Elyas v Democratic Alliance and Others (2026/258188) [2026] ZAWCHC 648 (2 November 2026)

55 Reportability
Administrative Law

Brief Summary

Interim Interdict — Political party membership — Applicant sought to suspend termination of membership pending review — Urgency established due to imminent local government elections — Applicant failed to demonstrate a prima facie right; interpretation of disciplinary settlement pact barred him from standing for any position — Clause interpreted to exclude campaign roles, and unauthorized subsequent invitations by party leaders did not alter the disciplinary sanction — Application for interim interdict dismissed, with costs awarded against the applicant.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
CASE NO: 2026-258188
In the matter between:
ABDULKADER El VAS
and
THE DE MOC RA TIC ALLIANCE
THE CHAIRPERSON: FEDERAL LEGAL COMMISSION,
OF THE DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
THE CHAIRPERSON: FEDERAL EXECUTIVE, OF THE
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE
THE CITY OF CAPE TOWN
THE CITY MANAGER: CITY OF CAPE TOWN
THE INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Coram: Justice Nziweni
Heard: 28 October 2026
Delivered electronically: 2 November 2026 ( electronically)
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Fifth Respondent
Sixth Respondent
Summary - Interim Interdict - Application under Part A to suspend termination of
political party membership pending review under Part B.

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Urgency - Matter heard urgently under Uniform Rule 6(12) due to imminent local
government elections. Delays in launching the application were sufficiently explained by
the production of internal records. Urgency was objective and not self-created.
Prima Facie Right - Applicant failed to establish a prima facie right under the OUTA
threshold framework. The case turned on the interpretation of a signed disciplinary
settlement pact (the P&P Agreement) prohibiting the applicant from "standing for an
elective or non-elective position."
Contractual Interpretation - Applying Endumeni, the clause is structured disjunctively
to bar both ballot elections and administrative staff appointments. The explicit
retrospective requirement to resign from existing roles bridges any semantic gap
between "standing for" and "holding" an appointed office. The applicant's narrow
interpretation is textually unsustainable.
Rules of Construction - Under expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the explicit
mention of two narrow exemptions ( ordinary public representative and councillor) strictly
excludes unmentioned campaign staff roles, such as Ground War Lead. The penal
canon in poenis strictissima verborum significatio accipienda est is a rule of last resort
and inapplicable because the text is unambiguous.
Authority & Condonation - Subsequent campaign invitations extended by individual
regional and provincial leaders were unauthorized, made outside the collective scope
of the Federal Executive (FedEx), and carried no legal force to vary or waive the federal
disciplinary sanction.
Constitutional Rights - Section 19 political rights are not absolute and may be
contractually regulated. Distinguishing De Lille, due process was meticulously observed
through multiple internal hearings before termination. Enforcing agreed contractual
consequences is prima facie lawful and does not violate the Ramakatsa principle of
legality.
ORDER
1. The applicant's non-compliance with the ordinary forms, timeframes, and rules

ORDER
1. The applicant's non-compliance with the ordinary forms, timeframes, and rules
of service is condoned, and this application is heard as a matter of urgency
pursuant to Uniform Rule 6(12).

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2. The application for an interim interdict to stay and suspend the first respondent's
executive decision to terminate the applicant's party membership, pending the
final determination of the main judicial review under Part B, is dismissed.
3. The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application on Scale B, including
the costs of two counsel where so employed.
JUDGMENT
Nziweni, J
Introduction
[1] This opposed application has its genesis in charges levelled against the applicant in
2024, wherein he was charged with misconduct for breaching the constitution of the first
respondent, the Democratic Alliance ("the DA"). Specifically, the applicant was accused
of misrepresenting his academic qualifications in applications to become a public
representative of the DA and a candidate for its Young Leaders' Programme.
[2] This is a review application that is composed of two parts, A and B. Part A, is the
exclusive focus of this Court. Hence, this Court is seized with Part A of the application ,
related to the issues wherein the applicant seeks an interim interdict, pending the
determination of the review in Part B. The present application for an interim interdict was
brought on an urgent basis.
[3] At the commencement of the hearing, it was agreed that the issue of urgency would
be heard simultaneously with the merits of the matter.
Urgency
[4] In addressing the threshold question of urgency under Uniform Rule 6(12), I am
satisfied that the applicant has met the requisite criteria and that the urgency is not self­
created. The reasons for concluding in the manner I which I have are set out below.

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[5] The first respondent contends that the applicant sat on his rights after receiving the
Federal Legal Commission ("FLC") minutes on 2 October 2026 and following the City
Manager's declaration of a vacancy on 6 October 2026. However, the record shows that
the applicant launched this bifurcated application on 19 October 2026. A period of
thirteen days to consult counsel, gather evidence, and draft complex review and interdict
papers cannot be characterised as dilatory conduct or tactical procrastination. It
represents an expeditious response to a rapidly unfolding administrative crisis.
[6] Given that the impending local government elections are scheduled for 4 November
2026, a date formally gazetted since 7 August 2026, the timeline available to the
applicant to secure effective relief was severely compressed. Had the applicant followed
the ordinary motion roll, the matter would not be heard for months, rendering his
undertying review in Part B entirely academic and causing him irreversible harm. The
urgency is objective, structural, and legally condoned. Accordingly, the matter is heard
as one of urgency under Rule 6( 12) and the applicant's non-compliance with the
ordinary forms and timeframes for service is condoned.
The interdict
[7] In his opening remarks, Mr Corbett SC, counsel for the applicant, introduced the
applicant as a Proportional Representative Councillor of the fourth respondent, the City
of Cape Town. On that premise, he submitted that, for the purposes of securing interim
relief under Part A, the applicant maintains a prima facie right to remain in that position.
Further, it was contended on the applicant's behalf that, although the first respondent
has purported to terminate his party membership, such termination was unlawful, a
central issue to be determined definitively by the review court in Part B. That being said
it does, of course, follow that the central questions presented by this component of this

it does, of course, follow that the central questions presented by this component of this
application is whether the applicant satisfies the requirements for an interdict.
[8] The background facts of this matter are straightforward and largely undisputed. As
adverted to above, this case turns on whether the applicant has established a prima
facie right regarding the proper interpretation of clause 4.1.1.2 of the Plea and Penalty
Agreement ("P&P Agreement"). In addition to the parties' extensive oral submissions, I

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was provided with comprehensive bundles of authorities and helpful heads of argument,
for which I express my gratitude to counsel.
[9] The applicant joined the first respondent ("the DA') in 2018 and was subsequently
elected as a Proportional Representative Councillor of the City of Cape Town in 2021.
[10] In 2024, the applicant was disciplined by the DA for misrepresenting his
qualifications over an extended period, including by holding himself out to be a fully
qualified medical doctor and /or qualified actuary. The FLC, in its investigation report
stated that the applicant misrepresented his qualifications in several candidate selection
and the DA application processes. According to the DA, these representations were
calculated to advance the applicant's standing in the DA.
[11] After its investigations, the FLC, found that there was sufficient evidence of a prima
facie act of misconduct having taken place and recommended that the evidence it
unearthed to be presented to the disciplinary panel for consideration. It was then
recommended that the applicant be charged accordingly and that his matter be referred
for disciplinary hearing.
[12] In 2024, the applicant accepted responsibility and agreed to a penalty, culminating
in the P&P Agreement.
[13] It is common ground between the parties that the applicant withdrew his
candidature for the 2024 National and Provincial Government Elections. It is recorded
in the P&P Agreement that the applicant's withdrawal was seen as a bona fide attempt
to limit any further reputational harm to the DA in the runup to the 2024 elections.
[14] The underlying dispute in this matter raises a question of interpretation regarding
clause 4.1.1.2 of the P&P Agreement, which inter alia, spells out the agreed-upon
sanction. Indeed, it was in this vein that, as I have previously observed, that the
purposes of the interim relief sought under Part A, this Court is not called upon to

purposes of the interim relief sought under Part A, this Court is not called upon to
definitively interpret the clause. Rather, the immediate inquiry is limited to determining
whether the applicant has established a prima facie right, among other requirements, to
warrant an interdict preserving the status quo, pending the final determination of that
interpretive question in Part B.

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[15] It is convenient to set out the entirety of that provision before considering whether
the applicant has established a prima facie case regarding its proper meaning. The
sanction imposed upon the applicant in terms of the P&P Agreement reads as follows:
"4.1.1 That the Charged Member's membership be terminated, which termination shall
be suspended for the remainder of his current term of office as a public representative
in the City of Cape Town, or the 2026 local Government Elections which ever date is
the latest. which suspension will be subject to the following condition:
4.1.1.1.
4.1.1.2 That the Charged Member will be barred from standing for any position in the
Party - elected or non-elected - other than that of ordinary public representative
(MP/MPUCouncillor) and constituency head and that the Charged Member will resign
from all such position, except that of councillor, that he currently holds for the suspension
period."
[16] In this opposed application, the applicant seeks the suspension of the following
decisions pending the final determination of the judicial review application in Part B:
1. The decision of the first respondent's Federal Legal Commission dated 15 July
2026 that the applicant's membership of the first respondent ("the DA") has been
terminated;
2. The decisions of the first respondent's federal executive ("the Fedex"), dated 30
September 2026:
2.2.1 To adopt the FLC report;
2.2.2 Not to amend the sanction whereby the applicant's membership of the DA has
been terminated;
2.2.3 To terminate the applicant's DA membership with effect from 30 September
2026.
3. The declaration of the vacancy (the declaration") on 06 October 2026, by the fifth
respondent ("the City Manager"), in respect of the seat held by the applicant in
the municipal council ("the council") of the fourth respondent ("the municipality").
4. That the DA restore the name of the applicant to its proportional lists of municipal

4. That the DA restore the name of the applicant to its proportional lists of municipal
councillors for the council ("the lists"), relating to the council's terms of office
namely:

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4.1 That will end, following the general election for local government scheduled for 4
November 2026;
4.2 That will commence, following the general election for local government
scheduled for 4 November 2026;
4.3 And not to fill the position of the applicant on the said proportional lists with the
name of any other person, pending the final determination of the review.
5. That the sixth respondent ("the IEC") will not fill any vacancy on the lists, relating
to the position/s of the applicant in respect thereof pending the final determination
of the review.
6. That the orders in paragraphs 1 and 5 will have the effect of an interim interdict
pending the final determination of the review.
[17] In his founding affidavit, the applicant states that he has been unemployed since
the purported termination of his party membership on 30 September 2026. This
termination resulted not only in the loss of his political membership but also in the
automatic forfeiture of his municipal council seat. The thrust of the applicant's case is
that the FLC and the Fedex acted arbitrarily and unlawfully. In this regard, Mr Corbett
SC strenuously contended during oral argument that the Fedex failed to independently
exercise its discretion, choosing instead to merely rubber-stamp the decision of the FLC.
[18] In addition, the crux of the applicant's argument is that his membership was
terminated because he held positions within the DA's election campaign, which the FLC
subsequently ruled he was prohibited from holding.
[19] According to the applicant, the impugned provisions of the FL C's ruling provides as
follows:
"6. The Panel is of the view that the position currently occupied by Elyas, to wit that
of Ground War Lead /Manager of the Western Cape Campaign T earn constitutes
a position as envisaged in terms of section 4.1.1.2 of sanction as being one other
than that of an ordinary public representative (MP /MPUCouncillor) or
constituency head. Accordingly, this Panel deems Elyas' occupation of this

constituency head. Accordingly, this Panel deems Elyas' occupation of this
position to warrant non-compliance with the condition contained in section
4.1.1.2.

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7. As the suspensive condition contained in section 4.1.1.2. has been breached, the
sanction specified in terms of section 4.1.1 is deemed to have taken effect, to wit:
'4.1.1 That the Charged member's membership be terminated .. . "
[20) It is common cause that on 30 September 2026, the Fedex resolved to adopt the
FLC's ruling. The applicant further submitted that he occupies the fourth position on the
DA's proportional representation ("PR") list for the City of Cape Town for the impending
local government elections scheduled for 4 November 2026. However, as a direct
consequence of the termination of his DA membership, he stands disqualified from
being elected to the incoming municipal council.
[21) According to the applicant, the termination of his DA membership and the
consequential loss of his seat on the municipal council are the direct results of a patently
flawed ruling by the FLC. The applicant denied that he breached the P&P Agreement,
strongly disputing the finding that his conduct fell foul of clause 4.1.1.2 thereof.
[22] He argued that he was not in breach of the provisions of clause 4.1.1.2 of the P&P
Agreement, which prohibited him from standing for any position in the Party, whether
elective or non-elective, other than that of an ordinary public representative
(MP/MPL/Councillor) or a constituency head. The applicant maintained that his disputed
roles were filled by direct administrative appointment, rather than an internal party
election, and therefore did not require him to 'stand' as a candidate within the meaning
of the prohibition.
[23] The applicant asserted that, by the time of the Fedex decision on 30 September
2026, it was common cause that he had complied with all requirements of paragraph 4
of the P&P Agreement, save for the compliance dispute arising from the FL C's ruling of
15 July 2026. That ruling found that the applicant's position as Ground War Lead /
Manager of the Western Cape Campaign Team constituted a breach of clause 4.1.1.2

Manager of the Western Cape Campaign Team constituted a breach of clause 4.1.1.2
of the agreement. Crucially, the applicant emphasises that he was never facing any
formal complaint. nor was any adverse finding ever made against him, regarding his
alleged role as the Deputy Campaign Manager in Cape Town.

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[24] The applicant highlighted the contradictory nature of the first respondent's stance;
despite having concluded the P&P Agreement, leadership structures within the DA
actively appointed him to two separate campaign roles the following year. Specifically,
the applicant contended that on 30 January 2025, he was approached and requested
to assist by the Regional Chairperson, and on 30 March 2025, a similar request was
extended to him by Minister Tertius Simmers. Mr Corbett SC characterised these
requests as anomalous, particularly given that they were extended by the party
leadership the year immediately following the imposition of the sanction.
(25) The essence of the applicant's argument is that the positions were not elective
offices. The applicant buttressed this argument by stating that he was appointed, rather
than elected, to that position on 30 March 2025. According to the applicant, there was
no objection to his name. He submitted that the positions of deputy campaign manager
and Ground War Lead/Manager are not official positions in the DA. So, the argument
ran, neither of these are a position in the Party as contemplated in paragraph 4.11.2.
According to the applicant, these positions are operational roles to help ensure
successful election outcome for the DA. He further argued that the roles he held did not
require him to stand for the positions.
[26] Mr Corbett SC further contended on the applicant's behalf that the first respondent's
interpretation of clause 4.1.1.2 is unsustainable.
[27] It was further argued on the applicant's behalf that the internal legal opinion
provided to the DA by Advocate Bishop underscored the lack of merit in the FLC's
finding. The essential thrust of that opinion was that the positions assumed by the
applicant did not constitute internal party offices but were merely operational roles. The
applicant submits that by ignoring this counsel, the Fedex exercised its powers
capriciously.

applicant submits that by ignoring this counsel, the Fedex exercised its powers
capriciously.
[28) The applicant further contended that; following an inquiry by the FLC Manager, his
attorney responded on 13 February 2025, explaining why the applicant was not in
breach of the P&P Agreement. The applicant argues that because the Fedex and the
FLC took no further steps for over a year, his appointments continued undisturbed. He
places great reliance on a subsequent letter dated 28 February 2026, wherein the FLC

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Regional Manager wrote to the FLC Chairperson, stating that the applicant's
interpretation was correct and that no violation had occurred. Mr Corbett SC strenuously
argued that this correspondence carries definitive weight, as it demonstrates how the
party's own internal structures interpreted the contract and shows that they did not view
the assumption of these roles as a transgression.
[29) The counsel further submitted that clause 4.1.1.2 is a strict penal provision and, in
accordance with established principles of interpretation, such provisions must be
construed restrictively rather than expansively so as to preserve the applicant's
remaining political rights.
The DA submissions
[30] In assessing the factual matrix, regard must be had to the submissions advanced
by the DA. The DA contends that in January 2025, the applicant made himself available
for, and subsequently accepted, a leadership role within the City's campaign team.
Consequently, on 31 January 2025, the applicant was appointed as the Deputy
Campaign Manager. The DA maintained that this role constitutes a formal leadership
position which vested the applicant with considerable authority and influence.
(31) The DA asserted that because the provision incorporates non-elective positions,
the phrase 'stand for' must textually encompass the mere acceptance of an
administrative appointment, thereby characterising the applicant as having 'stood' for
office by agreeing to assume those campaign roles.
[32) Although the applicant contends that he was appointed to his campaign roles by
the leadership structures of the party themselves, the DA strenuously asserts that he
failed to comply with the terms of the P&P Agreement, and that the resulting termination
of his membership was an automatically triggered, contractually agreed consequence.
[33) According to the DA, the agreed terms barred the applicant from standing for any
position in the party, whether elective or non-elective. Other than that, of an ordinary

position in the party, whether elective or non-elective. Other than that, of an ordinary
public representative, for a period of suspension lasting for the remainder of his term in
office or until the impending local government elections.

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[34) It is further asserted by the DA that the purpose of this restrictive provision was to
ensure that while the applicant was effectively on probation, he did not exercise any
administrative power or leadership within the party, nor occupy roles requiring a high
degree of trust and integrity.
[35) The DA contended that the applicant directly breached the conditions of the P&P
Agreement by accepting the role of Ground War Lead and Manager of the Western
Cape Campaign Team. According to the DA, this is a prominent leadership position that
yields authority over other party members, grants access to highly confidential strategic
operations and enabled the applicant to accumulate internal performance points. These
points, the DA argues, directly improved his ranking on the PR list, effectively enabling
him to secure a candidacy for a second term as a PR Councillor.
[36] The DA argued that the applicant cannot escape the clear operational
consequences of the P&P Agreement merely because he was appointed to the position
rather than elected, or simply because he was encouraged by certain individual
members of the party to accept the role.
(37] Although Mr Corbett SC contended that the leadership of the DA was fully aware of
the agreed-upon sanction imposed on the applicant, the DA maintains that the sole
responsibility for ensuring strict compliance with the terms of the P&P Agreement rested
squarely on the applicant. The DA maintains that this is so because the P&P was not
distributed within the Party. The DA further contended that the applicant knew that he
should not take any leadership roles while serving his period of suspended termination.
It is clear that the period of suspension is operational until either the expiration of the
applicant's current term or the conclusion of the 2026 Local Government Elections,
whichever of the two dates occurs first.
[38) Ultimately, the DA maintained that there is nothing procedurally unfair or

[38) Ultimately, the DA maintained that there is nothing procedurally unfair or
substantively unlawful in the enforcement of these consequences. It asserts that due
process was meticulously followed, and that the applicant was afforded multiple internal
hearings and exhaustive opportunities to make representations before the terms of the
P&P Agreement were strictly enforced.

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Issues to be considered
a. Whether the applicant has established a prima facie right, even if open to some
doubt, to the relief sought in the main review;
b. Whether there is a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm to the
applicant if the interim relief is refused and the main review eventually succeeds;
c. Whether the balance of convenience favours the granting of the interim interdict,
weighing the prejudice to the applicant against the prejudice to the respondents;
and
d. Whether the applicant has any other ordinary, satisfactory alternative remedy
available to them to protect their rights in the interim.
Discussion
The Assessment of a Prima Facie Right
[39) As pointed out previously, before evaluating the text of the P&P Agreement, it is
necessary to clarify the nature of this Court's inquiry under Part A. While the definitive
interpretation of clause 4.1.1.2 is a matter reserved exclusively for the review court in
Part B, this Court cannot evaluate the existence of a prima facie right in a vacuum. In
accordance with established precedent, I am required to examine the contractual text
transiently to determine whether the applicant's underlying case is serious and
plausible, or whether it is textually unsustainable on the face of it. Mr Corbett had
conceded as much. The analysis that follows is conducted strictly through this threshold
lens.
[40] It is well-established in our law, following the principles underscored in National
Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and Others 2012 (6) SA 223
(CC), para 49, that in assessing a prima facie right for interim relief, this Court is enjoined
to consider the applicant's prospects of success in the main review. As I have already
mentioned, this requires a transient evaluation of the merits to determine if the applicant
has made out an answerable case. If the underlying contractual interpretation advanced
by the applicant is textually unsustainable, the prospects of success are non-existent,

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and the threshold requirement for a prima facie right cannot be met. It is for this limited
purpose that I turn to examine clause 4.1.1.2 of the P&P Agreement.
[41] I wish to state from the onset that the applicant's assertion regarding the restrictive
interpretation of penal provisions, while tracking a well-recognised common-law canon
of construction, fails to establish a prima facie right. While it is true that strict penal
provisions or clauses limiting vested rights are generally construed restrictively, this
interpretive rule cannot be used to distort the clear text or defeat the manifest purpose
of an agreement.
[42] This common law canon that penal clauses must be interpreted strictly [in poenis
strictissima verborum significatio accipienda est] means that if a clause imposes a
penalty or forfeits a right, any real ambiguity must be resolved in favour of the person
being penalised. However, the applicant's contention ignores the fact that under the
modern Endumeniframework, this canon only applies as a last resort if the text remains
genuinely ambiguous after looking at its language, context, and purpose.
[43] The common law interpretation, fails in this matter for the following reasons:
a. Absence of textual ambiguity. The written text is unambiguous, a fact conceded
by the parties;
b. Nature of the instrument. The clear context remains an integrated disciplinary
settlement agreement designed for strict probation.
c. Impact of the retrospective prong: As will be discussed in more detail below, the
P&P Agreement is explicitly two-pronged. The P&P Agreement mandatorily
commands the applicant to resign retrospectively from 'all such positions'
currently held, completely counters the prospective semantic distinctions
advanced on his behalf.
[44] Furthermore, in assessing whether the applicant has established a prima facie right,
close regard must be had to the text of clause 4.1.1.2 of the P&P Agreement, which

close regard must be had to the text of clause 4.1.1.2 of the P&P Agreement, which
renders the applicant ineligible to 'stand for' any elective or non-elective position. The
core of the interpretive dispute is what constitutes 'standing for'. While this term is not
explicitly defined in the agreement, the applicant's argument that it must be read

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narrowly is heavily contested by the express language of the clause itself. The inclusion
of 'non-elective' positions strongly suggests, on a prima facie basis, that the restriction
is broader than merely contesting an internal election; it textually encompasses making
oneself available for administrative selection or appointment. Because non-elective
roles do not involve a democratic ballot, the DA's contention that the clause was
intended to block the active assumption of any party leadership role carries significant
contextual weight. As such, the applicant's counter arguments are unavailing.
[45] But, more importantly, in this regard, in determination as to whether the applicant
has established a prima facie right to the interim relief sought under Part A, close regard
must be had to the strength of his underlying interpretive case. The applicant's
contention that the restriction does not apply to his appointed roles relies (as conceded]
on a highly restricted definition of the word 'stand for'. He argued that because the senior
leadership of the DA approached him and offered him the position Ground War Lead
role / Manager directly, he was passively appointed and therefore did not 'stand' or
campaign for it within the meaning of the prohibition.
[46] This argument relies on a false dichotomy and appears, on a prima facie basis, to
be contextually untenable and grammatically strained. I believe that it is important to
keep in mind two significant facts: While the applicant currently holds standard
employee status, this does not preclude the fact that such employment was secured by
virtue of standing for a position within the broader contemplation of the P&P Agreement.
Clause 4.1.1.2 also explicitly refers to standing for a 'non-elected position'. A non­
elective position, by its very nature, does not involve a vote of delegates; it involves an
administrative appointment. To accept the applicant's narrow definition would render the

administrative appointment. To accept the applicant's narrow definition would render the
term 'non-elective' in the agreement entirely redundant.
[47] In this context, it is significant that the interpretive principle underlying clause 4.1.1.2
is that the phrase 'standing for an elective or non-elective position' is structured
disjunctively. More significantly, the P&P Agreement establishes two distinct categories
of disqualification; positions filled by direct election and positions filled by non-elective
means. By using this disjunctive framing, the agreement ensures that all forms of party
office fall within the scope of the restriction. Hence, the prima facie interpretation of
'standing for' under this specific framework must be necessarily broad.

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[48] Furthermore, the sanction which is in terms of the constitution of the DA is explicitly
two-pronged: it prospectively bars the applicant from 'standing for' any position, explicitly
defined to include both elective and non-elective roles and retrospectively mandates
that he 'will resign from all such positions that he currently holds.' The applicant's
argument that he did not 'stand' for his current positions because they were filled by
appointment is entirely neutralised by this retrospective requirement. By explicitly
commanding the applicant to resign from 'all such' non-elective positions currently held,
the clause deliberately bridges any semantic gap between the act of 'standing' for office
and the act of 'holding' office.
[49) While our courts approach the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius with a
degree of circumscription, recognising it as a rule of logic rather than a rigid principle of
law, its application in this instance is entirely appropriate. This rule of construction,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius simply stated, means that the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing.
[50] In the instant case, it appears that the P&P Agreement does not deploy open­
ended, illustrative language; rather, it sets out a closed, precise enumeration of exactly
two permitted exemptions, namely, an ordinary public representative and a councillor.
In accordance with established contractual interpretation under Natal Joint Municipal
Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA), where a strict
disciplinary instrument selectively carves out specific allowances from a general
prohibition, the express mention of those roles must, by necessary implication, denote
the exclusion of all unmentioned operational or campaign roles, such as Ground War
Lead. To hold otherwise would yield an insensible, unbusinesslike result that completely
eviscerates the manifest purpose of the suspension conditions.

eviscerates the manifest purpose of the suspension conditions.
[51] This is further fortified by the clear commercial purpose of the contract, which is to
prohibit the individual from putting himself forward for, or accepting, any party role
whatsoever, regardless of how it is filled. If I may venture to repeat what I said on this
point, this purpose is supported by the fact that the clause explicitly carves out its own
narrow exceptions, namely an ordinary public representative and a councillor. Under

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the established principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the explicit mention of
these specific exemptions strictly excludes any unmentioned appointed positions.
[52] Under any fair prima facie reading of the P&P Agreement, there is no lack of clarity
as to what it intended with respect to what the applicant was prohibited from doing.
While the applicant attempts to attribute an altemative interpretation to these terms, a
mere disagreement between litigants does not create an ambiguity where none exists.
When read in the context of the agreement as a whole, the prohibition is open to only
one sensible, business-like interpretation. Consequently, the applicant has failed to
establish even a prima facie right, open to some doubt, to sustain his interpretation in
the main review. The contractual foundation of his case is textually unsustainable.
[53] Thus, on the papers before me, the underlying contractual interpretation advanced
by the applicant is so textually strained that his prospects of success in the main Part B
review appear, on a prima facie basis, to be wholly insufficient to justify the extraordinary
remedy of an interim interdict.
[54] In addition, the argument regarding the applicant's appointment by senior members
of the DA, while rhetorically attractive, fails to establish a prima facie right. In this regard,
Mr Corbett SC posed the rhetorical question of whether the DA's right hand knew what
its left hand was doing. However, this metaphor cannot overcome the constitutional
architecture of the party. The fact that individual leadership structures within the
province or region requested the applicant's assistance does not alter the clear
contractual obligations set out in the P&P Agreement. Neither a regional chairperson
nor a provincial leader possesses the authority to unilaterally waive or vary a sanction
imposed by the FLC and adopted by the Fedex.
[55] Consequently, these operational requests are legally distinct incidents that do not

[55] Consequently, these operational requests are legally distinct incidents that do not
absolve the applicant from his compliance breach, nor do they yield any realistic
prospects of success on review.
[56] Similarly, nothing turns on the fact that these appointments were formally
announced at a regional meeting of the party. The public nature of the announcement
does not cure the regional structure's underlying lack of constitutional capacity to vary

17
an FLC or the Fedex sanction. Publicity cannot transform a non-compliant act into a
compliant one, nor does it displace the applicant's personal obligation to adhere to his
suspension conditions. Consequently, the regional announcement is of no legal force
or effect in relation to the operational status of the sanction.
[57] In relation to the formal sanction imposed upon the applicant. nothing can be read
from these subsequent appointments to suggest a variation or waiver of his contractual
obligations.
[58] I wish to emphasise that in making these observations regarding the regional
structures, this Court is not granting a final, declaration on the question of waiver or
authority. Rather, as stated above, sitting as a court that is seized with an application
for an interim relief, I am bound by the principles in OUTA to assess the applicant's
prima facie prospects of success. On the papers before me, the applicant's reliance on
regional announcements is so legally remote from the central powers of the Fedex that
it fails to demonstrate the requisite, arguable case necessary to trigger an interim
interdict.
[59] Mr Corbett SC also submitted that it is palpably unfair for the very leadership
structures that actively appointed the applicant to reverse their position more than a year
later and terminate his membership based on those same appointments. However, on
this point, the applicant conflates political fairness with contractual obligation. While the
temporal delay and the conduct of individual officials may appear contradictory, they
cannot create a prima facie right where the express language of the P&P Agreement
remains absolute. In terms of the party's constitutional structures, individual recruiters
acting outside the collective scope of the Fedex possess no authority to condone a
breach or waive a binding disciplinary sanction. The ultimate obligation to ensure strict
personal compliance with the suspension conditions rested solely on the applicant, and

personal compliance with the suspension conditions rested solely on the applicant, and
he cannot rely on these subsequent appointments to escape the contractually agreed
consequences of his infraction.
[60] Moreover, the applicant's contention is not salvaged by the fact that the senior party
officials who approached him are themselves members of the Fedex. It is common
cause on the papers that these individuals extended the campaign invitations outside

18
the formal, collective scope of the Fedex operations. In our law, individual members of
a corporate or political executive structure cannot unilaterally exercise powers that are
structurally vested in the collective body.
[61] Without doubt, a formal disciplinary sanction adopted by the Fedex can only be
varied or stayed by a lawful resolution of that collective body, sitting in a duly constituted
meeting. As previously mentioned, when acting outside that scope, individual officials
possess no actual or ostensible authority to waive contractual prohibitions.
Consequently, the applicant could not derive a legitimate expectation or a prima facie
right from actions that were, on his own version, contractually unauthorised.
[62] I wish to emphasise at the outset that the applicant's reliance on the first
respondent's twelve-month delay and the internal letter from the FLC Regional Manager
condoning his appointments cannot alter the contractual reality of his situation. It is well
to bear in mind that this argument, though meticulously framed on behalf of the applicant
in paragraph 28 above, fails to establish a prima facie right. At the cost of repetition, if I
may venture to repeat what I said on this point, in our law, an internal opinion or
recommendation expressed by a subordinate administrative official, such as a regional
manager, does not bind the ultimate decision-making body, nor does it yield actual or
ostensible authority to vary a formal disciplinary sanction. Furthermore, the mere fact
that the first respondent delayed in enforcing its rights, allowing the applicant's
appointments to continue undisturbed for a period, does not meet the high legal
threshold required to establish a tacit waiver or condonation of a contractual breach.
[63] Furthermore, I am not persuaded by Mr Corbett SC's assertion that the subsequent
interpretation of the P&P Agreement by individual party officials reflects the objective

interpretation of the P&P Agreement by individual party officials reflects the objective
understanding or common intention of the contracting parties at the time of conclusion.
[64] As argued by the respondents' counsel, Mr Adiel Nacerdien to hold otherwise would
run directly foul of the parol evidence rule ( or the integration rule), which is deeply
embedded in our law of contract. Under this well-established doctrine, where a contract
has been reduced to writing and represents the complete integration of the parties'
agreement, extrinsic evidence of prior or subsequent conduct, verbal assurances, or

19
individual administrative opinions is generally inadmissible to contradict, alter, or add to
the clear, objective meaning of the written text.
[65) The modem, mandatory approach to legal interpretation in South African
jurisprudence was definitively articulated by Wallis JA Endumeni, supra at paragraph
18 Wallis JA noted:
"The present state of the law can be expressed as follows. Interpretation is the process
of attributing meaning to the words used in a document, be it legislation, some other
statutory instrument. or contract, having regard to the context provided by reading the
particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the
circumstances attendant upon its coming into existence. Whatever the nature of the
document, consideration must be given to the language used in the light of the ordinary
rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision appears; the apparent
purpose to which it is directed and the material known to those responsible for its
production. Where more than one meaning is possible each possibility must be weighed
in the light of all these factors. The process is objective not subjective. A sensible
meaning is to be preferred to one that leads to insensible or unbusinesslike results or
undermines the apparent purpose of the document. Judges must be alert to, and guard
against, the temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or
businesslike for the words actually used."
[66] Under the Endumeni principle, the objective meaning of clause 4.1 .1.2 cannot be
altered or watered down by the transient administrative interpretations of individual staff
members. It bears reiterating that the final responsibility for personal compliance
remained with the applicant, and the internal correspondence referred to in paragraph
28, fails to deliver any realistic prospects of success on review.
[67) I now tum to the applicant's contention that this matter raises constitutional issues,

[67) I now tum to the applicant's contention that this matter raises constitutional issues,
specifically asserting that he has been unlawfully denied his right to participate in
political activities under section 19 of the Constitution. In this regard, Mr Corbett SC
placed heavy reliance on the landmark decision in Ramakatsa and Others v Magashule
and Others 2013 ( 1) BCLR 202 (CC), which underscores that internal political party
processes must comply with the principle of legality.

20
[68] While the constitutional principles articulated in Ramakatsa are indisputable, they
do not assist the applicant in establishing a prima facie right at this interlocutory stage.
The applicant's argument cannot succeed. It ignores the fundamental premise that
section 19 rights are not absolute and may be contractually regulated by a political
party's internal disciplinary structures. Because the applicant's underlying case on the
interpretation of clause 4.1.1.2 appears, on a prima facie basis, to be textually
unsustainable, he lacks the requisite prospects of success to demonstrate that his
section 19 rights were unlawfully infringed by the enforcement of the suspension.
Ramakatsa demands adherence to lawful party structures, and the first respondent's
execution of its internal disciplinary regulations is, on the papers before me, prima facie
lawful. All these considerations underline the sharp distinction between Ramakatsa and
the matter.
[69] Finally, I tum briefly to the applicant's implicit reliance on the principles underscored
in De Lille v Democratic Alliance and Others 2018 (3) All SA 684 (WCC). While the full
bench in De Lille correctly established that a political party must strictly and meticulously
adhere to its own constitutional architecture when terminating a member's status, the
facts of that matter are completely distinguishable from the present application. In De
Lille, the first respondent flouted its own regulatory frameworks by invoking an automatic
cessation clause without a hearing or an opportunity for mitigation.
[70) In this instance, it is uncontroverted on the papers that due process was
meticulously observed, and that the applicant was afforded multiple hearings and
extensive opportunities to make representations before the collective Fedex body acted.
Crucially, the restriction enforced against the applicant stems not from an ambiguous
constitutional clause, but from a specific, written disciplinary agreement that was

constitutional clause, but from a specific, written disciplinary agreement that was
willingly executed by the applicant himself. This Court fully agrees with the contention
made by Mr Nacerodien that the strict administrative and procedural irregularities that
proved fatal to the party's case in De Lille are entirely absent from the record before me,
and the applicant's reliance on that precedent fails to demonstrate the requisite prima
facie prospects of success on review.

21
[71] The applicant's assertion that the central issue in De Lille was also whether the
termination was lawful is correct, but it misconstrues the underlying legal basis of that
finding. I entirely agree with the Mr Nacerodien that in De Lille, the termination was
declared unlawful specifically because the first respondent breached its own
constitutional regulations, bypassed its disciplinary structures, and failed to afford the
member an internal hearing.
[72] The legal grounds that rendered the tennination unlawful in De Lille are entirely
absent from the record before this Court. I emphasise this point because it does very
seriously draw a tight distinction between the two.
[73] The applicant further asserted that the P&P Agreement is not an agreement in the
ordinary commercial sense, but rather a specialised disciplinary instrument executed
within the internal rules and constitutional framework of the DA.
[74] While this characterisation is conceptually correct, it does not advance the
applicant's case for a prima facie right. That being said, it does not, of course, follow
that the applicant is correct.
[75] On that basis, I am of the view that it is a well-established principle in our
jurisprudence, reinforced in De Lille, that the internal regulations and disciplinary
agreements of a voluntary association constitute a binding contractual pact between the
organisation and its members. Whether viewed as an ordinary contract or an instrument
under party rules, the P&P Agreement remains subject to the objective, text-and-context
approach to interpretation mandated by Endumeni.
[76] In the consequences, I am unable to accept the submission advanced by counsel
for the applicant that the issues in De Lille are 'almost identical' to the matter under
consideration. This assertion is factually incorrect and misconstrues the true ratio
decidendi of that particular case. Mr Corbett SC further submitted that, even if the facts

decidendi of that particular case. Mr Corbett SC further submitted that, even if the facts
differ, the underlying legal principles in De Lille remain identical to those in the present
matter. While it is true that the foundational principles of administrative legality,
procedural fairness, and adherence to internal party rules apply universally, the
applicant's argument misapplies how these principles operate in practice. Legal

22
principles cannot be evaluated in a vacuum; they must be rooted strictly to the proven
facts of the case.
[77] Moreover, the core principle governing this specific dispute is pacta sunt seNanda,
that written agreements must be honoured. The applicant freely executed a specific
disciplinary contract, and because his transient interpretation of that agreement is
textually unsustainable under Endumeni, has no prospects of success. Consequently,
while the broader principles of legality are the same, their application to these distinct
facts yields an entirely different result, and the applicant has failed to establish a prima
facie right.
[78] Consequently, this characterisation fails to yield any realistic prospects of success
on review, and the threshold requirement for an interim interdict remains unmet.
[79] As a final consideration, this Court notes that, because the applicant has failed to
cross this initial threshold [insofar as the requirements for an interim interdict is
concerned] to establish a prima facie right open to some doubt, the application under
Part A cannot succeed.
[80] It follows from all these considerations that having found that the applicant has
failed to establish even a prima facie right open to some doubt, it is unnecessary for this
Court to enter into a detailed evaluation of the remaining prerequisites for an interim
interdict, namely, irreparable harm, the balance of convenience, and the absence of an
alternative remedy. The failure to cross this initial threshold is fatal to the relief sought
under Part A. See OUTA case, supra, at para 50.
[81] In the result I make the following order:
Order
81.1 The applicant's non-compliance with the ordinary forms, timeframes, and rules
of service is condoned, and this application is heard as a matter of urgency
pursuant to Uniform Rule 6(12).

23
81 .2 The application for an interim interdict to stay and suspend the first respondent's
executive decision to terminate the applicant's party membership, pending the
final determination of the main judicial review under Part B, is dismissed.
81.3 The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application on Scale B, including
the costs of two counsel where so employed .
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant
Instructed by
For the 1st - 3rd Respondents
Instructed by
CN. Nziweni
Judge of the High Court
Adv PA Corbett SC
Van Rensburg & Co - Mr LJ van Ransburg
Adv A Nacerodien
Adv. C Cohen
Mindes Schapiro & Smith In. - Mr V Reddy