South African Legal Practice Council v Janse van Rensburg and Another (2026/050537) [2026] ZALMPPHC 107 (3 November 2026)

62 Reportability
Legal Practice

Brief Summary

Legal Practice — Disciplinary proceedings — Application for removal from roll of legal practitioners — First respondent contending that disciplinary hearing was flawed due to incomplete record and failure to consider mitigating factors — Court determining that the application is not solely dependent on the Disciplinary Committee's recommendation and can proceed independently — Court empowered to adjudicate on the conduct of legal practitioners under section 44 of the Legal Practice Act.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private det ails of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy


IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO DIVISION, POLOKWANE

CASE NO.: 2026-050537








In the matter between:

THE SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL PRACTICE COUNCIL APPLICANT
AND
NINETTE GEORGETTE JANSE VAN RENSBURG FIRST RESPONDENT
(LANDSBERG)
JANSE VAN RENSBURG-LANDSBERG SECOND RESPONDENT
ATTORNEYS
(1) REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
(3) REVISED: YES/NO



_____________________ 03/11/2026
SIGNATURE DATE



DATE………… SIGNATURE:……

JUDGMENT

NGOBENI J


[1] The applicant is The South African Legal Practice Council (LPC), a body
corporate, established in terms of the Legal Practice Act 28 of 2014 (LPA),
and exercises jurisdiction over all legal practitioners. The objective of the
LPC is to regulate professional conduct of legal practitioners to ensure
accountable conduct of the legal profession to the public.

[2] The first respondent is Ninette Georgette Janse Van Rensburg
(Landsberg), with identity number 7[...], who was admitted on 08 April
2003 by the High Court of South Africa as a legal practi tioner, and her
name was enrolled and authorised to practice as an attorney, with legal
practitioner number 20014. The first respondent is currently practicing as
a sole practi tioner under the name and style Janse Van Rensburg -
Landsberg Attorneys, practicing at 1[...] L[...] Avenue, Musina and/or
2[...] K[...] Street, Ext. 4, Musina, Limpopo Province.

[3] The second respondent is Janse Van Rensburg -Landsberg Attorneys, with
its principal place of business at 1[...] L[...] Avenue, Musina and/or 2[...]
K[...] Street, Ext. 4, Musina, Limpopo Province. The second respondent

was established by the first respondent to conduct her legal practice as
an attorney, and the second respondent is registered as Firm Number
8947.

[4] This is an application for the removal of the first respondent from the roll
of legal practitioners, based on the applicant’s con tention that the first
respondent is guilty of unprofessional or dishonourable or unworthy
conduct as a legal practitioner. The applicant further alleges that the first
respondent contravened various provisions of the LPA, the Rules and the
Code of Conduct of the LPC. The applicant alleges that the first
respondent is not a fit and proper person to continue to practice as a
legal practitioner. It is at this stage not necessary to go into the merits of
the application as the first respondent raised a point in limine in reaction
to the application and this court must deal with that aspect first.

[5] The first respondent who is the sole proprietor trading as the second
respondent also represents the second respondent in this application. I
will summarise the point in limine that the first respondent raised for easy
understanding because it was expounded . The point in limine that is
raised by the first respondent is that this application to remove her from
the roll of legal practitioners is based on the recomme ndation by the
Disciplinary Committee ( DC) that held a disciplinary enquiry against her
and convicted her. The first respondent discovered that the brief

summary of the judgment of the DC on merits and conviction as well as
the recommended sanction and reasons for such recommendation
attached to the founding affidavit of the LPC, which is referred to as LPC6,
was incomplete. The said incomplete record is what was served on her in
March 2026 pursuant to this application to remove her.

[6] The point in limine further raises the fact that the prosecutor who acted
on behalf of the applicant during the disciplinary hearing contended that
the first respondent did not submit her mitigating factors, and the DC
found that she refused to provide her mitigating factors. The DC therefore
finalised the disciplinary enquiry without considering her mitigating
factors.

[7] The applicant in May 2025 held a disciplinary hearing against the first
respondent where she was convicted and a recommendation was made
that this a pplication be brought against her. The first respondent alleges
that in that disciplinary hearing, the DC failed to consider her mitigating
factors and her exculpatory evidence. She was convicted of a
transgression that had not formed part of the charges levelled against
her. The DC allowed the complainant , one Mr. Grobler, to cross examine
the first respondent who appeared in person.

[8] The first respondent has lodged a complaint with the Legal Services
Ombud (Ombud) in terms of section 45 to 48 of the LPA on 30 June 2026.
That complaint is pending. The first respondent intends instituting judicial
review proceedings under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of
2000 (PAJA). In summary the respondents apply for the dismissal of the
application on the basis that the disciplinary hearing was flawed,
alternatively, the application proceedings must be stayed pending the
decision of the Ombud or pending the review application. After the
Ombud will have decided, a review will be instituted within 14 da ys of the
adjudication by the Ombud.

[9] In response to the point in limine raised by the respondents, the applicant
contends that although the recommendation of the DC culminated in the
institution of this application, that recommendation is not an
indispensable document for purposes of this application. It was therefore
not peremptory for the applicant to have pursued a disciplinary action
against the respondents before it could institute these proceedings. In
other words, the applicant could still pur sue this application without or
even though there was no recommendation from the DC. The further
submission is that the High C ourt (Court) is empowered in terms of
section 44 of the LPA to exercise its disciplinary powers over legal
practitioners.

[10] On the missing parts of the record or LPC6, the applicant admits that
indeed three pages were missing on the founding affidavit of this
application, but those pages were provided to the respondents on the
same day after being alerted about the missing pages and the omission
was explained. On the mitigating factors of the first respondent which
were not submitted to the DC, the response by the applicant is that
indeed the mitigating submissions of the first respondent were not placed
before the members of the DC because of an administrative oversight,
but the DC was aware of the circumstances of the first respondent
because of the evidence that was presented in the enquiry.

[11] The only information that was not presented to the DC regarding her
mitigating circumstances was her family responsibilities as a breadwinner.
The applicant denies that the recommendation of the DC without the
mitigating circumstances of the first respondent constitutes a gross
irregularity and that does not render the process fatally flawed as claimed
by the first respondent.

[12] In issue between the parties at this stage is as to whether the court must
uphold the point in limine and dismiss the application or not. In
applications of this nature, it is trite that the court must follow a three
stage enquiry which the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed in several
cases, which are, first, whether the alleged offending conduct has been

established on a preponderance of probabilities, which is a factual
enquiry, secondly, whether the person concerned in the discretion of the
court is not a fit and proper person to continue to practice. This involves a
weighing up of the conduct complained of against the conduct expected of
an attorney and, to this extent, is a value judgment. Thirdly, the court
must enquire whether in all the circumstances the attorney is to be
removed from the roll of attorneys or whether an order of suspension
from practice would suffice1.

[13] The point in limine that was raised by the respondents have segments
which must be dealt with individually. The issues raised were
unnecessarily compounded. The first issue that in my view must be dealt
with is as to whether this application is fully dependant on the
recommendations that arise from the DC. In other words, can this
application still be sustained even if there is no recommendation from the
DC.

[14] Section 30 of the LPA empowers the South African Legal Practice Council
(Council) to enrol the name of a practitioner to practice as a legal
practitioner upon application after the High Court would have admitted
such a person. It is again the High Court that can strike or suspend the

1 Jasat v Natal Law Society 2000 (3) SA 44 (SCA) para 10, Botha v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2009 (1) SA
227 (SCA) (23 September 2008), The Law Society of the Northern Provinces v Morabadi (1151/2017) [2018] ZASCA
185 (11 December 2018), Summerley v Law Society of the Northern Provinces 2006 (5) SA 613 (SCA).

legal practitioner from practicing after an application would have been
made before the High Court.

[15] The High Court is empowere d in terms of section 44 of the LPA to
adjudicate upon a matter that involves a legal practitioner, candidate
legal practitioner or a juristic entity. The provisions of section 44 of the
LPA read as follows:

Powers of the High Court
“44. (1) The provisions of this Act do not derogate in any way from the
power of the High Court to adjudicate upon and make orders in respect of
matters concerning the conduct of a legal practitioner, candidate legal
practitioner or a juristic entity.

(2) Nothing contained in this Act precludes a complainant or a legal
practitioner, candidate legal practitioner or juristic entity from applying to
the High Court for appropriate relief in connection with any complaint or
charge of misconduct against a legal practitioner, candidate legal
practitioner or juristic entity or in connection with any decision of a
disciplinary body, the Ombud or the Council in connection with such
complaint or charge”.

[16] In Legal Practice Council v Motlhabani 2, on paragraph 25 of the judgmen t
the court said the following:

“The suspension and removal/striking off application constituted sui
generis disciplinary proceedings which becomes the Court’s proceedings.
These proceedings are merely referred by the applicant to the court.
When the applicant exercises its discretion to refer the alleged offending
conduct to the Court for the court to make a decision on whether the
practitioner should be suspended and or removed/strike off as not being a
fit and proper person to continue to practice as an attorney…”

[17] This Division in the case of The South African Legal Practice Council and
Eric Matobola Mampana3, in interpreting the provisions of section 44(1) of
the LPA on paragraphs 15 and 16 of the judgment succinctly said the
following:

“[15] It follows that the mere fact that there were rulings or findings
made at a prior disciplinary meeting, does not presuppose that the Court
should blindly follow those rulings and simply determine the appropriate
remedy. The Court must still analyse the a ctual conduct of the legal
practitioner


2 (UM 148/2018) [2020] ZANWHC 76 (7 May 2020).
3 (3638/2023) [2025] ZALMPPHC 61 (26 March 2025).

[16] At this juncture, it is apposite to note that the applications for the
striking of an attorney’s name from the roll of legal practitioners are not
ordinary civil proceedings. They are proceedings of a disciplinary nature
and are sui generis” (the court quoted that extract from the case of Law
Society, Transvaal v Matthews 1989 (4) SA 389 (T) at 393 D-E).

[18] The fact that the suspension or striking off application is sui generis in
nature as the applicant i s not an ordinary litigant but performs a public
duty was also recently confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal on 16
October 2026 in Bouwer v The South African Legal Practice Council 4. The
same Court had already earlier remarked on the public function that the
applicant performs in these kinds of applications in Botha v Law Society,
Northern Provinces 5. It follows that even if the institution of this
application was because of the recommendation that flowed from the
disciplinary hearing that was flawed, t he powers that are vested in the
High Court to hear this application are not diminished or derogated by
that.

[19] The other issue that the respondents raised relating to the point in limine
is that in the disciplinary hearing Mr. Grobler who was the witness of the
applicant was allowed to cross examine the first respondent, and that is
according to the respondents a shortcoming in that disciplinary process.

4 (1050/2024) [2026] ZASCA 141 (16 October 2026).
5 (446/2007) [2008] ZASCA 106 (23 September 2008).

In Botha v Law Society of the Northern Provinces, supra, on paragraph 14
of the judgment, the court said the following:

“. . . an applicant law society is entitled to apply for a respondent
attorney to be called for cross -examination under Unform Rule 6(5)(g).
That right may usefully be invoked where the facts alleged in the
attorneys answering affidavit fall peculiarly within such attorney’s
knowledge and suspicion attaches to their veracity”

[20] The process of how the disciplinary hearing is conducted is governed by
LPR 41.8 as rightly submitted by the applicant. The further submission by
the applicant is that the first respondent agreed to being cross -examined
by Mr. Grobler. If the principle that was to be applied in that disciplinary
hearing, on the fact that one has to be cross examined on aspects that
he/she has knowledge of, I believe that it was an established fact that
was not in dispute that Mr. Grobler as the complainant in the estate that
the respondents are handling, what he cross examined the first
respondent on, should have been the aspects falling within her personal
knowledge, because she is handling the estate in question. Even if this
court must accept that, that process in the disciplinary hearing was
flawed for whatever reasons mentioned by the respondents, the
proceedings in this court are not sacrosanct or dependant on the
disciplinary process that was held.

[21] The institution of the proceedings in the High Court are not dependant on
the recommendation of the DC. The application is brought before the High
Court on the basis that the applicant believes that the first respondent is
guilty of misconduct, whereby the High Court will be called upon to
enquire into the fitness to continue to hold office or practice as a legal
practitioner. The ultimate decision to evaluate the conduct of the
respondent and to determine whether she is a fit and proper person to
continue to practice as an attorney lies with the court 6. The statement fits
appropriately to the case at hand, because the court will decide if the first
respondent is fit and proper to continue practicing or not.

[22] In Malan v The Law Society of the Northern Provinces7, the court said that
that even in cases not involving dishonesty, a conservative approach
should be followed to stem an erosion of professional ethical values. In
my view the Malan decision fortifies the trite notion that these cases are
brought before the Courts to protect members of the public. The
respondents in the case at hand admit that the time period to note an
internal appeal to the LPC has lapsed, hence the respondents allege that
they electronically lodged a complaint with the office of the O mbud. The

6 The Legal Practice Council v Motlhabani, see fn. 2 supra.
7 [2008] ZASCA 90 para. 4.

objects of the Ombud are outlined in section 46 of the LPA, whereas
section 48 of the LPA deals with powers and functions of the Ombud.

[23] Section 46(a) of the LPA states that:

Objects of Ombud
“46. The objects of the Ombud are to-
(a) protect and promote the public interest in relation to the rendering of legal
services as contemplated in this Act;
(b) ensure the fair, efficient and effective investigation of complaints of alleged
misconduct against legal practitioners;
(c) promote high standards of integrity in the legal profession; and
(d) promote the independence of the legal profession”.

[24] The objects of the Ombud from the reading of the above provisions are
very clear that the Ombud must act in the interest of the public in relation
to the rendering of professional legal services. However, that must be
done in a fair manner when addressing complaints against legal
practitioners. A fair manner in my view means that all sides must be
considered in addressing the complaint. In my view that will still not
subrogate the Court proceedings, because the Courts are mandated to
determine the suitability of a legal practitioner to hold the office of a legal
practitioner or not.

[25] I therefore find that, the fact that the respondents referred the matter to
the Ombud does not bar the Court to proceed with the application lodged
against the respondents, because the decision of the Ombud cannot
override the court proceedings or the decision of the Court. I therefore
find that the referral to the Ombud cannot stop the proceedings that have
already been brought before the Court.

[26] The last segment of the point in limine that I want to deal with is as to
whether the disciplinary proceedings that was conducted by the applicant
constitutes an administrative action as contemplated in section 6 of the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 8 (PAJA). The court in the
Motlhabani case, supra, said that when the applicant exercises its
discretion to refer the alleged offending conduct to the Court for the Court
to make a decision on whether the practitioner should be suspended and
or removed/struck off as not being a fit and proper person to continue to
practice as an attorney, the exercising of such discretion does not
constitute a decision within the ambit of administrative action as defined
in section 1 of PAJA. In the case at hand, the submission by the
respondents that the disciplinary proceedings together with its
recommendation constitute an administrative action cannot be sustained.


8 3 of 2000.

[27] In paragraph 31 of the Motlhabani case, supra, the court went on to say
that:

“The Courts, including the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA), have
repeatedly pronounced that sui generis disciplinary proceedings are not
normal civil proceedings. The LPC (applicant) merely brings the attorney
before Court by virtue of a statutory right and informs the Court as to
what the attorney has allegedly done and asks the Court to exercise its
disciplinary power. It does not institute any action or civil suit against the
attorney. It merely submits to the Court facts which it contends constitute
unprofessional, dishonourable and unworthy conduct”


[28] For the reasons that I have outlined above, t he point in limine that was
raised by the respondents together with its segments, is bound to fail. On
the issue of costs, it is trite that the LPC do not approach the Court as
ordinary litigant but sui generis, to protect the public9. The point in limine
raised is not a novel issue which past case law did not deal with. In the
light of the fact that the issues raised in the point in limine are not novel
issues that have not been dealt with before, the respondents should have


9 Bouwer v The South African Legal Practice Council, see fn. 4, supra.

upon reflection foreseen that the point in limine will not pass the muster.
The point in limine was raised in my view to delay these proceedings. The
applicant has requested that the respondents pay the costs jointly and
severally, one paying for the other to be absolved, on an attorney and
client scale. I could not find any reason to deviate from the norm.

[29] In the result, the following order is made:

(i) The point in limine raised by the respondents is dismissed with
costs on attorney and client scale.

_____________________
J.T. NGOBENI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
LIMPOPO DIVISION

I agree

___________________________
T.C. MAPHELELA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
LIMPOPO DIVISION

APPEARANCES
For the applicant: Mr. Jan Stemmet
Instructed by: Stemmet & Osman Inc Attorneys
For the 1st & 2nd respondents: Mr. A.F. Rheeder
Instructed by: Rheeder Attorneys
Date heard: 21 August 2026
Date delivered: 03 November 2026