Magwenyane v S (631/2025) [2026] ZASCA 149 (2 November 2026)

72 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Sentencing — Appeal against sentence — Applicant convicted of rape and sexual assault of minors — Age of applicant at time of offences not determined by regional court — Minimum sentencing regime inapplicable due to applicant being under 18 years old — Misapplication of law regarding age led to excessive cumulative sentence of 70 years — Sentence set aside and substituted with effective sentence of 11 years' imprisonment after proper consideration of age and mitigating factors.

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Reportable/Not Reportable
Case no: 631/2025

In the matter between:

ZIMISELE COLLEN VUMANI MAGWENYANE APPELLANT

and

THE STATE RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Magwenyane v The State (631/2025) [202 6] ZASCA 149 (2
November 2026)
Coram: ZONDI DP and MBATHA and MATOJANE JJA
Heard: 20 August 2026
Delivered: 2 November 2026.
Summary: Criminal law and procedure – sentence – applicant convicted of
the rape and sexual assault of two young children – applicant 17 years old when the
offences were committed and 18 years old when arrested – age never determined
by the regional court – s 51(6) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997
excludes the minimum sentencing regime where the offender was under the age of
18 years at the time of the commission of the offence – s 4 of the Child Justice Act
75 of 2008 determines the application of that Act by reference to the age of the
person when the criminal process is initiated– the two enquiries are independent of
one another – misdirections in the judgment on sentence – cumulative sentence of
70 years’ imprisonment imposed after a finding that imp risonment for life would be
disproportionate – sentence set aside and substituted – applicant having served the

substituted sentence in full, order made at the hearing for his release confirmed.

3




ORDER


On application for reconsideration referred in terms of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013:
1 The application for reconsideration in terms of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts
Act 10 of 2013 is refused in respect of the convictions and granted in respect of
sentence.
2 The decision of two judges of this Court refusing the applicant special leave to
appeal against sentence is set aside and substituted with the following:

‘Special leave to appeal against sentence is granted’

3 The appeal against sentence is upheld
4 The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following order:
‘(a) The appeal against the convictions is dismissed.
(b) The appeal against sentence succeeds. The sentences imposed by the
regional court on 30 April 2015, and the orders made in terms of s 50(2) of the Criminal
Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 and s 120(4)
of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, are set aside and replaced with the following:
(i) Count 1: 11 years’ imprisonment.
(ii) Count 2: five years’ imprisonment.
(iii) Count 3: five years’ imprisonment.
(iv) Count 6: 11 years’ imprisonment.
(v) The sentences on counts 2, 3 and 6 are to run concurrently with the sentence
on count 1, so that the effective sentence is one of 11 years’ imprisonment.
(vi) The sentence is antedated to 30 April 2015.
5 The order made on 20 August 2026 that the applicant be released from custody
forthwith is confirmed.

4



JUDGMENT

Matojane JA (Zondi AP and Mbatha JA concurring):

Introduction
[1] The applicant, Mr Magwenyane, was charged in the Pietermaritzburg Regional
Court (the regional court) of eight counts: count 1 rape of a seven-year-old girl; counts
2 and 3 sexual assault upon the same child; count 4 rape of a five-year-old girl; count
5 sexual assault upon that child; count 6 rape of a three -year-old girl; count 7 sexual
assault on that child and count 8 compelling or causing a child to witness a sexual act.
The applicant was convicted of the rape of a seven -year-old (count 1), of two counts
of sexual assault upon her child (counts 2 and 3), and of the rape of her three -year-
old cousin (count 6). He was acquitted on the remaining counts, including both counts
relating to the five-year-old.

[2] The offences were committed at Himeville in August and September 2009. On
30 April 2015 the regional magistrate sentenced the applicant to 25 years’
imprisonment on each of counts 1 and 6 and to 10 years’ imprisonment on each of
counts 2 and 3. In June 2016, she granted leave to appeal against both conviction and
sentence. The KwaZulu -Natal Division of the high court, Pietermaritzburg (the high
court) dismissed the appeal against the convictions and against sentence. On
sentence, it ordered that parts of the sentences run concurrently, which reduced the
effective sentence to 40 years’ imprisonment. Two judges of this Court refused special
leave to appeal on 22 February 2024, and the President of this Court referred that
decision to the Court for reconsideration and, if necessary, variation, in terms of s
17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (the Superior Courts Act).

[3] The appeal turns upon a fact which the regional court never determined. It is
the applicant’s age. The record before that court contained nothing on the subject
beyond a 2011 charge sheet that recorded his age as 18 years. On the strength of

beyond a 2011 charge sheet that recorded his age as 18 years. On the strength of
that single entry, the regional court proceeded as though he had been an adult when

5

the offences were committed and sentenced him under the minimum sentencing
regime in terms of s 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the Act). If
he was a child when the offences were committed, that regime did not apply. If he was
a child when he was arrested, the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008 (the Child Justice Act)
governed the proceedings against him from that moment. His age was therefore not
one of the many considerations to be weighed in sentencing. It determined which law
applied.

