Herzenberg v GM Loubser Family Trust and Others (Appeal) (A117/2026) [2026] ZAWCHC 645 (30 October 2026)

45 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Spoliation — Mandament van spolie — Requirements for peaceful and undisturbed possession — Applicant's occupation arising from a romantic relationship and domestic goodwill — Court finding no autonomous control over access established — Absence of own keys relevant within broader factual matrix — Tolerated and shared occupation insufficient to constitute protected possession — Final interdict sought in addition to mandament — Applicant failing to establish clear right — Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document
in compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy


IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)

JUDGMENT

Reportable
Case no: A117/2026
In the matter between:

JORDAN MIKAEL HERZENBERG Appellant

AND


GM LOUBSER FAMILY TRUST
ELIZABETH LOUBSER
KATHERINE LOUBSER


First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Coram: LEKHULENI, J et BARTHUS, AJ
Heard: 21 August 2026
Delivered Electronically: 30 October 2026
Summary: Spoliation — Mandament van spolie — Requirements — Peaceful and
undisturbed possession — Applicant’s occupation arose solely from romantic
relationship and domestic goodwill — No autonomous control over access
established — Absence of own keys relevant within broader factual matrix —
Tolerated and shared occupation insufficient to constitute protected possession.
Interdict — Final interdict sought in addition to mandament — Broader enquiry into
underlying facts and asserted rights permissible — Applicant required to establish
clear right — No contractual, proprietary, or personal right to remain in occupation
proved — Withdrawal of tolerated access not an infringement of a legally protected
right.

Appeal — Cross-appeal — Attempt to appeal against reasons rather than order —
Impermissible — Appeal and cross-appeal dismissed.

ORDER

1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal is dismissed.
3. Condonation is granted for the late filing of the heads of argument.
4. The Appellant shall pay the costs of the appeal on Scale B, including the costs
of Counsel.
5. The Respondents shall pay the costs occasioned by the cross -appeal on
Scale B including the cost of counsel.

JUDGMENT


Barthus, AJ (Lekhuleni, J concurring)

INTRODUCTION

[1] This appeal concerns the dismissal of a mandament van spolie application
brought in the Magistrate’s Court for the District of Malmesbury . The dispute arises
from a domestic arrangement rather than any commercial or contractual relationship.

[2] The Appellant resided at 9[...] M[...] Road, Yzerfontein (“the Property”) solely
because of his romantic relationship with the Third Respondent and the goodwill of
the Second Respondent , the Third Respondent’s mother . When the relationship
ended, the Respondents removed the keys from behind the kitchen door, thereby
preventing the Appellant from entering or remaining on the premises. The Appellant
approached the Magistrate’s Court seeking restoration of possession.

[3] The Magistrate dismissed the application. The Appellant now appeals that
dismissal. The Respondents filed a cross -appeal directed only at the Magistrate’s
reasons.

[4] The Appellant’s litigation strategy is central to the appeal. By seeking final
interdictory relief in addition to the mandament, he placed the asserted legal basis of
his continued occupation in issue for purposes of that additional relief. This permitted

a rights-based enquiry that would have been impermissible in determining the
spoliation claim alone. The two enquiries nevertheless remained distinct: the
mandament depended upon factual possession and unlawful dispossession,
whereas the final interdict required proof of a clear right, an injury actually committed
or reasonably apprehended, and the absence of an adequate alternative remedy.

[5] The appeal therefore turns on two interrelated questions: first, whether the
Appellant proved peaceful and undisturbed possession for purposes of the
mandament; and second, whether he established a clear right for purposes of the
final interdict. The Respondents’ cross‑appeal also requires brief consideration.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES
The cross-appeal and condonation for the late filing of the heads of argument

[6] The Respondents also seek condonation for the late filing of their heads of
argument. That application is unopposed, offers an adequate explanation, and
causes no prejudice. Condonation for the late filing of the heads of argument should
accordingly be granted.

[7] The Respondents obtained the precise order they sought: dismissal of the
appeal. Their cross-appeal is directed only at aspects of the Magistrate’s reasoning.
It is settled that an appeal lies against the substantive order of a court, not the
reasons given for it. In Neotel (Pty) Ltd v Telkom SA SOC Ltd and Others 1, the
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed that an appellate court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain an appeal directed only at reasons where the operative order is not
challenged. The cross -appeal is accordingly impermissible and must be dismissed.
Its late filing is immaterial.

[8] It is convenient to consider the appeal in three stages. First, I address
whether the Appellant’s founding papers established peaceful and undisturbed
possession for purposes of the mandament. Second, assuming in his favour that any
pleading deficiency may be overlooked, I consider whether the evidence establishes

pleading deficiency may be overlooked, I consider whether the evidence establishes
corpus and animus. Third, I address the distinct claim for final interdictory relief.


1 (605/2016) [2017] ZASCA 47.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

[9] The Appellant began residing at the Property in March 2025. His occupation
was informal and arose from his romantic relationship with the Third Respondent and
the Second Respondent’s goodwill. The Property is the Respondents’ family home,
and the Appellant’s presence was accommodated within that domestic arrangement.

[10] The romantic relationship ended in November 2025. Shortly thereafter, the
Respondents retrieved the keys to the Property from the hook behind the kitchen
door. The Appellant nevertheless continued to access the Property until his removal.

[11] It is also significant that, in the eviction application subsequently initiated and
later withdrawn by the Respondents, they explained the basis upon which the
Appellant had been permitted to reside at the Property. In that application, the
Respondents stated that the Appellant had been allowed to live with them because
his parents were in the throes of a divorce and he required a quiet and stable
environment in which to study for his examinations.

[12] That explanation accords with the Appellant’s own account of how he came to
reside at the Property.

[13] A rule nisi was granted directing restoration of possession. The sheriff’s
attempts to execute the order were resisted, necessitating a second order
authorising the sheriff to change the locks. The Respondents then handed over a
single key.

[14] The Appellant later alleged that he was assaulted by two men inside the
Property. Those alleged events occurred after the Respondents had taken the keys
and after the alleged spoliation. They therefore do not assist in determining whether,
before the alleged deprivation, the Appellant had peaceful and undisturbed
possession of the quality required for the mandament.


THE MANDAMENT VAN SPOLIE
The Nature and Purpose of the Mandament

[15] The mandament van spolie is a remedy of narrow and specific application. It
protects factual possession, not rights or entitlement. Its purpose is to restore the
status quo ante by reversing unlawful dispossession , without determining the merits
of the underlying dispute or the parties’ rights.

[16] In Yeko v Qana ,2 the Appellate Division , as it then was, confirmed that an
applicant must allege and prove two jurisdictional facts: peaceful and undisturbed
possession before the deprivation, and unlawful dispossession. The Constitutional
Court reaffirmed the remedy’s anti -self-help purpose in Ngqukumba v Minister of
Safety and Security and Others 3, Nieuwoudt v Steyn and Another 4
(‘Nieuwoudt’) and Bond v Harman-Leak and Others5 (“Harman-Leak”) are recent
High Court decisions applying those orthodox requirements.

[17] The mandament restores possession; it does not enforce rights or elevate
tolerated access into a legally enforceable entitlement.

Pleading Defect: The Bare Assertion of Possession

[18] The Appellant’s founding affidavit contains a single, unadorned assertion that
he “ enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession ” of the Property. It does not
explain how he exercised that possession, what incidents of control he enjoyed, or
whether he possessed keys, regulated access, excluded others, or regarded himself
as possessor. The assertion is therefore conclusory rather than factual.

[19] The omission is material because the jurisdictional facts must be established
by primary facts, not by merely repeating the conclusion that possession was
peaceful and undisturbed. Harman-Leak confirms, in the context of quasi -
possession, that actual exercise must be pleaded and proved; a bare allegation of a
right or ability to exercise control is insufficient. Similarly, Faku and Another v City
of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 6 held that an allegation framed in the
language of spoliation, without supporting facts establishing the asserted incidence

language of spoliation, without supporting facts establishing the asserted incidence
of possession, is fatally deficient.


2 1973 (4) SA 735 (A).
3 2014 (2) SACR 325 (CC) (15 May 2014).
4 [2025] ZAGPHC 60 (22 January 2025).
5 (2026/051129) [2026] ZAGPJHC 273 (18 March 2026).
6 [2026] ZAGP JHC 273 (18 March 2026).

[20] The Appellant’s counsel invited this Court to infer possession from the
surrounding circumstances. A court may draw proper inferences from pleaded
primary facts, but it may not construct an unpleaded case or supply the factual
foundation for a jurisdictional requirement. The question is therefore whether the
facts actually alleged, taken at their highest, establish a sufficiently stable and
effective measure of physical control coupled with the intention to hold for the
Appellant’s own benefit.

[21] The defect is not cured by the duration of the Appellant’s residence or by the
fact of occupation itself. The founding papers do not allege facts showing that his
residence transcended tolerated domestic occupation or that he exercised the
corpus and animus required for protected possession.

[22] The Appellant’s case therefore cannot engage the mandament’s protective
function. Although he uses the language of the remedy, he does not plead the facts
necessary to sustain it: peaceful and undisturbed possession, corpus, and animus.

[23] Nieuwoudt does not establish that occupation arising from a romantic
relationship is, without more, merely tolerated or incapable of protection. Restoration
was granted because the applicant had occupied the property for years, made
renovations and improvements, asserted a lien, and was dispossessed despite
pending eviction litigation known to the purchaser. Those features provided objective
evidence of settled control and an intention to possess for the applicant’s own
benefit; they are absent here. Although the ple ading deficiency is dispositive of the
mandament, I consider in the alternative whether the evidence as a whole
establishes corpus and animus.


APPLICATION OF LAW TO THE FACTS
Corpus (Physical Control)

[24] Even if the pleading deficiency is overlooked in the Appellant’s favour, the
evidence must still establish corpus. The enquiry is whether his occupation afforded

evidence must still establish corpus. The enquiry is whether his occupation afforded
him a sufficiently stable and effective measure of physical control over the Property
immediately before the alleged dispossession.

[25] The Appellant’s occupation was not shown to be exclusive or autonomous. He
lived within the Respondents’ household, did not regulate access, secure or maintain
the premises, exclude others , or otherwise exercise independent control over the
space. On this record, his occupation remained embedded within the Respondents’
domestic arrangements and was relational and tolerated rather than possessory.

[26] Physical control is assessed practically and in context; neither exclusivity nor
the possession of a personal set of keys is an invariable legal requirement. Shared
or mediated access may nevertheless fall short where the alleged possessor cannot
enter, remain, regulate use, or otherwise exercise a sufficiently stable measure of
control. The evidence about keys is therefore relevant only as one part of the
broader factual matrix.

[27] In the present matter, the Appellant alleges residence at the Property but does
not identify any room or area under his control, any possessions kept there as indicia
of settled occupation, any independent means of entry, or any conduct by which he
regulated use of the premises. The keys remained inside the Respondents’ home
and were used within an arrangement controlled by them. That fact is not decisive by
itself, but, read with the absence of pleaded acts of control, it does not establish the
effective physical control required for corpus.

[28] In De Beer v Zimbali Estate Management Association (Pty) Ltd and
Another7, Nicholson J reviewed the distinction between access and possession for
purposes of the mandament. The decision confirms that the enquiry remains whether
the applicant exercised possession or quasi -possession of the requisite quality,
rather than merely enjoying access dependent on another’s control.

Animus (Intention to Possess for One’s Own Benefit)

[29] Animus possidendi requires an intention to hold the property as possessor for
one’s own benefit, assessed objectively from the surrounding facts. The enquiry is

one’s own benefit, assessed objectively from the surrounding facts. The enquiry is
not whether the Appellant had a legal right to possess, but whether his conduct
demonstrated possession of the requisite quality rather than mere residence by
tolerance.


7 (6711/05) [2006] ZAKZHC 21; 2007 (3) SA 254 (N) (11 May 2006).

[30] The fact that the Appellant’s occupation began through a romantic relationship
and permission does not, without more, negate animus: a permissive occupier may
possess for their own benefit, and the mandament does not ask whether that
occupation was lawful. What matters is the objective quality of the occupation. Unlike
the applicant in Nieuwoudt the Appellant pleaded no improvements, lien,
contribution, demarcated area of control, independent access, or other conduct
showing that he held the Property, or an identifiable part of it, as possessor rather
than as a member of the Respondents’ household.

[31] Animus cannot be rejected merely because the Respondents later withdrew
permission. The withdrawal of consent does not retrospectively determine whether
possession existed immediately before the deprivation. The difficulty for the
Appellant is evidential: the founding papers do not allege objective acts by which he
manifested an intention to hold the premises for his own benefit before access was
withdrawn.

[32] On the facts pleaded, the Appellant’s occupation remained dependent on the
Respondents’ tolerance and domestic arrangements. He alleged no objective
conduct demonstrating an intention to hold the Property, or an identifiable part of it,
as possessor for his own benefit.


[33] In Ivanov v North West Gambling Board and Others 8, the Supreme Court
of Appeal confirmed that the mandament protects factual possession rather than
rights, and that even unlawful possession may qualify for restoration. That principle
assists the Appellant only if factual possession is first established.

[34] The recent authorities therefore require a fact -sensitive enquiry. Cohabitation,
permission, shared access, and the absence of a personal key are not individually
dispositive. On these papers, however, their combined significance lies in the
absence of pleaded facts showing effective control and an intention to possess for

absence of pleaded facts showing effective control and an intention to possess for
the Appellant’s own benefit. The Appellant accordingly failed to establish peaceful
and undisturbed possession immediately before the alleged deprivation.

The Landlord-Tenant Analogy Advanced by the Appellant


8 (312/2011) [2012] ZASCA 92; 2012 (6) SA 67 (SCA) (31 May 2012).

[35] The Appellant sought to liken his occupation of the Property to that of a
tenant, relying on the duration of his residence and the absence of interference
before the romantic relationship ended . The analogy is misplaced . A tenancy
ordinarily involves contractual entitlement, defined possession, autonomous control,
and an ability to exclude. None of those features was present here: the Appellant’s
occupation was relational rather than contractual, tolerated rather than bargained for,
and subject to the Respondents’ authority.

Final interdictory relief

[36] The Appellant’s claim for final interdictory relief required a separate rights -
based enquiry. Street Pole Ads Durban (Pty) Ltd and Another v eThekwini
Municipality9 explains that additional non -spoliatory relief may open the door to a
consideration of the asserted right. Harman-Leak restates the qualification: a
respondent may not challenge the applicant’s right merely because it is mentioned;
the merits become relevant where the alleged right is relied upon as part of the
cause of action for further, non -spoliatory relief. Here, the Appellant sought a final
interdict and was therefore required to establish the clear right on which that relief
depended.

[37] In Setlogelo v Setlogelo 10, the Appellate Division stated the requirements for
final interdictory relief: a clear right, an injury actually committed or reasonably
apprehended, and the absence of any other satisfactory remedy. The Appellant did
not allege any basis for a clear right. His occupation arose from his romantic
relationship with the Third Respondent and the Second Respondent’s goodwill. He
asserted no contractual entitlement, proprietary interest, or other legal foundation
entitling him to remain on the Property or regulate access to it.

[38] The Appellant also failed to establish an injury in the legal sense required for
final interdictory relief. The keys were kept on a hook inside the Respondents’ home

final interdictory relief. The keys were kept on a hook inside the Respondents’ home
and used by the Appellant with their permission. By removing and retaining them
when the relationship ended, the Respondents withdrew that permission; they did
not take keys held independently by the Appellant or infringe an established right of
access.

9 2008(5) SA290 (SCA) (28 March 2008).
10 1914 AD 221 at 227.

[39] The removal of the keys from the hook may have terminated the Appellant’s
practical ability to access the Property, but on the case pleaded it did not infringe any
legally protected rights. The mandament cannot create or enforce rights, and an
interdict cannot be granted in the absence of a right. The Appellant’s complaint is, at
its highest, the loss of tolerated access. On these facts, tolerated access was not
shown to be a right capable of protection by interdict.

[40] The Appellant also failed to establish the absence of an adequate alternative
remedy. Had he possessed a contractual or personal right to remain on the Property,
he could have pursued a claim founded on that right. He alleged no such entitlement
and identified no unavailable remedy. A final interdict cannot cure that deficiency by
creating an underlying right of access.

[41] The requirements for final interdictory relief were therefore not established.

[42] The distinction between the remedies is decisive: the spoliation claim
concerns factual possession, whereas the final interdict depends upon an
enforceable right.

Conclusion
[43] The spoliation claim fails because the Appellant did not plead or establish
factual possession of the requisite quality immediately before the alleged
dispossession. That conclusion does not depend upon whether he had a legal right
to occupy the Property. The claim for final interdictory relief fails independently
because he established no contractual, proprietary, or personal right entitling him to
remain in occupation or regulate access. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.

ORDER

[44] In the result, I propose the following order:
1. The appeal is dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal is dismissed.
3. Condonation is granted for the late filing of the heads of argument.

4. The Appellant shall pay the costs of the appeal on Scale B, including the
costs of Counsel.
5. The Respondents shall pay the costs occasioned by the cross -appeal on
Scale B including the cost of Counsel.


_____________________________
V BARTHUS
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT

I agree and it is so ordered.

_____________________________
J LEKHULENI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT




Appearances

For Appellant: ADV ALEXANDER GLOOR
Instructed by: MHI Attorneys

For Respondents: ADV D PETERSEN
Instructed by: Brink & Thomas Inc