SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private det ails of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case No.: A39/2026
Court a quo Case No: 1938/2024
In the matter between:
ALBERTUS JACOBUS SNYMAN First Appellant
RONEL RAUTENBACH Second Appellant
And
MARIUS ALEXANDER JOOSTENBERG First Respondent
DANREE CATHERINE JOOSTENBERG Second Respondent
NEDBANK LIMITED Third Respondent
DRAKENSTEIN MUNICIPALITY Fourth Respondent
Coram: Francis J et Mthimunye AJ
Heard: 30 September 2026
Delivered: 3 November 2026
ORDER
1. To the extent that condonation is required, the appellants' failure to apply for a
date of hearing within the period prescribed by Uniform Rule 50(4)(a) is
condoned.
2. The application to adduce further evidence is granted under s 87(c) of the
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 read with s 19(b) of the Superior Courts Act
10 of 2013. The affidavit of Albertus Jacobus Snyman dated 2 April 2026, with its
annexures, and the municipal valuation, bond statement and municipal rates
statement furnished after the hearing, are admitted as part of the record on
appeal.
3. The appeal is upheld.
4. The order of the Magistrates' Court for the District of the Cape Winelands, sub -
district Drakenstein, held at Paarl under case number 1938/2024 on 21 October
2025, including its order as to costs, is set aside and replaced with the following:
"(a) The immovable property described as the Remainder of Erf 1[...] Paarl, in the
Drakenstein Municipality, Division Paarl, Province of the Western Cape,
measuring 535 (five hundred and thirty -five) square metres, held by Deed of
Transfer No. T[...], also known as 4[...] K[...] P[...] Avenue, Klein Parys, Paarl, is
declared specially executable in satisfaction of the unpaid balance of the
judgment granted against the first respondent on 12 December 2024 under case
number 1938/2024, together with interest and costs recoverable under that
judgment, after crediting all payments received.
(b) A reserve price of R1 000 000.00 (one million rand) is set for the sale in
execution.
(c) The property may be attached, and the steps preparatory to a sale in execution
may be taken, but no sale in execution of the property shall take place before 1
March 2027.
(d) The clerk of the court is authorised to issue a warrant of execution against the
property, subject to paragraphs (b) and (c) and to rules 43 and 43A.
(e) Any party, including the third and fourth respondents, may on notice to all other
parties, and before a sale in execution takes place, apply to this court for the
reserve price to be reconsidered in the light of updated information as to the
amounts owing under the mortgage bond registered over the property and to the
local authority in respect of rates and other dues.
(f) If the reserve price is not achieved at the sale in execution, rule 43A(9)(c) to (e)
shall apply.
(g) The first respondent shall pay the applicants' costs of the application on the party
and party scale."
5. There is no order as to the costs of the condonation application.
6. The first respondent shall pay the appellants' costs of the appeal, including the
costs of the application to adduce further evidence, on the party and party scale,
with counsel's fees on scale B.
7. Paragraph 2 of this Court's order of 28 August 2026, concerning the wasted costs
occasioned by the postponement on that date, remains operative. Those costs
shall not be recovered again under paragraph 6 of this order.
JUDGMENT
FRANCIS J (MTHIMUNYE, AJ concurring):
Introduction
[1] This appeal is against the whole judgment and order of the Magistrates' Court for the
District of the Cape Winelands, sub -district Drakenstein, held at Paarl. The order was
made on 21 October 2025 and written reasons followed on 18 November 2025. The
magistrate dismissed the appellants ’ application to have the first and second
respondents’ home declared specially executable.
[2] The property is the Remainder of Erf 1[...] Paarl, also known as 4[...] K[...] P[...]
Avenue, Klein Parys, Paarl. The first and second respondents are married in community
of property. They own the property jointly and live in it. The judgment debt arises from a
settlement agreement concluded on 24 June 2024, under which the first respondent
undertook to pay the appellants R165 000 by 15 August 2024. He did not pay, and the
court granted default judgment against him on 12 December 2024 for R165 143.50, with
interest and costs. The judgment was taken against the first respondent alone. Becau se
the spouses are married in community of property, the property forms part of their joint
estate. Where a debt is recoverable from a joint estate, s 17(5) of the Matrimonial
Property Act 88 of 1984 permits the spouse who incurred it to be sued alone. The
second respondent is not a judgment debtor. She was joined because the home in
which she lives, and in which she holds an undivided half share, is the property against
which execution is sought. Her interests are directly affected, and I give them
throughout the same weight as her husband's.
[3] The Court heard two interlocutory applications with the appeal. The first seeks
condonation for the late prosecution of the appeal. The second is for leave to adduce
further evidence on appeal, namely the respondents’ payment history after the order
under appeal. In this judgment, ‘the respondents’ means the first and second
respondents unless the context shows otherwise.
[4] The appeal was first set down for 28 August 2026. The respondents' attorneys had
withdrawn on 22 January 2026. The matter was postponed to 30 September 2026 to
allow the respondents to obtain legal representation, with the respondents ordered to
pay the wasted costs of the postponement. On 30 September 2026, the respondents
appeared in person. They had not secured representation and elected to proceed on
their own. We explained the nature of the appeal, the two interlocutory applications and
the order the appellants sought, and we heard them in full. The third respondent,
Nedbank Limited, and the fourth respondent, Drakenstein Municipality, have recorded in
writing that they do not oppose the relief sought. No relief is sought against either of
them.
[5] The property is a primary residence. Section 26 of the Constitution, as interpreted in
Jaftha v Schoeman and Others; Van Rooyen v Stoltz and Others 2005 (2) SA 140 (CC);
and Gundwana v Steko Development CC and Others 2011 (3) SA 608 (CC), requires
judicial oversight before a home is sold in execution. That duty does not lessen because
the debtors are unrepresented. It is, if anything, more exacting, because no legal
representative was there to test the creditors' account of the facts. I have read the
record with that in mind.
[6] The first respondent, Mr Joostenberg, represented both respondents at the hearing.
He admitted the debt. He said that he and the second respondent live at the property
with their two children, aged 9 and 11. He expects his mother to also come to live with
them but is waiting for a hospital report before that can be decided. He is unemployed.
The second respondent is employed and earns R22 000 a month, of which R12 000
remains after deductions. He asked the Court to consolidate all his debts and work out a
repayment plan. He put forward no figure of his own.
[7] During the hearing, we asked for documents showing the property's current
municipal valuation, the balance owing on the mortgage bond, and the state of the rates
account. They were furnished after the hearing. The appellants and the respondents
each provided the municipal valuation of R1 425 000. The respondents provided the
municipal rates statement, and the third respondent's quarterly home loan statement
dated 31 August 2026. The rates statement shows that the account is up to date. The
bond statement shows an outstanding balance of R236 614.89, after interest debited on
1 September 2026. It records a monthly instalment of R3 979.46, interest at 12.25% per
annum, 129 months remaining on the loan term, and no arrears. I deal below with the
basis on which these documents are received.
[8] I deal in turn with condonation, the further evidence, the merits, the reserve price and
costs.
Condonation
[9] The notice of appeal was served and filed on 3 December 2025. On Sunday 1
February 2026, the appellants’ correspondents uploaded the documents initiating the
appeal on the Court Online portal under reference HCGS894663. The appellants filed
the documents in hard copy on 13 February 2026.
[10] Uniform Rule 50(1) requires a civil appeal from a Magistrates’ Court to be
prosecuted within 60 days after it is noted, failing which it is deemed to have lapsed.
Rule 50(4)(a) requires the appellant to apply in writing to the registrar for a hearing date
within 40 days of noting the appeal. If the appellant does not, rule 50(4)(b) permits the
respondent to apply at any time before the 60 -day period expires. Rule 50(5)(a) forbids
the registrar to assign a date until the provisions of rule 50(7)(a) to ( c) concerning the
record have been complied with. Rule 1 defines a ‘court day’ and provides that only
court days are counted when computing any period expressed in days in the Uniform
Rules.
[11] Counting only court days from 3 December 2025, and excluding the public holidays
on 16, 25 and 26 December 2025 and 1 January 2026, the 40 -day period ended on
Tuesday 3 February 2026. That is the date the appellants worked to. The 60 -day period
ended on Tuesday 3 March 2026. The appellants would have more time if the count
excluded the days from 16 December to 15 January . They are not left out. Rule 1
excludes only Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays. If the rule -maker meant to
exclude the December recess as well, it would have said so: rule 19(1) does so for the
notice of intention to defend, and rule 26 for the delivery of pleadings. Rule 50 has no
such provision. In Coetzee NO and Another v Saldanha Bay Municipality [2025]
ZAWCHC 434 para 14, this Division computed the 60 -day period excluding the recess,
but only to show that the appeal was out of time even on the more generous count. The
Court did not decide the point, and the rules do not support the exclusion. The 1
February 2026 upload fell within the 40-day period. The hard-copy filing on 13 February
2026 fell eight court days outside that period, but well within 60 days.
[12] The next question is whether an appeal lapses when the appellant misses the 40 -
day period in rule 50(4)(a) but applies for a date within the 60 days in rule 50(1). Other
Divisions have answered it differently. In Spamer v Olivier [2024] ZANWHC 236 para s
30-33, the North West Division held that the deeming provision in rule 50(1) is triggered
only when 60 days pass without prosecution, and that an appellant who misses the 40
days does not lose the appeal on that account. In Dique and Another v De Jager and
Another [2026] ZAMPMHC 21 paras 15 and 18, the Mpumalanga Division held rule 50
Another [2026] ZAMPMHC 21 paras 15 and 18, the Mpumalanga Division held rule 50
to be peremptory and struck an appeal from the roll in which the appellants had applied
for a date on day 47. Neither decision binds this Court , and this Division has not
decided the point. In Cape Cobra (Pty) Ltd v Landman [2007] ZAWCHC 57 paras 1 to 5,
the appellant applied for a date some six and a half months after noting the appeal, long
after both periods had expired. The Court treated the matter as one of condonation and
had no occasion to consider whether the 40-day period has consequences of its own.
[13] I prefer the approach in Spamer, for three reasons. First, rule 50(1) attaches
lapsing to one period only, the 60 days. Rule 50(4)(a) imposes a duty and says nothing
of lapsing. Second, rule 50(4)(b) allows the respondent to apply for a date at any time
before the 60 days expire, and rule 50(4)(c) then deems the appeal duly prosecuted.
Those provisions assume that the appeal is still alive after the 40th day. An appeal that
died on day 41 could not be duly prosecuted on day 50. Third, that rule 50 is
peremptory, as Dique rightly holds, does not tell us which consequence attaches to
which period. With respect, Dique's conclusion does not follow from its premise. The
appeal did not lapse, and no reinstatement was needed. What remains is whether the
appellants complied with rule 50(4)(a). That turns on whether the 1 February 2026
upload was effective. The record does not show when the notice excluding lower -court
appeals from the portal was published, or on what terms the portal was then accepting
such appeals. I therefore assume, against the appellants, that the upload was
ineffective and that they applied for a date eight court days late. That is a non -
compliance this Court may condone.
[14] This Court may condone any non -compliance with the Uniform Rules on good
cause shown (rule 27(3)). The relevant considerations are the degree of lateness, the
explanation for the lateness , the prospects of success, and any prejudice ( Melane v
Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1962 (4) SA 531 (A) at 532C-F).
[15] The explanation is satisfactory. The portal accepted the upload on 1 February 2026
and issued a confirmation. Hearing nothing further, the correspondents made enquiries.
On or about 13 February 2026, they learnt from a notice posted at the High Court that,
On or about 13 February 2026, they learnt from a notice posted at the High Court that,
for the time being, the electronic system excluded appeals from the lower courts, which
had to be filed in hard copy. They filed that day. A practitioner who files on a portal that
accepts the filing and confirms receipt cannot fairly be blamed for not anticipating an
exclusion published only on a notice board.
[16] The appellants were also trying to agree the amount of security for the respondents'
costs of appeal with the respondents' then attorneys, Faure & Faure Inc. Rule 51(4) of
the Magistrates’ Courts Rules, as it then read, required an appellant to enter into good
and sufficient security before lodging the record, unless the respondent waived it or the
court released the appellant from that obligation. The amount was left to agreement,
failing which the registrar or clerk of the court would fix it. Faure & Faure advised on 21
January 2026 that they would withdraw and did so the next day. That added to the
difficulty, though it is not the main explanation. The appellants subsequently filed a Deed
of Security for R1000 (the historic norm) on 13 February 2026 , without any apparent
objection by the respondents.
[17] The prospects of success are good for the reasons set out below. An eight -day
delay has not prejudiced the respondents. They did not oppose condonation or , at the
hearing, suggest that the delay affected them. Refusing condonation would penalise the
appellants for a feature of a transitional filing system they were not told about.
[18] Good cause has been shown. To the extent that condonation is required, the
appellants' failure to apply for a date within the period in rule 50(4)(a) is condoned. Had
I concluded that the appeal lapsed, I would have reinstated it on the same
considerations.
The further evidence
[19] The appellants seek to place before us an affidavit by the first appellant dated 2
April 2026, with annexures. It records the following payments by the respondents into
the appellants' attorneys' trust account: R3 500 on 30 November 2025, R1 500 on 28
December 2025, R3 000 on 30 January 2026, R3 000 on 27 February 2026, and R3
000 on 30 March 2026. The attorney confirms on oath that no other payment was
received by any means during that period. The total is R14 000 over five months, an
average of R2 800 a month.
[20] Section 87(c) of the Act empowers this Court, sitting on appeal, to order the parties
to produce such further proof as it considers necessary or desirable. Section 87(b)
permits remittal where the record is insufficient, and s 87(d) permits any other course
that leads to a just, speedy, and inexpensive settlement of the case. Section 19 of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 gives a Division exercising appeal jurisdiction the power
to receive further evidence, remit, and confirm, amend or set aside the decision under
appeal. Those powers are conferred "in addition to any power as may specifically be
provided for in any other law". Section 19 therefore applies of its own force alongside s
87, and not through it.
[21] These powers are used sparingly. An appeal is ordinarily decided on the record that
was before the court below. Further evidence is admitted only in special circumstances.
The applicant must generally provide a reasonably sufficient explanation for not leading
it earlier, that it is credible and preferably incontrovertible, that it is materially important
to the outcome , and that its admission must not unfairly prejudice the other side
(Staatspresident en 'n Ander v Lefuo 1990 (2) SA 679 (A) at 692A-D.
[22] The appellants ask us to hold that the magistrate erred on the tender because of
the respondents' actions after he ruled. That would mean judging a decision by facts
the respondents' actions after he ruled. That would mean judging a decision by facts
that did not exist when it was made. If the application rested there, it would fail.
[23] It does not rest there. The magistrate proceeded on the premise that a tender of R7
500 a month, rising to R10 000, was a reasonable alternative to execution. That
premise was already unsound on the record. The tender was premised on the first
respondent's employment. The respondents undertook to prove it was permanent but
never did. The first respondent’s employment contract was time -limited and ended by
effluxion of time on 20 October 2025, a day before the order was made. The income on
which the tender depended had ceased by the time judgment was handed down. At the
hearing, Mr Joostenberg confirmed that he remains unemployed. Nor could the tender
be met from what remained of the joint estate’s income, which after 20 October 2025
was the second respondent’s salary alone. On her net salary of R12 000 a month, less
a bond instalment of about R4 000, a payment of R7 500 would leave about R500 a
month for a family of four, and R10 000 would exceed what remains. The further
evidence introduces no new, unrelated facts. It confirms, from the objective record, a
defect already apparent.
[24] No earlier opportunity existed to lead the evidence. It records payments made only
after judgment.
[25] The evidence is credible. It consists of trust account records of payments made by
the respondents themselves, verified on oath by the attorney who received them.
[26] It is material. It goes directly to the factual premise of the order under appeal.
[27] Its admission causes the respondents no unfair prejudice. The payments are their
own and are within their knowledge. They have known of the application since 2 April
2026 and filed nothing in answer. At the hearing, the first respondent admitted the debt .
He did not dispute the payments recorded in the affidavit. The affidavit does not fix the
balance owing. The order I propose directs that every payment received be credited, so
that the respondents suffer no prejudice if a payment has been overlooked.
[28] I have considered whether the evidence should rather be remitted to be led below
under s 87(b) of the Act or s 19(c) of the Superior Courts Act. Remittal is appropriate
where further evidence is disputed or needs testing in cross -examination. This evidence
is documentary, verified on oath , and known to both sides. Remitting it would only add
delay and cost.
[29] The documents furnished after the hearing stand on a different footing. We called
for them under s 87(c) of the Act because a reserve price cannot properly be fixed on
figures more than a year old. Both sides relied on the municipal valuation, and it is
common cause. The bond statement and the rates statement came from the
respondents themselves, and the figures in them are within their own knowledge. Only
the municipal valuation came from the appellants, and it is the same figure the
respondents supplied. No party has questioned any of these documents. They are
received under s 87(c) of the Act and s 19(b) of the Superior Courts Act.
[30] The further evidence is admitted. It does not point only one way. It shows that the
tender has not been met at anything like the promised rate. It also shows that the
respondents have paid something from their own resources every month. Both points
bear on proportionality.
The merits: the approach on appeal
[31] Rule 43A(2)(a) of the Magistrates Court Rules requires a court considering an
application of this kind to establish whether the property is the judgment debtor's
primary residence, and to consider alternative means by which the debtor could satisfy
the judgment debt. Rule 43A(2)(b) provides that the court shall not authorise execution
against a primary residence unless, having considered all relevant factors, it considers
execution warranted. Rule 43A( 8) sets out the orders the court may make. These
include condoning a failure to provide documents required by rule 43A(5), ordering
execution where no other satisfactory means can satisfy the debt, setting a reserve
price, postponing the application on terms, and refusing it if it lacks merit.
[32] That is a discretion in the true sense because the court below has a wide range of
equally permissible options. This Court may not interfere merely because it would have
decided differently. It may interfere only if the discretion was not exercised judicially, was
influenced by a wrong principle or a misdirection on the facts or led to a result that a
court properly directing itself could not reasonably have reached ( Trencon Construction
(Pty) Ltd v Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa Ltd and Another 2015 (5)
SA 245 (CC) paras 85 and 88).
[33] The magistrate dismissed the application on four grounds. First, the tendered
payment plan appeared reasonable, and the purpose of proceedings under s 65A of the
Act was to test its viability. Second, the court had not fully explored execution against
movables, given that the respondents had accepted personal service. Third, the
application was defective because it lacked the exact bond balance and the latest
municipal account. Fourth, the appellants were not interested in a supervised payment
plan, and the respondents were not given a proper opportunity to settle before the court
targeted their home. I address each finding in turn.
The payment plan
[34] The first ground is internally inconsistent. A tender is reasonable only if it can be
performed. To hold the tender reasonable while holding that whether it could be
performed was a question for another statutory process is to make a finding and decline
to test its foundation in the same breath.
[35] The strongest argument for the magistrate's approach draws on Jaftha para 59.
There, the Constitutional Court said the judicial officer must always keep in mind the
practicability of payment by instalments, that the inquiry is not all -or-nothing, and that
execution should be a last resort. I accept all of that. But considering an instalment
proposal means testing it. Rule 43A(2)(a)(ii) requires the court itself to consider
alternative means of satisfying the judgment debt. That requires looking at the debtor’s
income, its security, the debtor’s other debts, and whether the proposal will discharge
the debt within a reasonable time. A proposal that cannot do so is not an alternative
means of satisfying the debt. It only postpones execution.
[36] The magistrate had the material for that inquiry. The second respondent's bank
statements, annexure "RA7", show debit orders returned unpaid and defaults on
existing credit. The first respondent's employment contract ended on 20 October 2025.
The respondents' own income and expenditure summary, annexure "RA6", understates
their expenses and omits debts that appear on their bank statements. The addendum to
the home loan agreement shows that the bond arrears were capitalised, increasing the
capital owing to R253 633.99 as at 20 March 2025.
[37] The payments since the order point the same way. Against a tender of R7 500 a
month from August 2025, the respondents paid an average of R2 800 over the five
months after the order under appeal. On the amortisation schedules before us, the
judgment debt stood at R189 904.97 on 31 March 2026. Those schedules apply interest
to the judgment debt at 11.25% a year. That is not the 12.25% rate referred to in
to the judgment debt at 11.25% a year. That is not the 12.25% rate referred to in
paragraph [7], which governs the bond, a different debt. At R2 800 a month, the
judgment debt would take about nine years to discharge, and at R3 000 a month about
eight. The record shows no payments after March 2026. Even if payments of about R3
000 a month continued, they would reduce the capital by only about R1 220 a month,
because interest absorbs some R1 780 of each payment : a month’s interest at 11.25%
of R 189 904.97 comes to R1 780.36.
[38] The first respondent’s evidence confirms it. He has no income. The household lives
on the second respondent's net salary of R12 000 a month. From that, they must
support two children, pay a bond instalment of R3 979.46 a month, and pay the
appellants about R3 000. That leaves about R5 000 a month for everything else a family
of four needs, including the rates. He did not suggest that the household can pay more.
Instead, he asked the Court to consolidate his debts and devise a plan. This Court
cannot do that on appeal. Nothing in this judgment prevents him from seeking whatever
relief the law provides for over-indebted debtors. But a request that a plan be devised is
not itself an alternative means of satisfying the judgment debt.
[39] I accept that the respondents may have paid what they could. Ordinarily , that
attracts sympathy. But the question under rule 43A(2)(a)(ii) is not whether the debtors
are doing their best. It is whether a viable alternative to execution exists. On the
objective record, no such alternative exists.
[40] The magistrate held that a financial inquiry under s 65A was the ‘exact purpose’ of
testing a tender of this kind. If he meant that such an inquiry must precede relief under s
66, he misdirected himself. The two provide parallel remedies. Section 65A allows a
creditor to examine a debtor's means to obtain an instalment order. Section 66, read
with rule 43A, governs execution against property. Nothing in s 66, rule 43A or the
authorities makes one a condition of the other. The Act gives a debtor who can pa y
reasonable instalments a remedy of his own: s 73 allows him to apply to suspend
execution. That remedy is for the debtor to invoke and to make out. It is no legal basis
for the court hearing a Rule 43A application to assume a tender to be good.
[41] If the magistrate meant only that a s 65A inquiry is the better forum, the reasoning
still cannot stand. Rule 43A places the inquiry on the court hearing the application. A
court may not defer it to another process and treat the tender as good in the meantime.
To do so grants an open-ended stay of execution on an untested premise. It inverts the
balance struck in Gundwana para 54, where the Constitutional Court held that execution
is not odious in itself but part of normal economic life, and that alarm bells ring only
when the means used to exact payment are disproportionate to the other means
available. If there are no other proportionate means, execution may not be avoided.
[42] The contrary approach produces unacceptable results. A debtor could shield
immovable property indefinitely by tendering instalments no court ever examined. A
debtor with assets but little income could never be made to realise property, however
large the debt and however hopeless the proposal. Jaftha para 57 recognises the widely
accepted legal and social value of debtors paying the debts they incur, and para 40
cautions that what seems trifling to an affluent observer may not be trifling to a poorer
creditor.
[43] The first ground of dismissal cannot be sustained.
Execution against movables
[44] Section 66(1)(a) makes a money judgment enforceable against movable property
and against immovable property “if there is not found sufficient movable property to
satisfy the judgment or order, or the court, on good cause shown, so orders”. In Jaftha
paras 64 and 67, the Constitutional Court read in words requiring a court to order
execution after considering all relevant circumstances. In para 62, it explained that the
good cause route already involves judicial oversight, because only a court can order
execution on that basis. The two routes are disjunctive. The existence of movables does
not by itself bar execution against immovable property where good cause is shown.
[45] The Sheriff made five attempts to execute against movables, as the return s of non-
execution show. He could not gain access. There was no intercom or bell at the gate,
and the telephone numbers given went to voicemail. Counsel confirmed that no order
authorising forced entry was sought.
[46] Five attempts without gaining access show that execution against movables has
not been, and is not likely to become, a practical route to satisfying this debt within a
reasonable time. They do not show that the respondents own no movables of value,
and I do not treat them as if they did. The failure to seek an order for forced entry does
not defeat the application. Forced entry is a serious step. It would have been an odd
use of it against debtors who were legally represented and negotiating a payment pla n
at the time.
[47] The respondents have never identified a single movable asset capable of
attachment, and the first respondent did not do so at the hearing. They are best placed
to know what they own. In motion proceedings, a real and genuine dispute of fact exists
only where the party raising it has seriously and unambiguously addressed the fact said
to be disputed ( Wightman t/a JW Construction v Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another 2008
(3) SA 371 (SCA) para 13). A bare assertion that movables have not been exhausted
does not meet that standard. In Nkola v Argent Steel Group (Pty) Ltd t/a Phoenix Steel
2019 (2) SA 216 (SCA) para 11, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that neither the
common law nor the rules oblige a creditor to execute against movables the debtor has
common law nor the rules oblige a creditor to execute against movables the debtor has
not pointed out and made available. The ordinary contents of a family home would in
any event be largely protected. Section 67 of the Act protects from attachment the
necessary beds, bedding and clothing of the debtor and family, and necessary furniture
and household utensils up to a value fixed by the Minister.
[48] Nkola contains a qualification that must be addressed. At para 17, the court said
that ‘or’ need not be read as ‘and’ in the corresponding High Court rule, except where a
debtor is indigent, has insufficient assets to satisfy the debt, and risks losing a primary
residence. Para 15 explains why. A poor person at risk of losing a home should not be
put in jeopardy without properly considering their circumstances. The respondents risk
losing their home, and their income is modest. It is no answer that they own a valuable
house, because the house is the very asset the qualification protects. The answer lies
elsewhere. The qualification does not oblige a creditor to search for movables the
debtor will not identify; para 11 of Nkola holds the opposite. Para 15's protection
requires full consideration of the debtor's circumstances before putting a home at risk.
Rule 43A requires exactly that, and this judgment undertakes it. It examines the
alternatives to execution in paragraphs [3 4] to [42] and [69], and weighs proportionality
and the children's interests in paragraphs [5 6] to [70]. It sets a reserve price to preserve
the family's equity, defers any sale, and leaves in place the requirement of a court order
before any eviction. Reading ‘or’ as ‘and’ would add nothing of substance to that
protection. It would only require a further attempt at execution against movables that the
respondents have not identified and that s 67 would largely protect.
[49] The reliance placed by the court below on the respondents' acceptance of personal
service was misplaced. Accepting a document at the gate is not the same as letting the
Sheriff in to take an inventory of the house.
[50] Good cause within the meaning of s 66(1)(a) has been shown. It is unnecessary to
[50] Good cause within the meaning of s 66(1)(a) has been shown. It is unnecessary to
decide separately whether sufficient movable property was not found. The second
ground fails as well.
The bond balance and the municipal account
[51] Rule 43A( 5) requires every application to be supported, where applicable, by
documents evidencing the market value of the property, its local authority valuation, the
amounts owing on mortgage bonds, the amount owing to the local authority for rates
and other dues, levies owing to a body corporate, and any other factor needed to give
effect to subrule (8). A proviso adds that the court may call for any other document it
considers necessary. The magistrate held the application defective for want of the exact
bond balance and the latest municipal account.
[52] Compliance with rule 43A(5) is not a formality. The rule exists so the court can
assess equity in the property, set a just reserve price, and give proper weight to
preferent creditors. But it must be read for what it can sensibly require. Information
about the bond and the rates account lies with the bondholder, the municipality , and the
debtor. A judgment creditor who is a stranger to both accounts has no right to demand it.
The rule recognises as much. The proviso to rule 43A( 5) allows the court to call for
further documents, and rule 43A(8)(c) allows it, on good cause shown, to condone a
failure to provide any document referred to in rule 43A(5).
[53] The appellants put before the magistrate the best information reasonably available
to them: the registered bond amount of R219 377 from the Deeds Registry, this Court's
order of 26 April 2024 in the third respondent's foreclosure proceedings reflecting the
bondholder's claim at that time, and the most recent municipal statement available to
them, dated March 2024, for R7 431.30. The respondents themselves produced the
addendum to the home loan agreement, reflecting a restructured capital amount of
R253 633.99 as at 20 March 2025. The bondholder and the municipality were both
served. Neither opposed, nor did either suggest that the financial picture was wrong.
[54] If the magistrate thought a document was missing, the rule told him what to do. He
could call for it under the proviso to rule 43A( 5), order the municipality to furnish the
rates due under rule 43A(8)(b)(i), or decide whether to condone its absence under rule
43A(8)(c). He did none of these. He did not raise the point with the parties. He relied on
it for the first time in his written reasons as a ground to dismiss the application outright.
That was a misdirection. The proper response to a gap the creditor cannot fill is to ask
those who can fill it, not to dismiss without warning.
[55] This Court has now done what the rule contemplated. The documents called for at
the hearing and furnished afterwards show the current municipal valuation, the bond
balance and the state of the rates account. To the extent that any rule 43A(5) document
remains outstanding, there is good cause to condone its absence under rule 43A(8)(c).
This Court exercises that power under s 87(a) of the Act and s 19(d) of the Superior
Courts Act. The third ground fails.
Proportionality
[56] Rule 43A(2)(b) forbids an order for execution unless the court, having considered
all relevant factors, considers execution warranted. That is a fact -bound inquiry into
proportionality. Any measure that deprives a person of existing access to adequate
housing limits the right in s 26(1) of the Constitution (Jaftha para 34). Where the rules
have been complied with, and there is no other reasonable way to satisfy the debt, an
order authorising a sale will ordinarily be appropriate, unless it would be grossly
disproportionate. This is so if the creditor's interest in payment is significantly less than
the debtor's interest in security of tenure, particularly if the sale is likely to render the
debtor and his or her family completely homeless (Jaftha para 56).
[57] The relevant factors include the circumstances in which the debt was incurred, the
debtor's attempts to pay it, the parties’ financial position, the amount of the debt,
whether the debtor has a source of income, and any other factor relevant to the facts
(Jaftha para 60). The list is not closed. Gundwana para 53 adds that if the debt can be
satisfied in a reasonable manner without such drastic consequences, the court should
first consider that course. In the context of the reserve price, rule 43A(9)(b)(vi) directs
attention to who occupies the property and the circumstances of their occupation.
Where children live in the home, s 28(2) of the Constitution applies. A child's best
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child.
[58] The magistrate did not conduct this inquiry, because he treated the tender as a
sufficient answer. His fourth ground, that the respondents had not properly been given
an opportunity to settle, rests on the same premise and falls with it. The misdirections
identified above open the discretion to reconsideration within the limits set by Trencon.
This Court is as well placed as the court below to conduct the inquiry. The record is
documentary and complete, and it is supplemented by further evidence, Mr
Joostenberg's submissions, and documents furnished after the hearing.
[59] I begin with how the debt arose, which Jaftha para 58 describes as a factor of great
importance. The judgment rests on a settlement agreement that the first respondent
failed to perform. The agreement arose from a contract for construction work at the
appellants’ house that the respondents failed to complete, used defective building
materials, left certain works defective, and failed to remove their building equipment and
rubble. The appellants say they paid for the construction from a family loan of R220 000
which they are still repaying at R5 000 a month. They also say the first respondent left
which they are still repaying at R5 000 a month. They also say the first respondent left
their house's roof sagging and without gutters. Two things follow. The first favours the
respondents. They never offered this house as security for the appellants' claim, so
Jaftha para 58 on debtors who pledge their homes does not help the appellants. Their
claim is unsecured and warrants closer scrutiny. The second cuts the other way. This is
not the kind of debt Jaftha addressed. A debt of R189 904.97 is not trifling ( Jaftha para
57). Mr Joostenberg admits it. He owes it under a compromise he negotiated, chose the
payment date for, and then broke.
[60] Weighing against execution are the following. The property is the family home. Two
children, aged 9 and 11, live there, and their interests are paramount. The respondents
have kept their bond up to date. They pay the appellants something every month from
their own resources, however inadequate. The debt is modest when compared with the
value of the property. A sale will uproot the family.
[61] The following weigh in favour of execution. The respondents have repeatedly failed
to honour their undertakings. The first respondent did not pay the settlement amount by
15 August 2024, a date he himself proposed. The respondents twice offered to sell the
property privately and twice withdrew. They failed to provide proof of permanent
employment, which they undertook to provide. They have not paid what they tendered
in their answering affidavit. Their financial disclosure was incomplete and omitted debts
that appear on their own bank statements. The household now depends on a single net
income of R12 000 a month, of which about R4 000 goes to the bond, and the record
shows a capacity to pay the appellants about R3 000 a month at most. At that rate, the
debt will not be paid off within a decade, while interest runs. The appellants are private
individuals, not a financial institution, and they service a family loan of R5000 a month.
That directly affects the weight of the creditor’s interest, which Jaftha para 56 weighs
against the debtor’s interest in security of tenure. It also engages the caution in para 40
that not all creditors are affluent. And the two preferent creditors, who would be paid first
from a sale, do not oppose.
[62] The bond account is another matter. The capital owing was R253 633.99 when the
bond was restructured in March 2025. It now stands at R236 614.89. The respondents
bond was restructured in March 2025. It now stands at R236 614.89. The respondents
paid each instalment of R3 979.46 in the quarter to 31 August 2026, and the statement
reflects no arrears. On a single income, the respondents have kept their home loan
current while paying the appellants something each month. That counts in their favour. It
shows a family that has kept faith with the bank, and it means the property’s equity is
substantial and not being eroded. But it does not supply an alternative means of
satisfying this judgment debt. The same statement shows where the household’s money
goes. Once the bond is paid, little remains, and nothing in the record suggests the
appellants can find more.
[63] The third respondent’s position must be recorded, because it affects what a
declaration of executability will and will not change. On 26 April 2024, this Court, per
Mapoma AJ, granted judgment in the foreclosure proceedings the third respondent
instituted. The Court declared the property specially executable at a reserve price of
R700 000. That order has not been rescinded. The bond was later restructured by the
20 March 2025 addendum. The inference is that the bank obtained its order, reinstated
the loan, and has not acted on the order. Since then, the family’s security of tenure has
depended on keeping the restructured bond current. On the statement now before us,
they have done so. The bank's order remains extant, however, and I bear it in mind in
framing the order of this Court . Two consequences follow. A declaration in the
appellants’ favour neither enlarges nor diminishes the bank’s rights under its own order.
And the bank’s preferent claim is protected in any sale at the appellants’ instance.
Section 66(2) of the Act forbids the sale of property subject to a preferent claim unless
the preferent creditor has been notified, and the proceeds are sufficient to satisfy its
claim in full, or it confirms the sale in writing. The reserve I fix is about four times the
bond balance. The bank has been served in these proceedings and has recorded that it
does not oppose. Whether it will at some future time act on its own order is a matter
between it and the respondents, and for the court that granted that order.
between it and the respondents, and for the court that granted that order.
[64] I turn to the children and to the risk of homelessness. Their interests require me to
ask two questions: whether a sale will leave them without a home, and whether the
manner and timing of execution can be shaped to limit the harm to them.
[65] On the first question, the answer lies in the equity. The current municipal valuation
is R1 425 000, and the Lightstone market value on 11 March 2025 is R1 680 000.
Against that, the bond stands at R236 614.89, the judgment debt (including interest and
costs) is roughly R190 000 to R200 000, and execution costs will apply. The rates
account is up to date. A sale at the reserve price I set below would, after paying the
bond and the judgment debt, leave about R560 000 before those costs. The family
would also no longer have to pay the monthly bond instalment of R3 979.46. The record
contains no evidence of what alternative accommodation in the area would cost, and I
make no finding about it. But a family with about half a million rand in hand, a net
income of R12 000 a month, and no bond to service is not rendered homeless. Nothing
in Mr Joostenberg's evidence suggested otherwise. The evidence does not show that a
sale will render the children homeless. It shows that the family will have to move and will
have the means to do so. The disruption of a move, and its effect on the children's
schooling, is real. It is addressed by the timing of any sale, to which I turn in paragraph
[68].
[66] Mr Joostenberg’s hope that his mother may come to live with the family depends on
a hospital report that has not yet been received. I take it into account as a possibility. It
is not a present circumstance of occupation, and it does not alter the balance.
[67] On the second question, the procedure itself affords protection. Notice of the
attachment must be served, and no sale may take place until it has been advertised and
conducted as the rules prescribe. If the reserve is not achieved, the Sheriff must report,
and the court must decide how execution is to proceed (rule 43A(9)(c) to (e)). A sale in
execution does not, of itself, remove the family from the house. If they do not leave after
the transfer, the court may evict them from their home only by an order made after
the transfer, the court may evict them from their home only by an order made after
considering all relevant circumstances (s 26(3) of the Constitution). That court will also
consider the children’s interests. Sections 62(3) and 73 of the Act also remain available
to the respondents in the court a quo. In Jaftha paras 47 to 49, the court held that those
sections do not substitute for judicial oversight because indigent debtors are unaware of
them. These respondents were legally represented in the court below, have now
litigated in two courts and appeared before us. This judgment draws those remedies to
their attention.
[68] I am nonetheless persuaded that the timing of the sale should be fixed with the
children in mind. A family with school -age children should not be pressed into a move
without time to plan. Rule 43A(8)(a) permits the court to include in the conditions of sale
any condition it considers appropriate, and rule 43A(8)(i) permits any other appropriate
order. I therefore direct that no sale in execution take place before 1 March 2027.
Attachment and the steps preparatory to a sale may proceed in the meantime. Tra nsfer
after a sale will itself take further time. That gives the respondents several months from
the delivery of this judgment to arrange alternative accommodation and, if need be,
schooling. It also gives them the chance to sell the property themselves, if they can, at a
better price than a sale in execution is likely to achieve. This is not the open -ended stay
I declined to countenance in paragraph [4 1]. It is a fixed, limited period tied to the
children's interests, after which execution proceeds. The cost to the appellants of a few
months' further delay is modest by comparison.
[69] I have considered the less drastic alternatives. The second respondent’s net salary
is R12 000 a month. An emoluments attachment order under s 65J of the Act would,
after any permissible deductions, yield no more than the respondents already pay and
would further strain a household with two children. A garnishee order under s 72 has
nothing to attach. There is no evidence of any debt owed to the respondents by a third
party. Making the tender an order of court, with a warrant to issue on default, would be
party. Making the tender an order of court, with a warrant to issue on default, would be
an empty formality. The tender has been in default for over a year, and the income it
depended on no longer exists. Even if it were performed at R7 500 a month, it would
take about 30 months while interest ran. This appeal cannot accommodate Mr
Joostenberg's request for a consolidated repayment plan, for the reasons given in
paragraph [38].
[70] Weighing these matters and giving the children's interests the weight s 28(2)
requires, execution against the property is warranted within the meaning of rule
43A(2)(b), and good cause exists under s 66(1)(a). The court a quo erred in holding
otherwise. The reserve price, the deferral of the sale, and the requirement of a court
order before the family can be evicted protect the children's interests.
The reserve price
[71] Rule 43A(9)(a) requires the court to consider whether a reserve price is to be set.
Where a primary residence is declared executable, and the facts call for it, one should
be set (Body Corporate of Le Grande Bernard Sectional Scheme v Van der Linde [2022]
ZAGPJHC 16 para 25). The facts here call for one. Rule 43A(9)(b) lists the matters to
be considered. They include the market value, the amounts owing as rates and on
registered bonds, the equity that may be realised between the reserve and the market
value, the reduction of the debtor’s indebtedness, the occupants and the circumstances
of their occupation, the likelihood that the reserve will not be realised, and the prejudice
any party may suffer if it is not achieved.
[72] The appellants seek a reserve of R700 000, or alternatively that the reserve be
remitted to the court a quo . I fix the reserve in this Court. In my view, a court that
authorises execution against a home should not leave the protective element of its order
to be settled elsewhere, and the material is now before us.
[73] A reserve of R700 000 is too low on the present facts. It is the figure set out in the
bank's April 2024 foreclosure order. According to Mr Joostenberg, it was based on the
land's unimproved value. It is less than half the municipal valuation and about 42% of
the Lightstone market value. A sale at that figure would pay the bond of about R237 000
and the judgment debt of about R200 000. It would leave the family with about R263
000 before execution costs, roughly R300 000 less than the reserve I set below. Rule
43A(9)(b)(iv) requires me to consider the equity that may be realised between the
reserve and the market value. Here, that equity is what will rehouse the children. A
reserve that lets most of it pass to a buyer at auction does not protect them.
[74] I fix the reserve at R1 000 000. That is about 70% of the current municipal valuation
and about 60% of the Lightstone market value. No forced -sale valuation is before us,
and the property’s condition is not in evidence. I have therefore set the reserve well
below both measures of value rather than near them. On the documents before me, it
covers the bond and the judgment debt in full, which rule 43A(9)(b)(v) makes relevant,
and should leave the family about R560 000 before the costs of execution. Rule
43A(9)(b)(vii) and (viii) require a court to weigh the risk that the reserve will not be
achieved and the prejudice that would follow. At this level, the risk is real but moderate.
If it materialises, the appellants' prejudice is delay and further cost, not the loss of their
claim. Rule 43A(9)(c) to (e) then requires the Sheriff to report and the court to
reconsider how execution should proceed and permits a sale to the highest bidder. The
respondents' prejudice from a reserve set too low would be the permanent loss of the
equity they need to rehouse their children. That asymmetry favours the figure I have
chosen.
[75] Balances will have moved by the time of any sale. The order therefore allows any
[75] Balances will have moved by the time of any sale. The order therefore allows any
party, including the third and fourth respondents, to approach this court on notice before
a sale to reconsider the reserve on updated figures. I make no order compelling the
third or fourth respondent to produce anything. No relief was sought against them; they
recorded only their non-opposition, and neither has been heard on any such obligation.
Costs
[76] The magistrate ordered each party to pay its own costs. That order formed part of
the dismissal and falls away with it. Costs lie in the discretion of the court of first
instance, and an appellate court interferes only where that discretion was not exercised
judicially ( Trencon paras 85 and 88). Where the order under appeal is set aside, the
costs order made on the strength of it must be reconsidered. Section 87(e) of the Act
empowers this Court to make such order as to costs as justice may require.
[77] Costs ordinarily follow the result. The respondents opposed the application and
have lost. The appeal has succeeded. In Le Grande Bernard para 27, the court treated
the appeal process as an extension of the recovery process, part of enforcing the
judgment debt, and awarded the creditor its costs even though the appeal was
unopposed. The reasoning applies more strongly where, as here, the application was
opposed. Clause 7 of the settlement agreement provides for costs on the attorney -and-
client scale, and the first respondent twice tendered the appellants' reasonable costs in
his answering affidavit. The appellants nevertheless seek only party and party costs,
and only against the first respondent. I make that order and no more. Counsel's fees on
appeal are allowed on scale B under Uniform Rule 67A.
[78] The appellants sought condonation as a precaution and do not ask for its costs.
Whether it was needed depends on the effect of the 1 February 2026 upload , which I
have not decided. There will be no order as to those costs.
[79] This Court dealt with the wasted costs of the postponement on 28 August 2026 in
paragraph 2 of its order of that date. That order stands, and those costs are not
recoverable again under the costs order on appeal.
Order
[80] I grant the following order:
1. To the extent that condonation is required, the appellants' failure to apply for a
date of hearing within the period prescribed by Uniform Rule 50(4)(a) is
condoned.
2. The application to adduce further evidence is granted under s 87(c) of the
Magistrates' Courts Act 32 of 1944 read with s 19(b) of the Superior Courts Act
10 of 2013. The affidavit of Albertus Jacobus Snyman dated 2 April 2026, with its
annexures, and the municipal valuation, bond statement and municipal rates
statement furnished after the hearing, are admitted as part of the record on
appeal.
3. The appeal is upheld.
4. The order of the Magistrates' Court for the District of the Cape Winelands, sub -
district Drakenstein, held at Paarl under case number 1938/2024 on 21 October
2025, including its order as to costs, is set aside and replaced with the following:
"(a) The immovable property described as the Remainder of Erf 1[...] Paarl, in the
Drakenstein Municipality, Division Paarl, Province of the Western Cape,
measuring 535 (five hundred and thirty -five) square metres, held by Deed of
Transfer No. T[...], also known as 4[...] K[...] P[...] Avenue, Klein Parys, Paarl, is
declared specially executable in satisfaction of the unpaid balance of the
judgment granted against the first respondent on 12 December 2024 under case
number 1938/2024, together with interest and costs recoverable under that
judgment, after crediting all payments received.
(b) A reserve price of R1 000 000.00 (one million rand) is set for the sale in
execution.
(c) The property may be attached, and the steps preparatory to a sale in execution
may be taken, but no sale in execution of the property shall take place before 1
March 2027.
(d) The clerk of the court is authorised to issue a warrant of execution against the
property, subject to paragraphs (b) and (c) and to rules 43 and 43A.
(e) Any party, including the third and fourth respondents, may on notice to all other
parties, and before a sale in execution takes place, apply to this court for the
reserve price to be reconsidered in the light of updated information as to the
amounts owing under the mortgage bond registered over the property and to the
local authority in respect of rates and other dues.
(f) If the reserve price is not achieved at the sale in execution, rule 43A(9)(c) to (e)
shall apply.
(g) The first respondent shall pay the applicants' costs of the application on the party
and party scale."
5. There is no order as to the costs of the condonation application.
6. The first respondent shall pay the appellants' costs of the appeal, including the
costs of the application to adduce further evidence, on the party and party scale,
with counsel's fees on scale B.
7. Paragraph 2 of this Court's order of 28 August 2026, concerning the wasted costs
occasioned by the postponement on that date, remains operative. Those costs
shall not be recovered again under paragraph 6 of this order.
___________________
M FRANCIS
Judge of the High Court
____________________
S MTHIMUNYE
Acting Judge of the High Court
Appearances:
For Appellant: Adv Arina Du Toit
Instructed by: Snyman Attorneys
First and Second Respondent in person.