[4] That question is now answered. In its heads of argument, the State placed
before us the date of birth reflected in the signed special power of attorney and his
identity number, namely, 04 June 1992. Neither party dispute d that date. The state
accepts, as counsel confirmed at the hearing, that the applicant was 17 years old
when the offences were committed and 18 years old when he was arrested on 8
September 2010. That concession was properly made, and it is decisive of much that
follows.

Factual background
[5] The evidence on the merits need s to be summarised insofar as it bears upon
sentence. The two complainants are cousins. They lived near the applicant’s
homestead at Himeville. The families were on good terms, and the children regularly
visited. On an afternoon during the charged period, the elder complainant, then seven
years old, stopped at the applicant’s home on her way from school to drink water. The
applicant’s niece accompanied her. The applicant called her to his room, saying that
there was a letter for her family. Inside, he told her to undress. When she hesitated,
he drew her attention to a knife on the table. He made her lie on the bed and raped
her. He then made her take his penis into her mouth and put his own mouth to her
genitals. He told her that he would stab her if she told anyone. She told no one.

[6] On another day in the same period, the younger complainant, then three years

[6] On another day in the same period, the younger complainant, then three years
old, was sent with other children to the applicant’s homestead to borrow a cellphone
charger. The applicant made her take his penis into her mouth. Later, when she was
taken to visit her mother in Pietermaritzburg, she arrived in tears and could not be

6

consoled. Eventually she told her mother what had happened. Her mother went home
to make enquiries. During those enquiries, the elder complainant disclosed what the
applicant had done to her. A social worker interviewed the children, and the police
were informed.

[7] The applicant was arrested on 8 September 2010. He pleaded not guilty on 22
October 2014 and testified in his own defence. His defence was a bare denial coupled
with a suggestion, never put to the State witnesses, that the complainants’ family bore
him a grudge over grazing cattle. The regional magistrate rejected it. On 23 April 2015
she convicted him on counts 1, 2, 3 and 6 and acquitted him on the remaining counts.
The State proved no previous convictions.

[8] Sentence followed a week later. The applicant’s attorney addressed the cou rt
from the bar. No evidence was led in mitigation. No pre -sentence report or probation
officer’s report was obtained. The State handed up victim impact statements for both
complainants. The regional magistrate declined to read them into the record, saying
that ‘on the previous occasions when these were read, the emotions broke’, but she
relied upon their contents in her judgment. The applicant's personal circumstances,
as they emerge from the address in mitigation, were that he was a first offender, was
‘relatively young’, had left school in Grade 11 ‘because of this offence’, and had since
found employment.

[9] The only reference to the applicant’s age in the proceedings before the regional
court is the opening sentence of the judgment on conviction: ‘According to the charge
sheet before me, he is 18 years old’ . The case number, RC320/2011, indicates that
the matter was enrolled in the regional court in 2011. The offences were committed in
2009.

[10] The judgment on sentence addressed the applicant’s age in four passages
which do not cohere. The regional magistrate first recorded that ‘at the time of the

which do not cohere. The regional magistrate first recorded that ‘at the time of the
commission of the crimes, he was at least 18 years old’. She then said that ‘the
accused was very young at the time of commission of the offence’ and that it was ‘trite

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law that youthfulness of an offender will be a mitigating factor’. She later held:

‘At the age of 18 years old, the accused cannot be described by this Court as a youth. His age
is a neutral factor. Nothing about his age red uces his moral blameworthiness. He chose not
to testify and give evidence and put the Court into his confidence about the level of his
youthfulness or immaturity or any factor that may have caused him to act in the manner in
which he did.’

[11] Later stil l, after quoting from the judgment of this Court in S v
Mabuza(Mabuza),1 she found that ‘the age of the accused suggests to me that it will
be disproportionate for this Court to sentence the accused to the maximum sentence
permitted by the law’, and concluded that the fact that the applicant was a first offender
and ‘was young at the time of commission of the offence’ constituted substantial and
compelling circumstances justifying a departure from the prescribed sentence of life
imprisonment.

[12] Having so found, the regional magistrate imposed the sentences I have
described and added that ‘the provisions of section 280 of the Criminal Procedure Act
are applicable’. The combined sentences translated to a period of 70 years’
imprisonment. She made no direction that any of the sentences should run
concurrently. She ordered that the applicant’s particulars be entered in the National
Register for Sex Offenders under s 50(2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and
Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 (the Sexual Offences Act). She purported
to order under s 120(4) of the Child ren’s Act 38 of 2005 that ‘prospective employers
are informed of the unsuitability of the accused to work with children’. She declared
him unfit to possess a firearm under s 103(1) of the Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000.

[13] When the application for leave to appeal was argued in June 2016, the regional
magistrate said this: ‘The court is of the view that perhaps there ought to have been a

magistrate said this: ‘The court is of the view that perhaps there ought to have been a
pre-sentence report compiled on the accused as the accused was 18 at the time of
the commission of the offence. The Co urt is of the view that perhaps a higher court

1S v Mabuza and Others [2007] ZASCA 110; 2009 (2) SACR 435 (SCA) para 23.

8

will come to a different opinion about sentence.’ She granted leave on both conviction
and sentence.

[14] The high court delivered its judgment on 2 March 2017. It dismissed the appeal
against convictions. On sentence, it held that, because the cumulative effect of a 70 -
year sentence was worse than imprisonment for life and the applicant would not be
considered for parole until 35 years had elapsed, the sentence should be corrected. It
ordered that ten years o f the sentence on count 3 and 20 years of the sentence on
count 6 run concurrently with the sentence on count 1, producing a cumulative
sentence of 40 years. The application for special leave to appeal was filed on 7
December 2023, almost seven years later , and was refused on 22 February 2024.
The referral was made on 15 July 2024. The State did not oppose condonation for the
late filing of the application for special leave, and the Court granted it at the hearing.

Issues for determination
[15] Four issues arise. The first is whether exceptional circumstances exist to
reconsider the refusal of special leave, separately for the convictions and the
sentence. The second is whether the regional court erred in law by sentencing the
applicant without determining his age, and what follows from that error now that the
age is known. The third is whether, independently of the question of age, the judgment
on sentence is vitiated by misdirection. The fourth is whether this Court should
sentence the applicant afresh or remit the matter, and what is to become of the
ancillary orders.

Reconsideration in terms of s 17(2)(f)
[16] Section 17(2)(f) of the Superior Courts Act permits the President of this Court,
in exceptional circumstances, to refer a decision refusing leave to the Court for
reconsideration and, if necessary, variation. Reconsideration is an extraordinary
remedy and not a second chance upon the merits. It is a safeguard against manifest

remedy and not a second chance upon the merits. It is a safeguard against manifest
injustice, and the circumstances relied upon must be markedly unusual; pro spects of

9

success alone do not suffice.2

[17] Regarding the convictions, the applicant advances arguments that the regional
court, the high court, and the two judges of this Court who refused special leave have
already considered and rejected. He says th at the complainants were not credible,
that the caution required in the evaluation of the evidence of single witnesses and of
children was not applied, that the evidence of the elder complainant stood
uncorroborated, that the medical examination disclosed no injuries, and that the
evidence of the social worker as to what the children told her was not corroboration.

[18] That last submission is sound in principle. Corroboration must come from a
source independent of the witness whose evidence is to be confi rmed. The regional
magistrate did not rest her findings upon the social worker alone. She conducted a
competency enquiry for each child, heard them with the assistance of an intermediary,
and made credibility findings which she explained at length. The tru stworthiness of a
child’s evidence depends on the child’s powers of observation, recollection, and
narration, and measured against that test, her findings cannot be faulted. The caution
she professed appears genuine, as shown by the acquittals on the remaining counts.
The absence of injury recorded on the J88 does not exclude penetration.

[19] There is no rule that the evidence of a young single witness must be
corroborated. The court must approach it with caution and look for features which
confirm it. It must ask itself whether the evidence is trustworthy 3. Each complainant
made a spontaneous report to a member of her family. The elder complainant’s
disclosure was made in the course of enquiries prompted by the younger
complainant’s report, and a court must be alert to the risk that a child questioned in
those circumstances may repeat what she has heard. But the elder complainant’s
account contains detail, the knife and the threat to stab her, which forms no part of the

account contains detail, the knife and the threat to stab her, which forms no part of the
younger child’s account. The two accounts describe the same distinctive conduct by

2Nel v S [2025] ZASCA 89 (12 June 2025) para 6; Minister of Police and Another v Ramabanta [2025]
ZASCA 95; 2026 (1) SA 100 (SCA); 2026 (1) SACR 250 (SCA) para 22.
3 Woji v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1981 (1) SA 1020 (A) at 1028B-D.

10

the same man in the same house.

[20] The convictions rest on findings of fact which have twice been considered on
appeal. No exceptional circumstance appears which would warrant this Court
revisiting the refusal of special leave in respect of them, and reconsideration is refused
to that extent. The position in respect of sentence is different, for the reasons which
follow. It is convenient to address the legal framework before returning to the merits.

[21] This limb of the application raises no substantial point of law, is not of general
public importance, and discloses no grave injustice. The court refuses reconsideration
in respect of the convictions. The position in respect of sentence is the reverse, for the
reasons which follow. It is convenient to address the legal framework before returning
to the merits.

Legal framework
The minimum sentencing regime
[22] Rape of a person under the age of 16 years falls within Part I of Schedule 2 to
the Act. Section 51(1) obliges a regional court which has convicted a person of such
an offence to sentence him to imprisonment for life unless, in terms of s 51(3)(a), it is
satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify a les ser
sentence. The approach to that enquiry was settled in S v Malgas .4 The prescribed
sentence is the starting point and should not be departed from lightly or for flimsy
reasons. But all the factors traditionally relevant to sentence remain relevant. Whe re
the prescribed sentence would be disproportionate to the crime, the criminal and the
needs of society, the court is entitled to impose a lesser sentence. The proviso to s
51(3)(a) confines a regional court which imposes a lesser sentence in respect of a n
offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to ‘a term of imprisonment for a period not
exceeding 30 years’.

[23] Section 51(6) provides that the section does not apply in respect of an accused
person who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of an offence

person who was under the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of an offence
contemplated in subsec (1) or (2). The provision has a history. As amended by the

4S v Malgas [2001] ZASCA 30; 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA); 2001 (2) SA 1222 (SCA) para 25.

11

Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007, s 51 applied to offenders who
were 16 or 17 years old when they committed the offence, subject t o a discretion to
depart from the prescribed sentence. The Constitutional Court held that extension
inconsistent with the constitution in Centre for Child Law v Minister for Justice and
Constitutional Development and Others,5 and ordered that, to remedy the defect, the
subsection is to be read as though it referred to the age of 18 years. As a result, the
minimum sentencing regime does not apply to a person who was under 18 when the
offence was committed, whatever his age when he is arrested, tried or sentenced. The
enquiry under s 51(6) is directed at age on the date of the offence.

The Child Justice Act
[24] The Child Justice Act came into operation on 1 April 2010. Section 4(1)( b), in
the form in which it stood at the time of the proceedings in the regional court, provided
that the Act applies to any person who is alleged to have committed an offence and
who was ten years or older but under the age of 18 years when he was handed a
written notice, served with a summons or arrested for that offence. 6 Section 4(2)
provides that where a person is alleged to have committed an offence when he was
under the age of 18 years, but is 18 years or older and under the age of 21 years when
the process against him commences, the Director of Public Prosecutions having
jurisdiction may, in accordance with directives issued by the National Director of Public
Prosecutions, direct that the matter be dealt with in terms of s 5(2) to (4) of that Act.
Section 4(3)( a) provides that the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the Crim inal
Procedure Act) applies to a person referred to in s 4, save in so far as the Child Justice
Act provides for amended, additional or different provisions or procedures.

[25] The trigger for the application of the Child Justice Act is the person's age when

[25] The trigger for the application of the Child Justice Act is the person's age when
the criminal process against him commences, not his age when the offence was
committed.7 The two enquiries, the one under s 51(6) of the Act and the other under

5Centre for Child Law v Minis ter for Justice and Constitutional Development and Others [2009] ZACC
18; 2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC); 2009 (6) SA 632 (CC); 2009 (11) BCLR 1105 (CC).
6The lower limit in s 4(1) was raised from ten to 12 years by s 2 of the Child Justice Amendment Act 28
of 2019 with effect from 19 August 2022. Nothing turns on the amendment for present purposes.
7 4 Application of Act

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s 4 of the Child Justice Act, ask different questions and may yield different answers.
A person who was 17 when he committed an offence and 19 when he was arrested
falls outside the Child Justice Act unless the Director of Public Prosecutions (the
Director) directs otherwise. He nonetheless falls outside the minimum sentencing
regime, regardless of what the Director does.

[26] Where the Child Justice Act applies, its provisions are peremptory. A probation
officer must assess the child before his first appearance. He must be brought before
a preliminary inquiry. If the matter is not diverted, h e must be tried in a child justice
court. Before sentencing, the court must obtain a pre -sentence report prepared by a
probation officer, and it may not impose a sentence of imprisonment without such a
report. Sentence must be imposed in accordance with the objectives set out in s 69 of
the Child Justice Act.8 Imprisonment may be imposed upon a child of 14 years or older
only as a measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time, and
may not exceed 25 years.9

[27] The Child Justice Act also makes provision for determining age. Where the age
of a person is uncertain, and it is material to whether the Act applies, the presiding
officer is obliged to estimate the age of the person upon the material available and, if

(1) Subject to subsection (2), this Act applies to any person in the Republic who is alleged to have
committed an offence and-
(a) was under the age of 12 years at the time of the commission of the alleged offence; or
(b) was 12 years or older but under the age of 18 years when he or she was -
(i) handed a written notice in terms of section 18 or 22;
(ii) served with a summons in terms of section 19; or
(iii) arrested in terms of section 20,
for that offence.
8 69. (1) In addition to any other considerations relating to sentencing, the objectives of
sentencing in terms of this Act are to-

sentencing in terms of this Act are to-
(a) encourage the child to understand the implications of and be accountable for
the harm caused;
(b) promote an individualised response which strikes a balance between the 40
circumstances of the child, the nature of the offence and the interests of
society;
(c) (d) promote the reintegration of the child into the family and community;
ensure that any necessary supervision, guidance, treatment or services which
form part of the sentence assist the child in the process of reintegration; and 45
(e) use imprisonment only as a measure of last resort and only for the shortest
appropriate period of time.
9 Child Justice Act Chapter 5 (assessment), Chapter 7 (preliminary inquiry), Chapter 9 (trial in child
justice court), s 69 (objectives of sentencing), s 71 (pre-sentence reports) and s 77 (imprisonment).

13

necessary, to direct that a probation officer or a medical practitioner determine his
age. Independently of that Act, s 337 of the Criminal Procedure Act empowers a court,
where a person's age is relevant to any matter, and there is insufficient evidence of it,
to estimate that age, and the estimate is deemed his correct age, subject to the proviso
to that section. 10 Neither provision permits a court to proceed upon an assumption
where the question of age is live, and the means of resolving it are at hand.

Youth as a factor in sentencing
[28] Even where an offender was a young adult when he committed the offence, his
youth remains a weighty consideration. In Mabuza, dealing with an applicant who was
18 years old when he participated in a gang rape, this Court said that a court ‘cannot
. . . lawfully discharge its sentencing function by disregarding the youthfulness of an
offender in deciding on an appropriate sentence, especially when imposing a sentence
of life imprisonment, for in doing so it would deny the youthful offender the human
dignity to be considered capable of redemption’.11 In S v Matyityi, the Court cautioned
that youthfulness is not a talisman, and that a court should not depart from a
prescribed sentence upon the ground of ‘relative youthfulness’ without evidence of the
offender’s immaturity.12 It did not suggest that an 18 -year-old’s age is irrelevant. The
two judgments must be read together. The younger the offender, the more readily
immaturity may be inferred; but where reliance is placed upon it, the court should be
placed in a position to assess it. That is a reason for a sentencing court to inform itself,
not a reason for it to disregard the question.

[29] Where the offender was a child when he offended, the enquiry is different again.
Section 28(1)( g) of the Constitution requires an individualised judicial response to
sentencing, one that focuses on the particular child, rather than an approach

sentencing, one that focuses on the particular child, rather than an approach
encumbered by the rigid starting point that minimum sentencing entails. 13 As it was
put in S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae), ‘[a] truly principled child-centred

10Section 337 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977; ss 13 to 16 of the Child Justice Act 75 of 2008.
11Mabuza above fn 1 para 23.
12S v Matyityi [2010] ZASCA 127; 2011 (1) SACR 40 (SCA); [2010] 2 All SA 424 (SCA) paras 13 -14
and 23.
13Centre for Child Law above fn 6 paras 26-31.

14

approach requires a close and individualised examination of the precise real -life
situation of the particular child involved’. 14 Once s 51 falls away, reduced moral
culpability is not a fact the offender must establish to earn a departure. It is the premise
from which the enquiry begins.

Cumulative sentences
[30] Section 280(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act provides that sentences of
imprisonment imposed at the same tim e run consecutively unless the court directs
that they run concurrently. A court which imposes more than one sentence must have
regard to their cumulative effect. It must not impose an effective term which exceeds
the ordinary life expectancy of the offender, or which in its practical operation is more
severe than the sentence of life imprisonment which the law reserves for the most
serious cases. 15 A prisoner serving life imprisonment becomes eligible for parole
consideration after 25 years; a prisoner ser ving a determinate sentence becomes
eligible after serving half of it.16

Analysis

The failure to determine the applicant’s age
[31] The regional magistrate proceeded throughout on the basis that the applicant
was 18 years old when he committed the offences. She had no evidence to that effect.
The figure came from the charge sheet, which records the accused's age as at the
date it was drawn. This one was drawn in 2011, at least two years after the offences.
If the applicant was 18 in 2011, he was 16, or at most 17, in August or September
2009. Her own formulation, that he was ‘at least 18 years old’, betrays the uncertainty.
So does the fact, recorded in her judgment, that he was in Grade 11 when the offences
were committed and left school as a result. A learner in Grade 11 is ordinarily 16 or
17 years old.


14S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) [2007] ZACC 18; 2008 (3) SA 232 (CC); 2007 (12)
BCLR 1312 (CC) para 24.
15S v Mhlakaza and Another 1997 (1) SACR 515 (SCA) at 519A-E; S v Nkosi 2003 (1) SACR 91 (SCA)
para 9.

para 9.
16Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, s 73(6)(b).

15

[32] These were not obscure indications. They were upon the face of the record,
and they called for enquiry. The regional magistrate had s 337 of the Criminal
Procedure Act at her disposal and, if the applicant was a child, the age-determination
provisions of the Child Justice Act. She could have called for a birth certificate or an
identity document. She could have asked the applicant, his attorney, or his next of
kin. She could have directed a probation officer to investigate and report. She did
none of these things. Nor did the prosecutor draw the matter to her attention,
although the State bears responsibility for ensuring that a person who may be a child
is dealt with under the law that applies to children.

[33] Counsel for the State submitted that the applicant was represented throughout,
that his attorney never contended he was a child, and that it does not lie in his mouth
to raise the point on appeal. I do not agree. The application of s 51(6) of the Act and
of the Child Justice Act does not depend upon the point being taken. Both provisions
define the class of persons to whom a statutory regime applies, and a court must
satisfy itself that the accused falls within the class before it applies the regime. The
failure of an attorney to raise the point does not relieve the court of that obligation, and
the consequences of the omission fall upon the applicant and not upon his attorney.

[34] The error was one of law. The regional magistrate applied the minimum
sentencing regime without establishing the fact on which it depended, and she
sentenced the applicant as an adult without establishing that he was one when th e
process against him began. What follows from that error would ordinarily depend upon
which of three positions was the true one. The State’s concession has resolved that
question. The applicant was under 18 when he committed the offences and 18 when
he was arrested. The second of the three positions therefore obtains.

he was arrested. The second of the three positions therefore obtains.

[35] Two consequences follow. First, s 51 of the Act did not apply to the applicant.
The judgment on sentence, which took imprisonment for life as the prescribed
sentence and searched for su bstantial and compelling circumstances to depart from
it, was misconceived from the outset. The second is that the Child Justice Act did not
apply of its own force, because s 4(1)( b) was not satisfied. It did not apply under s

16

4(2), because nothing on this record shows that the Director of Public Prosecutions
gave a direction, refused one, or considered the question at all. Counsel for the State
candidly conceded that he could not say that the Director knew that the Act was in
issue. A functionary who is un aware that a power exists cannot be said to have
exercised the discretion which that power confers. The complaints that no assessment
took place, that no preliminary inquiry was held and that the regional court did not sit
as a child justice court accordingly do not arise. The prosecuting authority's failure to
consider the exercise of the discretion is nonetheless not indifferent, since the
subsection exists to extend the Act's protective machinery to a young adult who
offended as a child.

[36] What the regional magistrate was required to do, therefore, was to exercise an
ordinary sentencing discretion, unconstrained by s 51, in the light of the fact that the
applicant was a child when he offended and of what s 28 of the Constitution and Centre
for Child Law require of a court sentencing such an offender. It is inconceivable that
such a discretion would have produced sentences of 25 years’ imprisonment on each
of two counts.

The misdirections in the judgment on sentence
[37] The reasoning on the applicant’ s youth is irreconcilable. The regional
magistrate held that his age was ‘a neutral factor’ and that there was ‘nothing about
his age that serves to reduce his moral blameworthiness’. She then held that imposing
the prescribed sentence on him was dispropor tionate, and that his youth was a
substantial and compelling circumstance. Both findings cannot be right. A sentence
which rests upon findings which contradict one another is not the product of a properly
exercised discretion, and an appellate court is at large to interfere with it.

[38] The passage in which the regional magistrate faulted the applicant for not

[38] The passage in which the regional magistrate faulted the applicant for not
testifying about ‘the level of his youthfulness or immaturity’ compounds the error.
There is no onus upon an accused to establish substantial and c ompelling
circumstances; the court is obliged to consider all the circumstances bearing upon

17

sentence, whether or not the accused places them before it.17 Where a court regards
the information before it as insufficient on a question as important as the maturity of a
youthful first offender facing life imprisonment, it may call for evidence under s 274 of
the Criminal Procedure Act, in particular a pre -sentence report. Sentencing is not a
formality to be completed based on whatever is said from the bar. 18 The regional
magistrate recognised as much a year later, when she granted leave to appeal. That
recognition came too late.

[39] The regional magistrate also said that ‘the seriousness of the offences that he
has been convicted of justifies his circumstan ces being ignored over the interests of
justice’. That is a misstatement of the law. The personal circumstances of an offender
may be outweighed by the gravity of the offence and the interests of society. They
may never be ignored.19

[40] The effective s entence is a further and independent ground of interference.
Having found that imprisonment for life would be disproportionate, the regional
magistrate imposed 25 years on count 1, ten years on each of counts 2 and 3, and 25
years on count 6, and said no m ore than that s 280 of the Criminal Procedure Act ‘is
applicable’. Section 280(2) provides that the sentences run consecutively unless the
court directs otherwise. She gave no such direction. As written, the order commits the
applicant to an effective term of 70 years’ imprisonment, after which he would become
eligible for parole consideration after 35 years. Had he been sentenced to
imprisonment for life on counts 1 and 6, he would have become eligible after 25 years.
The regional magistrate thus departed from the prescribed sentence upon the ground
that it was too severe for this offender, and then imposed one which was, in every
practical respect, more severe. No court could have intended that result, and it shows
that the cumulative effect of the sentences was never considered.

that the cumulative effect of the sentences was never considered.

[41] If, on the other hand, the regional magistrate intended the sentences to run

17Malgas above fn 5 para 25.
18S v Siebert 1998 (1) SACR 554 (SCA) at 558g-559b.
19S v Zinn 1969 (2) SA 537 (A) at 540G-H; Malgas above fn 5 para 25.

18

concurrently, she did not say so. A direction under s 280(2) must be express. A
sentencing order from which the effective sentence cannot be read is defective in
itself, because the accused, the correctional authorities and any court which later has
to consider the matter must be able to tell from the order what sentence has been
imposed. On either reading, the order cannot stand. The applicant reads it as
producing 25 years and the State as producing 70 years; this difference itself
measures the defect.

[42] Nor did the high court repair the position. Having recognised that a cumulative
sentence of 70 years was worse than imprisonment for life, it did not ask itself whether
the regional magistrate had intended that result. It treated the sentence as one of 70
years and reduced it to 40. If the applicant is right about what was intended, the effect
was to increase his effective sentence from 25 years t o 40 years, without a cross -
appeal by the State and without notice to him. The high court also proceeded upon
the basis that the complainants had each been raped more than once, which was
never the State’s case and does not accord with the convictions.

[43] Two further features of the judgment call for comment. The first is how the court
treated the victim impact statements. The regional magistrate declined to place them
on the record and then relied upon their contents, quoting from one of them , the
complainant’s wish that the applicant ‘not be in a position where he will rape more
children’. A victim impact statement is a legitimate and often valuable aid to
sentencing. But it becomes evidence only when it is properly admitted, whether by
consent, upon affidavit or through oral evidence, and only when the accused has had
the opportunity to challenge or to answer it.20 A document which the court declines to
place upon the record is not evidence, and a court may not sentence upon its strength.

[44] The second is the catalogue of considerations which the regional magistrate

[44] The second is the catalogue of considerations which the regional magistrate
treated as aggravating. She counted against the applicant that the court ‘sat . . . in the
newly refurbished Sexual Offences Court, which was brought about by the former

20Matyityi above fn 12 paras 16-17.

19

Minister of Justice Programme’. The venue of a trial has no bearing upon the sentence
of the person tried in it. She relied on statistics that were not in evidence, on public
demonstrations outside court buildings for which there was no evidence.

[45] She treated the applicant’s failure to show remorse in the face of the three-year-
old complainant’s evidence as aggravating. An accused who maintains his innocence
and puts the State to the proof of its case cannot be punished for not repenting of what
he denies having done; the absence of remorse deprives him of a mitigating factor; it
does not supply an aggravating one. The prevalence of sexual violence against
children is a matter of which a court may take notice, and the regional magistrate was
entitled to give it weight . But the passages I have described, read together, show a
court sentencing with an eye to public sentiment rather than to the offender and the
offences before it. This Court has repeatedly warned against that approach.21

[46] The misdirections are cumula tive, and they are material. The sentencing
discretion was not exercised properly, either at first instance or upon appeal, and this
Court is at large. It follows also that exceptional circumstances within the meaning of
s 17(2)(f) exist in respect of sent ence. A person who was a child when he offended
was sentenced upon the express basis that he was an adult whose age was irrelevant,
under a regime from which the law excluded him, to terms of imprisonment which in
the aggregate exceed a natural life; and t he court which sought to correct that upon
appeal arrived at an effective sentence higher than the one which the applicant says
was intended. Were that to stand, the administration of justice would be brought into
disrepute. Special leave to appeal against sentence is granted, and the appeal against
sentence must succeed.

Whether to remit or to sentence afresh
[47] The ordinary rule is that an appellate court which sets aside a sentence for

[47] The ordinary rule is that an appellate court which sets aside a sentence for
misdirection imposes the sentence which it considers appropriate, rather than
remitting the matter. That course is open only where the record places the court in a

21S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 862G-H.

20

position to sentence. When these papers were first considered, the obstacle to
sentencing afresh was that the applicant’s age had never been established, so that it
could not be said which sentencing regime applied to him. That obstacle has fallen
away. Age is now common cause, and the applicable regime is known.

[48] What remains is the absence of a pre -sentence report, which, in the ordinary
course, would call for a remittal. It does not do so here. The offences were committed
17 years ago. The applicant was sentenced 11 years ago and has been in custody
since. A report obtained now would speak to a man in his thirties, not the youth who
was sentenced in 2015, and it could not tell a sentencing court what it needed to know
then. A remittal would add further delay to a matter that has already taken far too long,
and it would do so while the applicant remains in prison under a sentence that ought
never to have been imposed. This Court must do its best with the material available,
including the evidence at trial, the victim impact statements, and the personal
circumstances placed on record.

The appropriate sentence
[49] Both parties invited us to substitute an ef fective sentence of 25 years’
imprisonment: the applicant on the basis that this is what the regional magistrate
intended and the State on the basis that it is just and equitable. Their common position
does not bind this Court, and I cannot accept it. The figure of 25 years is not the
product of an independent assessment. It is the residue of an exercise in which the
regional court began with imprisonment for life, applied an inapplicable regime, and
treated the applicant’s age as irrelevant. A sentence arr ived at in that way cannot be
reinstated merely because it is lower than the one which replaced it.

[50] The offences are grave. The applicant raped a seven -year-old child at
knifepoint and subjected her to two further acts of sexual violation, and he rap ed a

knifepoint and subjected her to two further acts of sexual violation, and he rap ed a
three-year-old child. He was their neighbour, the families were on good terms, and the
children had no reason to fear him. The victim impact statements show that the harm
they suffered has not abated. Offences of this kind against very young children call for
severe punishment. The interests of the complainants are not to be discounted

21

because the offender was himself young; a child’s best interests are of paramount
importance in every matter concerning that child, and that applies to a child
complainant as much as to a child offender.

[51] Against that, the applicant’s circumstances are as follows. He was 17 years old
when he offended. He was a first offender. He left school in Grade 11 and was
employed when he was arrested. The law distinguishes betw een an offender of 17
and an offender of 27 not out of sentiment, but because a child's culpability is not that
of an adult who has done the same thing, and because a child retains a capacity for
change that a sentencing court is bound to weigh.

[52] Weighing the gravity of the offences and the interests of the complainants and
of society against the applicant’s age when he offended, and his clean record, a
sentence of imprisonment in line with the Child Justice Act would have been
appropriate had the enquiry been conducted correctly in April 2015.

[53] In my view, a court applying the Child Justice Act would have imposed a
custodial sentence at a youth centre, consistent with the Act’s rehabilitative purpose.
It would not have sentenced him to 14 years’ i mprisonment. Moreover, the regional
court had a duty to refer the sentence for review to the high court, and he was denied
that. Counts 1 to 3 concern a single course of conduct against one complainant; count
6 concerns a different child upon a different occasion and standing alone would attract
a substantial term of its own, but the totality of the applicant’s conduct must be
measured as a whole, and the individual sentences will accordingly run concurrently.

Why the applicant is to be released forthwith
[54] Paragraph 4 of the order directs that the applicant be released from custody
forthwith. Because an order of that kind is not lightly made, I set out the reasons. The
first and decisive reason is that the sentence which this Court substitutes has been

first and decisive reason is that the sentence which this Court substitutes has been
served in full. An effective term of 11 years, antedated to 30 April 2015, expired on 30
April 2026. Since then, no sentence has been in force authorising the applicant’s
detention, and no lawful warrant supports it. No one may be deprived of fre edom

22

without cause.22 Once this Court sets aside the sentence upon which his imprisonment
rests and substitutes one which has expired, his continued detention becomes
unlawful from the moment the order is made, and the order must say so.

[55] The second is the length of what he has already endured. The applicant was
arrested on 8 September 2010 and sentenced on 30 April 2015, he has been in
custody in an adult correctional centre contrary to the provisions of the Child Justice
Act without interruption since that day. The record is unclear as to whether he was on
bail or released on warning before the trial. On any view of this matter he has been in
prison for longer than the law permitted, and the excess cannot be recovered.

[56] The third is that even the sentence which this Court considers would have been
appropriate has been overtaken. Had a determinate sentence of 11 years b een
imposed on 30 April 2015, the applicant would have become eligible for consideration
for parole after five and a half years, that is in about October 2020. He has therefore
been detained for close to six years beyond the date upon which he became eligi ble
even for consideration, and for more than four months beyond the expiry of the
sentence itself. A term of imprisonment which has run its course cannot be extended
by the time it takes a court to correct the error which produced it.

[57] The fourth is that the delay in this matter has been extraordinary and none of it
is attributable to the applicant. Eleven years have passed since the sentence was
imposed. He pursued an appeal to the high court, applied for special leave to this
Court, and applied to t he President for referral, and he has remained in custody
throughout. A right which has been infringed for that long is not vindicated by an order
which leaves its holder in prison. To set aside an unlawful sentence and then to
postpone the consequence would be an empty vindication.

postpone the consequence would be an empty vindication.

[58] The applicant was denied access to the rehabilitative opportunities available at
Youth Centres, including formal schooling, vocational training, and other rehabilitation

22Section 12(1)(a) of the Constitution.

23

programmes. Without these interventions, he was depr ived of the support needed to
return to society as a reformed and rehabilitated person. This unlawful denial of such
opportunities likely had a detrimental effect on his prospects for positive development.

[59] In the result, the following order is made:

1 The application for reconsideration in terms of s 17(2)(f) of the Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013 is refused in respect of the convictions and granted in respect
of sentence.
2 The decision of two judges of this Court refusing the applicant special leave to
appeal against sentence is set aside and substituted with the following:

‘Special leave to appeal against sentence is granted’

3 The appeal against sentence is upheld
4 The order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the following order:
‘(a) The appeal against the convictions is dismissed.
(b) The appeal against sentence succeeds. The sentences imposed by the
regional court on 30 April 2015, and the orders made in terms of s 50(2) of the
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007
and s 120(4) of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005, are set aside and replaced with the
following:
(i) Count 1: 11 years’ imprisonment.
(ii) Count 2: five years’ imprisonment.
(iii) Count 3: five years’ imprisonment.
(iv) Count 6: 11 years’ imprisonment.
(v) The sentences on counts 2, 3 and 6 are to run concurrently with the sentence
on count 1, so that the effective sentence is one of 11 years’ imprisonment.
(vi) The sentence is antedated to 30 April 2015.
5 The order made on 20 August 2026 that the applicant be released from
custody forthwith is confirmed

24


KE MATOJANE
JUDGE OF APPEAL

25

Appearances:

For the applicant: L Barnard
Instructed by: Mlilo Attorneys, Pietermaritzburg
Blair Attorneys, Bloemfontein
For the respondent: A Khanyile
Instructed by: Director of Public Prosecutions, Pietermaritzburg
Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein.