Gericke v S; Director of Public Prosecutions, Free State v Gericke (244/2024; 571/2024; 754/2024) [2026] ZASCA 150 (3 November 2026)

60 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Appeal against conviction and sentence — Appellant convicted of murder and assault with intent to do grievous bodily harm — Appellant claiming self-defence — Court finding that the appellant was the aggressor and that the killing was unlawful — Appeal dismissed and sentence upheld as appropriate.

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not reportable
Case no: 244/2024; 571/2024 and 754/2024
In the matter between:
RUDI NEVILLE GERICKE APPELLANT
and
THE STATE RESPONDENT

And

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS, FREE STATE APPELLANT
and
RUDI NEVILLE GERICKE RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Gericke v The State; The Director of Public Prosecutions, Free State
v Gericke (244/2024; 571/2024 and 754/2024) [2026] ZASCA 150
(03 November 2026)
Coram: KOEN and COPPIN JJA and DLODLO AJA.
Heard: 25 August 2026.
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal website and
release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down of the judgment is deemed to be
11h00 on 03 November 2026.

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Summary: Criminal Law and Procedure – Appeal in respect of special entry in terms
of s 318 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 – whether an irregularity occurred
during or in connection with the trial proceedings giving rise to prejudice and a failure of
justice sufficient to vitiate the trial – whether conviction and sentence should be set aside.
Criminal Law– appeal against conviction – private defence – whether appellant was the
aggressor – whether assault of victim and killing of deceased unlawful.
Sentence – whether trial court materially misdirected itself in not applying s 51(1) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 – whether killing of the deceased premeditated
– whether there are ‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ justifying the imposition
of a sentence lesser than the prescribed minimum – whether sentence imposed is
disturbingly inappropriate.

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ORDER


On appeal from: Free State Division of the High Court, Bloemfontein (Boonzaaier AJ)
sitting as the first court of instance:

The appeals and the cross-appeal are dismissed.


JUDGMENT


Coppin JA (Koen JA and Dlodlo AJA concurring)

[1] The Free State Division of the High Court, Bloemfontein, on circuit in Ficksburg
(the high court), convicted the appellant of murder and assault with intent to do grievous
bodily harm and sentenced him to 12 years’ imprisonment for the murder and 2 years’
imprisonment for the assault. The appellant is appealing against his convictions and he
is also advancing an appeal in terms of s 318 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977
(the CPA) pursuant to a special entry made by the high court in terms of s 317 of the
CPA, at his behest. The Director of Public Prosecutions (the State) opposes the
appellant’s appeals and cross-appeals the sentence imposed for the murder. Leave to
appeal to this Court was granted by the high court.

[2] The issues are relatively crisp. In respect of the conviction for murder, the question
is whether the appellant’s killing of the 28-year-old Evan Felix Sorour (the deceased), on
8 January 2023, was justified. In respect of the assault, the question is whether the
appellant justifiably attacked the complainant, Mr Reuter Albert Sorour (Mr Sorour). In
respect of both the killing and the assault, the appellant contends that he acted in self-
defence. Concerning the special entry, the question is whether the irregularities alleged

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in the entry were established, and ultimately, if so, whether the appellant’s rights to a fair
trial, guaranteed in terms of s 35(3) of the Constitution, were so compromised as to
constitute a miscarriage of justice warranting the setting aside of his convictions and
sentences. In the cross-appeal, the State contends that the sentence of 12 years’
imprisonment for the murder was irregularly imposed by the high court, or alternatively, is
inappropriate and shocking. Ultimately, the issue is whether any grounds exist for this
Court to interfere with the sentence imposed.

[3] Following a brief overview, the issues will be addressed sequentially: first, the
s 318 appeal, then the appeal against the convictions and finally the cross-appeal. There
is an inevitable overlap between the appellant’s grounds of appeal.

OVERVIEW
[4] At the time of the crimes, the appellant was 38 years old and resided with his family
as a tenant in the house on the farm Moolmanspruit, held under a long lease by Mr
Frederick Dell (Mr Dell). The appellant traded in livestock on another farm. Mr Dell farmed
with Simbra stud cattle. On a neighbouring farm, Uitkyk, Mr Sorour, and his family,
including his son, the deceased, farmed with cattle of a mixed breed.

[5] On 8 January 2023, while the Sorours were visiting elsewhere, Mr Dell telephoned
the deceased to report that the Sorour’s cattle had strayed onto Moolmanspruit. The herd,
comprising about 200 cattle, had broken out of a paddock on the neighbouring farm,
Oliviersrust, where they were kept by the Sorours. In response to the call, the deceased
and Mr Sorour, went to Moolmanspruit on motorcycles to retrieve the cattle. The cattle
were gathered in the camp or kraal close to the house at Moolmanspruit. With Mr Dell’s
assistance and consent, the Sorours identified and separated their cattle from his. They
subsequently drove their cattle across the veld back to their property on their motorcycles.

subsequently drove their cattle across the veld back to their property on their motorcycles.

[6] Shortly after their departure, Mr Dell returned to the kraal at Moolmanspruit to
check on his cattle. As he prepared to leave in his vehicle, the appellant arrived and halted
alongside him, enquiring about the Sorours’ presence on the farm. According to the State,
the appellant persisted in demanding an explanation despite Mr Dell’s response. Mr Dell
appealed to the appellant in Afrikaans to desist, stating: ‘Rudie, asseblief los hulle net’

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(Rudi, please just leave them). The appellant denies being told not to interfere with the
Sorours; his account is that he was told to tell them not to come to Moolmanspruit again.
The State contends that the appellant appeared aggrieved with Mr Sorour and Mr Charl
Malan. Mr Malan managed the security company engaged by Mr Sorour and other
farmers in the area to combat stock theft. He worked closely with the South African Police
Service Stock Theft Unit in recovering stolen cattle. The appellant claimed to be a police
informant. The State’s evidence was that the appellant had previously telephoned Mr
Malan to question his contact with one, Jan Le Grange (Mr Le Grange). The appellant
expressed dissatisfaction with that contact and made allegations implicating the Sorours
in criminal activity. In the course of the conversation, according to the State, Mr Malan
had also cautioned the appellant to refrain from interfering with the Sorours.

[7] Having parted company with Mr Dell, the appellant proceeded in the same
direction as the Sorours, pursuing them. The State and the appellant offered divergent
accounts of the subsequent events. According to the State, the appellant intercepted Mr
Sorour’ s motorcycle with his vehicle. He approached Mr Sorour aggressively, and while
the latter still held the handle bars of the motorcycle, struck him in the face. The State
alleges that, after Mr Sorour fell, the appellant continued the assault by kicking, striking
and jumping on him. During the attack, the appellant threatened to kill Mr Sorour and Mr
Malan, stating in Afrikaans: ‘ek gaan julle f…n dood maak. Ek gaan vir Charl Malan
doodmaak. Vandag gaan ek Morgan doodmaak en jou dood bl…m’ (I am going to f…n
kill you. I am going to kill Charl Malan. Today I am going to kill Morgan and trash you to
death).

[8] The State further contends that, at one stage during the assault, the appellant
twisted Mr Sorour’s arm around his neck whilst Mr Sorour was facing down. Mr Sorour

twisted Mr Sorour’s arm around his neck whilst Mr Sorour was facing down. Mr Sorour
testified that he felt close to losing consciousness and perceived that the appellant’s
expressed intention to kill him, was real. Mr Sorour testified that he managed to break
free and flee, but the appellant pursued him, threatening that he would kill him even if he
escaped, and even if that was to be in Mr Sorour’s own house. The appellant denied
making such threats and assaulting Mr Sorour as the State alleged.

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[9] It was not in issue that as Mr Sorour was running away, he was joined by the
deceased who was on a motorcycle. They abandoned the motorcycle on a cattle path
and moved in the veld to rougher terrain in something like a ditch, in order to get away
from the appellant. The appellant continued his pursuit, initially in his vehicle and, upon
approaching within about 30 meters, on foot.

[10] It is not in issue that the deceased videoed the unfolding scene with his mobile
telephone, and that not even this deterred the appellant, who continued to advance
towards them. According to the State, the appellant disregarded warnings from the
Sorours to keep his distance and to de-escalate the situation. Instead, he taunted them,
questioning whether they believed the video footage would be of any assistance. At one
point Mr Sorour positioned himself between the appellant and the deceased, who
continued filming. The appellant attempted to strike Mr Sorour but missed. The State
maintains that the appellant persisted in his advance throughout. The appellant’s account
is that he merely intended to seize the video footage to present it to the police.

[11] It is not disputed that the deceased produced his firearm, which he usually carried
in a holster on his side, pointed it towards the appellant saying in Afrikaans: ‘kyk-kyk’
(look-look). The deceased pushed his father aside. Although the exact sequence is
unclear, the appellant also produced his firearm. After Mr Sorour shouted to the
deceased, ‘shoot damnit shoot’, shots were discharged. The appellant was struck and
returned fire. The deceased was severely wounded and collapsed to his left in a crouching
position.

[12] Mr Sorour retrieved the deceased’s firearm from the ground and aimed it at the
appellant, who had his back turned, but the firearm jammed. The appellant who was also
injured in the exchange of the gun shots, then went to his vehicle and drove off.

injured in the exchange of the gun shots, then went to his vehicle and drove off.

[13] The deceased was subsequently pronounced dead on route to medical treatment.
The appellant and Mr Sorour also went for medical attention for injuries sustained in the
course of this tragic incident, with the appellant being hospitalised for an extended period.

[14] Following his discharge from hospital, the appellant was arraigned in the high court
on the charges of assault with the intention to do grievous bodily harm, attempted murder

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and murder. He pleaded not guilty to all the charges and relied on private defence as a
justification. The State called Mr Sorour, Mr Dell, Mr Malan, and Dr EP Kleynhans as
witnesses. The appellant testified in his defence and called no other witness. Several
admissions were made. On 23 February 2024, the high court, having preferred the State’s
version in so far as there was a conflict between the two versions, convicted the appellant
on the charges of murder and assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm. He was
sentenced to 12 years’ imprisonment in respect of the murder and two years’
imprisonment in respect of the assault. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently.
He was accordingly sentenced to an effective term of 12 years’ imprisonment.

THE APPEAL IN TERMS OF s 318 OF THE CPA
[15] In the s 317 application the appellant specifically referred to the following remarks
made by the prosecutor during cross-examination in the bail proceedings: (a) ‘[t]he
information in the docket is that the deceased was shot five times accurately on the chest.
Four times on the chest [and] one at the back’; (b) ‘[t]here is witness statements to the
effect that when you arrived at the scene where the deceased was with the father you
had already pulled out the firearm’; (c) ‘… there is a witness statement in the docket from
Mr Dell that said that he was even reprimanding you to leave the deceased and the father
alone’; (d) ‘He further mentions that you said to him the deceased’s father is talking about
you all over, and you are going to show him’; (e) ‘Okay, [h]e further says that when you
left him you said you are going to show him and then you left the scene spinning your
car’; (f) ‘And you must also bear in mind that there is a witness that also said during –
since the cattle were in the farm you have been looking for the deceased father before
you met with the landlord. You have been looking for the deceased father’; (g) ‘Okay

you met with the landlord. You have been looking for the deceased father’; (g) ‘Okay
[t]here is evidence to the effect that you – they even ran away from you from the main
road, running into the bushes. You chased them into the bushes with your car …’.

[16] It was contended by counsel in support of that application that either, there were
statements, as alluded to by the prosecutor, in the police docket, that were subsequently
removed from the docket when the video evidence came to light, or were amended,
alternatively, that their existence was ‘fabricated’ and ‘misleading’. Counsel then
requested the high court to record the following as a special entry:

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‘Having been placed on his defence to rebut, and the Applicant/Accused having been confronted
with statements of what is in the police docket of the State’s case as entailed in Paragraph 3 of
this Application now serves as evidential material under Section 235 of the CPA before the
Honourable Court, is in direct contrast with the present State case and not in accordance with
basic fairness, the Rule of Law, the administration of Justice and the Constitution Section 35(3)(h),
(i) and (j) with regard to a fair trial.’

[17] In response, the State merely ‘noted’ the special entry and the high court ruled: ‘I
accept the application for the special entry on the record, and I accept that – note it.’
There is no indication on the record that the high court settled the terms of the special
entry, or what its views were regarding the merits of that application. It merely ‘accepted’
or ‘noted’ it.

[18] Section 317(1) of the CPA provides:
‘if an accused is of the view that any of the proceedings in connection with or during his or her
trial before a High Court are irregular or not according to law, he or she may, either during his or
her trial or within a period of 14 days after his or her conviction or within such extended period as
may upon application … on good cause be allowed, apply for a special entry to be made on the
record … stating in what respect the proceedings are alleged to be irregular or not according to
law, and such a special entry shall, upon such application for a special entry, be made unless the
court to which or the [J]udge to whom the application for a special entry is made is of the opinion
that the application is not made bona fide or that is frivolous or absurd or that the granting of the
application would be an abuse of the process of the court.’

[19] Section 317(4) of the CPA stipulates that ‘… [t]he terms of a special entry shall be
settled by the court which or the [J]udge who grants the application for a special entry.’

settled by the court which or the [J]udge who grants the application for a special entry.’
Section 318(1) of the CPA provides that ‘[i]f a special entry is made on the record, the
person convicted may appeal to [this Court,] against his conviction on the ground of the
irregularity or illegality stated in the special entry … ’ provided that a notice of appeal in
that regard had been given to the registrar of this Court and to the registrar of the high
court concerned (other than a circuit court) within the prescribed period.

[20] In this Court, counsel for the appellant submitted that the aforementioned remarks
of the prosecutor in the bail proceedings were either contained in statements that have

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been removed or amended, or alternatively, were fabricated and misleading. He relied on
observations of this Court in S v Crossberg (Crossberg)1 that the State’s failure to disclose
statements that were relevant to ‘the true strength of the state’s case’, had an impact on
credibility. There the State gave questionable reasons for the re-taking of statements and
did not offer a reasonable explanation why so many statements were missing from the
docket. The disclosure by the State that numerous statements had been taken and were
missing, only occurred after the State witnesses were ‘caught out’; entries were made in
the investigation diary of statements even before they were taken. This Court found that
the ‘conclusion, that the first set of statements did not suit the State’s case and that they
are missing by design, rather than misfortune, is compelling.’ However, this Court did not
explore the position further, because the murder conviction could not stand for reasons
other than the alleged irregularities pertaining to the non-disclosure.

[21] It was further submitted by the appellant’s counsel that the conduct of the State’s
case was not in accordance with ‘basic fairness, the [r]ule of [l]aw, the administration of
[j]ustice and the [C]onstitution section 35(3)(h), (i) as well as (j) with regard to a fair trial’.2
It was also argued that if the appellant had the benefit of the supposed statements ‘it
would have made a fundamental impact and goes to the true strength of the state case
against the [a]ppellant’. Counsel further submitted in that context, concerning the subject
of the application for special entry, that the video that the deceased made of the incident
only became available ‘months later with no reasonable explanation’ and that the
inference is inescapable that the video was concealed until its existence was disclosed.
According to counsel, after the emergence of the video, statements changed and went

According to counsel, after the emergence of the video, statements changed and went
missing by design rather than misfortune. Finally, he argued that the alleged irregularities
go ‘to the core of the conviction’ and are, consequently, in conflict with a fair hearing. He
sought the setting aside of the appellant’s convictions and sentences purely on those
grounds.

1 S v Crossberg [2008] ZASCA 13; [2008] 3 All SA 329 (SCA); 2008 (2) SACR 317 (SCA) (Crossberg)
paras 80-81.
2 Section 35 (3)(h), (i) and (j) provides as follows:
‘Every accused person has a right to a fair trial, which includes the right –
…
(h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to testify during the proceedings;
(i) to adduce and challenge evidence;
(j) not to be compelled to give self-incriminating evidence …’

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[22] The State submitted the following: the appellant’s reliance on Crossberg is
misplaced; unlike in that matter, the appellant here was legally represented throughout
the trial, there was no deliberate suppression of statements, and no proof that any
statements were missing by design. Further, the appellant did not pursue the alleged non-
disclosure by bringing an application in terms of s 87 of the CPA to compel disclosure,
and the record of the bail proceedings, handed in as exhibit H, was not used by the State
to impeach the credibility of the appellant’s testimony. In addition, the State submitted
that the forensic evidence about the nature and extent of the gunshot injuries sustained
by the deceased, was not contested at all by the appellant; that the appellant had a fair
opportunity at the trial to ventilate any alleged inconsistencies; that the trial was fair and
none of the appellant’s constitutional rights was infringed, and that he suffered no
prejudice. The State maintained that all the statements in the police docket were made
available to the appellant.

[23] It is the task of this Court to ascertain whether an irregularity has occurred; if so,
to define its nature and its impact on the fairness of the trial, as well as the consequences
thereof.3 Should this Court determine that an irregularity has occurred, it is to decide
whether the irregularity resulted in a failure of justice that renders the proceedings invalid.4
Unless it results in or causes a failure of justice, this Court will not reverse a conviction or
sentence merely because of the irregularity.5 If the irregularity did not by itself result in
such a failure, the following test was formerly applied to determine whether such a failure
has occurred: ‘Does the evidence, unaffected by the irregularity, show proof of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt? If it does, the irregularity did not bring about a failure of
justice.’6 Under the Constitution, whether there was a failure of justice as contemplated

justice.’6 Under the Constitution, whether there was a failure of justice as contemplated
in s 322(1)7 of the CPA gives rise to the question whether the irregularity has led to an

3 S v Botha 2006 (1) SACR 105 (SCA); [2006] 4 All SA 113 (SCA) (Botha) para 3.
4 Ibid para 4.
5 Ibid paras 3-4; s 309(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA).
6 S v Xaba 1983 (3) SA 717 (A) (Xaba) at 735-736; S v Felthun 1999 (1) SACR 481 (SCA); [1999] 2 All SA
182 (A) at 485I– 486A; S v Khoza & Others [2010] ZASCA 60; 2010 (2) SACR 207 (SCA) para 46.
7 Section 322(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1972 reads as follows:
‘(1) In the case of an appeal against a conviction or of any question of law reserved, the court of appeal
may-
(a) allow the appeal if it thinks that the judgment of the trial court should be set aside on the ground of a
wrong decision of any question of law or that on any ground there was a failure of justice…’ (Emphasis
added.)

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unfair trial. And in turn, the question whether there is an unfair trial is determined with
reference to an accused’s constitutional right to a fair trial.8

[24] In S v Jaipal,9 the Constitutional Court aptly summarised the position under the
Constitution as follows:
‘Section 317 provides that an accused who thinks that any of the proceedings in connection with
or during a trial are irregular or not according to law, may apply for a special entry to be made on
the record by the presiding Judge, especially in a case where the alleged irregularity does not
otherwise appear in the record. In practice the terms “irregular” and “not according to law” have
been regarded as synonymous.
The alleged irregularity stated in the special entry is a ground of appeal, which has to be dealt
with by the relevant Court of appeal. In terms of s 322(1) the Court of appeal may allow the appeal
if it thinks that the judgment of the trial court should be set aside on the ground of a wrong decision
of any question of law or that on any ground there was a “failure of justice”. Therefore, a failure of
justice must indeed have resulted from the irregularity for the conviction and sentence to be set
aside. In construing when an irregularity had led to a failure of justice, regard must be had to the
constitutional right of an accused person to a fair trial. If an irregularity has resulted in an unfair
trial, that will constitute a failure of justice as contemplated by the section and any conviction will
have to be set aside. Whether a new trial may be commenced against the accused will also
require a constitutional assessment of whether that would be a breach of the right to a fair trial or
not. The meaning of the concept of a failure of justice in s 322(1) must therefore now be
understood to raise the question of whether the irregularity has led to an unfair trial.’ (Footnotes
omitted.)

[25] The facts in S v Ncaphayi en Andere10 (Ncaphayi) bear some similarities to the

[25] The facts in S v Ncaphayi en Andere10 (Ncaphayi) bear some similarities to the
present matter. It is a pre-constitutional decision by this Court, which was not referred to
by either of the parties. In that matter there were material differences between the further
particulars to an indictment furnished by the State and the testimony of the State
witnesses in the trial. The appellants applied for a special entry on the basis that the trial
court took into account those witnesses’ evidence, despite the fact that the prosecutor
had not made their previous, inconsistent, statements available to them. It was further

8 S v Jaipal [2005] ZACC 1; 2005 (1) SACR 215 (CC); 2005 (4) SA 581 (CC); 2005 (5) BCLR 423 (CC)
(Jaipal) para 39.
9 Ibid paras 38-39.
10 S v Ncaphayi en Andere 1990 (1) SACR 472 (A).

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contended that the differences between the further particulars and their evidence had to
be ascribed to the existence of discrepancies between the witnesses’ testimonies and
their police statements, which the State used in providing the further particulars. The
appellants alleged that the failure constituted a failure of justice. In considering leave to
appeal the trial court held, inter alia, that even though it had to be accepted that there
were indeed discrepancies between the witnesses’ police statements and the evidence:
(a) the defence had not requested disclosure; (b) the discrepancies were fully explored
through cross-examination of the witnesses regarding the differences between their
testimonies and the further particulars; and (c) the trial court could not speculate on the
outcome if the previous, inconsistent, statements were disclosed and accordingly it only
drew an adverse inference against the witnesses concerned.

[26] In that matter the State, apparently adopting the trial court’s approach, argued in
this Court that the appellants were not seriously prejudiced by the State’s failure,
because: (a) the state witnesses only deviated from their police statements in those
respects where their testimonies differed from the further particulars, and (b) that those
witnesses were cross-examined by the defence, and that the trial court accordingly had
not erred. This Court rejected those arguments. It held that it was ‘pure speculation’ and
dangerous to assume that there were no other discrepancies between the witnesses’
statements and their evidence in court and also to assume that they had been cross-
examined enough regarding the discrepancies. It held that the differences were material
and that the prosecutor, who ought to have known what the source of the further
particulars was, ought to have made the statements available to the defence for the
proper testing of the witnesses’ testimony in court. The lack of a request by the defence

proper testing of the witnesses’ testimony in court. The lack of a request by the defence
for those statements did not exempt the prosecutor from that duty, unless the defence
was made aware of their existence and did not require their disclosure. Finally, this Court
held that the prosecutor’s failure to make those statements available to the defence was
a material irregularity and that the evidence of the witnesses concerned should not have
been accepted. Then, applying the test, as summarised in S v Xaba11 and laid down in S
v Yusuf,12 this Court determined whether the guilt of the appellants had, nevertheless
been proved beyond a reasonable doubt without the evidence of those witnesses.

11 S v Xaba fn 6 at 735-736.
12 S v Yusuf 1968 (2) SA 52 (A); [1968] 1 All SA 118 (A) at 57C-D.

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[27] The facts here differ in material respects from those in Ncaphayi. There the
discrepancies were in the further particulars to the indictment and the witnesses’
testimonies at the trial. The particulars supplied were indeed taken from the witnesses’
police statements in the docket, and the State was bound by them. There was no
speculation in that regard. The particulars carried the same weight as evidence. They set
out the case the appellants had to meet. In contrast to that, the mere remarks of a
prosecutor in bail proceedings as to what the State’s case entails is not evidence and
cannot be accorded equivalent weight. Had the prosecutor led evidence in the bail
proceedings that diverged from the testimony subsequently given at the trial, and the
State did not disclose the prior inconsistent statement to the defence, the inference
sought by the appellant might more readily have been drawn.

[28] It is evident that the appellant’s s 317(1) entry is based on conjecture and
inference. He contends that because the prosecutor in the bail proceedings had made
remarks regarding the nature of the State’s case which were not borne out by the
evidence given by the State witnesses in the trial, there must have been statements in
the docket, at the time of the bail proceedings, which were not disclosed to him. The
implications of such inferences are significant; therefore, they should not be drawn lightly.
A careful review of certain of the remarks attributed to the prosecutor in the bail
proceedings, in the light of the evidence presented by the State, suggests that they merely
represent the prosecutor’s interpretation or recollection of the docket’s contents. Although
there are some differences between what he said and the evidence subsequently led by
the State, those differences are not material. He may have misinterpreted the statements.
In any event, the appellant was at liberty before any evidence was led to apply in terms

In any event, the appellant was at liberty before any evidence was led to apply in terms
of s 87 of the CPA for any information, including the alleged statements, to be furnished
by the State.

[29] In this matter, the State does not admit that there were statements in the docket at
the time of the bail proceedings that were removed or amended, subsequently, for the
trial. The appellant wants that to be inferred. Of the seven comments by the prosecutor
in the bail hearing relied upon by the appellant there are only three which are specifically
linked to the State’s witness, Mr Dell. The others are not linked to any particular witness.
No one other than the appellant and Mr Sorour could testify about the actual assault and

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killing. The video evidence only relates to the subsequent pursuit of the Sorours by the
appellant, culminating in the shooting.

[30] There is no witness linked to the following statement: ‘the information in the docket
is that the deceased was shot five times accurately on the chest. Four times on the chest,
one at the back.’ It was not put to Mr Sorour that he had said so in a previous statement.
The provisional list of state witnesses consisted of 26 persons. There is also the medical
legal report (Exhibit G) and the forensic statement which included photographs of the
cartridges and other material found on the scene. Only the post-mortem report specifies
the number and nature of the bullet wounds sustained by the deceased. Without the aid
of the evidence of the medical officer who completed it, it could have been misinterpreted
or misunderstood. There is no suggestion that there was any other post-mortem report
which contradicted that of Dr Kleynhans. Any other information concerning the number
and nature of the gunshot injuries, unless from a qualified source, such as Dr Kleynhans
or Dr Platt, was not admissible in any event. According to the record, Dr Platt also
performed an autopsy, but it is clear from the record that his findings were materially the
same as that of Dr Kleynhans. All these documents were made available to the appellant.
The appellant’s counsel’s cross examination of Dr Kleynhans was very brief, and there
was no reference to any discrepancies. According to Dr Kleynhans the shots were fired
at the deceased in quick succession, one hitting him in the back, just as he was turning
around.

[31] Regarding the bail prosecutor’s remark that ‘there [are] witness statements to the
effect that when you arrived on the scene where the deceased was with the father you
had already pulled out the firearm’ - this statement is not attributed to any specific
individual. The only persons that could testify about the scene immediately before and at

individual. The only persons that could testify about the scene immediately before and at
the time of the shooting was the appellant and Mr Sorour. At no stage during the trial did
the appellant’s counsel confront Mr Sorour, and either put to him that he made an
inconsistent statement, or that there were discrepancies between his evidence and his
police statement. Anyone else's testimony of the facts pertaining to the scene, other than
the expert opinion, was in any event, inadmissible hearsay evidence.

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[32] The next three statements put by the bail prosecutor to the appellant, were all
ascribed to Mr Dell. There is no material discrepancy between the statement attributed to
Mr Dell - that he requested the appellant to leave the Sorours alone - and his evidence at
the trial; indeed, that was in fact his evidence. The term ‘reprimanding’ seems to be the
prosecutor's own choice of words to describe the request. Regarding the other two
statements ascribed to Mr Dell, there is no material discrepancy between those
statements and his testimony at the trial. He may not have stated in evidence that the
appellant told him that Mr Sorour was talking about the appellant ‘all over’, and that the
appellant had said that he was ‘going to show’ Mr Sorour, or that when the appellant left
Mr Dell, he was ‘spinning his car’; but there is no evidence that that is not what was
contained in his statement. Counsel for the appellant, who represented him throughout,
including at the bail hearing, was acutely aware of the remarks of the bail prosecutor, but
never confronted Mr Dell with them. In any event, Mr Dell testified that the appellant was
upset when he left Mr Dell in pursuit of the Sorours. The remarks are consistent with the
appellant being upset and agitated and there is no material discrepancy to be inferred
between Mr Dell’s statement and his evidence at the trial.

[33] The bail prosecutor's reference to a statement that the appellant had been looking
for Mr Sorour is not attributed to any particular witness. As pointed out earlier, there were
a number of witnesses on the State's list of witnesses. None of the witnesses, including
Mr Dell and Mr Sorour, who gave evidence at the trial, were confronted with this aspect.
In any event, the statement is not out of kilter with the general tenor of the evidence. It is
to the effect that the appellant was looking for Mr Sorour even before he met Mr Dell, after
the Sorours’ cattle were at Moolmanspruit. Having considered the testimony, that is the

the Sorours’ cattle were at Moolmanspruit. Having considered the testimony, that is the
clear impression that one gets, namely, that the appellant's urge to find and confront
Mr Sorour preceded his meeting with Mr Dell. There is no material discrepancy.

[34] Lastly, the remark that the Sorours ‘ran away from the main road … into the
bushes’ and that the appellant ‘chased them into the bushes’ with his car ‘like the
mountain’, can hardly be said to constitute a discrepancy. Although Mr Sorour did not use
the words ‘chased into the bushes’ and ‘like a mountain’, that version is consistent with
his testimony and the video evidence. One could reasonably describe the terrain as a

16

‘veld’ or as ‘rough’ and ‘hilly’ or as ‘bushy’. And that is most probably how the bail
prosecutor saw it. It was his interpretation of the scene.

[35] The appellant also had a fair opportunity to challenge the state witnesses regarding
any purported inconsistencies and to explore those issues. The facts of this matter are
distinguishable from those in Ncaphayi and Crossberg. What is clear, is that there is no
real possibility that the alleged ‘none disclosure’ has affected the outcome or impacted
the appellants right to a fair trial. The interest of justice would not be served by ordering
a new trial solely based on the appellant’s allegations in his s 317(1) entry.13

[36] The facts of this case are relatively straight forward. There is no reasonable
possibility that the outcome of the trial might have been different if statements
corroborating the prosecutor’s verbatim interpretation were not disclosed to the appellant.
As noted, the prosecutor’s interpretation is in any event not materially inconsistent with
the evidence led by the state at the trial, which is the evidence on which the appeal is to
be decided. The forensic evidence concerning the nature and extent of the deceased’s
gunshot injuries was not disputed. Further, only the appellant and Mr Sorour could testify
on the actual attack on Mr Sorour and the killing of the deceased. The video clip by the
deceased before his demise is evidentiary material, although open to interpretation, which
did not materially contradict the State’s oral evidence. Moreover, the evidence of Mr Dell
and other witnesses was largely peripheral.

[37] The application for a special entry has no merit and borders on frivolity. It is nothing
more than pedantry or a ‘grasping at straws’. It is plain from the record that the appellant
had a fair trial and that there was no material irregularity. There is no reasonable basis
for finding otherwise. The appeal in respect of the special entry accordingly falls to be
dismissed.

dismissed.

THE APPEAL AGAINST THE CONVICTIONS
[38] The appellant is also challenging his convictions for assault and murder on
grounds other than the alleged irregularities recorded in the s 317 entry. He attacks the

13 Crossberg paras 3 and 75.

17

credibility findings of the high court of the State witnesses, especially that of Mr Sorour
and Mr Dell, and to an extent that of Mr Malan. He argues that his version ought to have
been accepted, and that on that version the State did not make out a case against him.
His version, essentially, is even though he went after the Sorours, he acted in self-defence
when he struck Mr Sorour and subsequently shot and killed the deceased.

[39] The prevailing principle is that even though an appeal court will not easily disturb
the trial judge’s finding of credibility based on demeanour, and will generally respect them,
it will not be inhibited from interfering with those findings, and from substituting inferences
of the trial court based on other facts and probabilities, with its own, if it considers them
to be more appropriate. An appeal court may, arguably, be better positioned than the trial
court in drawing such inferences, since it has the benefit of a full record.14

[40] This Court is to decide the appeal on the record of the evidence and the reasons
which the high court gave for its decision, regarding the appellant’s conviction. The high
court gave detailed reasons for accepting the versions of the State witnesses and for
rejecting the appellant’s account, where it differed from theirs. It appears from the
judgment that the high court was fully aware of the principles applicable to the assessment
of evidence and credibility, and in coming to its conclusions, was not ignorant of the
criticism that could be levelled at those State witnesses’ evidence. In the light of all the
evidence, there is no basis for interfering with its findings on credibility and of fact and for
substituting those findings and inferences with any others.

[41] The high court rightly found that the appellants’ version, that Mr Sorour was the
aggressor and tried to assault him first and that he merely reacted to that, was peculiar in

aggressor and tried to assault him first and that he merely reacted to that, was peculiar in
the light of all the other relevant evidence pointing the other way. It correctly found that
the appellant’s pursuit and confrontation of the Sorours, was probably due to an incident
that had occurred previously at the golf club and of which the appellant felt aggrieved. Mr

14 Union Spinning Mills (Pty) Ltd v Paltex Dye House (Pty) Ltd and Another 2002 (4) SA 408 (SCA); [2002]
JOL 9514 (A) para 24. See also R v Dhlumayo and Another 1948 (2) SA 677 (A); [1948] 2 All SA 566 (A)
at 698. Dictum in para 24 applied in Louwrens v Oldwage 2006 (2) SA 161 (SCA); [2006] 1 All SA 197
(SCA) para 14; Mugwena and Another v Minister of Safety and Security 2006 (4) SA 150 (SCA); [2006] 2
All SA 126 (SCA) para 23.

18

Sorour testified that when the appellant first confronted him, the appellant said to him in
Afrikaans: ‘jy praat mos k-k van my by die golf klub wat sy jy nou?’ (You speak sh-t of me
at the golf club what do you say now). This is consistent with the appellant’s impulsive,
bare-footed, pursuit of the Sorours in the veld and rough terrain, after he left Mr Dell.
Further, there is no reason for Mr Dell to have lied concerning what he may have said to
the appellant, and there was certainly no reason for Mr Dell to have told the appellant to
tell the Sorours that they should not come to his farm again. Mr Dell himself could have
told them that.

[42] In light of all the evidence, the high court correctly found various improbabilities in
the appellant’s account, including the following: that Mr Sorour first confronted the
appellant and tried to assault the appellant; that the appellant had information that stock
theft was about to take place, but did not convey this to Mr Dell; that Mr Dell would give
false evidence against the appellant, or that Mr Malan would do so; that the only reason
that the appellant gave for continuing to pursue the Sorours, especially the deceased,
after he became aware that the deceased was filming the occurrence, was to get hold of
the video footage to take it to the police; and that Mr Dell and Mr Malan never told him to
leave the Sorours alone, or that he did not hear them say that. The high court justifiably
found that the appellant’s defence, in effect, that he was not the aggressor and not
confrontational, was a last-minute attempt to salvage his credibility.

[43] The high court rightly decided the case on the version of the State in so far as it
was consistent with and corroborated by all the other evidence and the probabilities, both
inherent and arising from the evidence. The following, inter alia, was established beyond
a reasonable doubt. The appellant was aggrieved by what he may have heard was said

a reasonable doubt. The appellant was aggrieved by what he may have heard was said
about him by Mr Sorour; he believed that Mr Sorour was part of the conspiracy to have
him imprisoned; he pursued the Sorours after they left the farm Moolmanspruit in order
to confront Mr Sorour, even if it meant violently so; the appellant was told by Mr Malan
and Mr Dell to leave the Sorours alone because they perceived the appellant’s aggressive
mood or attitude towards the Sorours, but he did not heed their advice or caution. On the
appellant’s version, he acted as more than just an informant regarding the investigation
of the stock theft in the area. He took matters in his own hands, and acted on his own

19

perceptions or misperceptions, that were influenced by unverified information implicating
the Sorours in the imminent theft of cattle.

[44] The appellant violently confronted Mr Sorour and assaulted him. In doing so, the
appellant, was the aggressor and was not acting in self-defence. His version to the
contrary was rightly rejected for being improbable and not reasonably possibly true. He,
as the aggressor, pursued Mr Sorour and assaulted him. Mr Sorour was entitled to defend
himself against such unlawful attack but chose to avoid the confrontation and ran away
from the appellant. Instead of ending the matter there, the appellant continued to pursue
Mr Sorour in his vehicle and then on foot, even after Mr Sorour had been joined by the
deceased. The fact that this was being filmed did not deter the appellant. On his own
version, he wanted to get hold of the video footage to take it to the police. This explanation
is so improbable that its rejection was warranted. The actual position is that the appellant,
emboldened by the thought of being armed, and encouraged by Mr Sorour’s flight
following the assault, as well as the deceased’s retreat, continued to threaten and taunt
them. He was reasonably and justifiably viewed as a real threat to the Sorours, because
he had already exhibited unprovoked and egregious violence towards Mr Sorour.

[45] While it is so that the appellant did not draw his firearm first, and that the deceased
did so, the deceased did not just shoot at the appellant, even after Mr Sorour urged him
to do so. Instead, the deceased tried to deter the appellant’s pursuit, by making the
appellant aware of the firearm. Despite several warnings from the deceased the appellant
persisted. The situation may be likened to a red flag being waved at a charging bull. The
high court found that when the deceased fired at the appellant, the latter was a real threat
to them. The deceased did so in defence of their safety and bodily integrity. This is

to them. The deceased did so in defence of their safety and bodily integrity. This is
consistent with the video evidence. As the victim of an unlawful attack there was no duty
on the deceased to flee and to risk injury or death in doing so.15

[46] A prerequisite for invoking private defence as a justification is that the conduct
must be directed at the attacker.16 Another is that the attack must be unlawful.17 The

15 See CR Snyman Snyman’s Criminal Law 8 ed (2025) at 89-90 and the authorities cited there.
16 Ibid at 88.
17 Ibid at 86 and the authorities cited there.

20

appellant’s version that he returned fire in self-defence and that he accordingly did not
act unlawfully in killing the deceased in doing so, was rightly rejected. As the aggressor,
he could not avail himself of this defence. In firing at the deceased the appellant was not
defending himself against an unlawful assault, but was retaliating against the lawful
resistance by the deceased to ward off his unlawful attack on Mr Sorour and the
deceased. The appellant intended to overcome that lawful resistance and knew that he
was acting unlawfully. He could not believe that he was being attacked unlawfully by the
deceased, whereas the deceased would reasonably have held the belief that they were
being unlawfully attacked by the appellant.

[47] The deceased’s act in shooting at the appellant was not disproportional. The fact
that the appellant did not shoot once at the deceased, but fired several times, not only
demonstrates his violent disposition at the time, but also his intent to kill the deceased.
The appellant’s convictions, for the assault of Mr Sorour and the murder of the deceased,
are confirmed.


THE CROSS-APPEAL AGAINST THE SENTENCE FOR MURDER
[48] In terms of the indictment, regarding the death of the deceased, the appellant was
alleged to be guilty of the crime of ‘MURDER READ WITH THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION
51(1) PART I SCHEDULE 2 OF ACT 105 OF 1997’. The indictment further states: ‘the
provisions of section 51(1) of Act 105 of 1997 [are] applicable in that the murder was
planned or pre-meditated.’ In terms of that section ‘notwithstanding any other law, but
subject to subsections (3) and (6), a regional court or a [h]igh [c]ourt shall sentence a
person it has convicted of an offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to imprisonment
for life.’ According to Part I of Schedule 2 the sentence referred to in s 51(1) applies to a
conviction for the crime of murder, inter-alia, where the murder ‘was planned or pre-
mediated.’

mediated.’

[49] The high court did not convict the appellant on this count as framed, but simply of
murder. In coming to that conclusion, the high court reasoned as follows:
‘The State in the indictment stated that this court should find that the actions of the accused [were]
pre-meditated. Even, if there may be suspicions that the accused acted with premeditation, the

21

state bears the onus of proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt. That is an
inevitable consequence of living in a society in which the freedom and dignity of the individual are
properly protected and are respected. Convictions based on suspicions or speculation is the
hallmark of a tyrannical system of law.’

[50] The high court subsequently applied s 51(2) to the appellant, to whom, as a first
offender, a minimum sentence of an imprisonment of not less than 15 years was
applicable (s 51(2)(a)(i)). In respect of a conviction under s 51(1) or (2) the sentencing
court has to impose the prescribed sentence unless substantial and compelling
circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than the prescribed
sentence (s 51(3)(a)).

[51] In imposing the sentence, the high court again expressed the view that the crime
was not pre-meditated. It held the view that the appellant’s intention was ‘to confront the
Sorours’ but doubted whether ‘he anticipated the killing of the deceased’. The high court
further found substantial and compelling factors present that justified the imposition of a
sentence less than the prescribed 15 years’ imprisonment.

[52] The State argued, that the high court ‘did not find that pre-meditation was absent
[and] nevertheless proceeded to sentence the appellant under section 51(2)’ and that this
constituted a material misdirection. This argument is misconceived and is unsupported
by the record. As indicated above, the high court found that the state did not prove that
the murder was pre-meditated. The State argued that the appellant ‘inserted himself
unnecessarily’; ‘ignored repeated warnings’; ‘advanced despite visible danger’; ‘fired
multiple directed shots’; and that ‘each warning afforded an opportunity for reflection’; and
that ‘this was not a reflexive discharge’ and that ‘the only reasonable inference is
premeditated murder within the meaning of s 51(1)’. The appellant, on the other hand,

premeditated murder within the meaning of s 51(1)’. The appellant, on the other hand,
denied that the killing was planned or premeditated.

[53] In Peloeole v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng,18 the minority judgment
considered the application of the concept ‘planned or premeditated murder’. The following

18 Peloeole v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng [2022] ZASCA17; 2022 (2) SACR 349 (SCA); [2022]
4 All SA 1 (SCA) paras 40-57.

22

is a summary of the salient points regarding the concept. There exists a broad spectrum
between a planned or premeditated crime and one that is committed ‘on the spur of the
moment’. In assessing whether the crime was planned or premeditated the period of time
between when the perpetrator formed the intention to commit it and the execution of that
intention is of cardinal importance, but not determinative of whether the crime was
‘planned or premeditated’. The time lapse is but one of the considerations. A lengthy
interval is not a prerequisite for planning; however, a longer interval between the decision
and its implementation may indicate premeditation; whereas, a shorter interval may
suggest the contrary, although not necessarily so. Ultimately every case must be decided
on its facts. A finding of planning or premeditation should only be made if the evidence
establishes that fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The State bears the burden of proof;
any reasonable doubt must be resolved in favour of the accused.

[54] In this matter there is no evidence that the appellant had planned, or contemplated
shooting and killing the deceased prior to the deceased firing at him, or at least
threatening him with a firearm. Taking into account all the evidence, including that
advanced by the State it cannot be found that it has been established beyond a
reasonable doubt that the killing of the deceased was ‘planned or premeditated’. The
finding of the high court to that effect is unimpeachable.

[55] The State’s second principal argument regarding the sentence is that, even if the
high court’s finding on the premeditation was correct, it ought to have imposed the 15
year sentence of imprisonment prescribed by s 51(2), because: (a) there are no
substantial and compelling factors justifying the imposition of any lesser sentence, and
(b) the high court over-emphasised the appellant’s personal circumstances, including the

(b) the high court over-emphasised the appellant’s personal circumstances, including the
fact of his detention awaiting trial, the injuries he sustained, and the fact that his children
were still minors.

[56] The State argued further that the high court under-emphasised the factors of
retribution and deterrence and failed to guard against misplaced sympathy, and to take
into account that the appellant showed no remorse. The State also referred to the
following ‘aggravating factors’. The deceased was only 28 years at the time of his death;
he was killed in front of his father; and that, while he was trying to protect himself and his

23

father multiple direct shots were fired; the appellant could have avoided the shooting by
withdrawing; and the killing was preceded by ‘persistent aggression’. Finally, the State
submitted that the 12 years’ imprisonment imposed, was not only lenient, but ‘disturbingly
inappropriate’; and failed to ‘properly reflect the gravity of the offence, the interest of
society and the legislative scheme’. The State wants the sentence imposed to be replaced
with a substantially longer term of direct imprisonment.

[57] It is a trite principle that an appeal court may only interfere with the sentence
imposed by the trial court where the latter erred in the exercise of its discretion when
sentencing, or where there is a shocking disproportion between the sentence imposed by
that court and the sentence that the appeal court would impose.19 The sentencing court
is to consider all the facts and circumstances and to determine whether they justify the
imposition of a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum sentence. It has been held
by this Court that it is not possible to give ‘an all-embracing definition’ to the term
‘substantial and compelling circumstance’.20 And that the sentencing court is to bear in
mind that the prescribed sentence is not to be departed from ‘lightly and for flimsy
reasons’.21

[58] In this matter the exercise by the high court of its discretion cannot be faulted. Even
though it found that the appellant did not show remorse, it found his personal
circumstances, which are on record, so ‘substantial and compelling’ to justify the
imposition of a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment.
The high court appropriately considered all the relevant factors in sentencing and was
aware of both the mitigating and aggravating factors. Ultimately, ‘sentencing is pre-
eminently a matter for the discretion of a trial court’. It is not an easy process, but complex
and involves the balancing and grading of all relevant factors.22 The sentence imposed

and involves the balancing and grading of all relevant factors.22 The sentence imposed
by the high court is appropriate and there is no reason for this Court to interfere with it
and increase it. The cross-appeal must therefore fail.

19 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA); [2001] 3 All SA 220 (A); 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) (Malgas)
para 12; S v Moagi [2025] ZASCA 188; [2026] 1 All SA 301 (SCA); 2026 (1) SACR 457 (SCA) para 23.
20 Malgas para 22. Dictum applied in S v Tiry and Others 2021 (1) SACR 349 (SCA) para 124.
21 Ibid paras 9 and 25. Dictum applied in S v Govender [2023] ZASCA 60; 2023 (2) SACR 137 (SCA)
para 24.
22 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) et 862 A-B 862 G-H; S v Banda 1991 (2) SA 352 (BG) at 354 E-G & 355
A-B.

24


[59] In the result, the following ordered:
The appeals and the cross-appeal are dismissed.


___________________
P COPPIN
JUDGE OF APPEAL

25

Appearances
For the Appellants: WJ Edeling SC
Instructed by Barnard & Venter Inc, Clocolan
Lovius Block Inc, Bloemfontein


For the Respondents: JW Roothman
Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein.