(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes
(3) Revised
Signature Date
THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA, GQEBERH
In the matter between:
ENOCH MGIJIMA LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
and
THE SOUTH AFRICAN LOCA
BARGAINING COUNCIi:::
ADVM FOUCHE
INDEPENDENT
12 February 2026
o: PR237/23
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
This judgment was handed down electronically by emailing a copy
parties. 30 October 2026 is deemed to be the date of delivery of this
judgment.
2
JUDGMENT
KROONAJ
Introduction
[1 J The Applicant (the Municipality) seeks the review, jde, and/or
correction of the exemption ruling (the Ruling)11?f~ued ;~t Second
Respondent (the Panellist), acting under the t;fl t Respondent ··=-
(the Bargaining Council). Both the Third Res ndent (11 ATU) and the Fourth
Respondent (SAMWU) oppose the ap litf1ffibn. ,,~~r,,,FJii
[2] In terms of the Ruling, the )=!RPlicatio · f~mption from the three-year
Bargaining Council Wag~tr°;d -;"' lary Collective Agreement (the Collective
Agreement) was refuse~,(, ~~ithe Municipality sought an order setting
aside the Ruling a .. d su;~, ith a Ruling that the Municipality be granted
and 6.7 of the Collective Agreement until the an exemption fro
pay levels the Municipality's grading as a Category 4
re "re1,tarised', or for such period and on such terms as the
,Jl?F
Municipal
,-;.,0_
Cqi,(
¾~
,ri,fppropriate. In the alternative, the Municipality sought the
e matter to the Bargaining Council, to be heard afresh by a
llist.
exemption application was brought in terms of clause 15.1.15 of the
ollective Agreement, concluded on 15 September 2021 for the period 1 July
2021 to 30 June 2024. Having complied with the Collective Agreement for the
first two years, the Municipality sought a "partial exemption" for the third year.
Under the Collective Agreement, employees of all municipalities were entitled
to an across-the-board increase of 5.4%, based on the projected average CPI
for 2023.
3
[4] SAMWU raised whether the review application was brought in terms of the
correct section of the Labour Relations Act No 66 of 1995 (the LRA). The point
so raised is worthy of consideration. However, in light of the conclusion to which
the Court comes, it is unnecessary to say anything further about it, and the
Court will assume, without deciding, that no procedural hurdles
entertaining the merits of the application.
The factual matrix
[5] The salient facts are, for the most part, not seriously''
the Municipality indicated in its heads of argu ·~Jtt1
captured by the Panellist in the Ruling, for
d the facts as
[6]
review application. It, however, conten JI!Yfllat st's legal conclusions,
drawn from the facts, were errone s to theiextent that they vitiated her
decision.
By way of overview, th -:ttbismatter, like many municipalities in this
>p
country, found itself in fin .. '.. straits. It seems that, broadly speaking, the
Municipality "'"·
that those
fallen way lort of ~--
~~-
he-'hiost part, the reason for its predicament was
and governed the Municipality historically had
ark. Maladministration and poor governance, including
ipal employees on an inflated scale, so the Municipality
ed in the Municipality being, in its words, "technically bankrupf'. 1
e national government intervened as contemplated by Section
Constitution and instituted a so-called financial recovery plan. The
nicipality pursued other avenues in search of financial respite. There was 7,#t
·--
"titentially light at the end of the tunnel. However, the situation was serious and
it was acknowledged that the emergence from the tunnel, if there was going to
be an emergence at all, would be somewhere in the distant future.
11n short, monies owed exceeded revenue
4
[7] The Panellist described the factual background to the matter as follows:
"15. The Applicant municipality was the culmination after the merger of three
municipalities, the erstwhile Tso/wane, lnkwanca and Lukhanji
municipalities. During the merger, in 2016, the employees of the former two
municipalities demanded by way of strike action to be paid at the sawi; level
as the latter municipality's employees. That took them frorg{Jifypicipa/
category 1 pay levels to category 4 levels. Much the sal7Jf!,J,?;pp;'/f:'i!!g)n
2018/2019 when, through industrial action, the emptp/les lanaged 'f'&
receive pay at municipal category 6 levels (and task g,;,adt~[Jt,1,tj?lrtfflpr:Qved).
The new municipality, the Applicant, had to carry the biiftl nd~iflf! excessive
- -,::,,_,.,,_
17.
18.
payroll it had inherited.
Job grades had to be normalis'/!ld and other anomalies had to be resolved.
~l ~ Once resolved, the Applicant wi:fq[q be able to pay increases on the correct
--0::xs- -,if7;f,
grades. Paying incr~'!ff.g•· · on the i!1di:frrect grades would not solve the
problem, but woutf1!.F
In April 2022 and I tiof section 139(7) of the Constitution the national
?I~ ,ad /he Appl<ant ram,l"ed '"bject to ,m,,
h:~&li;@,,qJJ!l.ie Applicant, Mr Mah/ale/a, presented figures from the 2021
022 audited financial statements and sections 71 and 72 reports
fl. ting the Applicant's financial position. There was, for example, an
.· ncrease in creditor liabilities from R670+m to R990+m; the total revenue
came to R846m, whereas the total expenditure was well in excess of R1b;
instead of the supposed 8% to be used for maintenance, only some 0,3%
and 0, 03% was so used because of a lack of funds (the actual figures are
0,31% and 1,03%); debt collection, supposed to be at a rate of 95%, stood
at 64% and 74%; instead of paying creditors within one to three months,
some creditors were not paid at all because of a cash flow problem - it was
a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul; an amount of R1, 1b was owed to
5
Eskom alone; infrastructure and service delivery grants were reduced by
National Treasury.
20. A financial recovery plan by National Treasury to assist the Applicant was
adopted by its Council and was in the process of being implemented,
although it was still in the early stages of implementation."
Overview
[8]
[9]
If the Court understood the thrust of the Municipality's po§[tio
,,,~,,,, ·•c . .> --·-·
that it had turned over a new leaf, that there were new broofit§"wil;;were of the
mind to set things right, and that the sins of the fat~t~-,sho~;!ifuoibe passed
down to the next generation when a successtgfJfiffint~nt§.g"al~ contribute to
restoring the finances of the Municipality. RatJ!s, beca:l a new administration
had replaced the erstwhile administrs:(fi~':thi~~~-§,yiit it was contended, a
proper case where the Panellist fbould i,fye. had sympathy with the
"\'f-+t ;;if§
Municipality and should have a rded ii''Feli@f,cjff1terms of the powers vested in
her.
'TB] A/tho
ofthc¾ex
~d as follows:
"'/ y accepted that the grading issue fell outside the remit
ibunal, its argument was and remains that the costs caused
ading were relevant to its financial distress and thus to the
application. The point made by the union, and accepted by the
; hat the Municipality could "afford" an increase in the third year of the
:reement because it had managed to do so in the previous two years is
tautologous - this is precisely why the Municipality was constrained to seek
exemption in the third year.
[9] The unions and the presiding panellist also ignored the fact that managers who
had succumbed to the unions' demand that the Municipality be upgraded have
been replaced by a new management team, headed by myself. and a new
Council, which are legally obliged to take measures to ensure that the
Municipality fulfils its constitutional and statutory mandate to provide the
6
sustainable delivery of services to the community falling within its impoverished
iurisdiction.
