applicant, the Foundation was established in or
about February 2013 following a proposal made by him and accepted by the
AmaHlubi Traditional Council. Its purpose was to manage and protect the
commercial interests of the AmaHlubi Traditional Community.

[5] The applicant submits that the Foundation is a juristic person governed by its
constitution and that all matters relating to its affairs, including the institution of
legal proceedings in its name, must be undertaken strictly in accordance with
the provisions of that constitution. It is on this basis that he disputes that
Vulindlela’s recognition as Senior Traditional Leader automatically confers
upon him the authority to institute legal proceedings on behalf of the
Foundation. He maintains that such authority must be established by reference
to the Foundation’s governing instrument an d the procedures prescribed
therein.
[6] The first respondent on the other hand, relies on Vulindlela’s recognition as the
Senior Traditional Leader of the AmaHlubi community. It further contends that
the decision to institute the main application was duly authorised by a resolution
and that the attorneys representing the Foundation were properly mandated.
The first respondent also relies on Proclamation Notice 159 of 2025, dated 3
July 2025, recognising Vulindlela as the traditional leader of the AmaHlubi
community. It is submitted that the proclamation has not been reviewed or set
aside and remains operative.
[7] In addition, the first respondent relies on a previous court order dated 18
September 2024, marked as annexure NZL5 in the papers. It contends that the
previous proceedings are relevant to the present dispute and that the applicant
is attempting to revisit issues that have already been dealt with. The applicant
disputes that the proclamation and the previous court order resolve the question
of the Foundation’s authority to institute the main proceedings. His contention

is that the first respondent’s traditional leadership status does not dispense with
compliance with the Foundation’s constitution.
[8] The parties have consequently advanced competing versions regarding the
source of the authority relied upon by the first respondent, the role of the
Foundation’s constitution and the validity and effect of the resolution said to
authorise the main proceedings.
The issues for determination
[9] The issues arising from the parties’ submissions are:
[9.1] in the first instance, whether the applicant’s challenge falls within
the scope of Rule 7 and secondly, whether the authority to
institute and prosecute the main application has been
established.
[9.2] A further issue is whether the factual disputes concerning the
Foundation’s governance, the resolution relied upon and the
authority of the persons involved can properly be resolved on the
affidavits or whether oral evidence is necessary.
[10] It is important at the outset to distinguish between the authority of an attorney
to act on behalf of a litigant, the authority to institute and prosecute proceedings
on behalf of a juristic person and the authority of a person to depose to an
affidavit. These are related but distinct questions and the applicable legal
principles must be applied to each in its proper context.
The applicable legal principles

[11] Rule 7 of the Uniform Rules of Court provides a mechanism through which the
authority of a person acting on behalf of a litigant may be challenged. Its
purpose is to ensure that a person purporting to act for another has the requisite
mandate. The Rule provides that:
Rule 7(1) provides as follows:
“7(1) Power of attorney
Subject to the provisions of subrules (2) and (3), a power of attorney to act need
not be filed, but the authority of anyone acting on behalf of a party may, within 10
days after it has come to the notice of a party that such person is so acting, or with
the leave of court on good cause shown at any time before judgment, be disputed,
whereafter, such person may no longer act unless he satisfied the court that he is
authorized to act, and to enable him to do so, the court may postpone the hearing
of the action or application”.


[12] In Ganes and Another v Telecom Namibia Ltd 1 the Supreme Court of Appeal
distinguished between the authority of a deponent to depose to an affidavit and
the authority required for the institution and prosecution of proceedings. The
Court held that:
“The deponent to an affidavit in motion proceedings need not be
authorised by the party concerned to depose to the affidavit. It is the

1 2004 (3) SA 615 (SCA), para 19

institution of the proceedings and the prosecution thereof which must be
authorised. In the present case the proceedings were instituted and
prosecuted by a firm of attorneys purporting to act on behalf of the
respondent. In an affidavit filed together with the notice of motion a Mr
Kurz stated that he was a director in the firm of attorneys acting on behalf
of the respondent and that such firm of attorneys was duly appointed to
represent the respondent. That statement has not been challenged by
the appellants. It must, therefore, be accepted that the institution of the
proceedings were duly authorised. In any event, rule 7 provides a
procedure to be followed by a respondent who wishes to challenge the
authority of an attorney who instituted motion proceedings on behalf of
an applicant. The appellants did not avail themselves of the procedure
so provided”
[13] It follows that the applicant’s challenge cannot succeed merely because
Vulindlela’s authority to depose to the founding affidavit is disputed. The
relevant inquiry is whether the main proceedings were duly authorised and
whether the attorneys purporting to represent the Foundation have the requisite
mandate. To this end, t he first respondent relies on Botha v East of Eden
Trading 764 CC and Another2 in support of the distinction between authority to
depose to an affidavit and authority to institute and prosecute proceedings. The
distinction is relevant, but it does not resolve the factual question of whether the

2 (983/2015) [2016] ZANWHC 82 (15 December 2016)

Foundation’s proceedings were authorised in accordance with its governing
arrangements.
[14] In FirstRand Bank Ltd v Fillis and Another 3 the Court considered the position
where an attorney’s authority to act on behalf of a litigant is challenged. The
relevant question is whether the attorney can demonstrate the requisite
mandate. The precise form of proof required depends on the circumstan ces
and the nature of the challenge.
[15] Accordingly, the mere fact that proceedings have been instituted in the name
of the Foundation does not necessarily establish that the decision to litigate was
validly taken. Equally, a challenge to authority does not without more, render
the proceedings invalid. The question must be determined on the available
evidence.
The Foundation’s constitution and the resolution
[16] The applicant relies on Pretoria City Council v Levinson4 for the principle that a
juristic person acts through authorised agents and must take decisions in
accordance with the requirements governing its affairs. Where a juristic person
is governed by a written constitution, the provisions of that constitution are
relevant in determining who may exercise its powers and how decisions,
including decisions to institute litigation, are to be taken.
[17] The applicant contends that the Foundation’s constitution regulates its affairs
and that Vulindlela’s traditional leadership status does not automatically confer

3 2010 (5) SA 565 (ECP),para 13
4 1962 (1) SA 325 (A)

authority to institute proceedings in its name. On the other hand, t he first
respondent contends that the authority of the traditional leader is central to the
Foundation’s governance and that the resolution relied upon establishes the
requisite mandate. It further criticises the applicant for failing to place the
Foundation’s constitutional documents before the Court.
[18] The existence and contents of the constitution, the source of the authority to
adopt the resolution, the circumstances in which the resolution was adopted
and the scope of the mandate are therefore material to the determination of the
dispute. The Court cannot determine the question simply by accepting the
applicant’s assertion that the constitution was not complied with. Nor can it
conclude merely because Vulindlela is a recognised traditional leader, that he
is necessarily authorised to institute proceedings on behalf of the Foundation.
[19] The relevant constitutional provisions and resolution must be considered
together with the evidence concerning their adoption and operation. Where the
parties’ versions concerning these matters are materially divergent and cannot
satisfactorily be reconciled on the papers, oral evidence may be necessary.
Whether a genuine dispute of fact exists
[20] The applicant submits that Vulindlela has failed to address the material
allegations concerning the Foundation’s constitution and the absence of proper
authority. He contends that the answering affidavit contains bare denials and
that the first respondent has failed to discharge the burden of demonstrating
that the main proceedings were duly authorised. The first respondent disputes
this characterisation. It relies on Vulindlela’s recognised position as traditional

leader, the resolution allegedly authorising the proceedings and the previous
court order. It further contends that the present application is an attempt to
challenge the traditional leadership position indirectly and to delay the
determination of the main application.
[21] The applicable approach to disputes of fact in motion proceedings was
explained in Plascon-Evans Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd 5
Ordinarily, final relief on motion is determined on the applicant’s admitted
factual allegations together with the respondent’s version, subject to the
established exceptions where the respondent’s allegations are not genuine or
are so far-fetched or untenable that they may be rejected on the papers.
[22] In Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 6 the
Supreme Court of Appeal emphasised that a real, genuine and bona fide
dispute of fact requires the party raising it to address the disputed facts
seriously and unambiguously. The Court must consider the factual allegations
within the broader context o f the case and determine whether the dispute is
genuine.
[23] Applying these principles, the question is not merely whether the parties
disagree about the legal effect of Vulindlela’s recognition as traditional leader.
That question may be capable of resolution through the interpretation of the
applicable law and the relevant documents. The difficulty lies in the factual
circumstances surrounding the authority relied upon by the first respondent.
The applicant disputes that Vulindlela was authorised to institute proceedings

5 1984 (3) SA 623 (A)
6 2008 (3) SA 371 (SCA), para 12 & 13

in the Foundation’s name. The first respondent relies on a resolution said to
establish that authority. The applicant, however, maintains that the
Foundation’s constitution governs the exercise of its powers and that the
necessary requirements have not been satisfied.
[24] The parties’ competing positions raise questions concerning the adoption and
effect of the resolution, the authority of the person or body responsible for
adopting it and the relationship between that resolution and the Foundation’s
constitution. The existence of a resolution, if established, does not necessarily
dispose of the dispute. Its validity, scope and legal effect may depend on the
circumstances in which it was adopted and the powers conferred by the
Foundation’s governing instrument.
[25] Conversely, the applicant’s assertion that the constitution was not complied with
cannot be accepted as established merely because the first respondent relies
on traditional leadership status. The Court must be satisfied that the factual and
legal basis fo r the authority claimed has been properly established. On the
evidence before me, the competing contentions concern facts that are
potentially decisive of the authority to institute the main application. Those facts
cannot be determined merely by adopting one party’s characterisation of the
Foundation’s governance arrangements.
[26] I am therefore not satisfied that the issues concerning the source, existence
and scope of the authority relied upon can properly be resolved on the affidavits
alone. In particular, the circumstances in which the resolution was adopted, the
authority of th ose responsible for adopting it and the scope of the mandate
require further investigation. I do not, at this stage, make a finding that the

resolution is invalid or that Vulindlela lacks authority . Those are matters to be
determined after the relevant factual disputes have been resolved.
Whether the matter should be referred for oral evidence
[27] Rule 6(5)(g) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that :
“Where an application cannot properly be decided on affidavit the court may
dismiss the application or make such order as it deems fit with a view to
ensuring a just and expeditious decision. In particular, but without affecting the
generality of the aforeg oing, it may direct that oral evidence be heard on
specified issues with a view to resolving any dispute of fact and to that end may
order any deponent to appear personally or grant leave for such deponent or
any other person to be subpoenaed to appear and be examined and cross-
examined as a witness or it may refer the matter to trial with appropriate
directions as to pleadings or definition of issues, or otherwise.”
[28] The rule affords the Court a discretion to determine the appropriate procedure
where material disputes of fact arise. That discretion must be exercised
judicially, with due regard to the nature of the dispute, its materiality, the
evidence already available and the interests of justice.
[29] In Greyling v George Randell High School 7, the Court considered the
application of Rule 6(5)(g) where material factual disputes could not be
determined satisfactorily on the affidavits. The decision illustrates the
importance of identifying the specific disputes requiring resolution before

7 (PR11/22) [2023] ZALCPE 2; [2023] 5 BLLR 412 (LC); (2023) 44 ILJ 1254 (LC) (27 February 2023)

determining the appropriate procedural course. Similarly, in Lefakane v Vuyo
and Others 8, the North West Division emphasised that the Court must
determine whether the factual disputes are genuine, material and incapable of
resolution without viva voce evidence.
[30] In the present matter, the authority to institute proceedings on behalf of the
Foundation is central to the interlocutory application. It is not a peripheral issue.
If the proceedings were not duly authorised, that finding may have significant
consequences for the continuation of the main application. The dispute cannot,
in my view, be resolved simply by finding that Vulindlela is a recognised
traditional leader. Nor can it be resolved by accepting, without further
examination, the applicant’s contention that the Foundation’s constitution was
not complied with.
[31] Consequently, the appropriate course is to allow oral evidence on the factual
issues necessary to determine whether the decision to institute the main
application was validly taken and whether the persons involved were duly
authorised to act on behalf of the Foundation. The referral will permit the parties
to test the evidence concerning the resolution and the authority relied upon
through examination and cross examination. This will assist the Court in
determining the factual basis of the alleged mandate without prematurely
deciding the merits of the interlocutory application.

8 (M653/2020) [2026] ZANWHC 7 (21 January 2026)

[32] I am accordingly satisfied that the interests of justice are best served by
referring the specified issues for the hearing of oral evidence in terms of Rule
6(5)(g) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Costs
[33] The applicant seeks a punitive costs order on the basis that the main application
was instituted without proper authority and that the first respondent has
persisted in the proceedings despite the challenge. Whilst the first respondent
seeks dismissal of the interlocutory application with costs on Scale B,
contending that the application is an abuse of process intended to delay the
main proceedings.
[34] At this stage, the Court has not determined whether the main proceedings were
duly authorised. It would therefore be premature to make a final costs order
based on a finding that either party acted improperly in relation to the disputed
authority.
[35] The costs of the interlocutory application should accordingly be reserved for
determination after the hearing of oral evidence, when the Court will be in a
position to assess the outcome and the conduct of the parties in the context of
the evidence presented.
Order
[36] In the circumstances, the following order is made:
1. The interlocutory application is referred for the hearing of oral evidence in
terms of Rule 6(5)(g) of the Uniform Rules of Court .

2. The evidence to be adduced at the hearing shall be that of such witnesses
as either party may elect to call.
3. No party shall be entitled to call a witness unless:
3.1 such party has served on the opposing party a statement setting
out the evidence that the witness intends to give in chief. The
applicant shall deliver such statement within 20 court days of the
date of this order and the respondents shall deliver their
respective statements within 20 court days of th e date of receipt
of the statement referred to herein above;
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 3.1 above, either party shall be
entitled to subpoena any person to give evidence at the hearing, irrespective
of whether that person has consented to furnish a statement.
5. Within 15 court days of the date of this order, each party shall make
discovery, under oath, of all documents relevant to the issues in dispute.
6. The discovery referred to in paragraph (5) herein above shall be effected in
accordance with Uniform Rule 35 of the Uniform Rules of Court. The
provisions of that Rule relating to the inspection and production of
discovered documents shall apply accordingly.
7. The parties shall set the matter down for hearing in accordance with the
Practice Directives of this Division.