Gabriel NO v Road Accident Fund (10758/2018) [2026] ZAWCHC 646 (30 October 2026)

70 Reportability

Brief Summary

Delict — Damages — Future loss of earning capacity and general damages — Minor child sustaining traumatic brain injury in motor vehicle collision — Plaintiff claiming R3 219 510 for future loss of earning capacity and R1 300 000 for general damages — Court finding substantial impairment of educational and vocational potential due to neurocognitive deficits — Damages awarded as claimed, with interest and costs

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy



THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case No: 10758/2018
In the matter between:

LEE GABRIEL N.O PLAINTIFF
(RE: CURATOR TO O[…] M[…])
and
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND DEFENDANT

Coram: YAKE AJ
Heard: 19 August 2026
Delivered: Electronically on 30 October 2026

Summary: Delict - Damages – Future loss of earning capacity and general
damages – Minor child sustaining traumatic brain injury in motor vehicle
collision –Probable unemployability due to permanent neurocognitive

impairment – Future loss of earning capacity assessed at R3 219 510 – General
damages of R1 300 000.



ORDER


1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff, the capital sum of
R 4 519 510 (‘the capital sum’), which amount shall be due and payable
within 30 (thirty) days from date of the order, failing which interest shall
accrue on the capital sum at the statutory prescribed rate, calculated from
due date to date of final payment.
2. The defendant shall provide O[…] M[…] with an undertaking in
terms of s 17(4) (a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 , to
compensate him for the costs relating to his future accommodation in a
hospital or nursing home, for treatment of or rendering of a service to
him, or the supplying of goods to him, arising from the injuries sustained
in the collision on 9 December 2016 , after such costs have been incurred
and upon proof thereof.
3. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff's party -and-party costs on the
High Court Scale (including VAT) , as taxed or agreed, such costs to
include, but not limited to the costs referred to herein, as well as the costs
of counsel on Scale C, to include preparation for trial, drafting heads of
argument and attending court on 27 May 2026.

4. In the event of costs not being agreed, the plaintiff shall serve a notice
of taxation on the defendant’s attorneys of record.
5. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed costs incurred
up to and until the date hereof, as well as any subsequent costs incurred in
finalising the matter and any costs incurred in obtaining the undertaking
and/or payment of the capital sum, interest and costs.
6. Regarding the expert witnesses referred to hereinafter, the defendant
shall pay the taxed or agreed fees and all costs attached to the
procurement of medico -legal reports, as well as X -rays and scans and
other related costs, the latter costs also include the costs of attending all
plaintiff’s and defendant’s medico -legal examinations, including the
qualifying fees of the experts, the amount of which will be at the
discretion of the Taxing Master:
6.1 Dr P A Olivier (orthopaedic surgeon);
6.2 Prof. Tuviah Zabow (psychiatrist);
6.3 Dale Ogilvy (speech and language therapist);
6.4 Karin Trollip (educational psychologist);
6.5 Prof. Anthony Figaji (neurosurgeon);
6.6 Hayley Leonardi (occupational therapist);
6.7 Elspeth Burke (clinical psychologist0;
6.8 Dr J Reid (neurologist);
6.9 Heather Knox (industrial psychologist); and

6.10 Mary Cartwright Consultants CC (actuary).
7. The defendant shall pay costs occasioned with Rule 37A
conferences.
8. Payment of the taxed or agreed costs shall be made within 14days
from the date of agreement or allocatur, failing which interest shall
accrue on the taxed or agreed costs at the statutory prescribed rate,
calculated from due date to date of final payment.
9. Payment of the capital sum and costs shall be effected by way of
electronic transfer of funds into the Trust Account of the plaintiff’s
attorneys, the details which are referred to hereinafter.
10. It is recorded that there is no contingency fee arrangement.
11. Plaintiff’s attorney trust banking details are as follows:
BANK First National Bank
ACCOUNT Kruger & Co. Inc.
BRANCH Parow
BRANCH CODE 200 510
ACCOUNT NO. 5[...]


JUDGMENT

YAKE, AJ

Introduction
[1] The plaintiff, in his representative capacity as curator ad litem of O[…]
M[…] ("the minor child"), claims damages against the defendant, the Road
Accident Fund ("RAF"), in terms of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
("the Act") arising from bodily injuries sustained by the minor child in a motor
vehicle collision (‘the collision’).
[2] The collision occurred on 9 December 2016 , on the N2 highway near
Grabouw. At the time of the accident, the minor child, then seven years old, was
a pedestrian. The collision was caused by the sole negligence the insured driver,
George Hugo. As a result of the collision, the minor child sustained:
(a) fractured ribs associated with a pneumothorax;
(b) a traumatic head injury; and
(c) an open fracture of the right tibia and fibula.
[3] The pleaded sequelae of the injuries include:
(a) hospitalisation and medical treatment;
(b) future hospital and medical treatment;
(c) future loss of earnings and earning capacity; and
(d) pain and suffering, shock, discomfort and loss of amenities of life,
both past and future.
[4] Liability has been settled between the parties. The defendant conceded
100% liability for the plaintiff's proven damages. An undertaking in terms of
section 17(4)(a) of the Act in respect of future medical and hospital expenses
was likewise furnished.

[5] The only remaining issues for determination are the plaintiff's claims for
future loss of earning capacity and general damages.
[6] In support of the claim, the plaintiff relied on the medico-legal reports of:
6.1 Dr P A Olivier (orthopaedic surgeon);
6.2 Prof Tuviah Zabow (psychiatrist);
6.3 Dr Dale Ogilvy (speech and language therapist);
6.4 Karin Trollip (educational psychologist); and
6.5 Prof Anthony Figaji (neurosurgeon).
[7] The defendant filed the medico-legal reports of:
7.1 Dr F D J Steyn (orthopaedic surgeon);
7.2 Dr A Mbatha (neurosurgeon);
7.3 Esther Cloete (occupational therapist);
7.4 Dr Greeta M Prag (educational psychologist);
7.5 Rosa Bredekamp (counselling psychologist); and
7.6 Mr J A Botha (industrial psychologist).
[8] By agreement between the parties, all expert reports were admitted into
evidence in terms of Uniform Rule 38(2). The following joint minutes were
likewise admitted:
8.1 Hayley Leonardi and Esther Cloete (occupational therapists);
8.2 Elspeth Burke and Rosa Bredekamp (neuropsychologists);
8.3 Dr Reid and Dr Mbatha (neurologist and neurosurgeon);
8.4 Heather Knox and Johanna Botha (industrial psychologists).
[9] The plaintiff called one witness, Ms Heather Knox, an industrial
psychologist to give evidence in support of his claim . She testified that on 11
May 2026, she prepared an addendum after receipt of the educational

psychologist's and speech and language therapist's reports, which had not been
available when the joint minute was compiled. Upon consideration of those
reports, she revised her opinion regarding the minor child's pre -morbid
educational and vocational potential.
[10] Ms Knox further testified that the minor child and his family relocated to
Zimbabwe in 2021. She acknowledged the challenges associated with predicting
the minor child's future employment prospects in either Zimbabwe or South
Africa.
[11] She explained that, because the minor child's future place of residence
and employment remained uncertain, she utilised South African earnings data
reflected in Koch's Quantum Yearbook and allowed for the attendant
uncertainty by way of contingency deductions.

Submissions by parties
[12] Mr McLachlan , appearing for the plaintiff, submitted that the evidence
establishes a substantial loss of earning capacity. He contended that Ms Knox's
addendum was properly founded upon additional expert evidence and that her
testimony remained uncontested.
[13] Counsel argued that the plaintiff's actuarial calculations should be
accepted and that any uncertainty arising from the family's relocation to
Zimbabwe should be addressed through contingencies.
[14] Conversely, Mr Mushwana appearing for the defendant, submitted that
the minor child had largely recovered from his injuries and that Ms Knox had
improperly departed from the industrial psychologists' joint minute without

justification. He argued that the pre -morbid scenario should be limited to Grade
12 and unskilled employment.


Future loss of earnings / earning capacity
[15] The plaintiff bears the onus of proving the damages allegedly suffered.
Unlike general damages, patrimonial loss requires proof upon admissible
evidence and, where appropriate, expert opinion and actuarial calculation.
[16] The plaintiff claims compensation in the amount of R3 219 510 for future
loss of earning capacity. The assessment requires a comparison between the
earning trajectory the minor child would probably have followed had the
collision not occurred and that which he is now likely to follow as a
consequence of the injuries sustained.
[17] Actuarial calculations provide a useful framework for that enquiry, but
they do not bind the court. The assumptions underpinning the calculations must
however be justified by the evidence.
[18] The industrial psychologists in the joint minute agreed that, but for the
collision, the minor child would probably have completed Grade 12, albeit after
repeating two grades. They further agreed that he would probably have entered
the labour market after school and would initially have been employed at an
unskilled level, with gradual progression through acquired skills and
experience. The experts assumed normal retirement at age 65 and recommended
contingency deductions to account for educational uncertainty and periods of
intermittent unemployment.

[19] In respect of the post -morbid scenario, they identified significant
educational, social and economic barriers adversely affecting the minor child's
future prospects. They concluded that his neurocognitive difficulties
substantially impair his educational advancement and vocational functioning.
They considered it unlikely that he would be competitively employable in the
open labour market.
[20] Dr Prag identified two possible educational trajectories. If the minor child
suffered from microcephaly or a congenital condition affecting cognition, she
considered that he would likely have followed a specialised educational
pathway where he would have been able to complete his schooling career (NQF
level 1). Absent such a condition, she concluded that he would probably have
completed Grade 12 and obtained vocational training at approximately NQF
Level 5.
[21] Ms Trollip similarly concluded that, but for the collision, the minor child
possessed average educational potential and would probably have completed
Grade 12 and a Higher Certificate qualification before entering the labour
market.
[22] Professor Figaji rejected the proposition that the minor child suffers from
microcephaly and attributed his present difficulties to the traumatic brain injury
sustained in the collision.
[23] Dr Reid recorded significant neurocognitive deficits, including
impairments in memory, attention, executive functioning, literacy and problem -
solving ability. In his opinion , these difficulties materially affected the child's
future employability. On the other hand, Dr Mbatha accepted that the minor
child sustained a moderate traumatic brain injury and acknowledged the
existence of neurocognitive sequelae. In their joint minute , Dr Reid and Dr

Mbatha agreed that the minor child sustained a moderate traumatic brain injury
with associated neurocognitive sequelae.
[24] Dr Ogilvy found normal speech production and hearing acuity.
[25] The occupational therapists agreed that the minor child would benefit
from ongoing therapeutic intervention and specialist educational support. They
further recognised that his future vocational functioning would depend
significantly upon the support and interventions available to him.
[26] The neuropsychologists agreed that the minor child displayed significant
neurocognitive deficits consistent with the traumatic brain injury sustained in
the collision. They concluded that he suffers from a major neurocognitive
disorder accompanied by enduring personality, behavioural and cognitive
changes. They further agreed that he would experience substantial educational
difficulties and would be unlikely to cope successfully within mainstream
education. They considered him unlikely to be competitively employable in the
open labour market and in need of lifelong support.
[27] Professor Zabow likewise recognised residual psychological and
cognitive difficulties attributable to the traumatic brain injury.
[28] Dr Steyn confirmed that the orthopaedic injuries had largely resolved and
that no significant long -term physical disability remained. The evidence
accordingly demonstrates that the principal residual injury is the traumatic brain
injury and its associated neurocognitive sequelae.
[29] In evaluating the expert evidence, I attach particular weight to the joint
findings of the neuropsychologists and industrial psychologists. Their
conclusions are broadly consistent with the contemporaneous medical records,

the observations of the neurosurgeons and the developmental difficulties
reported by the child's caregivers.
[30] No expert was called to challenge the methodology, professional
competence or factual foundation of the plaintiff's experts. To the extent that
differences exist between the experts, I find no reason in not accepting those
opinions supported by the joint minutes and the cumulative effect of the
neurological, neuropsychological, educational and occupational evidence.
[31] In my view, the evidence establishes on a balance of probabilities that the
traumatic brain injury has profoundly diminished the minor child's educational
and vocational potential.
[32] There is no material inconsistency between the neurosurgeons'
classification of the injury as a moderate traumatic brain injury and the
neuropsychologists' findings concerning its long -term consequences. The
severity of a traumatic brain injury is not determined solely by its initial
classification but also by its functional sequelae. The accepted evidence
establishes that, irrespective of its initial grading, the injury has resulted in
enduring and substantial neurocognitive impairment.
[33] In Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt,1it was recognised
that the assessment of future loss of earnings inevitably involves uncertainty.
Such uncertainty is addressed by the application of contingency deductions to
account for the vicissitudes of life, including illness, unemployment, economic
factors and other unforeseen events.
[34] Similarly, in Southern Insurance Association v Bailey NO,2 the Appellate
Division emphasised a claim for future loss of earning capacity is inherently

1 Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveldt [1973] 2 All SA 173 (A); 1973 (2) SA 146 (A).
2 Southern Insurance Association v Bailey NO 1984 (1) SA 98 (A) at 113H–114E.

speculative and that, where sufficient material exists, actuarial computation
provides a logical and useful basis for quantification. The Court observed that
while such calculations remain no more than an informed estimate, they are
generally preferable to a purely intuitive assessment unsupported by objective
data.
[35] Likewise, in Road Accident Fund v Guedes, 3 the court endorsed a
‘robust’ approach to the assessment of future loss and confirmed that actuarial
calculations provide a useful framework for determining compensation where
sufficient evidential material exists. The court held as follows:
‘It is trite that a person is entitled to be compensated to the extent that the person's
patrimony has been diminished in consequence of another's negligence. Such
damages include loss of future earning capacity (see for example President Insurance
Co Ltd v Mathews). The calculation of the quantum of a future amount such as loss of
earning capacity, is not, as I have already indicated. a matter of exact mathematical
calculation. By its nature such an enquiry is speculative, and a court can therefore
only make an estimate of the present value of the loss which is often a very rough
estimate (see for example Southern Insurance Association Ltd v Bailey NO. The court
necessarily exercises a wide discretion when it assesses the quantum of damages due
to loss of earning capa city and has a large discretion to award what it considers
right. Courts have adopted the approach that in order to assist in such a calculation,
an actuarial computation is a useful basis for establishing the quantum of damages.’
[36] An actuarial report prepared by Mary Cartwright Consultants CC dated
11 May 2026, calculated the minor child's uninjured earnings on the basis that
he would complete Grade 12, obtain a Higher Certificate qualification and enter
the labour market in 2032. The actuarial value of his uninjured earnings was
calculated at R4 599 300 before contingencies , suggesting a contingency

calculated at R4 599 300 before contingencies , suggesting a contingency
deduction of 20%.

3 Road Accident Fund v Guedes [2006] ZASCA 19; 2006 (5) SA 583 (SCA) para 8.

[37] Mr McLachlan submitted that a higher -than-normal contingency
deduction should be applied to account for the uncertainties associated with the
minor child's educational progression, socio-economic circumstances and future
periods of unemployment. He proposed a contingency deduction of 30%.
[38] Mr Mushwana contended that the assumptions should be confined to
those reflected in the industrial psychologists' joint minute and that the minor
child should be regarded as having remained within the unskilled labour sector.
He contends that the calculation of the minor’s loss of future earnings should be
in accordance with the actuarial report of Mary Cartwright dated 24 February
2025. He further contended that Ms Knox's addendum does not justify a
departure from the joint minute.
[39] The application of contingencies is a matter for judicial discretion. As
was recognised in Bee v Road Accident Fund ,4 the younger the claimant, the
greater the uncertainty regarding future educational attainment and career
progression and, in appropriate circumstances, the higher the contingency
deduction that may be justified.
[40] While the industrial psychologists agreed in their joint minute that the
minor child would probably complete Grade 12 and initially enter the labour
market at an unskilled level, the court is required to determine the issue on the
totality of the evidence.
[41] Dr Prag identified two possible educational pathways. The first was
premised on academic difficulties arising from microcephaly or a congenital
condition. The second assumed the absence of such pathology, in which event
the minor child would probably complete Grade 12 and benefit from further
vocational training.

4 Bee v Road Accident Fund (093/2017) [2018] ZASCA 52.

[42] The evidence supports the latter scenario. Professor Figaji concluded that
the minor child does not suffer from microcephaly and neither the neurologist
nor the neurosurgeon attributed his educational difficulties to any congenital
condition.
[43] The opinions of Dr Prag and Ms Trollip are broadly consistent in
concluding that, but for the accident, the minor child possessed the potential to
complete Grade 12 and obtain further vocational training at approximately NQF
Level 5. Those opinions are persuasive and supported by the evidence as a
whole.
[44] I am mindful that experts are ordinarily bound by conclusions recorded in
their joint minutes unless a proper basis exists for departure therefrom. In the
present matter, however, Ms Knox's addendum did not withdraw any agreed
factual findings. Rather, it reflected a revised vocational opinion based upon
additional educational and speech-language evidence not previously available. I
am satisfied that the revised opinion is adequately supported by the broader
body of expert evidence.
[45] I accordingly find that, but for the collision, the minor child would
probably have completed Grade 12, obtained a Higher Certificate qualification
and thereafter entered the open labour market.
[46] The family's relocation to Zimbabwe introduces uncertainty regarding the
minor child's future residence and employment. The evidence does not establish
that he will permanently remain in Zimbabwe for the duration of his working
life, nor was reliable expert evidence presented regarding Zimbabwean
earnings. In those circumstances , the use of South African earnings, coupled
with enhanced contingencies, provides the most reliable basis for assessment.

[47] The minor child was only seven years old when the collision occurred.
The ordinary uncertainties associated with childhood claims are compounded by
his socio-economic circumstances and relocation between countries.
[48] Having regard to all the circumstances, I am satisfied that a contingency
deduction of 30 % against the uninjured earnings appropriately reflects the
vicissitudes of life. Applying that deduction yields a net value of R3 219 510.
While certain experts contemplated the possibility of sheltered or supported
employment, those prospects were expressed tentatively and depended upon
interventions that the evidence suggests are unlikely to be available. Any
residual earning capacity is therefore too speculative to quantify. I am
accordingly satisfied that the plaintiff has established a future loss of earning
capacity in the amount of R3 219 510.

General damages
[49] I now turn to the assessment of general damages. The plaintiff claims R1
800 000, while the defendant contends R800 000 would constitute fair and
appropriate compensation. It is trite that the assessment of general damages falls
within the broad discretion of the court and must be undertaken upon equitable
considerations.
[50] This principle was stated in Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd,5
where it was held that general damages must be assessed on broad and equitable
considerations. It was further reaffirmed in Southern Insurance Association v

5 Sandler v Wholesale Coal Suppliers Ltd 1941 AD 194 at 199.

Bailey NO,6 and endorsed in Minister of Safety and Security v Seymour,7 where
the court emphasised that an award must be fair to both parties.
[51] In Road Accident Fund v Marunga ,8 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated
that, although general damages cannot be determined with mathematical
precision, the court should identify the factors material to the assessment and
provide a reasoned basis for the award.
[52] In De Jongh v Du Pisanie, 9 the Supreme Court of Appeal reaffirmed that
previous awards serve merely as a guide and approved the principle stated in
Pitt v Economic Insurance Co Ltd,10 that courts must ensure that awards are fair
to both parties.
[53] Mr McLachlan submitted that the court should consider the plaintiff's age
and circumstances, the nature and extent of the injuries, the sequelae and
prognosis, the impact of inflation and comparable awards. He contended that an
award of R1 800 000 would be appropriate.
[54] In support of that submission , counsel relied upon Nsibande v Road
Accident Fund, M v Road Accident Fund , Jamieson v Road Accident Fund and
Tromp NO v Road Accident Fund. 11
[55] Mr Mushwana submitted that the minor child had made a favourable
recovery and that the long -term prognosis was generally good. He argued that
an award of R800 000 would constitute fair compensation.

6 Fn 8 supra.
7 Minister of Safety and Security v Seymour [2006] ZASCA 71; 2006 (6) SA 320 (SCA) at 325B.
8 Road Accident Fund v Marunga [2003] ZASCA 19; [2003] 2 All SA 148 (SCA); 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA) para
33.
9 De Jongh v Du Pisanie [2004] ZASCA 43; [2004] 2 All SA 565 (SCA); 2005 (5) SA 457 (SCA); 2004 (5J2)
QOD 103 (SCA) paras 60-64.
10 Pitt v Economic Insurance Co. Ltd 1957 (3) SA 284 (D) at 287E-F.
11 Nsibande v Road Accident Fund (A174/2020) 2022 (8B3) QOD 1 (GNP); M v Road Accident Fund 2024
(8B4) QOD 76 (NCK), Jamieson v Road Accident Fund 2021 (8J2) QOD 1 (ECG) and Tromp NO v Road
Accident Fund 2024 (8J2) QOD 64 (GNP).

[56] Counsel further relied on the evidence of Dr Ogilvy, who reported normal
speech production and hearing acuity, and submitted that the principal residual
injury was the traumatic brain injury identified by the neurosurgeons.
[57] In support of a lower award , Mr Mushwana relied on Ncama v Road
Accident Fund, Phasa v Road Accident Fund, and Maela v Road Accident
Fund,12.
[58] In determining an appropriate award, I have considered the nature and
extent of the injuries, the sequelae established by the expert evidence, the minor
child's age, the pain and suffering endured, the permanent impairment
established by the evidence, and comparable awards.
[59] The minor child sustained multiple serious injuries which necessitated
hospitalisation and significant medical intervention. Although the orthopaedic
injuries have largely resolved, the consequences of the traumatic brain injury
remain substantial. The accepted evidence establishes persistent difficulties with
memory, concentration, learning and executive functioning. The
neuropsychologists diagnosed a major neurocognitive disorder and concluded
that the sequelae will continue to affect the minor child's educational, social and
occupational functioning. These cognitive limitations have materially
diminished the minor child's ability to function independently and to realise his
educational and vocational potential. They represent a substantial loss of the
ordinary amenities of life and will continue to affect him throughout adulthood.
[60] I have considered the comparative awards relied upon by both parties.
Although no two cases are identical, they provide a useful framework within
which to assess a fair award.

12 Ncama v Road Accident Fund 2015 (7E3) QOD 7 (ECP); Phasa v Road Accident Fund 2012 (6E4) QOD 21
(GNP) & Maela v Road Accident Fund 2025 (7E4) QOD 1 (GNP).

[61] The defendant's proposed award does not adequately reflect the
seriousness of the traumatic brain injury and its enduring consequences. The
accepted expert evidence establishes that the injury has fundamentally altered
the minor child's educational, social and vocational trajectory. At the same time,
the evidence demonstrates a favourable recovery from the orthopaedic injuries
and the absence of significant physical disability.
[62] Having regard to the serious traumatic brain injury, the pain and suffering
endured, the residual neurocognitive sequelae, the diagnosed major
neurocognitive disorder, the diminution of the amenities of life, the impact upon
the minor child's future independence and functioning, his young age and the
guidance provided by comparable awards, I am satisfied that an award of R1
300 000 constitutes fair and reasonable compensation for general damages.

Costs
[63] The plaintiff seeks a punitive costs order on the attorney-and-client scale.
It is contended that liability was settled in July 2018; that no dispute exists
between the experts regarding the minor child’s injuries, sequelae and
prognosis; and that the defendant failed to advance any meaningful settlement
proposals. In the alternative, the plaintiff seeks an order that counsel’s fees be
taxed on Scale C.
[64] The defendant contends that an award of costs on the party-and-party
scale, including counsel’s fees on Scale B, would be appropriate.
[65] The general rule is that costs follow the result. The defendant has
accepted liability for the plaintiff’s costs in relation to the heads of damages that
were settled. The question is whether there is a basis to depart from the ordinary
scale of costs.

[66] An award of costs on the attorney-and-client scale is an extraordinary
remedy, reserved for cases involving conduct that is vexatious, reprehensible, or
constitutes an abuse of the court’s process. Such an order may also be justified
where considerations of fairness dictate that a successful litigant should not be
out of pocket as a result of the conduct of its opponent. 13
[67] I am not persuaded that this is a case for a punitive costs order. The
defendant’s unsuccessful defence does not, without more, constitute conduct
warranting such an order.
[68] Having regard to the complexity of the issues, the value of the claim, and
the extent of the legal authorities considered, it is appropriate that counsel’s fees
be taxed on Scale C. The plaintiff is accordingly entitled to costs on the party-
and-party scale, including counsel’s fees taxed on Scale C.

Order
[69] In the results, I make the following order:

1. The defendant shall pay to the plaintiff, the capital sum of
R 4 519 510 (‘the capital sum’), which amount shall be due and payable
within 30 (thirty) days from date of the order, failing which interest shall
accrue on the capital sum at the statutory prescribed rate, calculated from
due date to date of final payment.
2. The defendant shall provide O[…] M[…] with an undertaking in
terms of s 17(4) (a) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 , to
compensate him for the costs relating to his future accommodation in a

13 In re Alluvial Creek Ltd 1929 CPD 532 at 535; Public Protector v South African Reserve Bank [2019] ZACC
29; 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC) paras 9 and 97; Road Accident Fund v Van Wyk (Appeal) (1169/2020; A186/2025)
[2026] ZAWCHC 39 para 50.

hospital or nursing home, for treatment of or rendering of a service to
him, or the supplying of goods to him, arising from the injuries sustained
in the collision on 9 December 2016 , after such costs have been incurred
and upon proof thereof.
3. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff's party -and-party costs on the
High Court Scale (including VAT) , as taxed or agreed, such costs to
include, but not limited to the costs referred to herein, as well as the costs
of counsel on Scale C, to include preparation for trial, drafting heads of
argument and attending court on 27 May 2026.
4. In the event of costs not being agreed, the plaintiff shall serve a notice
of taxation on the defendant’s attorneys of record.
5. The defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s taxed or agreed costs incurred
up to and until the date hereof, as well as any subsequent costs incurred in
finalising the matter and any costs incurred in obtaining the undertaking
and/or payment of the capital sum, interest and costs.
6. Regarding the expert witnesses referred to hereinafter, the defendant
shall pay the taxed or agreed fees and all costs attached to the
procurement of medico -legal reports, as well as X -rays and scans and
other related costs, the latter costs also include the costs of attending all
plaintiff’s and defendant’s medico -legal examinations, including the
qualifying fees of the experts, the amount of which will be at the
discretion of the Taxing Master:
6.1 Dr P A Olivier (orthopaedic surgeon);
6.2 Prof. Tuviah Zabow (psychiatrist);
6.3 Dale Ogilvy (speech and language therapist);

6.4 Karin Trollip (educational psychologist);
6.5 Prof. Anthony Figaji (neurosurgeon);
6.6 Hayley Leonardi (occupational therapist);
6.7 Elspeth Burke (clinical psychologist0;
6.8 Dr J Reid (neurologist);
6.9 Heather Knox (industrial psychologist); and
6.10 Mary Cartwright Consultants CC (actuary).
7. The defendant shall pay costs occasioned with Rule 37A
conferences.
8. Payment of the taxed or agreed costs shall be made within 14days
from the date of agreement or allocatur, failing which interest shall
accrue on the taxed or agreed costs at the statutory prescribed rate,
calculated from due date to date of final payment.
9. Payment of the capital sum and costs shall be effected by way of
electronic transfer of funds into the Trust Account of the plaintiff’s
attorneys, the details which are referred to hereinafter.
10. It is recorded that there is no contingency fee arrangement.
11. Plaintiff’s attorney trust banking details are as follows:
BANK First National Bank
ACCOUNT Kruger & Co. Inc.
BRANCH Parow

BRANCH CODE 200 510
ACCOUNT NO. 5[...]



_____________________________________
YAKE S.
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

Appearances

For the Plaintiff: H G McLachlan
Instructed by: Kruger & CO
c/o Louwtjie Rothman & Manus Gerbe Street


For the Defendant: S Mushwana
Instructed by: State Attorneys