[13] The only "solution" offered by the unions (and accepted by the pane ·st) to
resolve these intractable problems was to improve management,,,·
more efficient debt collection and cut down on alleged
expenditure, which is the ob ·ective of the
mana ement but which clear/ cannot be achieved over
not contradict the Municipality's explanation for each
' claimed was unnecessary - including the hirin o •
.ilflf),S did
to safeguard municipal property whic y unidentified
individuals." (own emphasis)
[10] In his oral submissions before the P
[11 l
exemption, Mr Jali, on behalf of the xplained as follows:
"The reasons why we • Y~JTlire or the mess that we find ourselves in,
t ;;~ taken earlier and the new Council that is
all the ills and all the thin s that were
yees of the Municipality and those that have left the
r resolve." (own emphasis)
Iple, the Court has two difficulties with the Municipality's
;:)cter this heading, i.e. that the Panellist should have, so to speak,
;f{escue of the Municipality, given the historical maladministration
petrated under the remit of the erstwhile Municipal Council.
he first difficulty is that, at conceptual level, insofar as it is so suggested, it is
not permissible for an organ of state to avoid accountability by drawing a line
between different eras of governance. In A/tech Radio Holdings (Pty) Ltd and
Others v Tshwane City,2 the Supreme Court: of Appeal rejected a similar
2 2021 (3) SA 25 (SCA)
7
argument, albeit that it was raised in a different context - as a justification for
an allegedly unacceptable explanation for an unreasonable delay. The Court
commented as follows:
'T24] The core contention advanced by the City is that the delay is justified
because the DA only won control of the City in August 2016 and t
[25]
required time to investigate the alleged irregularities perpetrat ._"
',--;;~
previous ANG controlled administration. That contention
found favour with Baqwa J, who held:
'(O)fficials of the previous administration who fl:
with the [City] were no longer there to acc,2unt for
the new officials had to find their way virt;;'ff!
the correctness or otherwise of the
I cannot agree with the learned judge. A e level o aw a chan e in olitical
control of an organ of state, suchfsiffre Clfv':r<is irre/lfvant. The City is a single
fffjJj!' -"'~.J!.010"
·uristic enti ,..!<!.!.'=!..!l,1£ olitical administration did not
[13] The second difficulty, int
appeared on behalf of
r~.~w. is, as was submitted by Mr Qhali, who ~ii¼ffffF
Mhat it would generally not be fair or proper for
~-
ch a Municipality, to rely on its own substandard
administrat anting of an indulgence of the nature sought in
this • atural question is why the hapless employees should
ponsible, or in part responsible, for the consequences of
vernance of the powers that be.
ot strictly analogous, in my view, a comparison may be drawn with
scenario where a deviation is sought, from compulsory procurement
cedures in the public sector, based on a dilemma which is either self-created
or self-inflicted. It has been held, in that context, that recourse may only be had
to a deviation in exceptional circumstances. In Joubert Galpin Searle Inc and
Others v Road Accident Fund and Others,3 the Supreme Court of Appeal
explained that ''poor planning" on the part of the organ of state cannot serve as
3 [2014] 2 All SA 604 (ECP); 2014 (4) SA 148 (ECP)
8
a basis for justifying a failure to comply with procurement procedures4. A similar
approach was taken in Martin Noel Pietersen v the State5 where the Court found
that when the dilemma an organ of state finds itself in is "self-imposed", there
can be little scope for deviations.6 Expressed differently, if an organ of state
seeks relief of this nature, reliance on its own poor performance will generally
not be acceptable.
[15] As mentioned above, the stark fact is that the Municipality its
for the perilous financial situation it finds itself in. Yet it seek
Z,
degree, to hold its employees responsible for its own ri'i\
: .. -. "•~a
effectively penalising them when it comes to their efi • emenf•"• uneration
increases. Whilst there can be no absolutes w1;J1n2IR to exercise of a
discretion of the nature in question, it offends c{e·s sen
if the Municipality were to escape the n~j:Uf'8l ;i. · es, albeit to a degree,
of its poor governance and m 1 dministtt.~tion by transferring those
• consequences onto its employees. ·ould particularly be so in
circumstances where the
when they are not entit
of the Municipal Council receive increases
[16] .a,c ✓,F,s: may validly be applied to the current
situation, a they can be, then much of the wind is taken out
of the sails'1f the icipality's case. Nonetheless, a detailed analysis of the
ic is desirable, if not required. -~~$-
ellist
Collective Agreement lists the applicable criteria as follows:
4 [
5 (A309/2017) [2019] ZAWCHC 93 (6 February 2019)
6 para [52]
7 The Court accepts the point made by Mr Grogan, who appeared on behalf of the Municipality, that the
amount paid to the Municipal Council members would not have come close to the footing the bill for the
increase payable to the employees. It should accordingly not be blown out of proportion. That said,
increasing the remuneration of Councilors, who are not employees and where there is no obligation to
do so whilst, in the same breath, requesting that employees forfeit, in their entirety, the increases to
which they are entitled, as of right, must, at some level, impact adversely on the integrity of the
exemption application.
9
"15.1.15.1.1 Any written and/or verbal substantiation provided by the
applicant or a Party to the SALGBC;
15.1.15.1.2 Fairness to the employer, its employees and other employers
and the employees in the local government sector;
15.1.15.1.3 Whether an exemption, if granted would
agreement or the collective bargaining proc
15. 1. 15. 1.4 The employer is unable to afford the cost
of this agreement;
15. 1. 15. 1. 5 The employer has short-le
a limited exemption;
15.1.15.1.6 Unexpected econo occurring during the currency
ation and/or loss thereof; of this a .ent and JO
15.1.15.1.7 e a provision, approved by National Treasury,
• plementation of the obligation arising out of the
.. Y process or directives as may be agreed to by the Executive
l!fl
<z¥?t,i¥Zrc,.,€ommittee from time to time; or
Any other factor(s) which is considered appropriate."
'ti Panellist considered each criterion. In refusing the application for an
• !mption, she reasoned as follows:
"47. The primacy and binding nature of a collective agreement is a well-known
fact and need not be dwelled upon. Therefore, a deviation or exemption from
a collective agreement should be treated with prudence and in a judicious
10
manner. I was referred to authority 8 in this regard. The principle that stands
out is that exemptions, adopting a narrow approach and not to be readily
granted, may be granted in a case of a party to a collective agreement
experiencing undue hardship.
48. Exemptions ought to be considered in light of the overall interestqp;pf the
sector with fairness to both sides in mind, while maintaining coqtlJ;nce in
the collective bargaining process. Exemptions too easily g1-;nt~
0
8!£/,1]Jay
49.
undermine that confidence.
The application is based on the issue of affordabJTt·,
acknowledged the financial challenges faced
view that increases could be paid were
properly.
/fl"_-;:i"~:.;
50. The Applicant referred to the ca'tf,gorisatio . o
~ •
the fact that employees were a.a ordingl
that contributed to th xperienced by the Applicant. This
forms part of the
contributes to it~~
cannot m e a rigri
ebts inherited by the Applicant and conceivably
. The Applicant contends that two wrongs
, ying increases on the incorrect grades.
0}5,'
51. Tll. not a matter to be determined by this forum. The
wl[ ~p
A/Jpjicant shqjJ/d have endeavoured to rectify the categorisation, if it is
"'1i@,,,s !@
deei;i,,in.coirect, Jong ago. Seven years have lapsed since one of the
✓ --~-i=-0
ile municipalities applied for a re-categorisation and nothing has been
before me to the effect that the Applicant has submitted a similar
More glaring though is the fact that the Applicant paid increases in the past
two years, covered by the same collective agreement, based on what it calls
the incorrect grades. If the grades played such a prominent role they should
have been corrected before or soon after the current collective agreement
took effect. I agree with the Applicant that two wrongs do not make a right,
6 Kem-Lin Fashions CC v Brunton & Another [2001] 1 BLLR 25 (LAC); (2001) 22 ILJ 109 (LAC); Du Toil
et al, Labour Relations Law: A Comprehensive Guide, 6 ed, LexisNexis.
11
but the grades could hardly be used as a factor when they evidently were
not much of a concern in the past two years.
53. A fairly new administration is also not a reason for not having turned around
the financial issues and not resolving factors that contribute to the financial
issues. Given the fact that many of the senior officials in thJ/" new
administration have been there for a year or more, much could/flf~ibeen
done to alleviate some of the problems. It is a matter of puttin i, ;h;Jf&J;if to
the wheel. And, the Applicant has been subject to a ~F 39 (of"ffr~
Constitution) national intervention to assist the ne ~ llbn: 0since ., ""'!(/;',·
early part of last year.
54. According to the Applicant, its total reveQJ[e'lw, 4pm, Jt,l ereas the total
expenditure was well in excess of R1b(with ;;:f/!fto Eskom alone.
55.
Creditor liabilities increased by some;lifj llection decreased and
was well below the benchmark/!f/95% af)J:/ g~ s have been reduced. The
wi '?j§;:
section 71 report of 2023 ref/ec1§1[W24m ~ceived in revenue, whereas the
_;~pess o?ff?lo(J,#,:a deficit of more than R300m. As
-~~.
a result, creditors_ paid in time or not at all and less is spent on
maintenance. •
e Firs !/fi?.espondent, the Applicants [sic] shows a surplus of 1ifff
11.§ifive cash-flow of R5, 2m, although the cash-flow is
.:ccording to the Second Respondent, the Applicant shows a /ifffj
p,ye#fncrease in revenue and in cash-flow and there was a positive "~-,"""~---·
e in cash at the end of 2022. Both Respondents pointed out that
diture increased, including unexplained expenditure, and blamed it on
1smanagement and a lack of control over financial issues. In addition, an
increase for councillors had been budgeted for, whereas no increases or a
decrease in salaries were budgeted for in respect of employees. Not all the
figures referred to by the Respondents could be verified.
56. The Respondents are of the view that the financial recovery plan and the
56. The Respondents are of the view that the financial recovery plan and the
municipal debt relief programme will assist and make it possible for the
Applicant to afford the increases. The Applicant agreed that the debt relief
programme would assist, but did not see it as the ultimate solution; other
12
measures had to be implemented. In the latter regard, it is probable that the
recovery plan will go some way in turning the Applicant's financial situation
around, especially with the assistance of national intervention. The Applicant
has now applied for debt relief in respect of the Eskom debt. An outcome
has not been received as yet and, considering Circular 124, an approval of
the application is not guaranteed - which is a point of concern. If approved,
d'i""''
the Applicant will have to realise that conditions under the progr/iJ{me will
,<(Sf"' ,.,._,,,.
have to be met at all cost.
57. The Applicant submitted that the total payroll made u11s'ff/J},ffej2flJ-,JsoftilYifotal
revenue. The financial expert, Mr Kumar, indicated thiff24!J;'f1"?Y[OII came to
58.
59.
between 30% - 40% over the past two years,
Turning to the factors contained in claJJ; 15.1.
Collective Agreement which havffeii{C1,-b!tconside1Jf1:1 when determining an
exemption application: the firstlfi~tor. is th;"Wfiffi;; and/or oral submissions
by the parties. These are bein'!J&ponside;J.a in this ruling. The second last
factor in the list of ni!Jf!: at of :,r1'i"ffrtl!:ss or directive agreed to by the
Executive Commi •ft~i
The second v:,.;,.
ot
m .. i~s to the Applicant and its employees, as well as
employees in the local government sector. The
hat its employees are being paid on the incorrect
espondents are of the view that withholding an agreed
,~~:JJ~i"'d have a negative effect on the morale and motivation of the
ees, especially when considering the fact that their counterparts in
municipalities have received increases and those municipalities paid
spite their financial positions. Moreover, it is unfair to pay an increase to
councillors, but no increase to the employees.
60. Any incorrect grades must be resolved without delay. In the meantime, as
observed above, the grades cannot be used as a justification not to pay
increases. I agree with the Respondents that withholding an increase would
increases. I agree with the Respondents that withholding an increase would
probably have a negative impact on employees. However, this argument
considers fairness to the employees only and fairness to the employer is
overlooked. The circumstances of the two sides need to be balanced. On
13
the other hand, the Applicant provides for increases of councillors, but not
for employees. This cannot be correct as councillors are not employees and
employees should enjoy priority. The first obligation must be towards
employees, not the councillors.
61. The third factor is whether an exemption would undermine the cojjpctive
agreement in question or the bargaining process. The Applicant's4i(~ition is
that an exemption would not undermine the agreement as its cotri"mit';!f\oJ to
the agreement can be seen from its compliance over the [J!) ears J1f~t
p;J!j!_ft
year as a result of a compliance order and subseq ?n~i fiif'.i¾l/%ard).
The Respondents' view is that the increase to be p
official inflation rate, agreed to by the Applicflqt via its
negotiations. Furthermore, a collective ,!!gr,
~
stability, security and industrial peace. •• ho/din
ded to create
unjustifiable hardship to employe
62. With the correct approach an 13,mption . ou/d generally not undermine a
"':~~-
e bargain process as both employers and
an exemption,
hat circumstances may arise which necessitate
hy exemption is provided for in collective
agree
e
. . . ... must be on a prudent and cautious approach to
~- "-'..·
e Resl!f?ndents repeatedly referred to a modest or below
-_s-f?of 4,5% or 4,9%. This is misleading. In terms of clause
e would be based on the projections of the Reserve Bank -
e, hence the circular that was issued by the General Secretary
SALGBC. The circular was issued after a meeting in which all parties
pated and agreed to the rate as 5,4% (as the projected CPI rate). The
rease to be paid by the Applicant is, therefore, slightly more than what the
Respondents led us to believe. Different amounts were mentioned by the
parties, ranging between R16m and R23m for salary increases alone,
increases in benefits to be included.
63. The fourth factor is whether the employer is unable to afford the costs of the
whole or part of the agreement. The Applicant contends that it cannot afford
whole or part of the agreement. The Applicant contends that it cannot afford
the costs in respect of the entire agreement because of its financial distress.
Not having to pay increases would mean a saving of almost R23m.
14
According to the Respondents, the increases can be afforded although it
may be difficult to do so. Financial controls and the curbing of irregular
spending are required.
64. The figures presented by the Applicant show financial difficulties. The
Respondents acknowledged the financial challenges more than once, but
were of the view that better financial controls were called for. I )perfect
world the Applicant should be able to turn its finances aroun a:iJfi?{q,ht.
However, we do not live in a perfect world. If the App/i unablitt()
stabilise things over a number of years ( since its incepfio
regard the one cannot help to wonder about is ability to do so -~
Applicant needs to rely on the recovery plan a • ebt re!i<J -{Jg[O
call on the assistance of the national intewrf ust i/J added that the
First Respondent's suggestion of a fol,. to c;;fs;s is not a good
suggestion. The last thing a perso :fttf,,.'. cial distress needs is to
incur more debt.
65. The fifth factor is Whf%Uffe1&o,lhe emp a short-term cash-flow problem
necessitating a Ii z.t ption. According to the Applicant, it has a cash-
flow problem.·' nts disagree. The First Respondent
acknow/eg9es a in cash-flow and the challenges faced by the
Applican/~t is rega, but, if well managed by implementing the recovery
,f,1'creases can be afforded.
presents a problem although the figures may reflect some
•• e cash-flow. There is clearly not enough money to pay all creditors on
rat all and Eskom has not been aid [sic] for a considerable time.
The sixth factor is an unexpected economic hardship during the currency of
the agreement and job creation or losses and the seventh factor is whether
the budget makes provision to comply with the agreement. According to the
Applicant, job losses are a possibility should its current financial situation
continue. Its budget, providing for increases, is unfunded. The Second
Respondent's opinion is that no increases have been budgeted for. The First
Respondent's opinion is that no increases have been budgeted for. The First
Respondent holds the position that a reduction in salaries has been
budgeted for whilst councillors stand to receive an increase.
15
68. A possible loss of jobs is a very relevant factor to be considered. It could
very well be argued that, if both sides could agree on a smaller than agreed
increase or no increase at all, jobs could be saved, which means better job
security.
69. The Applicant added that employees' rights would not be infri.
exemption, that National Treasury is assisting in the recovery_ o s fi ia/
situation and that it is in compliance with the statutory re • fi~t ts in ter
of other applicable legislation.
70. It is a positive sign that National Treasury will
programme may, if conditions are comp/'
71.
the Applicant's financial distress. It is a fi
is able to comply with the costs Q.G!lasio gislation other than the
LRA, under which collective l(;,.e;;enj§ a concluded. However, the
Applicant is incorrect in holding \~t empl~les' rights would not be infringed
if an exemption is granted.;. The ;,i'{Jlofi!~ are, in terms of the Salary and
Wage Collective •~em 'fist, entitled to an increase. If that increase is not
paid, their righ(
dded under "other factors" (the ninth factor) public
int
Ed f the country, funding the fiscus, are entitled to proper
sl/Jv.ices. E }oyees are unlikely to be able to render such services where
<~- II "'fi:,t!f:ff!itif circumstances are imperilled and their standard of living
by irresponsible governance.
again, the First Respondent is concentrating on employees only
without regard to the employer's situation. That can be expected; that is what
unions do. But, if fairness to both employer and employees are to be
considered, the employer's circumstances should not be overlooked. A
municipality has the obligation to provide services to the public. It needs
funds to do so. Employees are unions must a/so realise that it is not about
their subjective feelings and reactions only but, in the bigger scheme of
things, about the broader public and every citizen in the country - which
includes them.
16
73. In summary of what has been said: it is clear that the Applicant is in a
precarious financial situation. It has a deficit that cannot be ignored. On the
other hand though, it is clear that the Applicant needs to re-prioritise. We
have not had the benefit of viewing and studying the budget, but from what
has been submitted, it appears that some aspects are provided for,,;pthers
_;:v.oo
not. One or two examples will suffice: it cannot be said that inc,ftlses for .,.-->' '-Ji,, ..
councillors are more of a priority than increases to employe1s, n6t?kj[ an
increase for employees has been negotiated and incluJt/17/ff~ colled7~~
agreement. Nor can it be justifiable that expenditure ·~:47fant(af£eat~ices
has been increased considerably, such as more tha;•;R{j;[;,~lnonth.more
on security (despite the fact that more security"~u rds wiff•· ;;!"Pied)."
Analysis
Introduction
[19]
[20]
The Collective Agreement -~jbr'"
4fir
range of factors identifie.d a v
contends that the Pan:fts
criteria.
the Exemption Committee to consider the
SJJi,t;ntioned, in substance, the Municipality
to apply her mind properly to the exemption
epart "', exemption applications are, by definition, granted only
~ stances and where a proper case has been made out. The
discretionary power to exempt an employer from a term of a
~~ ement, forged through the sacrosanct process of collective
l@g·, is to cater for special or unforeseen circumstances.9 A good
;~mple would be a natural disaster such as a flood which wreaked havoc with
~
. •e infrastructure of a Municipality, resulting in catastrophic financial losses.
""*· ""'"
[21] Exemption applications are to be considered in light of the overall interests of
the sector in question, which is self-evidently invested in ensuring consistency
and fairness to all parties, as well as preserving confidence in the institution of
9 Kem-Lin para [24]
17
centralised collective bargaining. Significantly, the power to grant an exemption
is taken out of the hands of municipalities and is given to skilled panellists, who
are independent third parties. This fosters accountability, ensures transparency
and fairness, and curbs abuse. It ensures that an exemption is granted only
where it is reasonable and justifiable. On the other hand, it must be borne in
mind that the exemption procedure is itself a product of collective bc:J:(97/iining
and is contained in the collective agreement. It follows that it is no!'lS~~'§i§,?I to
say that the granting of the application, without more, or simpl" :,fei~\.som:R&;w
' ' ' ''ii{:
undermines the institution of collective bargaining.
[22] Importantly, a Review Court is not at large to substif", e the
on the basis that it would have made a differen!vtffi'f<'lr to interfere is
limited to circumstances where a proper cas{has be 84 made out on review.
\-?+. ,f/!fJg
Although it is unnecessary for me to deg,i'ffe,{I ta)t~Jhe Miew that the applicatiol'l lit _,,,~;,r;:t:'~
would fail even if the Court had to applia so-cal .d "/oose"discretiorl), it seems
to me that in granting an exemption of~·•. at • a parlellist exercises a narrow
or true discretion, an exe ing in the nature of an indulgence, akin to
1:fereJ;ice is, accordingly limited.10
<•,;,~
Overview of the approaJ/"t
[23] be said, with a!'ly conviction, that the Panellist did not
!i!S"y;.£1Jlc le to consider the various factors and to apply her mind
ear that she dealt, methodically, with each of the criteria, and
may be one or two questions about the weight which she
o some of the factors, in the Court's view this is not a case where it
be said that the Panellist made errors which were of such a nature that they
.erved to vitiate her Ruling. After having applied her mind and having
considered norms of fairness, she ultimately concluded, in the Court's view, il'l
a rational manner that what was required was a!'l exercise of re-prioritisation
a rational manner that what was required was a!'l exercise of re-prioritisation
1° Cf. Government Printing Works v Public Service Association and Another [2025] 2 BLLR 112 (LAC};
(2025) 46 ILJ 915 (LAC) para [19]; Zwane and Others v Orange Grove Dairy (Ply) Ltd and Others
(A2025/165189) [2026] ZALAC 42 (28 September 2026) para [17]
18
when it came to expenditure and not, to put it colloquially, a bailout in the form
of a reprieve from having to pay remuneration which was due to the employees
concerned. I agree with the contention by Ms Harvey, who appeared on behalf
of IMATU, that the panellist did not treat the collective bargaining as an absolute
trumping all other factors. She weighed it against affordability, fairness and the
public interest. She also took into account the the
Municipality and weighed it against other factors,
fairness.
[24] Thus, the Court is of the view that there is no basis to conf!•·.
did not properly exercise her discretion. Indeed, the jority
inferences and conclusions were justified ,I!lc!lf::fr or two were
accompanied by a degree of over- or unde? phas
either these instances were not materJalIB'fo t "½qjfr,~ e or, whilst all of the
~
inferences may not have been the o/lis whic'1the Court would have drawn,
they do not fall outside the bounds of ftta§pnablness. As IMATU pointed out,
the case of the Municipalit bore th;7m~s) was itself, to a large extent,
based on speculation. Jog to be overly critical, the impression
~,"""'''
gleaned is that the Mu • .0+had adopted what is called in the common
vernacular a shor·· appr iir¼ch~exploring all conceivable avenues to save
money, incl!{§~;;::01 'ttion application. There is nothing objectionable
about suctfL strate , in principle but, by the same token, the Municipality
~f$.!d{.:8~Jfd if every avenue followed did not yield fruit. I now turn
I factors insofar as this may be necessary.
n by the Municipality in general
factor has, to a degree, already been dealt with. The Panellist, having
stated the obvious, that exemptions are the exception rather than the rule
because of the importance of collective bargaining in the labour law landscape,
effectively found ,that the Municipality only had itself to blame for the financial
distress which it was experiencing, and from which it sought to break free. She
distress which it was experiencing, and from which it sought to break free. She
emphasised the circumstance that, when it came to the Municipality, next to
19
little had been done as the years slipped by and that, on the contrary, the
Municipality had been content to accept, if not the correctness, then the reality
of the fact that the Municipality had been categorised at grade 6, given that, for
the last two years, it had paid increases on this premise.
[26] In the Court's view, the appropriate way to remedy maladministration a '8 poor
governance is intervention as provided for by the Constitution and.c ation,
turnaround strategies as well as the securing of debt relief aga"ff~U;ier s;'~,\~
measures, and not, in effect, by requiring, at least as a det(' i; J!L~, that
• L~;;:+·
employees be penalised for the way that the Municipali
itself in the past. Ultimately, if a municipal councf
administer and govern within its jurisdiction, its
office. That is how democracy works.
,J~en running
"i;;;tt properly
The categorisation issue
[27] Although not expressly stat~;;c,:,,,,impression which the Court gained was that
the incorrect grading oj f,,, ~lllity was the mainstay of the exemption
'""'¼"'
application. In the cont~~~ ing the test that the Court should apply and
S&:'0_ '-½f$s,
in particular the limit~,when"' came to interference with an exemption ruling,
the followin • c Jc,;~t
~,k
jjjfJj
• 1something earlier about whether the right amount of weight, is
of a grey area? If there is a material fact which could have altered the
d that is completely disregarded, then I can say the discretion was not
d properly, But if it is just a question of how much weight was attached, is
it not very difficult for me to interfere to a particular factor?
MR GROGAN: I would readily concede to that And the one material factor that
the municipality alleges was given no weight at all was the incorrect grading.
COURT: So, I mean, I think it is common cause that that was disregarded. So, the
on/yquestion is whether it should have been disregarded. If it was disregarded,
then it certainly was material.
then it certainly was material.
If it was wrongly disregarded, and that is a decision which I will have to ponder on.
20
MR GROGAN: Yes.
COURT: Is that, would you say that that is the primary point? Do you have a, again
not wanting to put it crudely, a number 2 and a number 3 when it comes to
... [intervenes]
MR GROGAN: They are all listed in the supplementary affidavit and largely
replicated in my heads of argument. And I suppose they go down, well, do
not go down in order of priority, but they all relate to the holistic ass:est
ultimate finding that is made." (own emphasis)
[28] Indeed, as mentioned above, the relief sought on behalf o;fJh itY, as
[29]
contained in the notice of motion, is inextricably linked to th,f __
categorisation of the Municipality. It is appropriate, at'Tffl oin;) note that the
relief sought in the notice of motion was, to -~mpetent. It was
formulated in a manner resembling an interi
prayer that the Ruling be substituted wi
n that it contained a
exemption be granted
ff%!
Panellist was self-evidently on~,&lJ:Jtitled t f;g_fll~n exemption for the period of
/ft?-~~'-
the final year of the increas,ef%'as w - prayed for in front of the Panellist.
gh the , nicipality accepted that the grading issue fell outside the remit
mfilfn tribunal, its argument was and remains that the costs caused
igher grading were relevant to its financial distress and thus to the
tion application. The point made by the union, and accepted by the
ibunal, that the Municipality could "afford" an increase in the third year of the
agreement because it had managed to do so in the previous two years is
tautologous - this is precisely why the Municipality was constrained to seek
exemption in the third year.
9. The unions and the presiding panellist a/so ignored the fact that managers
who had succumbed to the unions' demand that the Municipality be upgraded
have been replaced by a new management team, headed by myself, and a
new Council, which are legally obliged to take measures to ensure that the
21
Municipality fulfils its constitutional and statutory mandate to provide the
sustainable delivery of services to the community falling within its
impoverished jurisdiction."
[30] As mentioned, the alleged incorrect categorisation was one of the main pillars,
if not the main pillar, on the strength of which the exemption applicatiJJfl was
brought. At the same time, the Municipality, correctly so, acknowledg~t~t the
.,,,,. ~-"'~'·
merits or otherwise of a challenge to the alleged wrong categor"
a matter for the Panellist. 11 The Court agrees that the
Municipality's categorisation is a matter for a Superior Ccf?i
no powers of review,12 nor are any such powers con.
the collective agreement, which is the source oJJit
comes to pronouncing on exemption applica1bns. T ,, ithstanding, the
1H Municipality sought to rely on the alleg I ul gra. 'hg of the Municipality
to justify the application for the exemp
it acknowledged that this alleged unla
consideration by the Panelli
, at the risk of repetition,
"'·=
.,.J cat~Jt>risation was not a matter for
:;·,,.,:z~:;;i{"''·"-
[31] By way of background~l
some seven yearst
~§ suggest that the recategorisation took place
i$11inicipality is, as the Court understands it, yet
to launch a~ s to rectify this alleged sorry state of affairs. All
that has hat the new Council has taken a resolution authorising
e Municipality came to find itself in what he contends is
.s.inequitable situation, although the details were not discussed at
1a
rbitration or in the Court papers, it appears that the Municipality
• wrong categorisation and wrong task levels arising from the
_ algamation of various municipalities (which then formed the Municipality) to
~
t:ome entrenched before the legal status of the categorisation, the proper
grading of posts and the financial implications of the remuneration
11 Through its actions (acknowledging that legal proceedings must be instituted to challenge the
categorisation), the Municipality accepted that a court of law can adjudicate Council's decision. Mr
Grogan did state that although Council had approved a resolution in 2023 for the institution of legal
proceedings, he had no instruction as to the status of any such proceedings.
12 Department of Justice v CCMA and Others [2004] 4 BLLR 297 (LAC) para [73]
22
arrangements had been satisfactorily resolved. That at least is the version of
the Municipality.
[32] On the face of it, one would have thought that if the Municipality was going to
make out a case for its recategorisation then, on its version, it could and should
have timeously adopted a resolution to follow the necessary steps to rEJgUlarise
the erroneous categorisation, including approaching the High or Latiot;r~,urts.
'">"•
[33]
Depending on the facts, the Municipality could have sought re •
Court for a declarator on the correct categorisation, as
consequential relief, including relief relating to the correct a
contentious remuneration arrangements. None of f
than half a decade slipped by whilst, at leas ..
public funds were dissipated on inflated s .. ies a
expression, the Municipality fiddled whjJ~Ro~i urne
1117 I -:;ttJ;,
a proverbial
\'.~- I
If I understand the submissions made 15Jtli(Jr G,ri~an, the challenges facing the -~~z;-~
Municipality, on this issu caused by the circumstance that the
employees, at the tim~"t l'.iE!Ji}'Ghicle of unprotected industrial action,
improperly or unlawfully";i ~, ... ,.d to exert, and indeed did exert, pressure on '\~- ·srz+
the Municipality. I ost unw1rtunate if it is true, as alleged, that the Municipal
rowifc>f mutinous striking workers, taking public funds
"'¾;ir'fa"
elivery and funnelling them to pay inflated salaries. That
f their mandate to serve the populace. But, the Court
hat the circumstances, so described by the Municipality, could
a legitimate basis to excuse an organ of state, such as the
lily, from having been acquiescent, or even a party, to the unlawful
gorisation. There comes a time when an organ of state, in the position of
Municipality, needs, so to speak, to stand its ground and to uphold the rule
law, to demonstrate what the Supreme Court of Appeal13 and the
13 Cf. MEG for Health, Province of Eastern Cape NO and Another v Kirland Investments (Ply) Ltd Ila
Eye & Laser Institute 2014 (3) SA 219 (SCA) paras [1], [7], [1 OJ and [11]
23
Constitutional Court have referred to as "moral courage".14 The buck stops with
the Municipality. The Municipal Council made decisions relevant to the
categorisation of the Municipality (not the trade unions or the employees), and
the Council was not entitled to abdicate its constitutional responsibilities in the
face of unlawful pressure from employees.
.sLit•
[34] But the Court must immediately record that the views it expresses 01;;'(~~/t1>sue
are not binding because the lawfulness or otherwise of the all~ij;··
categorisation was not before the Panellist, and the Panellis(,a
• "\.
of all the relevant facts. Furthermore, the Municipality's allElgE;"
>.-/,
grading was hotly disputed. In particular, it was dispTit~d. on s"•
by Ms Harvey that unprocedural industrial actiq
of the alleged incorrect grading.
[35] Returning to the contention that th anellist•lthould take into account the
[36]
allegedly inflated salaries, the Court vi >gsuplf a submission as problematic
at two further levels.
Firstly, there is the insu n ble hurdle which arises from the well-known
hich·,~~d~•lat an administrative act, until reviewed and -. }JI
set aside, e .,,,, a~~Jiioffact and has legal consequences. It must surely
follow fromt,, is prind~le that it is not permissible for the Municipality, in effect,
to c).~i<";z·: ;tfi@A!i§.t%ltf ignore an administrative decision which is binding until
-"";:; ~0,,Y"
hich, indeed, may never be set aside and, on the back of this
'~j> sk for relief on the basis that the decision is wrong in law. That is
thing which the Court has held is impermissible.15 Until the
inistrative decision, and only if, is set aside, the rule of law requires that the
:tneficiaries of that decision not be prejudiced.
14 Cf. Member of the Executive Council for Health, Province of the Eastern Cape NO and another v
Kirland Investments (Pty) Limited tla Eye and Laser Institute 2014 (3) SA 481 (CC) paras [31] and
[38]
15 Kirland (Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court decisions)
24
[37] In this context, the impression may be gleaned that the Municipality, in effect,
sought, at the hearing of the exemption application, to persuade the Panellist,
so to speak, to look into the future, as if she were an oracle, and to accept that
the Municipality will be successful in the setting aside of the alleged erroneous
categorisation and, on that basis, to come to the assistance of the Municipality.
If that were the thinking, then granting such relief would have been"'J1a"fently
premature. It needs only to be stated that there can be no guarante:/JJi*t9 the
outcome of any Court case.16 The Review Court may di,sc;1g
70
" with01l!:J!:l
[38]
contention that there was an erroneous categorisation. The if
find that an unreasonable delay has created an insu("1,
considering the merits of any challenge. The RevieW'Qgurt ma·
"½!§;,.
declare the grading unlawful but not to award c;1):fy"oo ",if",·ential relief or to set
"'d • •';~ » -~·- ..•
it aside. The list of contingencies is not a clos!d one.
Secondly, what the Municipality's sub. issions • erlook, under this heading, is
"fi'ff;
that a Superior Court, when considering\a, • , • have jurisdiction over both the
cause of action and the Q~ft!re~and extent of the relief to be granted. The
Bargaining Council is p.[offlh oni,ysurping the powers of the review court ,.,•,.:::;~
"'>'"•"'
in respect of bo .,,.,action and the relief which may be granted
n that forum be successful. Any Superior Court should the Ii •
e review application will not only be immersed in
e seized with it, and accordingly must decide the
e granted. Because the merits cannot be divorced from
is not permissible for the Municipality to seek, in an exemption
smuggle in a request for relief, dressing it up as a request for an
n, where that request should have been made to the Review Court
t "~ed with pronouncing on the alleged wrong categorization, such relief
"'presumably taking the form of a request for a retrospective order . . ,,;,,,,
"'presumably taking the form of a request for a retrospective order . . ,,;,,,,
[39] The Municipality may or may not have a claim of unjustified enrichment against
the employees who received allegedly inflated salaries if such are proved. That,
16 Cf. Bente/er South Africa (Ply) Ltd v Busakwe and Others (Application for Leave to Appeal)
(PR177/22) [2026] ZALCPE 27 (20 October 2026) paras [66] and [67]
25
however, without wishing to belabour the point, was not a matter for the
Panellist. Such a claim must be pursued in the appropriate forum and utilising
the appropriate legal remedy. In all probability it would be a delictual claim. It is
also not permissible to introduce surreptitiously a delictual claim, as it were,
through the back door and under the guise of an application for exemption.
Undermining of collective bargaining
[40]
Shorn of all elaboration, the Municipality criticised the Panilf1
ruling that a partial exemption would negatively affect coll~L
would undermine collective agreements concluded If the s!~i:!i~
1
ffg Council.
S$.C
The Municipality alleged further that the Panpm~- )JsJu/weight to the f!:f' ~d,:ffF_efg.;F'
doctrine of collective bargaining, which in t1.r er evaluation of the
factors she was enjoined to consider w'i:ler t -s,'G,,C_~--' Ve Agreement. It was
contended that this thinking has no p(ce in e~~mption applications, because
an exemption procedure would serve nltf?curpo:,_Jif that were the overriding and
'<7:;;;j,:;f:-
determinate consideration i ase. Reference was made to City Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipali
an application for leave t
t!ffi'f/:fJ,_ and Others, 17 a judgment concerning
~-',fi;Zf
as delivered on 15 July 2025.
anellist applied her mind to how much weight to
f collective bargaining and sought, as best she could, to
~,,,I!JfJI is regard. She certainly did not take the approach of
ing that an exemption should never be allowed because the
always trumped by collective bargaining.
the contention by the Municipality that the Panellist attached undue weight
_ --'"-the importance of collective bargaining in her analysis, the Court quotes, with
approval, from IMATU's heads of argument wherein the following observations,
are made:
17 JR1946/23 [2025] ZALCJHB 314 (15 July 2025)
[42]
26
"19. The Municipality complaints (sic) that the decision-maker erred by giving
undue weight to the integrity of collective bargaining and the collective
agreement: This contention is incorrect in law: Clause 15 of the
exemption procedure expressly requires consideration of whether
exemption would undermine the agreement or collective bargaining.
20. The decision-maker did not treat collective bargaining integqffftas an
absolute bar. She treated it as a weighty factor to be batl/,~/ltaif)st _,-,,, ~-,',,,,
affordability, fairness and public interest. That approactttccoifds with"'the
,;§ii!' j;1!?
purpose of the exemption regime. If collective ba~ i'"'' • frgritJ13carried ,_ -~"-'.':'0-:F
no real weight, exemptions would become routin
agreement would be rendered unstable. Tff~,.
would hollow out the exemption fra17Jt;j'Voi
with the agreement the parties cone/~
Jt negotiated
;;fisubmission
21. Even if it were assumed, int Munici~/J
could reasonably have been Jfached.l some of the factors, that does
not establish a fJ!lllf#}ffable ·iiregulitty. The Municipality does not
demonstrate thef/ihe wK/ght attached by the decision-maker produced an
unreasonabl~fpJfc![.tne. 'A'Bsent such a showing, disagreement about
emphai,is or Zffot:ltfit?lqn does not meet the review threshold and the
-So;;:;;, "S'~, ~J/
erhold.i(whether incorrect weight caused an unreasonable
lfl ;~tJffriggered. "
view, ii should not ordinarily, save possibly in an indirect sense,
se that a municipality can say it needs an exemption; otherwise, job
es may occur. The LRA provides finely tuned processes for dealing with
.::ltrenchments, and those avenues should be utilised to address the question
-:cc;+-
of potential job losses.
[43] Should dismissals be contemplated for genuine operational reasons, then the
implementation of cost-saving measures and the like to avoid or minimise such
contemplated dismissals are to be the subject of retrenchment consultations in
27
the retrenchment process itself. In the Court's view, it is not proper for the
Municipality, under the guise of an exemption application, to focus on potential
job losses and secure cost-saving measures that way without following the
peremptory retrenchment procedures as contained in the LRA. If the
Municipality has a bloated staff establishment and wishes to achieve greater
profitability, then the Section 189 consultations provide both the proce •· i1fre as
well as the mechanisms which nee_d to be followed and implemente the
potential loss of jobs is the central issue.
The morale of the workforce
[44] In my view, the Panellist correctly accepted,;ztfrat .
fjjjF''
negatively impact workforce morale. I think arf tribuna
~'
that this would generally be the cas • ·rtici:llw;ly ½!!i\ re the increases are
Z!JJ:Jiii!ip?
negotiated through collective bargain and o r employees nationwide are
enjoying their right to such increases. ed above, circumstances are
aggravated by the fact th embers of the Municipal Council received
annual increases. Whe ;lean be drawn between the increases and ,q;y
y Mr Grogan, more speculative.
Institutional bias
[45] ty with the allegation of institutional bias, raised for the
·"' heads of argument, is that the founding papers makes no case
~
:1fding. The word bias is not mentioned.18
is was going to be the case of the Municipality, one would have expected it
"'"have been alleged that bias is, by way of illustration, embedded within the
• structures, rules, and environment that dictate how decisions are made within
the Bargaining Council. No evidence showed that the system was designed to
produce a specific output. Insofar as it may be relevant, the Panellist
18 Had this point of bias been properly raised, the Panellist may well have entered the fray.
28
acknowledged that previous rulings did not bind her and the mere fact that the
majority of rulings share a similar outcome does not, per se, mean that there is
institutional bias.
[47] To succeed with a claim of institutional bias, a party must prove the system or
structure prevented a fair, independent hearing. It must be demonstrc1!dcl that
the entire set-up makes it inherently tilted towards one side, that the,~ffi~ 0 built
into the system itself, regardless of who is sitting in the room. ·s n~ii\Q2
[48]
to suggest to the Court that the Panellist was not genuinely
In summary, the highwater mark of the argument, if
contention that because the vast majority of exemptr
a ng, was a
s have failed,
I! this in turn meant that there was institutional biijs and, p 0 •• sumably, on the back
~G- ~
of this conclusion, the Ruling fell Je"difie "S:t;1L asj(te. This reasoning is fjf "q;fgij('~"r
unpersuasive. As mentioned it is, in tr~, a no • quitur. I would add only that,
ironically, the Municipality is represel'. LGA, which part of the very
institution which is alleged
[49] A feature o
.k) exemption from paying an increase to its employees; it
. e.JoJfisic fray saddled with a far-reaching ruling against it, i.e. ~"·--=>
ompelling its Municipal Council to develop its budget in a
ner. The result is that IMATU and SAMWU, and one must
he employees as well, now have a ruling in their favour which they
enforce, if necessary, by way of contempt of court proceedings when they,
respondents, sought no such relief (in fact sought no relief at all), from the
Panellist. I elaborate below.
[50] The executive part of the Ruling reads as follows:
"Ruling
[51]
[52]
29
77. The application for exemption is dismissed.
78. The Applicant is ordered to review and adiust its budget and to prioritise
sa/arv. wage and benefits increases to employees in accordance with the
Salary and Wage Collective Agreement and. further, to have the adiusynents
budget approved.
79. The Applicant is ordered to pay said increases in resp /{'~fluty 202
February 2024 on the normal pay day towards the enct,of r Jfl"Fi2ll?land
thereafter monthly for the remainder of the financial ye;l~l .
··-t(~',c,
The Municipality contends that the Panellist e~ce'lra • .,,Q.g,i,1lrs in granting if{ ~.;_?/$;}§ff
the relief set out in paragraph 78 of the Ruling~! The ap ...,pach taken by IMATU
+4~''· ~
was, as I understood it, that, correct! , para~J:§Pfi#/78 was, in any event,
'zi:J:!J0r-.
superfluous and the outcome of the mptionlfepplication did not depend on
its inclusion in the Ruling. Accordingly, 1as no point in dwelling on it.
it clear that it had no issue with the Court
setting aside paragrap
ubmissions on this point. The "order" (the words
-reaching in the extreme. Its effect is to dictate to
I that they must not exercise their respective discretions
hen it comes to any resolution about the budget. Rather,
. the behest of a third party (the Panellist) who has ordained the
budget, irrespective of the councillors' views. Not only does such
violate the principles of common law,20 but it is unconstitutional. In
s of Section 160 (2)(b) of the Constitution, the approval of a municipal
dget is a function which may not be delegated by a Municipal Council.
Decisions regarding the approval of a budget may only be taken where they are
supported by a majority.21
19 Insofar as the point was not properly raised in the papers, in my view, given its jurisdictional nature,
it was the type of point which the Court was not only entitled, but obliged, to raise mero motu.
2° Cf. Hofmeyr v Minister of Justice and Another 1992 (3) SA 108 (C) at 117 F-G
21 Section 160(3)(b)
30
[53] The circumstance that a third party, including a judicial officer, may not usurp
the powers of a municipal council does of course not mean that a panellist may
not make a decision that has financial consequences for a Municipality, such
as the refusal of an exemption. A municipality cannot escape its financial
obligations by adopting a budget which does not cater for those obligati ifs. But
it is not for a third party to command how a municipal budget,
structured.
[54] There are other reasons why this submission made on beh!l
is correct. Firstly, in terms of the Collective Agreem
.Jv1unicipality
;f"may either
[55]
refuse or grant an exemption. A panellist, ho¥\'~ er to grant a
mandamus against a municipality of the natuft contai ~d in the Ruling. Such
~;;, !JJJ
relief does not fall within the ambit of ani,illary or~(lseg~ntial relief. A panellist g -,""tt@@FF
may not prescribe to a municipal counJil how it ould govern the Municipality.
~,-
By way of amplification, other than the ri,2· in costs order, and the granting
of condonation for non-co with time limits, a panellist's powers are, in
t.zJflimited to granting or refusing that
en! provides that a panellist may:
u/1 or partial exemption or reject an application for
is trite that a court or a judicial officer has no competence to
. ssues not before it and to grant relief not sought.22 In PL v YL 23,
ch explained as follows
"[24] .... the court's mandate or iurisdiction is determined by the lis between
the parties. The court's authority in other words does not extend beyond
22 MEC of the Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province v Gqebe [2009] 9 BLLR 896 (LAC);
(2009) 30 ILJ 2388 (LAC).
23 (2013 (6) SA 28 (ECG)
31
the issues which the action is capable of raising, and which the parties
themselves have raised in their pleadings .... 'e4 (own emphasis)
[56] It has been held by the Supreme Court of Appeal25 as well as the Labour Appeal
Court26 that it is impermissible for a judicial officer to grant relief not sought. The
reason for this prohibition is not difficult to fathom. Granting relief not .
breaches the audi Rule and deprives the party against whom t~;
[57]
granted of a hearing. In Knoop, Wallis JA characterise
unconstitutional to issue an order without hearing a party. In
Jones and Others,27 Heher J (as he then was before'½l(ij the
Supreme Court of Appeal) elaborated on this trite pri iple a
made or raised
ma thus bead
reference or con
and acts upon the
specified in iff~·
ter and nature
es, or at any rate one of
iven on a claim or defence not
·alent to not hearin him at all and
iry into the merits of the case but accepts
reference which the parties have chosen and
. In the adversary system of litigation, therefore, it is
o set the agenda for the trial ... "(own emphasis)
ness, I would add that, not only was the relief not sought,
d without it having been canvassed with the parties. Thus, ii
e as a surprise to the Municipality when the Ruling was issued.
J the Department of Education, Eastern Cape Province v Gqebe,
so Kirland (SCA) para [27], wherein the Court explained that judicial proceedings are
ma 'i ory, before relief may be granted; i.e. there must be a claim instituted in accordance with proper
procedure.
25 Knoop and Another NNO v Gupta (Tayob Intervening) [2021] 1 All SA 17 (SCA); 2021 (3) SA 135
(SCA) paras [27](a) and [28]
26 Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa v Modika and Others (Labour Appeal Court of
South Africa, Johannesburg) Case No. A2026-037072 delivered on 16 March 2026 in terms of which
Moshoana JA carefully explained that the Labour Court had erred" ... in issuing an order not sought ... "
para [24]. See also Parliament of/he Republic of South Africa v Albertyn and Others (C436/2020) [2023]
ZALCCT 30 (20 June 2023)
27 1998 (1) SA 836 (W) at 898G-J
32
Khampepe ADJP, as she then was, dealing with a similar situation where the
Labour Court, per Cele J, had granted relief not sought, elaborated further as
follows:
"[25] In Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs and Others 1996 (4) SA 965, referred
with approval in Groenewald NO and Another v Swanepoel 2002 "';£6) SA
724 (ECO), the court took a dim view on the practice which is oftenilfl~tf!d by
judicial officers of relying for their decisions, on matters not canV£$ •• d in ;,~,s
or in argument for their decisions. In Kauesa at 973I-974A th. •'ffe5~rt
'It would be wrong for judicial officers to rely for (.heir dee
sjf?;;,.
put before them by litigants either in evideflce. or in or written
not argued
to the resolution of the
submissions. Now and again a Judge.,t;b~"el!i'F
before him by counsel but which he thiflss mater
case. It is his duty in such a cir.ctf"/-ff§fanil,to info. counsel on both sides
and to invite them to submit ff" i1heUor or against the Judge's
r a judgment with a substantial
-~-
point. It is undesirable for a Co(!•.
portion containing i
emphasis)
[58] In this context, I q
ver canvassed or relied on by counsel."' ( own
tail end of the hearing before the Panellist:
ill the budget be available at this time of the year, iust as
st not because it matters.
, Commissioner, you would note that the municipalities how they
lured, between, between May and June, May - June up to towards
e municipalities always work on the draft budget and then July up to
the municipalities will work on the revised budget up until it is then
approved by counsel [sic]. So, but if, the current budget, if it is not yet been
approved, we cannot submit a budget that is not yet approved by counsel [sic].
COMMISSIONER: That is iust a question for matter of interest.
MR JAL/: Yes.
[There was then a brief interjection by Mr Kumar (the financial expert) querying
as to whether it is correct that the budget had not been approved.]
33
COMMISSIONER: All right. Let us not open that can of worms because we do
not want to, to have another problem about budget being approved or not
approved. The fact is we do not have that budget in front of us. It is not part of
our documents.
MR JALI: Yes, Commissioner.
... " ( own emphasis)
[59] Thus, not only was the relief not sought, but the Commissioner c
parties that the issue of the budget would not be relevant t
[60]
that she had only raised it as a matter of "interesf'; yet, e •
proceeded to do the opposite of what she had conv yed to
make a ruling about should be contained in the bud e
A ruling by a panellist exercising a qucj,aj-ju ial fun . on that exceeds her
§}.~
jurisdictional authority must be set as·' Ei.28 lf an itlfflor proceeds to exceed
zyYfl
her powers, this is sometimes referre o, in uijattering language, as judicial
£4
overreach29. Because the Pa • t had n fciiction to grant the order which
lls to be deleted. 30
Conclusion
[61] Having al argument based on the alleged erroneous
unicipality as well as the contention that the introduction
ouncil and administration should have counted in favour of
, the remainder of the argument presented on behalf of the
Protector v South African Reserve Bank 2019 (9) BCLR 1113 (CC); 2019 (6) SA 253 (CC)
hich the erstwhile Public Protector, astoundingly so, directed Parliament to change the
n as well as Public Protector and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and
BCLR 929 (CC); 2021 (6) SA 37 (CC) in terms of which the Public Protector directed the
National Directorate of Public Prosecutions to "conduct an investigation into prima facie evidence of
money laundering as uncovered during [her] investigation".
29 The Court does not suggest that, in this matter, the Panellist was guilty of anything more than a
material error of law when it comes to this aspect. She no doubt had the best intentions when
formulating the Ruling in the manner in which she did, and the Municipality may do well to heed the
sentiments contained in paragraph 78. The point hoVl(ever is that, if anything, her views in this regard
could have been part of her reasoning but should nolhave found their way into an enforceable order,
particularly in circumstances where, as mentioned, this issue was not canvassed with the parties.
30 Cone Textile (Pvt) Ltd v Ayres and Another 1~80 (4) SA 728 (ZA) at 735G-H
Costs
[62]
34
Municipality may be summarised as follows. Mr Grogan contended, for want of
a better expression, that, in attempting to balance the various factors, the
Panellist had done so in a jarring fashion. The colourful term "yo-yoing" was
used in the founding papers. There may be a degree of substance to this
submission. On the other hand, in a polycentric enquiry, given that the factors
coexist uneasily, it is all but inevitable that there will be tension when • mes
to the weighing of those factors, particularly where some of the f.
precise definition, are elastic and relative in nature. Take i •
concept of "affordability" which, at the end of the day, is to
value judgment. As has often been said, a polycentric e1f~ not lend
itself to judicial intervention. But that does not m that
~~"'
rtf s right to
challenge an exemption ruling should be ema
rendered nugatory. If a proper case is mac(" out th
~-
exercise judicially, there will always be f~ ng court to intervene.
However, all things considered, in this
made, and valiant case mounted, by
ite the eloquent submissions
on behalf of the Municipality,
in the Court's view, the th .
Ruling has clearly not b
for the reviewing and setting aside of the
oing r tionship between the parties and the issues at stake, in
!Ji
It10~1'principles of law and fairness, this is not a case where a
uld be made.
e application is dismissed save to the extent set out in paragraph 2 of this
2. Paragraph 78 of the Ruling issued under case number EX/HQ 072301 dated
28 September 2023 is deleted.
35
3. There is no order as to costs.
Acting Judge of the Labour Court
Appearances:
For the Applicant: Adv J Grogan
Instructed by:
For the Third Respondent:
Instructed by:
For the Fourth Respondent:
Instructed by: