African Rainbow Minerals Ltd v Technology and Mineral Holdings (Pty) Ltd and Others (2025/113077; 2025/113159) [2026] ZAGPJHC 1250 (29 October 2026)

55 Reportability

Brief Summary

Insolvency Law — Business rescue proceedings — Intervention and postponement applications — ARM, a major creditor, seeking to set aside voluntary business rescues of Mintech and TAM — Late intervention applications by PGVM and the business rescue practitioner — Court finding that while the applications were late and lacked sufficient justification, the intervenors had a prima facie interest in the proceedings — Postponement granted with costs to be borne by the intervenors personally.

-2-



SINGO N.O.; NNDINGENI MOSES Third respondent

MANDLAHAZI N.O.; MATIMU MAHLANZO Fourth respondent

COMPANIES INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMISSION Fifth respondent



JUDGMENT


AMM, AJ
Introduction
[1] This judgment concerns essentially last-minute intervention and postponement
applications (INS-10 and INS-11) in the above two (main) applications.
[2] The applicant (‘ARM’) is the same in both (main) applications. ARM is the major or largest
independent creditor of both first respondents. Its creditor status arises from an arbitration
award made an order of court. In the first of ARM’s applications, Technology and Mineral
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (‘Mintech’) is the first respondent. In ARM’s second application, TAM
Holdings (Pty) Ltd (‘TAM’) is the first respondent.
[3] In its applications , ARM seeks orders to set aside Mintech’s and TAM’s respective
voluntary business rescues and to convert their business rescue proceedings into
liquidation proceedings. If ARM succeeds in its application against TAM, that success will
almost certainly determine the fate of the Mintech application in ARM's favour.
[4] ARM’s applications were enrolled for hearing for the week of 26 October 2026, in this
Division’s Dedicated Insolvency Motion Court. They were set down together, albeit not on
a consolidated basis, during September 2026.
[5] The notices of set-down were served on the (current) business rescue practitioner of both
first respondents, Mr Holtzhauzen. He is a senior business rescue practitioner. He is by
all accounts the fourth successive business rescue practitioner in the business rescue
proceedings. He was appointed in April 2026.
[6] When I first considered ARM S’s applications, the opposition to them had effectively
evaporated (together with the then business rescue practitioners' counterclaims and the
personal cost order sought against them). I was prima facie minded to conclude that there
was no reasonable prospect of rescuing either Mintech or TAM and that, moreover, it was

-3-



just and equitable to set aside the relevant resolutions that commenced their respective
business rescues. I had begun drafting preliminary judgments to that effect.
[7] I thereafter allocated the two applications for a joint hearing commencing at 10:00 on 28
October 2026.
[8] However, on Thursday, 22 October 2026, PGVM Investments (Pty) Ltd (‘PGVM’) sought
leave to intervene in the applications. PGVM claims it is a creditor of Mintech and TAM.
For his part, Mr Holtzhauzen also sought leave to intervene in both applications . He ,
however, filed his applications only on the afternoon of 27 October 2026 (i.e. on the eve’
of the allocated hearings).
[9] In their respective intervention applications, both Mr Holtzhauzen and PGVM also seek
(directly and indirectly) a postponement of the hearing of the two applications and leave
to file further or supplementary affidavits in opposition to ARM applications.
[10] The founding affidavits in both Mr Holtzhauzen’s and PGVM’s intervention and
postponement applications leave much to be desired. D espite the obvious rights and
interests Mr Holtzhauzen and PGVM have in the business rescues and ARM ’s
applications, their applications are nevertheless fact- and particularity-sparse.
[11] At its high watermark, PGVM endeavours to justify its late bringing and the timing of its
intervention and postponement application by arguing (i) that the uniform rules permitted
its intervention at any time, and (ii) that Mr Holtzhauzen recognised it as a creditor in the
relevant business rescues only on 2 October 2026. PGVM, however, does not explain
what it did between 2 October 2026 and the filing of PGVM's intervention application on
22 October 2026, and how it acquired certain business rescue claims.
[12] For his part, Mr Holtzhauzen's explanation for the late filing of his intervention and
postponement application centres on his claims that, during his tenure as TAM’s business

postponement application centres on his claims that, during his tenure as TAM’s business
rescue practitioner, he actively pursued the sale of TAM’s sole asset (i.e. a 1,5 million-ton
stockpile of manganite) and that he only received, as he communicated on 22 October
2026, what he describes as ‘an irrevocable Offer to Purchase’ the stockpile. Similarly, Mr
Holtzhauzen does not meaningfully, if at all, explain what transpired between his April
2026 appointment and 22 October 2026. He does, however, state that an addendum to a
business rescue plan prepared by his predecessor, which provides for the recent offer to
purchase (‘the amended business rescue plan’), was circulated to creditors on 26 October
2026 and that he proposes to base the rescues inter alia on this and other sales.

-4-



[13] Importantly, however, Mr Roeloffze, appearing for Mr Holtzhauzen and in the best
traditions of the Bar, conceded at the outset that, absent his client’s intervention and
postponement applications, ARM should succeed in its applications.
[14] Mr Gilbert SC, who appeared for ARM in both its applications, correctly advised that his
client did not oppose the intervention applications. He did, however, state that ARM
opposed their respective requests to postpone the hearing of ARM’s two applications. Mr
Gilbert SC argued that ARM did so because the postponement applications had no merit
and, ultimately, inter alia, because Mr Holtzhauzen and PGVM did not make out a proper
case for the postponements. Mr Gilbert SC also took issue with the timing and bona fides
of the postponement applications. He further argued that the amended business rescue
plans did not provide a reasonable basis for rescuing Mintech or TAM. ARM, however,
did not wish to file answering affidavits in the postponement applications. Instead, Mr
Gilbert SC advised that he would argue the postponement applications on the papers filed
by Mr Holtzhauzen and PGVM.
[15] In doing so, Mr Gilbert SC raised various, on the face of it, genuine and justifiable
concerns regarding (i) the contents of the respective proposed amended business rescue
plans, (ii) TAM’s ability to meet its contractual obligations under the proposed amended
business rescue plan, and (iii) Mr Holtzhauzen's ability to successfully rescue Mintech
and TAM. Mr Gilbert SC further relied upon (i) Mr Holtzhauzen's conduct leading up to 22
October 2026, (ii) the lack of faith he had generated in the mind of at least ARM, and (iii)
the gaps in, and the veracity and implementability of, the proposed amended business
rescue plans. For example, Mr Gilbert SC argued that the plans failed to set out
meaningfully how the contractually agreed additional stockpiles would be sourced, paid

meaningfully how the contractually agreed additional stockpiles would be sourced, paid
for and delivered. He also pointed out that Mintech’s proposed amended business rescue
plan fails to recognise ARM as a concurrent creditor, despite a previous business rescue
practitioner conceding and confirming ARM’s concurrent creditor status and the amount
of the debt owed to it in response to urgent proceedings brought by ARM. Given the then-
belated concession and confirmation, ARM did not seek a determination of its urgent
application.
[16] Mr Holtzhauzen obviously has a right to participate in ARM’s applications. Mr Gilbert SC
did not argue otherwise. At this juncture, PGVM for its part need only satisfy me – which

-5-



it does do – that it has prima facie a direct and substantial interest in ARM’s applications
(i.e. that it is prima facie a creditor) for purposes of it being permitted to intervene.1
[17] The aforesaid is the position despite the indubitable merit in ARM’s and Mr Gilbert SC’s
various criticisms and concerns vis-à-vis the timing of the bringing of the intervention and
postponement applications as well as in respect of the amended business rescue plan,
Mr Holtzhauzen and PGVM have statutory rights to participate in ARM’s appli cations.
That said, I make no definitive, final or binding determination regarding PGVM status as
a creditor of Mintech and TAM. That determination may be required to be made another
day, and possibly in another forum.
[18] Turning now to the postponement applications, Myburgh Transport v Botha t/a S A Truck
Bodies2 sets out the following trite considerations in an application for postponement:
‘5. A Court should be slow to refuse a postponement where the true reason for
a party's non-preparedness has been fully explained, where his unreadiness
to proceed is not due to delaying tactics and where justice demands that he
should have further time for the purpose of presenting his case. Madnitsky v
Rosenberg (supra at C 398 9).
6. An application for a postponement must be made timeously, as soon as the
circumstances which might justify such an application become known to the
applicant. Greyvenstein v Neethling 1952 (1) SA 463 (C). Where, however,
fundamental fairness and justice justifies a postponement, the Court may in
an appropriate case allow such an application for postponement, even if the
application was not so timeously made. Greyvenstein v Neethling (supra at
467F).
7. An application for postponement must always be bona fide and not used
simply as a tactical manoeuvre for the purposes of obtaining an advantage
to which the applicant is not legitimately entitled.
8. Considerations of prejudice will ordinarily constitute the dominant

8. Considerations of prejudice will ordinarily constitute the dominant
component of the total structure in terms of which the discretion of a Court
will be exercised. What the Court has primarily to consider is whether any
prejudice caused by a postponement to the adversary of the applicant for a
postponement can fairly be compensated by an appropriate order of costs
or any other ancillary mechanisms. (Herbstein and Van Winsen, The Civil
Practice of the Superior Courts in South Africa, 3rd ed, at 453.)
9. The Court should weigh the prejudice which will be caused to the respondent
in such an application if the postponement is granted against the prejudice
which will be caused to the applicant if it is not.’

1 See SA Riding for the Disabled Association v Regional Land Claims Commissioner 2017 (5) SA 1
(CC) and Peermont Global (KZN) (Pty) Ltd v Afrisun KZN (Pty) Ltd t/a Sibaya Casino and
Entertainment Kingdom and Others [2020] 4 All SA 226 (KZP)
2 Myburgh Transport v Bot ha t/a S A Truck Bodies 1991 (3) SA 310 (NmS) at 315 B-G.

-6-



[19] In Lekolwane and Another v Minister of Justice, 3 the Constitutional Court added the
following in respect of applications for postponement as follows:
‘The postponement of a matter set down for hearing on a particular date cannot
be claimed as a right. An applicant for a postponement seeks an indulgence from
the court. A postponement will not be granted, unless this Court is satisfied that
it is in the interests of justice to do so. .... Whether a postponement will be granted
is therefore in the discretion of the court. In exercising that discretion, … .’
[20] For inter alia the reasons already mentioned, neither Mr Holtzhauzen nor PGVM fully
explains why they brought their respective applications late, and I cannot meaningfully
determine whether the applications were brought timeously . I also cannot determine
whether the postponement applications are bona fide or mala fide; accordingly, my finding
is neutral in this specific regard. That said, these issues alone or collectively do not
determine the fate of the postponement applications.
[21] ARM’s and Mr Gilbert’s SC’s well-articulated and well-argued concerns and criticisms of
the proposed amended business rescue plans are understandable. It is, however, not
within this court’s bailiwick to anticipate or pre-empt what may or may not happen in due
course within the context of, inter alia, the relevant attitude to, and fate of, the business
rescue proceedings vis-à-vis sections 145(2), 145(3), 145(4), 150, 151, 152, etc. of the
Companies Act, 2008 when determining the fate of the postponement applications.
[22] Mr Gilbert SC also referred to Aucamp AJ's well-reasoned judgment in Valsa Engineering
(Pty) Ltd and Others v Forgetech Fabrication (Pty) Ltd4 in support of ARM’s opposition to
the postponement applications in the context of institutional prejudice. However, the
circumstances that motivate Aucamp AJ’s judgment are distinguishable. It concerns the

circumstances that motivate Aucamp AJ’s judgment are distinguishable. It concerns the
late filing of an answering affidavit in ordinary civil litigation, albeit on void post-liquidation
dispositions. It thus does not address business rescue proceedings, the broader interests
of affected persons, or considerations under sections 7 and 1 58 of the Companies Act,
2008.
[23] Moreover, on the question of prejudice, one of Mr Gilbert SC's primary concerns was that
determining the recently arisen ‘dispute’ over ARM’s creditor status in Mintech’s business
rescue would delay the business rescue proceedings, with accompanying institutional
prejudice. These concerns have merit. Mr Holtzhauzen, however, addressed this by Mr
Roeloffze confirming that he (Mr Holtzhauzen ) accepted and would abide by his
predecessor’s previous acceptance of Mintech’s status as a concurrent creditor in its
business rescue in the original capital amount of R55,336,369.00 plus interest and costs

3 Lekolwane and Another v Minister of Justice 2007 ( 3) BCLR 280 (CC) para 17.
4 (2026/112593) [2026] ZAGPJHC 1146 (31 August 2026).

-7-



(albeit the specifically confirmed amount included subsequently accrued interest up to the
date of Mr Holtzhauzen’s predecessor's confirmation).
[24] Mr Holtzhauzen also tendered to be personally liable (de bonis propriis, i.e. from his own
pocket) for the wasted costs arising from his intervention and the postponement
application, which would remedy ARM's immediate prejudice if its applications were
postponed. I pause to note that, had Mr Holtzhauzen not personally tendered these costs,
I would have been inclined to grant such an order in any event. Mr Niedinger, appearing
for PGVM, advised that while his client did not tender the wasted costs arising from its
intervention and postponement application, he accepted that the court could order such
costs in its discretion. Given that PGVM's poorly articulated reasons for its postponement
request rest on Mr Holtzhauzen’s recent endeavours to sell the stockpile, PGVM should
not be exempt from joint and several liability for costs, together with Mr Holtzhauzen
personally.
[25] In conclusion, having considered the papers and the parties' submissions, and in the
exercise of my discretion and in the interests of justice, I am persuaded, by the smallest
margin, to grant the requested postponements and the orders that follow. Fundamental
fairness and justice justify the postponements, particularly because, in the context of
business rescue proceedings, the interests of ARM, Mr Holtzhauzen, and PGVM must be
considered, but so too the interests and possible prejudices to affected parties must also
be taken into account.
[26] Given my determinations on the postponement applications, I do not need to consider
section 145(1) and 146(1) of the Companies Act, 2008, which the parties also did not
raise or argue before me.
[27] Consequently, I grant the following orders
(a) I n the application under case no. 2025-113077:
1. Mr Holtzhauzen is joined as the sixth respondent in his nomine officio /

1. Mr Holtzhauzen is joined as the sixth respondent in his nomine officio /
representative capacity as the business rescue practitioner of the first
respondent.
2. PGVM Investments (Pty) Ltd is joined as the seventh respondent.
3. The proceedings under the above case number are postponed sine die.
4. Mr Holtzhauzen and PGVM Investments (Pty) Ltd are granted leave to file
their answering affidavits or supplementary answering affidavits in opposition

-9-



Electronically submitted:

Delivered: This judgment was prepared and authored by the Acting Judge whose name is
reflected above. This judgment is handed down electronically by circulation to the parties / their
legal representatives by email and/or by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on
CaseLines.

COUNSEL FOR THE APPLICANTS: Mr BM Gilbert SC
INSTRUCTED BY: Bowman Gilfillan inc.

COUNSEL FOR FIRST RESPONDENT &
INTERVENING BUSINESS RESCUE
PRACTITIONER (MR HOLTZHAUZEN):
Mr A Roeloffze (adv)

INSTRUCTED BY:

ATTORNEY APPEARING FOR
PGVM INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD:
Cilliers & Reynders Inc.

Mr Walter Niedinger

ENROLLED AS MATTER: INS-10 & INS-11
DATE OF ARGUMENT: 28 October 2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29 October 2026