IN THE ELECTORAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(HELD AT BLOEMFONTEIN)
Reportable
Case no: 0016/26EC
In the matter between:
DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE Applicant
and
ACTIONSA FIRST RESPONDENT
ECONOMIC FREEDOM FIGHTERS SECOND RESPONDENT
UMKHONTO WESIZWE THIRD RESPONDENT
GOOD FOURTH RESPONDENT
ELECTORAL COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA FIFTH RESPONDENT
MINISTER OF COOPERATIVE GOVERNANCE
TRADITIONAL AFFAIRS SIXTH RESPONDENT
Neutral citation: Democratic Alliance v ActionSA and Others (0016/26EC)
[2026] ZAEC 12 (30 October 2026)
Coram: MODIBA J, MANGCU -LOCKWOOD AJ, AND PROFESSOR
PHOOKO (ADDITIONAL MEMBER)
2
Heard: 13 October 2026
Delivered: 30 October 2026
Summary: Electoral law – municipal elections – proportional representation
submission of single -candidate party lists – whether party lists
submitted in bad faith and in fraudem legis – whether such lists
contravene the Constitution and electoral legislation – interpretation of
items 17 and 20 of Schedule 1 to the Local Government: Municipal
Structures Act 117 of 1998 – supplementation of insufficient party lists
after elections permissible – bad faith and unlawfulness not established
– declaratory, review and consequential relief dismissed –
constitutional challenge postponed sine die.
3
ORDER
The following order is made:
1. The following applications are dismissed:
1.1 The application for an order declaring the party lists submitted by the first to
fourth respondents (the four parties) to be –
a. In bad faith and in fraudem legis;
b. In violation of ss 157(2)(a), 19(2) and 19(3)(b) of the Constitution;
c. In violation of ss 1, 13(1) (a), 14(1) of the Local Government: Municipal
Electoral Act 27 of 2000 (the Municipal Electoral Act); and
d. In violation of item 11 of Schedule 1, and item 5 of Schedule 2 of the Local
Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (the Structures Act). (paras 1 -
1.4, notice of motion)
1.2 The application for review of the decision of the fifth respondent
(Commission), taken on 16 September 2026, to publish the party lists. (para 2.2,
notice of motion)
1.3 The consequential relief sought in paragraphs 3 to 5 of the notice of motion.
2. The following applications are postponed sine die:
2.1 The application to declare the decision of the Commission of 16 September
2026 unconstitutional, unlawful and invalid) (para 2.1, notice of motion);
2.2 The conditional constitutional challenge (paras 6 – 6.5.2, notice of motion)
3. There is no order as to costs.
4
JUDGMENT
Mangcu-Lockwood J (Modiba J, Prof Phooko concurring)
Introduction
[1] May a political party which expects to win more than one seat in municipal
council elections nominate only one candidate in its proportional representation (PR)
candidate party list? The applicant, the Democratic Alliance (DA), says it may not.
And to the extent that the first to fourth respondents - ActionSA, Economic Freedom
Fighters (EFF), GOOD Party (GOOD) and uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK Party) (the four
parties) - have done so in their PR party lists for the upcoming municipal elections
to be held on 4 November 2026, they acted i n bad faith as a stratagem to avoid
identifying their candidates , and to subvert and circumvent the law . Likewise, by
accepting and certifying those lists, the fifth respondent (Commission) acted
unlawfully.
[2] As a result, the DA seeks a range of relief, as follows:
‘Declaratory Relief
1. It is declared that the party lists submitted by the First to Fourth Respondents for all
municipalities in the 2026 local government elections, alternatively their party lists for those
municipalities listed in Annexure A were submitted:
1.1. In bad faith and in fraudem legis;
1.2. In violation of ss 157(2)(a), 19(2) and 19(3)(b) of the Constitution;
1.3. In violation of ss 1, 13(1)(a), 14(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Electoral Act
27 of 2000 (Municipal Electoral Act); and
1.4. In violation of item 11 of Schedule 1, and item 5 of Schedule 2 of the Local
Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (Structures Act).
Review Relief
5
2. The decision of the Commission, taken on 16 September 2026, to publish the lists is:
2.1. Declared unconstitutional, unlawful and invalid; and
2.2. Reviewed and set aside.
Consequential Relief
3. The Commission’s decision to certify the lists is substituted with a decision not to certify the
lists.
4. In the alternative to prayers 2 and 3 the Four Parties may not supplement the Lists in terms of
items 17 of Schedule 1 or item 10 of Schedule 2 of the Structures Act, but may only supplement
the Lists in terms of item 20 of Schedule 1, or item 13 of Schedule 2 of the Structures Act, after
the first meeting of the relevant municipal council.
5. In the further alternative:
5.1. The Four Parties are afforded 48 hours from the date of this order to submit new party lists to
the Commission for the 2026 local government elections; and
5.2. The Commission is directed to accept those party lists, determine whether they were submitted
in good faith and, within seven days of the date of this order, to process them in terms of ss 14(3)
to (6) and 15 of the Municipal Electoral Act.
Conditional Constitutional Challenge
6. To the extent necessary:
6.1. The Municipal Electoral Act and the Structures Act – alternatively ss 1 13(1)(a) and
14(1) of the Municipal Electoral Act, and items 11, 17 and 20 of Schedule 1 and items 5,
10 and 23 of Schedule 2 of the Structures Act – are declared unconstitutional and invalid
to the extent that they6.2. 6.3. 6.4. place no limit on the extent of, or reason for,
supplementing party lists after an election.
6.2. The declaration of invalidity in prayer 6.1:
6.2.1. Will have no retrospective effect, save as set out in paragraphs 6.3 and 6.4; and
6.2.2. Will be suspended for 24 months to allow Parliament to cure the defect.
6.3 During the period of suspension:
6.3.1. Item 17(1) of Schedule 1, and item 10(1) of Schedule 2 of the Structures Act, will
read as follows:
read as follows:
If a party list contains fewer candidates than the party is entitled to those seats must remain
unfilled for the duration of the council’s term, unless the vacancies render a quorum for
the municipal council impossible, in which case the party concerned forfeits the unfilled
seats, and the seats must be filled within 14 days in accordance with subitems (4) to (10).
6
6.3.2. Item 17(2)-(3) of Schedule 1, and item 10(2)-(3) of Schedule 2 will be severed.
6.4 For the upcoming 2026 local government election:
6.4.1. The Four Parties may not supplement the Lists in terms of items 17 of Schedule 1 or
item 10 of Schedule 2 of the Structures Act, but may only supplement the Lists in terms of
item 20 of Schedule1, or item 13 of Schedule 2 of the Structures Act, after the first meeting
of the relevant municipal council.
6.5. In the alternative, the Four Parties are afforded 48 hours from the date of this order
to submit new party lists to the Commission for the 2026 local government elections; and
6.5.1. The Commission is directed to accept those party lists, determine whether they were
submitted in good faith and, within seven days of the date of this order, to process them in
terms of ss 14(3) to (6) and 15 of the Municipal Electoral Act.
6.5.2. The Lists may not be supplemented in terms of item 17 of Schedule 1, or item 10 of
Schedule 2 of the Structures Act.’
[3] By the time the matter was heard, the relief sought had been substantially
narrowed down to exclude the review and consequential relief in paragraphs 3, 5.1
and 5.2, and to postpone the conditional constitutional challenge sine die, although
it was also stated that they were not necessarily abandoned. In effect, the draft order
proposed by the DA invited the Court to only deal with the declaratory relief and the
consequential relief in paragraph 4 of the notice of motion at this stage.
[4] The MK Party did not oppose the proceedings and conveyed that it would not
be filing an answering affidavit since the issues it intended raising were raised by
the opposing respondents . The sixth respondent, the Minister of Cooperative
Governance and Traditional Affairs (Minister) had not filed opposing papers by the
date of the hearing. However, c ounsel appeared at the hearing and sought
postponement of the conditional constitutional challenge. Since the DA had already
7
indicated that the relief in that regard was to be postponed sine die, the Minister’s
request for postponement was considered moot.
Preliminary points
[5] Two preliminary points have been raised, namely non -joinder and
jurisdiction. The non-joinder is raised on account of the wide-ranging nature of the
consequential relief sought, which may impact parties that are not before the Court,
some of whom submitted PR lists . While GOOD points to every political party
which submitted a PR list in this regard, Action SA specifies Speaker of the National
Assembly (Speaker), the Chairperson of the National Council of Provinces
(Chairperson), and the Minister responsible for Home Affairs.
[6] The test for joinder of necessity is whether the non -joined party has a direct
and substantial interest - a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation which
may be prejudicially affected by the judgment.1 In this case, the DA only seeks relief
against the four parties, stating that those are the only parties whose lists are
susceptible to it s challenge. There is no evidence to the contrary, and no other
political party has been shown to meet that test.
[7] While I accept that the impact of the relief sought is far -reaching and would
have precedent-setting value, that on its own does not grant them a legal interest in
this case. That is not the test for joinder. There is accordingly no basis to conclude
that there are other parties which have a direct and substantial interest in these
proceedings.
1 Judicial Service Commission and Another v Cape Bar Council and Anoth er 2013 (1) SA 170 (SCA) para 12;
Gordon v Department of Health, KwaZulu – Natal 2008 (6) SA 522 (SCA) para 9.
8
[8] The non-joinder point is also raised in relation to the conditional constitutional
challenge, where once again it is said the Speaker, Chairperson, Minister of Home
Affairs, and other parties or institutions required by the applicable constitutional and
procedural framework, may have a direct and substantial interest.
[9] It is correct that our courts have often preferred to receive the views and
insights of the Speaker and the Chairperson when Acts of Parliament are under
constitutional attack.2 Their absence from the proceedings may well deprive the
Court of submissions that could be of assistance. However, given the DA ’s
inclination to postpone the constitutional challenge, the issue does not require
determination at this point. I also take the view in any event, that it is not appropriate
to determine the conditional constitutional challenge, as discussed in due course.
[10] Turning to the jurisdiction challenge, GOOD argues that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to grant any of the relief sought in these proceedings except for the
review relief. This is because the powers of this Court are confined to those
mentioned in s 20 of the Electoral Commission Act 51 of 1996 .3 In view of the
2 See, for example Ramodibe v S (A80/2018) [2020] ZAGPPHC 271 (4 May 2020), para 2.
3 Section 20 of the Electoral Commission Act provides:
‘(1) (a) The Electoral Court may review any decision of the Commission relating to an electoral matter.
(b) Any such review shall be conducted on an urgent basis and be disposed of as expeditiously as possible.
(2) (a) The Electoral Court may hear and determine an appeal against any decision of the Commission only in
so far as such decision relates to the interpretation of any law or any other matter for which an appeal is provided
by law.
(b) No such appeal may be heard save with the prior leave of the chairperson of the Electoral Court granted
on application within the period and in the manner determined by that Court.
on application within the period and in the manner determined by that Court.
(c) Such an appeal shall be heard, considered and summarily determined upon written submissions
submitted within three days after leave to appeal was granted in terms of paragraph (b).
(2A) The Electoral Court may hear and determine any dispute relating to membership, leadership, constitution
or founding instruments of a registered party.
(3) The Electoral Court may determine its own practice and procedures and make its own rules.
(4) The Electoral Court shall-
9
approach I have taken regarding the conditional constitutional challenge, I do not
consider it necessary to decide the question of jurisdiction regarding that relief at
this point.
[11] It suffices for present purposes that the trigger event for these proceedings,
according to the DA, was the Commission’s decision to certify the party lists. That
is the subject-matter of the review challenge, which engages the jurisdiction of this
Court in terms of s 20(1)(a) of the Electoral Commission Act.
[12] The remainder of the relief sought is related to the submission of, and
certification of the lists, and is accordingly consequential upon the review of the
impugned decision. The court is empowered to deal with those issues because s 18
of the Electoral Commission Act accords to this Court the status of a Supreme Court,
which is the equivalent of the high court. That is consistent with s s 166 (e) and
172(2)(a) of the Constitution, which recognize the Electoral Court as a court of
similar status to the high court. I am accordingly of the view that this Court is clothed
with the necessary jurisdiction to determine the issues before it.
(a) make rules in terms of which electoral disputes and complaints about infringements of the Electoral
Code of Conduct as defined in section 1 of the Electoral Act, 1993 (Act 202 of 1993), and appeals against decisions
thereon may be brought before courts of law; and
(b) determine which courts of law shall have jurisdiction to hear particular disputes and complaints about
infringements, and appeals against decisions arising from such hearings.
(5) The hearings and appeals referred to in subsection (4) shall enjoy precedence in the courts of law determined
in accordance with that subsection.
(6) The Electoral Court may hear and determine any matter that relates to the interpretation of any law referred
to it by the Commission.
to it by the Commission.
(7) The Electoral Court may investigate any allegation of misconduct, incapacity or incompetence of a member
of the Commission and make any recommendation to a committee of the National Assembly referred to in section
7 (3) (a) (ii).’
10
Brief Background
[13] The party lists in question were certified by the Commission on 16 September
2026, in accordance with s 15(1)(b) of the Municipal Electoral Act. That is when the
DA states it became publicly known that each of the four parties had submitted a PR
list bearing only a single name in virtually every municipality that they are
contesting. This is despite the parties ’ prior electoral performance and current
polling which indicates that they will almost certainly receive more than one seat
from those party lists, says the DA . To summari ze the common cause factual
position of the four parties:
a. In 101 of the 102 municipalities contested by Action SA, it has submitted 1
PR candidate. It currently fields 2 211 ward candidates, and holds 44 PR seats
in Johannesburg, 19 in Tshwane and 15 in Ekurhuleni.
b. The EFF is contesting all 257 municipalities in the country. It presently has
31 seats in Ekurhuleni, 29 seats in Johannesburg, 23 seats in Tshwane and 23
seats in eThekwini.
c. The MK Party contests elections in 229 municipalities. It has 1 PR candidate
in all 229 municipalities , including in i ts stronghold the KZN. The DA
estimates that, based on its performance in the 2024 National and Provincial
Elections, it will likely win more than one seat in 72 municipalities. In
eThekwini, it might win 28 PR seats; in Johannesburg 30 seats and in
Ekurhuleni, 31 seats.
11
d. GOOD is contesting elections in 25 municipalities, mostly in the Western
Cape. It has 9 PR seats in Cape Town, 4 each in Saldanha Bay and
Drakenstein, 3 in Stellenbosch and Theewaterskloof and 2 in Breede Valley.
[14] The nub of the DA’s complaint is th at none of the four parties have stated
under oath that their reason for listing only a single PR candidate was because they
do not expect to win more than one seat, and i t would be unreasonable for any of
them to believe the contrary given their past performance.
[15] The opposing political parties have provided explanations for their stance.
ActionSA relies on its 2026 Candidates Selection Policy, which was last amended
in April 2026. Clause 3.1.2 thereof provides that the successful mayoral candidate is
the sole name to be submitted on the PR list before the election. Clause 3.1.3
provides that, after the election results have been declared, the balance of the PR list
is populated by ranking ward candidates according to the percentage of support each
candidate obtained on the ward ballot in the relevant ward. No provisionally ranked
PR list exists, and their final ranking will depend on the votes actually cast for the
respective ward candidates. The principal pool of candidates from which the
supplemented PR list will be populated comprises ActionSA’s publicly nominated
ward candidates.
[16] GOOD explains that it sought guidance from the Commission on whether it
could submit single candidate lists and to later supplement them under item 17 of
the Schedule 1 if necessary. The EFF admits to submitting only single-name lists,
stating that it complied with the provisions of the applicable legislation and that no
fraud can be inferred from that.
12
[17] It is common cause that the four parties’ conduct was deliberate, and that they
all intend to reveal the remainder of their PR candidates after the election. They have
taken the view that item 17 of Schedule 1, Part 3 of the Structures Act entitles them
to adopt that approach . The DA’s case is that their lists were accordingly not
submitted for the purpose required by the Constitution, the Municipal Electoral Act
and the Structures Act. The relief it seeks in prayer 4 aims to effectively freeze their
submitted single-name lists until after the first meeting of the municipal councils,
which is where the main leadership positions are normally elected.
Issues for determination
[18] The issues arising for determination are accordingly the following:
a. Whether the single candidate lists of the four parties were submitted in bad
faith and in fraudem legis (in fraud of the law); in violation of ss 157(2), 19(2)
and 19(3)(b) of the Constitution; and in violation of ss 1, 13 and 14 of the
Municipal Electoral Act, and item 11 of Schedule 1 (and its equivalent item 5
of Schedule 2) to the Structures Act.
b. Whether item 17 of Schedule 1 (and its equivalent item 10 of Schedule 2), is
available to a party that deliberately listed fewer candidates than the seats it
expected to win, or whether such a party may supplement its list only under
item 20 of schedule 1 (and its equivalent item 13 of Schedule 2), after the first
meeting of the municipal council;
c. Whether a party's purpose in submitting a single -candidate list is legally
relevant to the validity of the list and to the operation of item 17.
13
[19] All these issues are interrelated, and in considering them, this judgment
considers the following in turn : (a) t he overall statutory scheme; (b) s tatutory
interpretation; (c) t he relevant constitutional provisions; (d) Items 17 and 20 of
Schedule 1; (e) b ad faith and in fraudem legis ; (f) t he declaratory relief; (g) t he
review application; (h) the conditional constitutional challenge; and (i) costs.
The overall statutory scheme
[20] Section 157 of the Constitution provides as follows:
‘157 Composition and election of Municipal Councils
(1) A Municipal Council consists of-
(a) members elected in accordance with subsections (2) and (3); or
(b) if provided for by national legislation-
(i) members appointed by other Municipal Councils to represent those other Councils; or
(ii) both members elected in accordance with paragraph (a) and members appointed in
accordance with subparagraph (i) of this paragraph.
(2) The election of members to a Municipal Council as anticipated in subsection (1) (a) must
be in accordance with national legislation, which must prescribe a system-
(a) of proportional representation based on that municipality's segment of the national
common voters roll, and which provides for the election of members from lists of party
candidates drawn up in a party's order of preference; or
(b) of proportional representation as described in paragraph (a) combined with a system
of ward representation based on that municipality's segment of the national common voters
roll.
(3) An electoral system in terms of subsection (2) must result, in general, in proportional
representation.
…
(6) The national legislation referred to in subsection (1) (b) must establish a system that allows
for parties and interests reflected within the Municipal Council making the appointment,
to be fairly represented in the Municipal Council to which the appointment is made.’
to be fairly represented in the Municipal Council to which the appointment is made.’
[21] The national legislation contemplated in s 157(2) of the Constitution is the
Municipal Electoral Act which regulates the conduct of elections, and the Structures
Act, specifically its Schedules 1 and 2, which regulates the allocation of seats.
14
[22] Section 13 (1)(a) of the Municipal Electoral Act provides that a registered
party may contest an election by submitting a party list containing the names of
candidates to stand as its representatives for the election of members of the council
to proportionally represent parties in the council. A ‘party list’ is defined as a list of
candidates proposed by a party for the purposes of the election of members of a
municipal council to proportionally represent parties in the council either in relation
to the municipality or in relation to a district management area.4
[23] Section 14(1)(a) of the Municipal Electoral Act provides as follows:
‘A party may contest an election in terms of section 13 (1) (a) or (c) only if the party by not later
than a date stated in the timetable for the election has submitted to the Commission-
(a) in the prescribed format and signed by the party's duly authorized representative-
(i) ......
(ii) a party list…’
[24] In terms of regulation 4 of the Regulations to the Municipal Electoral Act, a
party list referred to in s 14 (1)(a)(ii) must be in a form substantially similar to
appendix 3 . In turn , appendix 3 provides a form for nomination of a party list
candidate, and a form for a party list of candidates. The latter is in a table format,
with the headings ‘order, identity number, full names and surname’.
[25] The contents of a party list are further regulated by item 11 of Schedule 1,
which applies to metro and local councils and provides as follows:
‘(1) The number of candidates on a list submitted by a party may not exceed double the number
of seats in the metro or local council to be filled from party lists.
(2) The candidates' names must appear on the list in the order of the party's preference,
commencing with the first in order of preference and ending with the last.
4 Section 1, Municipal Electoral Act.
15
(3) Every party must seek to ensure that fifty per cent of the candidates on the party list are
women and that women and men candidates are evenly distributed through the list.’5
[26] So, item 11 provides for a maximum number of names on a party list, though
no minimum. It provides for the order of the party ’s preference to be indicated,
which is accommodated in the pro forma tabulated annexure 3 of the regulations. It
provides for gender parity to be ensured in the list.
[27] After submission of the lists, the Commission may seek further information,
investigate candidates appearing on more than one list, and remove ineligible or
unregistered candidates in terms of s s 14(3) to (5) . Thereafter, it is required to
compile, certify and keep the party lists , which it must furnish upon request upon
payment of a prescribed amount.6
[28] The deadline for submission of party lists according to the election timetable
was 17h00 on 28 August 2026. The Commission certified the party lists on 16
September 2026 and immediately published them on its website for public viewing.
Statutory Interpretation
[29] Because of the remedy sought in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the notice of motion,
and as already foreshadowed, the focus of the proceedings became the interpretation
5 Item 5 of Schedule 2, which applies to district councils, provides similar provisions, as follows:
‘(1) The number of candidates on a party list submitted by a party may not exceed double the number of seats in
the district council allocated, as the case may be, for the election of councillors referred to in section 23 (1) (a).
(2) The candidates' names must appear on the list in the order of the party's preference, commencing with the first
in order of preference and ending with the last.
(3) Every party must seek to ensure that fifty per cent of the candidates on the party list are women and that women
and men candidates are evenly distributed through the list.’
and men candidates are evenly distributed through the list.’
6 Subsections 15(1)(a) to (c), Municipal Electoral Act.
16
of item 17 of Schedule 1 to the Structures Act. It is well to first recall the relevant
statutory principles.
[30] The approach to statutory interpretation set out in Endumeni7 involves a
unitary exercise which considers the text, context and purpose, to determine a
coherent and salient interpretation , thus avoiding any internal inconsistency. 8 The
interpretive process is objective and not subjective.9
[31] As stated in Cool Ideas10, the words in a statute must be given their ordinary
grammatical meaning, unless to do so would result in an absurdity. The interrelated
riders to this general principle, are that statutory provisions should always be
interpreted purposively, must be properly contextualised, and construed consistently
with the Constitution to preserve their constitutional validity.11
[32] But that is not a licence for sophistry , or for a search for the chimerical or
ephemeral.12 The relevant context in which the provision rests is to be understood
by identifying the mischief that the statute seeks to address.13
[33] Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires courts to promote the spirit, purport
and objects of the Bill of Rights in the interpretive process. If a provision is open to
7 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA)
(Endumeni) at para 18.
8 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd and Another v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2022 (1) SA 100
(SCA) para 25.
9 Moyo and Another v Minister of Police and Others (Moyo); Sonti and Another v Minister of Police and Others
(CCT174/18; CCT178/18) [2019] ZACC 40; 2020 (1) BCLR 91 (CC); 2020 (1) SACR 373 (CC) (22 October 2019)
paras 52 – 58.
10 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard [2014] ZACC 16; 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC); 2014 (8) BCLR 869 (CC) (Cool Ideas)
at para 28.
11 Ibid.
12 Endumeni, para 21.
13 Moyo, para 54.
17
multiple plausible interpretations, the one that best conforms with the Constitution
should be preferred. 14 The approach of interpreting legislation so as to avoid
inconsistency with the Constitution is referred to as ‘reading-down’, and it is limited
by what the text is reasonably capable of meaning. 15 It is distinguishable from the
constitutional remedy of ‘reading in’ of missing words from a statutory provision ,
which may be granted after a court has declared that a statute is constitutionally
invalid.16 The conflation of the two may well result in an intrusive interpretation
which offends requirements of the rule of law and the separation of powers.17
The constitutional provisions
[34] Turning to the constitutional provisions invoked in these proceedings, the text
of s 157 already quoted provides, per its heading, that its purpose is to establish the
composition and election of a municipal council. While s 157(1) regulates the
composition thereof, s 157(2) regulates the election to the municipal council.
[35] Both the composition and election of municipal councils must be performed
in accordance with national legislation, which I have already identified as the
Municipal Electoral Act and the Structures Act. The national legislation must
prescribe a PR system which provides for election of municipal council members
from lists of party candidates. In simple terms, this means that the names of the
members must be sourced from a party list.
14 Investigating Directorate Serious Economic Offences v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others:
In Re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty ) Ltd And Others v Smit No and Others [2000] ZACC 12; 2001 (1) SA 545
(CC); 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC) (Hyundai) and National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v
Minister of Home Affairs and Others [1999] ZACC 17 ; 2000 (2) SA 1 (CC); 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC) (National
Coalition).
Coalition).
15 Hyundai above fn 14 at para 24 and S v Zuma and Others [1995] ZACC 1; 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC); 1995 (4) BCLR
401 (CC) at para 18.
16 National Coalition at para 24.
17 Abahlali Basemjondolo Movement SA v Premier of the Province of KZN [2009] ZACC 31; 2009 JDR 1027 (CC);
2010 (2) BCLR 99 (CC) (Abahlali) at para 123.
18
[36] The DA emphasizes that a person cannot be elected from a list if they are not
on the list before the election, and that the inclusion of persons after the election is
the opposite of what s 157(2)(a) of the Constitution demands.
[37] What the provision prescribes is that, by the time an individual is elected to a
municipal council, their name must be on the PR list. It does not prescribe, nor does
it seek to prescribe, when that name is added to the list. That is the province of the
national legislation envisaged by the provision , which must ‘prescribe a system’
encompassing the objectives stated in the constitutional provision.
[38] That system, according to New Nation18 is an electoral system which provides
for political parties, as opposed to individual candidates, to participate in elections
at municipal level. It is a system of proportional representation comprising of a party
list, and in terms of which a voter votes for a party. In such a system, said the high
court in Miller19 -
‘the voter chooses a particular political party. The party, by submitting a list of candidates,
regulates the choice of candidates and the order in which they are to be elected. There is, to my
mind, no doubt whatsoever that every vote cast counts in the compu tation of the proportional
representation election.’
[39] The Court in New Nation re-affirmed what had been stated in Ramakatsa20 in
relation to a PR party list system, as follows:
18 New Nation Movement NPC and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (New Nation)
(CCT110/19) [2020] ZACC 11; 2020 (8) BCLR 950 (CC); 2020 (6) SA 257 (CC) (11 June 2020) at para 185.
19 Democratic Party v Miller NO and Others (Miller) 1997 (1) SA 758 (D) at 761 – 763.
20 Ramakatsa and Others v Magashule and Others (Ramakatsa) (CCT 109/12) [2012] ZACC 31; 2013 (2) BCLR
202 (CC) (18 December 2012) para 68.
19
‘Ramakatsa was concerned with and its reach was limited to cases where an adult South African
has chosen a political party to be a vehicle through which she would exercise the right to vote. That
case was concerned with the representation that involved political parties. Within that system, a
voter is obliged to vote for a pol itical party and it is the party which nominates
candidates. Whether those candidates meet the approval of the voters or some of the voters is
irrelevant. Once they have voted for the party, it falls upon the party to identify who will be their
representative. And that representative is directly accountable to the party concerned .’21 (my
emphasis)
[40] The DA highlights the political rights enshrined s 19(2) and 19(3)(b). In terms
of s 19(2) every citizen has the right to free, fair and regular elections for any
legislative body established in terms of the Constitution. In New National Party 22
the Court explained that the right to vote in free and fair elections is enjoyed within
the context of an ‘electoral system prescribed by national legislation which complies
with the …requirements laid down by the Constitution. The details of the system are
left to Parliament’.23
[41] In Kham24 it was confirmed that the adjudication of free and fair elections is
a question of fact, which must be decided on the evidence, not on mere speculation.
Since the elections have not yet taken place, including elections of the municipal
council, any determination regarding transgression of s 19(2) at this stage fits within
that description.
21 New Nation para 193.
22 New National Party of South Africa v Government of The Republic of South Africa and Others (New National
Party) 1999 (3) SA 191 (CC) para 14.
23 Independent Candidate Association SA NPC v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (CCT 144/23)
[2023] ZACC 41; 2024 (3) BCLR 321 (CC); 2024 (2) SA 104 (CC) (4 December 2023) para 55.
[2023] ZACC 41; 2024 (3) BCLR 321 (CC); 2024 (2) SA 104 (CC) (4 December 2023) para 55.
24 Kham and Others v Electoral Commission and Another 2016 (2) SA 338 (CC) (Kham) para 88.
20
[42] As for s 19(3)(b), it confers on every adult citizen the right : (a) to vote in
elections for any legislative body established in terms of the Constitution, and to do
so in secret; and (b) to stand for public office and, if elected, to hold office. In New
Nation it was confirmed that the right held in terms of s 19 (3)(b) is held by
individuals, not political parties, to stand for public office and to contest elections.25
And what entitles the citizen to hold office, in terms of the provision, is being
elected.26 Therefore, said the Court:
‘an ‘adult citizen who wishes to exercise the right conferred by section 19(3)(b) must first contest
elections. In that context “elected” means being voted for. One does not get voted for if one’s name
does not appear on the ballot paper. Without contesting elections, it is impossible for any adult
citizen to exercise the right to stand for and hold public office if elected.’27
[43] So, only individuals - not political parties - who are contesting elections may
place reliance on s 19(3) (b). Relying on My Vote Counts II 28 where the minority
court highlighted a connection between the proper exercise of the right to vote and
the right of access to information, the DA argues that the right to vote means voters
must know who a party’s candidates are for the election , and that w ithout this
information, a vote is cast blindly.
[44] The answer to that argument was given by the Constitutional Court in UDM
II29. What an individual is entitled to know in the voting process is constrained by
the PR political environment, as follows:
25 New Nation para 154.
26 New Nation para 170.
27 New Nation para 171.
28 My Vote Counts NPC v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Another 2018 (5) SA 380 (CC) (My
Vote II) paras 33 and 35.
29 United Democratic Movement v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (African Christian
Democratic Party and Others Intervening;Institute For Democracy In South Africa and Another As Amici Curiae)
(No 2) 2003 (1) SA 495 (CC) (“UDM (No 2)”) para 37.
21
‘Although voters might have been influenced by the names of candidates, and possibly their place
on the list, they voted for parties and not for particular candidates. Seats were allocated to the
various parties proportional to the votes cast. Those seats were filled by representatives on the
party lists, seats being allocated in accordance with the order in which the party’s candidates were
named on the list.’
[45] This is means that the right to know when voting for candidates on PR party
lists is informed and constrained by, firstly the PR system which highlights party
representativity, and secondly, similar to s 19(2) by what the applicable national
legislation requires. In this instance, the right to information is facilitated by s 15 of
the Municipal Electoral Act which provides for the compilation, safe record keeping
and granting of access to party lists upon request.
[46] Section 157(2) envisages that the names included in a party list be ‘drawn up
in a party’s order of preference’. It is the party which draws up a list, according to
its preferences. The reality is that a voter may not even know the identity of a person
that a party will later add if it wins more seats than nominated. So, the right to
information in this context is tempered by considerations of PR party
representativity.
[47] Ultimately, what becomes apparent when one has regard to the requirement
of a party list is that the Constitution seeks to balance a variety of interests. This is
borne out by the statutory scheme set out earlier, which shows that a party list serves
multiple purposes, including: providing information to the voter, the Commission,
and the public; acting as a source document for election of members who are to
occupy seats in the municipal council; providing certainty in cases of vacancies or
deficiencies, as discussed below; and regulating the orderly conduct of elections. All
of these considerations involve diverse interests which characterize our multi-party
22
system of democratic government 30, which is itself a foundational constitutional
value, and can only be balanced through policy which is articulated through the
national legislation envisaged by the Constitution.
[48] As the case law discussed above indicates, a ny attempt to highlight any one
of the constitutional rights, without applying the context of the national legislation
envisaged by s 157(2), is not helpful. That is unfortunately what the DA has done in
this case, especially in regard to the declaratory relief sought in paragraph 1.2, where
it seeks a declarator that the party lists are in violation of ss 157(2), 19(2) and
19(3)(b). The approach is in any event, contrary to the principle of constitutional
subsidiarity which provides that a litigant cannot directly invoke the Constitution to
enforce a right without first relying on, or attacking the constitutionality of,
legislation enacted to give effect to that right .31 I now turn to examine the relevant
provisions of the Schedules to the Structures Act, starting with item 17.
Items 17 and 20
[49] Item 1732 provides as follows:
‘Insufficient party lists
(1) If a party list contains fewer candidates than the party is entitled to, the Electoral Commission
must in writing immediately notify the party of the exact shortfall and request the party to deliver
within two days of the notice a list supplemented by the name or names of one or more eligible
candidates.
30 Ramakatsa, para 68.
31 My Vote Counts NPC v Speaker of the National Assembly and Others (CCT121/14) [2015] ZACC 31 (30 September
2015) para 53.
32 The corresponding provision for district councils is item 10 of Schedule 2.
23
(2) Immediately upon receipt of the list referred to in subitem (1), the Electoral Commission must
allocate the number of representatives, in the order of preference on the list, to which the party is
entitled.
(3) (a) Subject to paragraph (b)-
(i) if the party concerned has ceased to exist, the seat or seats must remain unfilled;
(ii) if the party concerned does not deliver a supplemented list, the seat or seats remain
unfilled until it delivers a list; or
(iii) if the party concerned delivers a supplemented list containing fewer names than the number
of seats to be filled from that list, the seat or seats remain unfilled to the extent of the shortfall until
it delivers a further list.
(b) Where seats are unfilled in terms of paragraph (a), and the vacancies render a quorum for the
municipal council impossible, the party concerned forfeits the unfilled seats, and the seats must be
filled within 14 days in accordance with subitems (4) to (10).
[50] The DA interprets item 17 by reference to item 20, which provides as follows:
‘Filling vacancies and changing the order
(1) (a) A party may not supplement or change its list from the date of the closure of nomination of
candidates for an election until a day after the date of the first council meeting.
(b)(i) Subject to paragraph (a), a party may supplement or change its list, provided that if a
councillor elected according to a party list ceases to hold office, the party concerned may
supplement or change its list by not later than 21 days after the councillor has ceased to hold office.
(ii) The vacancy must be filled as soon as the party in question has supplemented, changed or
increased its list, but not later than 14 days after the expiry of the 21-day period.
(2) If a party supplements, changes or increases its list in terms of subitem (1) it must provide the
chief electoral officer with an amended list.’
chief electoral officer with an amended list.’
[51] Its central interpretative argument is that item 20 provides for the general rule,
namely that a party may not supplement or change its list from the date of closure of
nomination of candidates for an election until after the date of the first council
24
meeting. Item 17 according to it contains a narrow safety valve which enables a party
that wins more PR seats than it has candidates because it genuinely and only slightly
underestimated the support it would obtain, to supplement its insufficient party list.
Its primary purpose is not for the ordinary selection of PR councillors, which the
four parties have converted it to mean.
[52] The text of item 17 is neutral, referring only to an ‘insufficient’ party list. The
reasons for the ‘insufficiency’ are characterized by the fact that the ‘party list
contains fewer candidates than the party is entitled to’ . This requires a mechanical
comparison between the list and the party ’s entitlement. And it must be made as
soon as the entitlement is known by the Commission. The key question then is: when
does it become known what the political party is entitled to? The answer is provided
in item 13(1)(a), which provides for the method for calculating and allocating seats
as follows:
‘The total number of valid votes cast for each party on the party vote and for the ward candidates
representing the party must be divided by the quota of votes for a seat. The result is the total
number of seats to which each party is entitled before any adjustment in terms of subitem (3).
…
(3) (a) In an election for a metro council or for a local council that has wards, the Electoral
Commission must deduct from the total number of seats to which each party is entitled in terms of
subitem (1) and (2), the number of ward candidates representing that party who were declared
elected.
(b) The result is the number of seats which the party is entitled to fill from its list of party
candidates.’ (my emphasis)
[53] This provision makes clear that the insufficiency contemplated in item 17 can
only arise after the calculation of votes. And it is determined by reference the number
25
of seats to which a party is entitled. That number is not, and cannot, be predetermined
and must await finalization of the calculation and allocation set out in item 13 which,
in turn, is informed by the valid number of party votes , ward candidates and the
quota of votes provided in item 12.
[54] In effect, the DA’s argument seeks to introduce a predetermined minimum
number of candidate names that will suffice in a party list . Its approach requires a
political party to project those numbers based on its previous performance and its
polling. However, the legislation stays clear of such a requirement.
[55] One of the features of Schedule 1 is the avoidance of specifying numbers. It
refers instead to calculations, formulae and a quota of votes.33 Item 11, to which I
have already referred, provides for the maximum number of candidates on a party
list which may not exceed double the number of seats in the metro or local council
to be filled from the party lists. There is no provision made for a minimum number
of candidates on a list in the Schedule.
[56] Significantly, in terms of item 16 , a political party may be disadvantaged by
the election of too many ward candidates . If such an election results in it obtaining
a number of seats that is equal to, or greater than the total number of seats in the
council to which it is entitled under item 13 , it will not be allocated seats from its
party list.34 In a way, this requires a balancing act by the political party regarding
33 Items 12 and 16 provide the formulae for calculating the quota of votes for a seat. Item 13 provides for the application
of the quota when calculating and allocating seat.
34 The relevant part of item 16 provides:
‘(1) If, through the election of ward candidates, a party listed on the part of the ballot paper for parties has obtained
a number of seats that is equal to, or greater than the total number of seats in the council to which it is entitled
under item 13, that party must not be allocated any seats from its list of party candidates.
(2) The seats of ward candidates are not affected.
(3) A new quota of votes for a seat must be determined…’
26
how many ward candidates to field vis-a-vis its party list candidates, and it must bear
the political consequences.
[57] One must accept that the legislature cast its mind to the issue of a number of
names on the list, hence the various enumerative provisions under headings such as
‘number of votes’35, ‘quota’36, ‘allocating seats’37, ‘excessive seats’38, ‘insufficient
party lists’39, ‘multiple seats’40 and ‘filling of vacancies’41. And hence the reference
in item 11 to a maximum number.
[58] The legislature’s reluctance to specify a minimum number of names may be
explained by the uncertainty of political life and of the electoral environment,
including the possibilities of redistribution of electoral support and the reality of
coalition arrangements. In fact, item 19 acknowledges the reality that a candidate’s
name may be withdrawn from a party list and cause a vacancy to arise, for a variety
of reasons.42
[59] There is also to consider the fact that, even on the DA’s argument, a list
containing a single name will in some instances comply with the constitutional
requirement in s 157(2). The difference according to it is in the motive behind it –
35 Item 9.
36 Item 12.
37 Item 13.
38 Item 16.
39 Item 17.
40 Item 17A.
41 Items 18 and 20.
42 Item 19 provides:
‘A person who is a candidate on a party list ceases to be a candidate and a vacancy arises in the list when the party
withdraws the person's name by written notice to the chief electoral officer, or when that person -
(a) assumes office as a councillor;
(b) resigns from the list by written notice to the chief electoral officer;
(c) becomes ineligible to be a candidate;
(d) is disqualified or removed from the list in terms of any legislation;
(e) ceases to be a member of the party for which that person was listed as a party candidate; or
(f) ceases to be ordinarily resident in the municipality to which the list relates.’
27
whether there was a ‘genuine’, ‘inadvertent’, or ‘unforeseeable’ underestimation by
the political party; or w hether there was a ‘genuine belief’ regarding its projected
winnings. There are no such requirements in item 17 or in Schedule 1. Rather, the
business of the schedule, as already shown, is the objective, mathematical
calculation and allocation of seats for composition of municipal councils in
compliance with the injunction issued in s 157 of the Constitution.
[60] An introduction of a requirement such as a ‘genuine belief’ or ‘genuine
underestimation’ is not only at odds with the current tenor of the schedule , but it
would also introduce more questions than answers. As the Commission correctly
asks: Who must determine such genuineness, and at what stage? Based on what test
must it be determined? How must the practicalities of such determination be
facilitated? How would the genuineness be determined? The Commission highlights
that it would also have to determine whether a party genuinely expected a particular
number of seats; whether its expectation was sufficiently reasonable; and whether
its shortfall was sufficiently unforeseen . Needless to say these are policy issues
which are not appropriate to venture into for this Court. But what these questions
also reveal is that the answers are not presently found in the text of the statute or the
statutory scheme.
[61] There is also to consider the fact that, even if an underestimation is genuine ,
the concerns s ought to be addressed by the DA would remain. The supplemented
names would not have undergone scrutiny by the public o r the opposition . This
highlights that, in introducing the requirements suggested by the DA, policy choices
including possible trade-offs would need to be made.
[62] It bears repeating that such an endeavour would be inappropriate for this Court
to undertake. It amounts to treading into the terrain of the legislature, contrary to the
28
principle of separation of powers. To interpret the legislation as to incorporate those
subjective elements would amount to a ‘reading in’ to the statute that which is not
currently envisaged, not a ‘reading down’ to make it compliant with the Constitution.
All of this brings to mind the SCA’s injunction in Endumeni to not resort to the
chimerical when interpreting statute.
[63] It also calls to mind the imperatives of a PR system , which places a high
premium on the interests of a political party, as the representative of the voter, and
as a member of a municipal council. At the stage of the composition and allocation
of seats of a municipal council , the seats are populated from the party lists . A
political party must therefore ensure that it has sufficient names on its list for
allocation of seats . If a party does not have names due to the DA’s suggested
interpretation, it will not be able to populate the seats, to its prejudice and the
prejudice of the voting public, not to mention the citizenry to be served by that
municipality.
[64] Aligned with the DA’s subjective elements is the suggestion that item 17
provides for a narrow safety valve which only applies where a party slightly and in
good faith underestimates its electoral support . A perusal at the rest of Schedule 1
indicates that there are other instances in which item 17 may be used to supplement
a list. One is where a vacancy is declared because a councillor who was elected from
a party list ceases to hold office , and a party list has become exhausted . In such an
instance, item 18(2) provides that the supplementation of the list must be effected in
accordance with item 17, with the necessary adjustments. One can imagine a number
of possible reasons why a municipal councillor may cease to hold office , including
resignation, ineligibility, disqualification or ceasing to be an ordinary resident within
a municipality. That is hardly a ‘narrow safety valve’.
29
[65] Similarly, when a party has obtained seats equal to or greater than the total
number of seats in the council to which it is entitled through the election of ward
candidates, resulting in a new quota calculation and allocation, item 16(9), read with
(4) envisages supplementation in terms of item 17(1).
[66] Turning to item 20, its subject-matter is the filling of vacancies and changing
the order of lists . Sub-item 20(1) (a) provides for a moratorium period which
prohibits supplementation or change of a list ‘ from the date of the closure of
nomination of candidates for an election until a day after the date of the first council
meeting’. Outside the moratorium period, item 20(1)(b) permits supplementation or
change, subject to a specific deadline if a councillor elected from a party list ceases
to hold office.
[67] The provision applies in a variety of situations which are dealt with in the
Schedule. One is the declaration of a vacancy of a councillor who ceases to hold
office in terms of item 18(1). In turn, that provision is expressly made subject to item
20, which requires a party to supplement or change its list within 21 days of the
councillor ceasing to hold office, and no later than 14 days thereafter; and to
thereafter provide an amended list to the Chief Electoral Officer of the Electoral
Commission (Chief Electoral Officer).
[68] Similarly, in terms of item 19 a vacancy may arise where a candidate on a
party list ceases to be a candidate due to a variety of reasons. In such circumstances,
item 20, which deals with the ‘filling of vacancies’ finds application, including the
moratorium in sub-item (1)(a).
30
[69] This brings me to the relationship between item 17 and the moratorium found
in sub-item 20(1)(a) which prohibits supplementation or change of a list ‘from the
date of the closure of nomination of candidates for an election until a day after the
date of the first council meeting’. At first glance, item 20 may appear to impose a
moratorium on the application of item 17 during the said period. However, when one
considers the time periods involved in the application of the two provisions, such an
interpretation becomes unworkable, and renders item 17 nugatory.
[70] As already discussed, item 17 is triggered once votes have been counted and
seats have been allocated - when it is known what a party is entitled to. That is
necessarily during the operation of the moratorium period in item 20. Yet, the
specific need for applying item 17 after elections and voting is to make up in
numbers that which could not have been known with certainty before. To exclude
the application of item 17 in such circumstances would work against the very aim of
bringing proportionality to the outcome of the votes. It would denude the voting
public of the outcome of its votes, expressed through proportional representativity
which is supposed to be the constitutionally enshrined result in terms of s 157(3) of
the Constitution.
[71] That was the effect of the legal position43 discussed in Miller, a case decided
early into our constitutional democracy, where the DA challenged a statutory
provision which provided that if the list does not contain sufficient candidate, the
additional seats to which the party is entitled to are forfeited. The court agreed that
disregarding the votes was undemocratic and unconstitutional , and commented as
follows:
43 The applicable provisions at the time were ss 75(4) and (5) of the Local Government Election Regulations 28 of
1996, published in the Provincial Gazette of KwaZulu-Natal 5109 on 27 February 1996.
31
‘There is no reason at all why mechanisms cannot be designed to deal with situations where
insufficient candidates are put up in party lists. To my mind, it is quite understandable that a
political party may take a conservative view or entirely misread its prospects in the election -
possibly by reference to opinion polls - and hence put up insufficient candidates. Why should it be
penalised for this? After all, it is part and parcel of the democratic process that the result of an
election may be unforeseen.’44
[72] In fact, the Commission confirms that item 17(1) was re-enacted in its present
form in 2021 by the same statute that substituted item 20(1). It also points to the
difference in electoral design between national and provincial elections on the one
hand, and municipal elections on the other. Whereas the legislature opted for
forfeiture of seats where a party list contains fewer names than the seats allocated to
it in national and provincial elections, 45 there is no such forfeiture in the case of
municipal councils . Instead, Parliament opted for supplementation through item
17(1). This is further indication that the intention was for the provision to apply after
election and during the moratorium.
[73] The two provisions are distinguishable in that item 17 deals with a limited
situation of an insufficient list arising from the objective consideration of what the
party is entitled to. The supplementation is initiated by the Commission upon
realizing a shortfall in the party’s list. And the timeframes imposed are tight in that
the Commission is required to act immediately, and the party is granted a turnaround
of two days. On the other hand , item 20 seeks to deal with general circumstances
where political parties may wish to change their list s for a variety of reasons . The
supplementation in such an instance is initiated by the party. The deadlines are fairly
flexible and the time periods longer.
44 Miller at 763C-E.
flexible and the time periods longer.
44 Miller at 763C-E.
45 Schedule 1A to the Electoral Act 73 of 1998.
32
[74] In order to bring parity between the two provisions and interpret them in a
constitutionally compliant manner, I am persuaded that the moratorium in item
20(1)(a) should be read down to exclude circumstances where item 17 finds
application. In other words, that it should be read to mean: ‘ Subject to item 17 , a
party may not supplement or change its list from the date of the closure of
nomination of candidates for an election until a day after the date of the first council
meeting’. Such an interpretation saves either provision from constitutional invalidity
and gives meaning to item 17. It also follows from the application of the common
law principle of statutory interpretation of generalis specialibus non derogant
(general words (rules) do not derogate from special ones), which proceeds from the
following premise:
‘When the Legislature has given attention to a separate subject and made provision for it the
presumption is that a subsequent general enactment is not intended to interfere with the special
provision, unless it manifests that intention very clearly. Each enactment must be construed in that
respect according to its own subject-matter and its own terms.46
[75] Such an interpretation also takes account of the uncertainties of the electoral
environment. One can think of a situation where a name appearing on a certified list
may need to be removed before the first council meeting due to discovery of serious
criminal conduct on the part of the candidate.
[76] Ultimately, the DA itself accepts that item 17 can find application during the
moratorium period, including before the first meeting of the council. Its condition is
46 See Sasol Synthetic Fuels (Pty) Ltd and Others v Lambert and Others (7/2001, 8/2001) [2001] ZASCA 133; 2002
(2) SA 21 (SCA) (27 November 2001) para 17 and the authorities cited there.
33
that this should only be where a party has inadvertently or genuinely underestimated
its support. I have already rejected that argument.
Bad faith and in fraudem legis
[77] Both the allegations of bad faith and acting in fraudum legis are founded on
the allegation that the four parties do not honestly believe that they will win only one
PR seat in all the municipalities in which they are competing, and have all sought to
circumvent the purpose of the submission of candidate lists.
[78] An act is in fraudem legis when a party attempts to avoid the provisions of a
statute or peremptory law by disguising or concealing the true nature of their
conduct.47 At least in the case of ActionSA and GOOD, the evidence directly
contradicts the allegations of disguise or concealment.
[79] As already mentioned, ActionSA relies on its 2026 Candidates Selection
Policy, which was last amended in April 2026 . It is a publicly available document,
which was made available long-before before the submission deadline for candidate
lists. It unequivocally sets out the party’s stance for its members, voters and the
public alike. All of this undermines any inference of co ncealment or acting in
disguise.
[80] Likewise, GOOD has attached emails which were addressed to officials of the
Commission as proof that it sought guidance from the Commission on whether it
could submit single candidate lists and later supplement them under item 17 if
necessary. At the very least, the correspondence shows that GOOD made known its
47 A & D Hutchison ‘Simulated transactions and the fraus legis doctrine’ . Commissioner for the South African
Revenue Service v NWK Ltd 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA) at 69 -73; Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC
and Others [2014] ZASCA 40; [2014] 2 All SA 654 (SCA); 2014 (4) SA 319 (SCA) paras 9 -11 and 14 -15.
34
intentions to the Commission, including the Chief Electoral Officer , before
submission of its lists. Again, this dispels any notion of concealment or disguise. I
have noted the Commission’s denial of the inference drawn by GOOD that it
sanctioned the conduct. Regardless, the communication with GOOD is not disputed.
[81] The position adopted by the EFF is that no fraud can be inferred from the
submission of a single name list, and that it complied with the provisions of the
applicable legislation. From the statutory interpretation exercise conducted above,
their stance was lawful. There is no basis to conclude that they acted in fraud of the
law. In fact, the starting point of the in fraudem principle is that a party may lawfully
arrange its affairs so as to remain outside a statutory provision even where that is the
very purpose of the arrangement.48 The MK Party is in a similar position as the EFF,
since the allegations against it rely on their interpretation of the law. No case has
been established against it.
[82] As for bad faith, no factual basis has been laid whatsoever, save for the same
allegations based on the parties’ interpretation of the law. It is trite that a party must
establish the factual basis for its case. None has been established against any of the
four parties. The first declarator sought in paragraph 1.1 of the notice of motion must
accordingly be dismissed.
The remaining declaratory relief
[83] All of the relief sought in these proceedings, save for the conditional
constitutional challenge, hinges on the outcome of the above interpretative analysis.
The outcome supports the approach adopted by the four parties, that based on the
current statutory scheme, they will be entitled to supplement their lists after elections
48 Roshcon (Pty) Ltd v Anchor Auto Body Builders CC and Others at para 14.
35
in terms of item 17 if they comply with its requirements . Further, that this was part
of a design of the statutory scheme; not an accident or due to mala fide opportunism.
[84] In paragraph 1.2 of the notice of motion the DA seeks a declarator that the
lists were submitted in violation of ss 157(2) (a), 19(2) and 19(3) (b) of the
Constitution. As the respondents point out, apart from the conclusory argument that
the rights are violated, there is no basis set out for reliance upon this relief apart from
the interpretive argument, which I have rejected.
[85] I have already indicated, in any event, that the relief sought in paragraph 1.2
transgresses the principle of subsidiarity in that there is no attempt to rely upon any
of the applicable statutory provisions . Instead, the case directly invokes the
constitutional provisions. As traversed earlier, t he legal parameters of th ose
constitutional rights do not avail the DA. The case law indicates that the content of
the constitutional rights is constrained by firstly , the design of PR electoral system
and secondly, the national legislation . As the interpretative analysis indicates, the
impugned lists were submitted in compliance with the legislation. There is
accordingly no basis to conclude that s s 157(2), 19 (2) and 19 (3)(b) of the
Constitution have been violated by the submission of the party lists.
[86] There is also no basis to conclude that the lists were submitted in violation of
sections 1, 13 and 14 of the Municipal Electoral Act49; or item 11 of Schedule 1 or
item 5 of schedule 250. The case on this score is likewise based on the interpretation
of items 17 and 20, which I have rejected. In any event, as the Commission states,
its certification decision exists in fact and has legal consequences until set aside, in
49 Paragraph 1.3 of the notice of motion.
50 Paragraph 1.4 of the notice of motion.
36
line with Oudekraal51. Accordingly, the DA cannot obtain substantive invalidation
of the certified lists without setting aside to the certification decision of the
Commission, to which I now turn.
Review of the Commission’s certification
[87] Given the DA’s ambivalence regarding its persistence with this ground, it is
best to deal with it. In prayer 2.2 of the notice of motion, the DA seeks to review the
Commission’s decision to publish the party lists. It is common ground that, although
the Commission does publish submitted lists, there is no specific provision requiring
publication. The operative decision in terms of s 15(1)(b) is certification of the lists,
which the Commission is required to keep and make available upon request.
[88] The DA’s case in this regard is that the Commission’s decision to certify the
four parties’ lists was based on a material error of law or a material error of fact
because the Commission assumed that the lists were compliant . In making these
allegations, the DA relies once again on its interpretation of the provisions in
question, which I have rejected.
[89] Apart from the generalized reference to an error of law or fact, there is no
legal basis identified or factual grounds upon which the Commission’s decision is
sought to be reviewed. The DA also does not identify whether it invokes the
Promotion o f Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (P AJA) or the principle of
legality, which it was required to do.52 This is contrary to the well-established rules
of pleading, which also apply in constitutional matters, that a party must make out
51 Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v The City of Cape Town and Others (25/08) [2009] ZASCA 85; 2010 (1) SA 333
(SCA) (3 September 2009).
52 Minister of Home Affairs v Public Protector of the Republic of South Africa 2018 (3) SA 380 (SCA).
37
its case in the pleadings so that the respondents may know the case they are required
to meet.53
[90] There is otherwise no basis to conclude that the Commission failed in its
duties in certifying the four parties’ lists, or that it acted in error of the law or fact in
doing so. No such case has been established. Accordingly, the review relief sought
in paragraph 2.2 of the notice of motion must be refused.
[91] Insofar as the DA seeks a declarator that the decision of the Commission t o
publish or certify the lists is unconstitutional, unlawful and invalid in paragraph 2.1
of the notice of motion, I am of the view that that aspect of the case is in essence part
of the relief sought in th e conditional constitutional challenge. I am accordingly of
the view that it should be postponed for determination with th e constitutionality
challenge. But to be clear, I have not found any basis to impugn the decision of the
Commission or to set it aside.
Conditional Constitutional Challenge
[92] In the conditional constitutional challenge, the DA impugns the constitutional
validity of items 11, 17 and 20 of schedule 1 and of the corresponding items of
schedule 2 , insofar as they p lace no limit on the extent of, or reason for,
supplementing party lists after election.
[93] As already presaged, I do not consider it appropriate to deal with that
challenge at this juncture. Not least because the Minister, a party with a direct and
substantial interest in that relief, was not before this Court by the time of the hearing,
53 SATAWU and Another v Garvas and Others 2013 (1) SA 83 (CC) para 114.
38
and has indicated a desire to participate. Further, given that there are two Acts of
Parliament under attack which are said to be invalid and in which a reading -in
remedy is sought, it would also be desirable to join the Speaker and the Chairperson
as parties.
[94] There are other reasons which render it undesirable and inappropriate to deal
with such a substantive challenge with far-reaching consequences at this point. One
is the fact that the matter has been brought and dealt with on an urgent basis, as is
the nature of proceedings in this Court. Usually, challenges of this nature require a
fair amount of time for preparation, consultation, research and explanation for the
parties, especially for the policy and lawmakers and those who have to execute the
policies. The effect of the relief sought under this heading would have a profound
impact on the design of the electoral system for the municipal councils. A matter of
such fundamental significance needs careful handling, not a rushed jolt.
[95] Also relevant is the timing of the application , which I consider to be an
important consideration. The matter has been brought some weeks before voting
day, after the date for nominations had closed and party lists were certified . The
disruption to the elections if such an order were granted at this point is unthinkable.
Given that, according to the Commission, the practice of submitting lists in the
manner that the four parties have done has been conducted since as far back as 2011,
there is no urgency which requires the matter to be dealt with under these
circumstances.
[96] And given that the DA is a political party which is contesting the elections
against the four parties, it cannot be ruled out that ‘changing the rules in the middle
of the game’ may have unfair consequences. This is especially so when all the
opposing parties point to the fact that the DA has itself previously indulged in the
39
same practice that it now complains about, including in the current elections. While
I note the DA’s denials, they illustrate the nature of the problem of relying, as it
does, on subjective elements to determine whether single-name lists are lawful.
[97] It is no wonder that the DA acknowledges, though half -heartedly, that the
conditional constitutional challenge is not appropriate for determination at this stage.
Costs
[98] The opposing political parties seek punitive costs for a variety of reasons,
chief among which is the imputation of bad faith and fraud, which has been found
to be without foundation. The other is the fact that the DA is guilty of the same
conduct that it complains about, and that the proceedings have been brought
frivolously and, in effect, as a political device.
[99] When taking into account the context in which the application is brought,
which is election season, it is un derstandable that the debate amongst the parties is
robust and charged. While the timing of the application may be unfortunate and
appear opportunistic, this does not detract from the importance of the issues raised
in the matter . They include the interpretation of items 17 and 20, which have not
been clarified before, and which are important for our electoral system.
[100] There is accordingly no reason to deviate from the usual rule of this Court to
not award any costs.
Order
[101] In the circumstances, the following order is made:
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1. The following applications are dismissed:
1.1 The application for an order declaring the party lists submitted by the first to
fourth respondents (the four parties) to be –
a. In bad faith and in fraudem legis;
b. In violation of ss 157(2)(a), 19(2) and 19(3)(b) of the Constitution;
c. In violation of ss 1, 13(1) (a), 14(1) of the Local Government: Municipal
Electoral Act 27 of 2000 (the Municipal Electoral Act); and
d. In violation of item 11 of Schedule 1, and item 5 of Schedule 2 of the Local
Government: Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998 (the Structures Act). (paras 1-
1.4, notice of motion)
1.2 The application for review of the decision of the fifth respondent
(Commission), taken on 16 September 2026, to publish the party lists. (para 2.2,
notice of motion)
1.3 The consequential relief sought in paragraphs 3 to 5 of the notice of motion.
2. The following applications are postponed sine die:
2.1 The application to declare the decision of the Commission of 16 September
2026 unconstitutional, unlawful and invalid) (para 2.1, notice of motion);
2.2 The conditional constitutional challenge (paras 6 – 6.5.2, notice of motion)
3. There is no order as to costs.
________________________
MANGCU-LOCKWOOD, J
ACTING JUDGE OF THE ELECTORAL COURT
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Appearances
Counsel for Applicant: A Katz SC
M Bishop
K Perumalsamy
M De Beer
Instructed by: Minde Schapiro & Smith Inc, Bloemfontein
Counsel for First Respondent: M Salukazana
Instructed by: MVMT Attorneys, Sandton
Webbers Attorneys, Bloemfontein
Counsel for Second Respondent: MM Ka-Siboto
F Sangoni
M Zikalala
Instructed by: England Slabbert Attorneys Inc, Cape Town
Lovius Block Inc, Bloemfontein
Counsel for Fourth Respondent: H J De Waal SC
Instructed by: Lionel Murray Schwormstedt & Louw,
Cape Town
Counsel for Fifth Respondent: D Borgstrom SC
M Tsele
Instructed by: Barnard Inc, Bloemfontein
For Sixth Respondent:
Instructed by: The State Attorney, Pretoria