SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN
JUDGMENT
Case No: 2025-211850
In the matter between:
MONODEAL INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD Applicant
and
KARRIN TRADING CC First Respondent
and
COFFEE BOSS (PTY) LTD Second Respondent
BIZAFRIKA 1984 T/A JCI CHURCH Third Respondent
MOSES NKOMA Fourth Respondent
(AND ALL THOSE HOLDING TITLE OVER THEM)
ALL THOSE PERSONS WHOSE IDENTITIES ARE TO Fifth Respondent
THE APPLICANT UNKNOWN WHO ARE UNLAWFULLY
OCCUPYING THE PROPERTY COMMONLY KNOWN AS
3[...] V[...] ROAD, PLUMSTEAD, CAPE TOWN
CITY OF CAPE TOWN Sixth Respondent
Coram: NJOKWENI J
Heard: 14 May 2026
Delivered: 3 November 2026
Summary: Purchase and Sale of immovable property from liquidators – public
auction sale – liquidation of a close corporation and sequestration of its sole member
– commencement date of concursus creditorum – deeming provisions – section 348
of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 – Huur gaat voor koop – Lease-free purchase and
sale Prevention of Illegal Eviction Act 19 of 1998 – rei vindicatio – Punitive Costs
Order on the attorney-and-client scale, including costs of counsel on scale C.
ORDER
1. The application for a stay of these proceedings is dismissed.
2. The first to third respondents are declared to be unlawful occupiers in respect of
the immovable property situated at 3[...] V[...] Road, Plumstead, Cape Town
(“the property” ), in terms of the common law, including all those who hold
occupation through them but do not occupy the property as their primary
residence.
3. The first to third respondents, and all those holding occupation through them
(who do not occupy the property as their primary residence), are ordered and
directed to vacate the property by 13h00 on Friday 13 November 2026.
4. The fourth and fifth respondents, and all those holding occupation through them,
are declared unlawful occupiers in respect of the property under the Prevention
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.
5. The fourth and fifth respondents, and all those occupying the property through
them, are ordered to vacate the property by 13h00 on Friday 27 November 2026.
6. In the event that the first to third respondents, and all those holding occupation
through them (who do not occupy the property as their primary residence), fail to
vacate the property by 13h00 on Friday 13 November 2026, the Sheriff of this
Court (or his deputy) is authorised and directed to execute this order, to eject
them, and to hand over vacant possession to the applicant.
7. In the event that the fourth and fifth respondents, and all those holding
occupation through them, fail to vacate the property by 13h00 on Friday 27
November 2026, the Sheriff of this Court (or his deputy) is authorised and
directed to execute this order, to eject them, and to hand the property over to the
applicant in vacant possession.
8. The first to fifth respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this application,
jointly and severally (with the one paying the other to be absolved), on an
attorney-and-client scale, including the costs of counsel on scale C and, where
so employed, the cost of two counsel.
NJOKWENI J
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an opposed motion brought by the applicant, Monodeal Investments
(Pty) Ltd (“applicant”), seeking the eviction and ejectment of two juristic persons, The
JCI Church, and two natural persons, from immovable property at 3[...] V[...] Road,
Plumstead, Cape Town (“property”).
[2] The two juristic persons are as follows:
2.1 Karrin Trading CC as the first respondent (“close corporation”);
2.2 Coffee Boss (Pty) Ltd as the second respondent (“Coffee Boss”); and
[3] The JCI Church respondent is Bizafrika1984 (Pty) Ltd, trading as the JCI
Church, as the third respondent (“the JCI Church”) , and the following identified
known natural person and unknown natural persons:
3.1 Mr Moses Nkoma as the fourth respondent (“Mr Nkoma”); and
3.2 Persons whose identities are unknown to the applicant and who are unlawfully
occupying the property commonly known as 3[...] V[...] Road, Plumstead, Cape Town
as the fifth respondent (“unknown natural persons”).
[4] The unknown natural persons are cited in this application to ensure that such
persons receive notice of this application.
[5] The sixth respondent is the City of Cape Town , a Municipality established in
accordance with the Local Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998, read
with the City of Cape Town Establishment Notice (Provincial Notice 479 of 22
September 2000, as amended), situated on the […] Floor, The Podium, Civic Centre,
1[…] H[…] Boulevard, Cape Town, Western Cape (“City”). No substantive relief is
sought against the City, which is cited herein as a party by virtue of its duties as an
Organ of State under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act 19 of 1998 (“PIE”).
[6] The juristic persons , the JCI Church, Mr Nkoma , and the unknown natural
persons occupy the property , each claiming to hold it under leases granted by the
previous owner. I will henceforth refer to them collectively as the respondents and,
where necessary, individually as the juristic persons, the JCI Church, Mr Nkoma, and
the unknown natural persons . The applicant contends that the respondents’ leases
are invalid and that the respondents have no right to remain (“impugned leases”) .
Save for the eviction of the juristic persons and the JCI Church , t he applicant
contends that the eviction of Mr Nkoma and all unknown natural persons falls under
section 4 of the PIE.
THE RELEVANT FACTS
The applicant’s case
Ownership of the property
[7] JCI CC Network 100 CC, Reg. No. 2007/003077/23, is a close corporation
duly registered under the close corporation laws of the Republic of South Africa
(“JCICC”). Mr Jerome Benjamin Swartz was registered as its sole member (“Mr
Swartz”). JCICC was the registered owner of the property currently occupied by the
first to fifth respondents.
[8] On 9 June 2021, by order of this Court, JCICC was placed under provisional
liquidation in case number 4293/2021, and on 10 June 2021, this Court also placed
Mr Swartz under provisional sequestration. On 22 March 2024, JCICC was finally
liquidated by an order of the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA” ) in case number
1175/22. On 22 March 2024, Mr Swartz was finally sequestrated in terms of an SCA
order dated 22 March 2024.
[9] The JCICC Liquidators were appointed on 7 July 2021. The JCICC
Liquidators sold the property to the applicant at a public auction on 5 May 2025. The
property was registered in the applicant’s name on 24 July 2025. A copy of the Title
Deed was annexed to the founding affidavit. On that basis, the applicant is the lawful
registered owner of the property.
Unlawful occupation
Denied access
[10] When the applicant purchased the property from the liquidators , its directors
were unaware that the first to fifth respondents were occupying it. The applicant
discovered the occupation only after the purchase, when its directors attempted to
access the property on Wednesday, 23 July 2025 , to inspect it and assess the
necessary repairs. Ms “Rensia”, who claimed to be an occupant, refused them
access, and Mr Clint C ollins, who claimed to represent Mr Swartz, whom he
described as the lawful owner of the property, told them to request access from Mr
Swartz. This was the applicant’s first attempt, after the property was registered in its
name, to seek access, and all subsequent requests were likewise refused.
The access proceedings
[11] On 28 August 2025, the applicant brought an application in this Division under
case number 2025 -146043 seeking access to the property. The first to fourth
respondents opposed that application (“the access application”).
Impugned written lease agreements
The close corporation and Mr Nkoma’s lease
[12] In opposing the access application, the first to fourth respondents filed
opposing affidavits. Documents purporting to be leases were attached to those
affidavits, namely one between JCICC and the close corporation (“close corporation
lease”) and another between JCICC and Mr Nkoma (“Nkoma lease”).
Impugned oral leases
Coffee Boss and the JCI Church
[13] It was further alleged that the JCI Church and the Coffee Boss entered into
oral leases for space in the same property with JCICC. The Coffee Boss’s lease was
allegedly concluded on 1 July 2024 at an agreed monthly rent of R2800. The JCI
Church’s lease was allegedly concluded on 1 January 2023 at an agreed monthly
rent of R2500. The terms of these oral leases, mutatis mutandis, were allegedly
identical to those of the close corporation’s and Nkoma’s written leases.
[14] The close corporation contended that Mr Swartz entered into the close
corporation lease on 13 January 2021 and that it would have lapsed on 30 January
2025. On 3 January 2025, he also signed a purported addendum to the close
corporation lease, extending the initial period after it lapsed on 30 January 2025
(“addendum”). Nkoma contended that Mr Swartz also entered into his lease on an
unspecified date in June 2022. The applicant disputes the authenticity and validity of
all the aforementioned leases and the addendum.
[15] In the circumstances, the applicant contends that the purported leases and
the addendum were void ab initio and/or have lapsed, thereby rendering them invalid
and without legal force.
Notice to vacate and response
[16] Accordingly, on 19 August 2025, the applicant served a “Notice to vacate” on
the juristic persons , the JCI Church , and Nkoma . The Notice to vacate , inter alia ,
stated:
16.1 stated that they were unlawful occupiers under PIE;
16.2 cancelled any perceived right to occupy with immediate effect.
16.3 required them to vacate by 31 August 2025; and
16.4 notified that the applicant would otherwise apply to this court for eviction and
seek punitive costs.
[17] On the same date, 19 August 2025, the respondents ’ attorneys replied. They
stated that their clients were lawfully in occupation under a valid lease with JCICC,
and that this right was l awful and protected by law. The respond ents did not vacate
and remain in occupation, which the applicant alleges is rent-free.
Defendants have no legal right
[18] As the registered owner, the applicant contends that it is entitled to
possession. The first to fifth respondents occupy without the applicant’s consent and
have no right in law to remain in occupation. They contend that Mr Swartz concluded
the purported lease agreements after he was no longer a member of JCICC, and
that his joint estate with his wife was first placed under provisional sequestration in
June 2021 and later under final sequestration by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
March 2024. As a result, the applicant contends that no lease agreements exist
between the applicant and the respondents. The purported leases arise from a
liquidated entity and a sequestrated individual and are void ab initio or have lapsed.
Second, JCICC was placed under provisional liquidation on 10 June 2021 and later
under final liquidation by the SCA in March 2024.
[19] The applicant asserts that the juristic persons and the JCI Church must be
evicted under common law. However, Nkoma and the unknown natural persons must
be evicted under section 4 of the PIE.
Just and equitable requirement.
[20] The applicant acknowle dges that eviction will be granted only if it is just and
equitable, and that the court has discretion to determine the circumstances and the
date of eviction.
Alternative accommodation (s 4(6) and 4(7) PIE)
[21] The applicant submitted that the Fourth Respondent had not unlawfully
occupied the land for more than six months before proceedings were commenced,
as the applicant became owner only on 24 July 2025. Section 4(7) (and the question
of the land being made available by the City ) therefore does not arise. The applicant
nevertheless attached a Personal Circumstances Questionnaire for the City ’s use
and undertook to notify the City.
Prejudice to the applicant
[22] The respondents pay no rent and deny the applicant use and enjoyment of its
property. The applicant alone bears the monthly municipal accounts. The
respondents’ earlier refusal to grant access without a court order suggests they will
delay eviction as long as possible, and their continued occupation violates the
applicant's property rights under section 25 of the Constitution. As a result, the
applicant contends that it is prejudiced by the respondents’ conduct. The applicant
asserts that it has been more than fair and that the respondents have shown “blatant
disregard” for its demands, which it offers as the basis for a punitive costs order.
The respondents’ defences
[23] The respondents request that the application be dismissed with costs. In
addition to the impugned leases, the grounds of opposition of the first to fifth
respondents are set out below.
Stay of the application
[24] First, the applicant bought the property from JCICC's liquidators. The
respondents contend that the June 2021 provisional sequestration and liquidation
orders were discharged by Goliath DJP on 4 May 2022 (“the discharge orders”).
Standard Bank of South Africa, which was the int ervening party in those
proceedings, appealed the discharge orders. However, the respondents contend that
they have filed an application to rescind the discharge order the SCA overturned
(“rescission application”).
[25] The rescission application was set down for hearing on 21 May 2026. If
successful, it would remove the basis of the applicant's purchase and render this
application obsolete. The respondents say this application should stand over until
then. However, at the time of preparing this judgment, the respondents had not
advised this Court of the outcome of the rescission application.
Defective notice
[26] The respondents contend that the Notice to Vacate:
26.1 Was never addressed to the Second and Third Respondents.
26.2 It did not cancel their rights or require them to vacate.
26.3 As against the First Respondent, it proceeds under PIE rather than cancelling
the lease on commercial or common-law grounds.
26.4 It says nothing about the leases, even though the applicant needed to
address them.
Huur gaat voor koop
[27] The respondents contend that the sale of the property to the applicants by the
liquidators of JCICC did not terminate their impugned “existing leases”. They
contend that this is entrenched in clause 29 of the lease, which provides that the
lease's validity is not affected by a transfer following a sale.
No valid ground to terminate the lease
[28] The respondents rely on clause 30 of the lease, which, inter alia, allegedly
provides that the insolvency of the lessor or lessee does not terminate the lease.
This, so the respondents contend, answers the applicant's argument that liquidation
and sequestration terminate the lease. They further rely on clause 21.1: the lessee
may renew. The respondents contend that the addendum is the exercise of the
renewal option, and the applicant does not deny that a renewal is valid.
[29] The respondents further contend that the applicant has failed to comply with
the breach procedure in clause 20, which, inter alia, provides that, in the event of a
breach, the applicant's remedy lies under this clause, and that the applicant has not
invoked it.
PIE non-compliance and no municipal report
[30] The respondents list procedural non -compliance with PIE as a ground but
develop only the homelessness argument. They have not filed a housing report,
even though the City has, and they say that eviction would leave them homeless.
Relying on Occupiers of Erven 87 and 88 Berea v De Wet NO and Baron v Claytile 1,
they argue that the court must investigate the circumstances, that the organ of state
must report on the impact on vulnerable occupiers and on alternative
accommodation, and that, without this information, the court cannot find eviction just
and equitable. They submit that the lack of this information is itself a valid defence.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
[31] This application concerns the validity of the impugned leases and the
addendum. Accordingly, the issues for determination have crystallised as follows:
31.1 Whether the determination of this application should be suspended pending
the outcome of the rescission application 4 May 2022.
31.2 Whether the addendum to the close corporation lease entered into on 3
January 2025 is void ab initio, invalid, or has lapsed.
31.3 Whether the Nkoma lease concluded in June 2022 is void ab initio, invalid, or
has lapsed.
1 (CCT241/16) [2017] ZACC 24.
31.4 Whether the oral leases of both Coffee Boss and the JCI Church are void ab
initio, invalid, or have lapsed.
[32] If the leases of the first to fourth respondents are found void ab initio, invalid,
or lapsed:
32.1 Whether the huur gaat voor koop is applicable.
32.2 Whether the respondents have a legal right to remain in occupation of the
premises.
[33] If the respondents have no legal right of occupation, are they unlawful
occupiers?
[34] If the respondents are found to be unlawful occupiers, whether:
34.1 The applicant has met the common -law requirements for the eviction of the
first to third respondents, the close corporation, Coffee Boss and the JCI
Church.
34.2 The applicant has complied with the procedural requirements of section 4 PIE
(including the section 4(2) notice and service on the City ) for the eviction of the
fourth and fifth respondents, Nkoma and the unknown natural persons.
34.3 It is just and equitable to evict the fourth respondent, having regard to all
relevant circumstances, including his personal circumstances and any
vulnerable occupants. If so, the date by which the first to fifth respondents must
vacate the property.
34.4 Costs should be awarded against the respondents jointly and severally on the
attorney-and-client scale.
THE LAW AND ANALYSIS
Stay of the application
[35] I will first address the issue of a stay of this application. To do so, it is
appropriate to briefly outline the background to a series of previous applications in
this Division involving Mr Swartz’ sequestration and the close corporations under his
control.
[36] Mr Swartz and Mrs Lucille Swartz were married in community of property, so
they shared a single joint estate. The joint estate held a 100% members' interest in
two CCs, namely Pygon Trading CC and JCICC. Mr Swartz was the controlling mind
of the CCs and of several other entities. The CCs and the joint estate all banked with
Standard Bank.
[37] JCICC Network 100 CC was one of two close corporations wholly owned by
the joint estate, with Pygon Trading CC the other. Pygon was the first CC to be
liquidated. Pygon owned three sections in the Montana Sectional Title Scheme. The
Montana Body Corporate launched its liquidation application on 2 October 2020
under case number 14097/2020. Standard Bank later intervened and, on 18 May
2021, obtained a provisional liquidation order after the Body Corporate withdrew
(“Pygon liquidation”).
[38] On 9 June 2021, JCICC was placed under provisional liquidation in case
number 4293/2021. On 10 June 2021, at Standard Bank’s request, the joint estate of
Mr Swartz and Mrs Swartz was provisionally sequestrated in case number
4294/2021 (“joint estate”).
[39] On 14 June 2021, Mr Swartz sought leave to intervene in the Pygon
liquidation application to file a business rescue application. Leave was never
granted. On 21 October 2021, the provisional trustees reported that Pygon was
hopelessly insolvent, with no prospect of rescue, and did not support the application.
[40] On 23 November 2021, a settlement agreement was made an order of court
by consent. Its terms, inter alia, were:
40.1 The business rescue application for Pygon was withdrawn.
40.2 R18 million plus VAT was to be paid by a set date…
40.3 If it had been paid, the provisional orders against Pygon, JCICC and the joint
estate would have been discharged . If it had not been paid, final liquidation
and sequestration orders would have been granted against Pygon, JCICC and
the joint estate. The R18 million was never paid. All three applications for final
liquidation of Pygon and JCICC and for final sequestration of the joint estate
were consolidated and heard together before Goliath DJP on 4 May 2022 . On
the same day , despite Mr Swartz's breach of the settlement agreement and
consent order, she granted the discharge orders , placed Pygon in business
rescue, and ordered the bank to pay all costs. The judgment blamed the bank's
closure of the accounts for the financial woes. It did not mention the settlement
or the consent order.
[41] Aggrieved by the discharge orders issued on 4 May 2022 , Standard Bank
appealed to the SCA in case number 1175/2022 . On 22 March 2024, the SCA
upheld Standard Bank ’s appeal with costs and set aside the discharge orders. It
found that none of the discharge orders was competent for two reasons:
41.1 Business rescue order (Pygon): it was granted on a non -existent application.
Swartz was never given leave to intervene, and the 23 November 2021 consent
order had, in any event, withdrawn the application.
41.2 Discharge of the JCICC and joint estate provisional orders: the High Court
had no jurisdiction to decide the merits of disputes already settled by the
transactio, which had been made an order of court. That order was never
rescinded, appealed against or abandoned, and the R18 million was never paid.
[42] The SCA held that the appeal must succeed and that the discharge orders
must be set aside. The order of 23 November 2021 and the consent order relating to
it must be given effect, under which the CCs are to be placed in final liquidation and
the joint estate finally sequestrated. Accordingly, JCICC was placed under fi nal
liquidation, and the joint estate of Mr and Mrs Swartz was finally sequestrated.
[43] Mr Swartz never applied for reconsideration of the SCA judgment and orders,
nor did he appeal to the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, the SCA orders confirmed
the commencement of the concursus creditorum, which is the date on which the
applications for the JCICC and the sequestration of Mr Swartz’s joint estate were
filed in this Division. At most, the concursus commenced on 9 and 10 June 2021,
when the provisional orders of liquidation of JCICC and the sequestration of Mr
Swartz’s joint estate were issued.
[44] Notwithstanding the SCA orders, the respondents continue to labour under
the illusion that the discharge orders remain in force and legally binding. The
respondents stated the following in the answering affidavit:
“[16] … On or about 4 May 2022, the provisional winding -up order against JCICC
was discharged, whereas the lease was entered into in or around June 2022. Thus,
if, at the time of signing the lease agreement, business was as usual, the applicant’s
contention regarding contractual capacity, or a lack thereof, holds no water.”
[45] In their heads of argument, the defendants, inter alia, submit the following:
“3. JCICC has launched a rescission and variation application regarding the
discharge orders to circumvent the impugned contractual capacity of Mr Swartz, who
concluded the leases on behalf of JCICC. They argue that , if the discharge orders
are rescinded, the SCA order placing Mr Swartz under final sequestration and JCICC
under final liquidation would have no legal effect. Thus, they argue, the impugned
lack of authority of Mr Swartz would be dealt a fatal blow.
4. The y submitted that the rescission application was set to be heard in the 4 th
Division of the above Honourable Court on 21 May 2026, and if successful would
remove the substratum upon which the Applicant purchased the premises and make
the present matter obsolete.”
[46] The submission is embarrassing because the now SCA-set-aside discharged
orders were, in fact, in the JCICC’s favour and in Mr Swartz’s favour. Had the SCA
not overturned them, Mr Swartz's authority and contractual capacity to enter into the
lease agreements in question would have been confirmed, and the leases would
have been valid and binding.
[47] The SCA-set-aside discharged orders no longer exist and therefore cannot be
rescinded or varied. The respondents’ defence seeking a stay of this application has
no merit. Accordingly, the respondents’ defence seeking a stay is dismissed.
The status of the Nkoma June 2022 lease agreement
The Illusion of “Business as Usual”
[48] The Nkoma lease was allegedly entered into on an unspecified date in June
2022. JCICC, placed under provisional liquidation on 10 June 2021, was represented
by Mr Swartz, who was also placed under provisional sequestration on 9 June 2021.
Nkoma contends that, at the time the Nkoma lease was concluded, the discharge
orders were still pending, making it “business as usual” for Mr Swartz to represent
JCICC in entering into the Nkoma lease.
[49] This argument misapprehends the retroactive effect of the SCA’s substitution
order. On 22 March 2024 , the SCA held that the court which granted the discharge
orders lacked competence and jurisdiction, because the parties were bound by an
unrescinded consent order dated 23 November 2021.
[50] When the SCA set aside the discharge orders and substituted them with final
liquidation and sequestration orders in respect of JCICC and Mr Swartz , the
concursus creditorum (“concursus”) was deemed to have commenced at the time of
the presentation to the court of the application for the winding-up2. Unfortunately, that
date is not apparent from the papers, and because it is unspecified, the
commencement of the concursus is deemed to be no later than 9 June 2021 and 10
June 202 1, the dates on which the provisional orders were initially issued. 3 Its
commencement is retroactively determined by statutory deeming provisions:
JCICC (Liquidation)
50.1 Section 348 of the Companies Act4 provides that the winding-up of a company
is deemed to commence when the application for winding -up is presented to the
court.
The Joint Estate (Mr Swartz Sequestration)
50.2 While a provisional order creates a holding pattern, the final order fixes
the concursus creditorum retroactively to the date of filing the application,
thereby crystallising the rights of all parties as they stood at that moment in
2021. Any contract entered into by a member after that 2021 filing date is
structurally compromised, and any contract entered into after the provisional
orders of 9 and 10 June 2021 is an absolute nullity due to the total cessation of
the member's powers.
2 “Presentation” means the exact date and time the application was filed and stamped by the Registrar.
3 Section 348 of the Companies Act, No. 61 of 1973 provides:
“A winding -up of a company by the Court shall be deemed to commence at the time of the presentation to
the Court of the application for the winding-up”.
4 Act 61 of 1973 (read with Section 66 of the Close Corporations Act).
[51] Consequently, the legal fiction that JCICC was operating normally in June
2022 is extinguished. Ex lege, the members' powers under JCICC ceased upon the
commencement of the concursus. Mr Swartz lacked the authority and contractual
capacity to enter into any agreements on behalf of JCICC when he purported to
execute the Nkoma lease in June 2022. Accordingly, the lease is void ab initio.
The validity of the addendum to the close corporation lease
[52] This addendum to the close corporation lease was concluded on 3 January
2025. Mr Swartz was placed under provisional sequestration on 10 June 2021 and
finally sequestrated by the SCA order of 22 March 202 4. The law draws a sharp line
at that moment: the hand of the law is laid upon the estate, the corporate powers of
the members cease by operation of law, and no single member retains the capacity
to alienate, encumber, or lease out the assets of the corporation. From at least 10
June 2021, alternatively from 22 March 202 4, Mr Swartz ex lege could not execute
lease agreements for JCICC. This was because he was sequestrated and could not
be a member of a close corporation. In addition, when he executed the addendum,
the JCICC liquidators were already in office. They were appointed on 7 July 2021.
[53] Consequently, the purported "window" of normality in June 2022 relied on by
the respondents is a legal fiction. By virtue of the SCA’ s final order, JCICC was in
liquidation, and Mr Swartz’s estate has been sequestrated continuously from the
2021 filing date to the present. Mr Swartz lacked even the vestige of contractual
capacity (animus contrahendi) and thus had no residual corporate power to execute
the 2025 addendum required to bind the corporation. As a result, the addendum did
not make it out of the delivery ward; it was stillborn. Accordingly, the addendum is
null and void ab initio.
The status of the oral lease agreements
(The JCI Church and Coffee Boss Leases)
[54] The purported oral lease of the JCI Church expired on 1 January 2023, and
that of Coffee Boss on 1 July 2024. These should s hare the same fate as the leases
of the close corporation and Nkoma. Mr Swartz was a deeply disqualified person
under Section 47(1)(b)(i) of the Close Corporations Act and had no residual
management powers. Concluding oral leases under these c ircumstances is not
merely void ab initio; it borders on criminal contempt and fraud.
[55] Ordinarily, under Section 54 of the Close Corporations Act, a third party can
rely on the doctrine of ostensible authority when dealing with a registered member in
good faith. However, liquidation entirely overrides this protection. A liquidation order
is a judgment in rem (affecting the status of the entity itself) and is published in the
Government Gazette, which serves as notice to the entire world.5
[56] Because Mr Swartz's legal authority to bind JCICC was formally revoked by
operation of law, he had neither actual nor apparent authority. A person cannot
validly enter into a contract on behalf of an entity that is already legally frozen in
liquidation. Because the leases are void ab initio, they do not legally exist. Therefore,
the Liquidators do not need to “void” or cancel the leases. The Liquidator can simply
ignore them, as a non-existent contract cannot bind the insolvent estate.
5 De Jager Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mark 1952(3) SA 471 (WLD) F-G. Also see: Mars on Insolvency, 4th Ed., 167.
The huur gaat voor koop defence
[57] The respondents also rely on the common -law maxim huur gaat voor
koop (lease trumps sale), arguing that the new owner is bound to honour their
occupancy under the impugned leases. For huur gaat voor koop to apply, there must
be a valid, legally binding lease in existence at the time the property is transferred, or
the estate is wound up. However, this defence fails entirely due to a fatal timing
defect: huur gaat voor koop only protects leases that were validly concluded bef ore
the sale or the owner's insolvency.
[58] As established, because JCICC had already been liquidated and its sole
member, Mr Swartz, had also been sequestrated when the leases were signed, the
leases were void ab initio (non-existent in the eyes of the law). One cannot
enforce huur gaat voor koop on the basis of a void contract. Legally, there was no
“huur” (lease) to go before the “koop” (sale). This defence has no merit and is
accordingly dismissed.
The respondents’ legal right of occupation
[59] The respondents rely on the purported leases between JCICC and the first to
fourth respondents. However, the leases are void ab initio, and therefore never
existed and still do not.
Applicant’s clean title
[60] When the liquidators sold the property to the applicant, they did so under the
statutory powers conferred by the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 and the Companies Act
61 of 1973. Liquidators have a statutory mandate to liquidate ass ets to pay
outstanding creditors. Because the liquidators were never bound by the leases
purportedly concluded after the liquidation of JCICC and the sequestration of Mr
Swartz, they sold the property free and clear of any leasehold encumbrances. As a
result, the applicant acquired clean, unencumbered ownership rights upon
registration of the property in its name.
The respondents' occupation status
[61] Because the purported underlying leases are nullities, the respondents are
not lawful lessees. Under the PIE Act, they are classified as unlawful occupiers. The
applicant, as the new owner and registered title deed holder, has the absolute right
to vindicate its property (rei vindicatio) and to evict anyone occupying it without lawful
cause or consent. As a result, all natural persons are liable to be evicted under the
PIE Act.
The bifurcated legal framework
PIE Act v Common Law
[62] A complicating feature of this application is the respondents’ mixed identities.
The First Respondent is a close corporation, the Second a private company, and the
Third a church. These are “juristic” entities. By contrast, the Fourth Respondent (Mr
Swartz) and the Fifth Respondent are natural persons. Consequently, this Court is
required to apply a bifurcated legal framework to the relief sought.
Common law requirements
[63] With respect to the first, second, and third respondents, the PIE Act does not
apply. Juristic persons cannot reside in a property or be homeless. The eviction of
the corporate and institutional respondents is governed strictly by the common -
law rei vindicatio. As previously determined, the applicant has proven ownership, the
entities are in possession, and the underlying leases are void ab initio. The common-
law requirements for their ejectment are fully met.
PIE Act eviction
[64] With respect to the fourth and fifth respondents (Nkoma and other unknown
natural persons ), the applicant must satisfy both the procedural and substantive
thresholds under Section 4 of the PIE Act. Procedurally, this Court is satisfied that
the mandatory Section 4(2) notices were duly authorised by this Court and served by
the Sheriff on the fourth and fifth respondents, as well as on the local municipality,
thereby clearly exceeding the statutory 14 -day notice period. Notwithstanding,
Nkoma and the unknown natural persons have refused to complete the municipal
eviction questionnaire for alternative emergency housing. The applicant has
therefore complied with the PIE Act requirements. The refusal to complete and
submit the said forms is a stratagem to hide behind the alleged homelessness.
[65] The alleged homelessness is undermined by the very basis of the fourth and
fifth respondents’ reliance on the purported lease agreement(s), which have been
found to be null and void ab initio . Under the purported lease agreement(s), the
fourth respondent undertook to pay a monthly rent of R3000 for five years. Th is
equates to an annual rent of R36 000 and R180 000 over five years. Yet they occupy
the property rent-free. This places the respondents in an irreconcilable paradox: they
cannot simultaneously claim to be indigent, vulnerable occupiers on the brink of
homelessness while asserting the financial capacity and commercial intent to
maintain a long-term lease of significant value.
[66] Furthermore, when given the opportunity to participate in the statutory
verification processes designed to protect truly vulnerable persons, the fourth and
fifth respondents explicitly refused to complete the municipal emergency housing
questionnaires. It is trite that where occupiers refuse to provide the court or the local
municipality with accurate information about their personal and financial
circumstances, they cannot frustrate an owner's vindicatory rights by raising an
unsubstantiated shield of homelessness.
[67] The PIE Act is designed to ensure equity and humanity; it is not a mechanism
for sophisticated litigators to abuse in an attempt to entrench an occupation arising
from a post-liquidation contract entered into by a disqualified, sequestered individual.
By refusing to disclose their true financial position to the municipality while
simultaneously asserting the validity of an R180,000 lease, the respondents have
failed to establish a factual basis for concluding that an eviction would not be just
and equitable. Consequently, their plea of homelessness is rejected as
disingenuous. The applicant’s right to their property under Section 25 of the
Constitution must prevail.
[68] Substantively, Section 4(7) of the PIE Act requires this Court to determine
whether an eviction is "just and equitable" after considering all relevant
circumstances. While the Court is mindful of the disruptions caused by eviction, the
fourth respondent cannot use the PIE Act to entrench an occupation arising from
statutory disqualification and a total lack of contractual capacity. Mr Swartz was a
sequestered insolvent who purported to execute leases on behalf of an entity already
frozen in liquidation. To deny an eviction in these circumstances would be to
sanction commercial fraud and severely prejudice a bona fide commercial purchaser
who holds clean title deeds.
Abuse of court process and the just and equitable date
[69] The respondents have been unlawfully occupying the applicant's property at
least since July 2025. This application was heard , and judgment was reserved, in
May 2026. Due to the unfortunate and unavoidable three -month absence of the
presiding judge for circuit court duties , it is now November 2026. The respondents
have used this administrative delay, alongside a series of unmeritorious defences, as
a tactical shield to stall their inevitable fate. They have enjoyed over 16 months of
rent-free unlawful occupation at the expense of a bona fide commercial purchaser.
The just and equitable eviction date
[70] Having found the respondents to be unlawful occupiers , the Court must
determine a “just and equitable” eviction date under Section 4(7) of the PIE Act . In
doing so, the Court must balance the occupiers’ rights against the severe financial
prejudice suffered by the owner. Given that the respondents have had notice of their
lack of tenure since the SCA judgment of 22 March 2024 and have benefited from an
extended litigation stay, an immediate, compressed move -out timeline is entirely
justified. 30 November 2026 provides the respondents with sufficient, humane
opportunity to vacate while preventing further abuse of the court process.
CONCLUSION
[71] In conclusion, having considered all the relevant facts, the law, and the
conspectus of the evidence on the papers, I am satisfied that the order I am about to
make is just and equitable , and that an eviction order be granted against the fourth
and fifth respondents, alongside the eviction and ejectment of the first to third
respondents. The distinction in their statuses will, however, be reflected in the time
allowed to vacate the premises.
ORDER
[72] In these circumstances, the following order is made:
1. The application for a stay of these proceedings is dismissed.
2. The first to third respondents are declared to be unlawful occupiers in respect of
the immovable property situated at 3[...] V[...] Road, Plumstead, Cape Town
(“the property” ), in terms of the common law, including all those who hold
occupation through them but do not occupy the property as their primary
residence.
3. The first to third respondents, and all those holding occupation through them
(who do not occupy the property as their primary residence) , are ordered and
directed to vacate the property by 13h00 on Friday 13 November 2026.
4. The fourth and fifth respondents, and all those holding occupation through them ,
are declared unlawful occupiers in respect of the property under the Prevention
of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.
5. The fourth and fifth respondents, and all those holding occupation through them,
are ordered to vacate the property by 13h00 on Friday 27 November 2026.
6. In the event that the first to third respondents, and all those holding occupation
through them (who do not occupy the property as their primary residence), fail to
vacate the property by 13h00 on Friday 13 November 2026, the Sheriff of this
Court (or his deputy) is authori sed and directed to execute this order, to eject
them, and to hand over vacant possession to the applicant.
7. In the event that the fourth and fifth respondents, and all those holding
occupation through them, fail to vacate the property by 13h00 on Friday 27
November 2026, the Sheriff of this Court (or his deputy) is authorised and
directed to execute this order, to eject them, and to hand the property over to the
applicant in vacant possession.
8. The first to fifth respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this application,
jointly and severally ( with the one paying the other to be absolved), on an
attorney-and-client scale, including the costs of counsel on scale C and, where
so employed, the cost of two counsel.
________________________
P NJOKWENI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Appearances
For the Applicant: Mr M Holland
Instructed by: Parker Attorneys Incorporated
For the first to fifth respondents: Mr William Fisher
Instructed by: Marius Abrahams & Associates
For the sixth respondent: No appearance