THE LABOUR COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT CAPE TOWN
Case no: C21/2025
In the matter between:
INGA SAMANTHA DYANTI Plaintiff
and
NORTON ROSE FULBRIGHT SOUTH
AFRICA INC
Delivered: 30 October 2026
Defendant
Summary (Special pleas – unfair discrimination dispute not conciliated – court
lacking jurisdiction – referral struck off the roll)
JUDGMENT
LAGRANGE, J
Introduction
(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: Yes
(3) Revised
___ 30 October 2026
Signature Date
2
[1] The plaintiff, Ms I Dyantyi (‘Dyantyi’), is an attorney formerly employed in the
defendant law firm’s commercial property department. She has instituted action
against the firm. She seeks compensation and damages from Norton Rose
Fulbright South Africa Inc (now Deneys) under section 50(2) of the Employment
Equity Act 55 of 1998 (‘the EEA’) . Her claim, as set out in her amended
statement of claim, is founded on alleged unfair discrimination in the form of
racial harassment as contemplated in section 6(3) read with section 10 of the
EEA.
[2] In response to the amended statement of claim, the firm delivered a statement
of response raising two special pleas concerning the jurisdiction of this court.
The primary special plea is that the discrimination dispute was never referred to
conciliation, nor conciliated by the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and
Arbitration, the CCMA, as required by section 10 of the EEA, and that this court
consequently lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate it . The alternative special plea
asserts that if the dispute was conciliated, the referral to this court took place
after the expiry of the statutory ninety-day period prescribed by section 10(7) of
the EEA read with section 136(1)(b) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995, the
LRA, without an application for condonation, thereby depriving the court of
jurisdiction.
[3] The parties agreed to separate the determination of the special pleas from the
main action. The special pleas were argued before me on 29 April 2026.
Chronology of events
[4] The factual background and chronology of events giving rise to the
determination of the special pleas are largely common cause, appearing from
the pleadings and the annexures placed before the court.
[5] Dyantyi, an admitted attorney of approximately five years standing, alleges that
from June 2023 onwards she was subjected to persistent workplace
victimization, bullying, and racial harassment by a director of the firm. Without
victimization, bullying, and racial harassment by a director of the firm. Without
purporting to make any findings on the facts, it would appear from the pleadings
that it was the director’s re- allocation of her duties to work on a pro bono
matter, leading her to complain about his conduct, which sparked off the chain
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of events. The director found her behaviour unacceptable and asked her to
apologise, which she refused to. Thereafter Dyantyi lodged her formal
grievance against the director complaining of his ‘ bullying, intimidation and
abuse of power’. In her view things deteriorated, as she described in an
annexure attached to her CCMA dispute referral. The firm’s alleged failure to
resolve the situation, siding with the director in question and suspending her
made the working relationship intolerable, causing her to resign with effect from
31 July 2024. She claimed that the termination of her service amounted to a
constructive dismissal.
[6] On 13 August 2024, Dyantyi referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration in Cape Town. Under
item 3 of the referral form (Form 7.11), where the referring party is required to
identify the nature of the dispute, Dyantyi marked the box designated for
dismissal and specifically indicated that it concerned a constructive dismissal
under section 191 of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. She did not mark the
box specifically provided for an unfair discrimination dispute under section 10 of
the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. Under item 5, Dyantyi inserted 31 July
2024 as the date on which the dispute arose, which coincided with the effective
date of her resignation.
[7] Under item 11, ‘Discrimination Matter’ the question posed on Form 7.11 states:
‘If it is a discrimination dispute, have you att empted to resolve the dispute?’ An
applicant must say what steps they took to resolve the dispute and, if none, to
provide reasons for not taking such steps . Dyantyi answered affirmatively that
she had taken steps to resolve the dispute and referred to an annexure, which
she had attached to the referral form for the details.
[8] The annexure attached to the referral form was a narrative statement bearing
the heading ‘Constructive dismissal - facts of the dispute’. In it she alleged she
the heading ‘Constructive dismissal - facts of the dispute’. In it she alleged she
had lodged a grievance against the director for ‘bullying, victimisation and
abuse of power’. She emphasised the director’s alleged history of mistreating
young women, particularly those who are black . She claimed the management
of the firm was more concerned about the reputational damage to the firm than
in aiding her. She alleged that the directors and HR department of the firm
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embarked on a ‘ dishonest and shameful campaign’ to discredit her and to
protect the director in question by embarking on a biased investigation which
she appears to allege exonerated the director of any racism. However, she was
denied a copy of the report. She claims that when the firm became aware of her
intention to resign on account of her mistreatment, she was placed on
suspension pending an investigation, which lasted more than a month and was
never concluded. She interpreted this as an attempt to intimidate and silence
her and to sully her reputation.
[9] Dyantyi concluded that she suffered ‘deep pain and distress’ at the hands of the
firm all because she had ‘dared to speak up in the face of racist mistreatment’.
She said that she left the firm because of the abuse she had been subjected to
by the directors and Human Resource department. The firm’s alleged vilification
of her and failure to protect her made her continued employment intolerable.
[10] The conciliation proceedings convened on 11 September 2024 at th e CCMA.
The conciliation failed to resolve the dispute, and the presiding commissioner
issued a certificate of outcome certifying that the dispute betw een the parties
and describing the dispute as constructive dismissal under section 186(1) of the
Labour Relations Act (‘the LRA’) , declared it was unresolved. Although it is
relatively unimportant , the commissioner did not indicate on the certificate
which forum should adjudicate the dispute.
[11] Following the inconclusive conciliation, on 3 October 2024, Dyantyi submitted a
request for arbitration of her constructive dismissal dispute, using Form LRA
7.13.
[12] In addition to her referral of her unfair dismissal dispute to arbitration, o n 3
February 2025, Dyantyi launched trial proceedings in this court under case
number C21/2025. Dyantyi set out the legal basis of her claim in her original
statement of case in the following terms:
‘6. STATEMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES FROM THE FACTS
statement of case in the following terms:
‘6. STATEMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES FROM THE FACTS
6.1 the Applicant’s claim is premised on the provisions of section 6
[3] read with section 10 [6] [a] of the Employment Equity Act 55 of
1998, as amended [’ EEA’]
5
6.2 The relevant provisions of section 6 [3] of the EEA provide as
follows:
“Harassment of an employee is a form of unfair discrimination and is
prohibited on any one, or a combination of grounds of unfair
discrimination listed in subsection [1]”.
6.3. Accordingly, the Applicant alleges unfair discrimination in the form of
harassment related to a listed ground of race against the Respondent.
6.4 The provisions of section 10 [6] [a] of the EEA provide the following:
“The dispute remains unresolved after conciliation -
[a) any party to the dispute may refer it to the Labour Court for
adjudication;
6.5 At the very outset of the legal issues, it must be emphasized and clarified
that the Applicant’s unfair discrimination claim in the main is that she suffered
racial harassment due to the Respondent’s conduct in handling the
Grievance, and the Respondent’s subsequent conduct thereafter, until the
applicant left the Respondent’s employee on 31 July 2024.’
(sic – emphasis added)
[13] She sought compensation comprising a solatium and loss of income amounting
to approximately R 5,7 million.
[14] An exception was raised by Norton Rose that the statement of claim was vague
and embarrassing and lacked averments necessary to sustain a cause of
action. The gist of the complaint was that Dyantyi had not laid a basis for
holding the firm vicariously liable for the alleged harassment. She then
amended her statement of case, in which she pleaded that the firm’s liability
arose by virtue of section 60 of the EEA, which makes provision, under certain
circumstances, for an employer to be held liable for the discriminatory conduct
of an employee.
[15] Incidentally, Dyantyi pleaded at paragraph 5.41 of the amended statement of
claim that the CCMA had not yet scheduled her constructive dismissal dispute
for arbitration due to an institutional backlog, and under those circumstances
she opted to refer this matter to this court for adjudication.
she opted to refer this matter to this court for adjudication.
[16] The firm filed its statement of response incorporating two special pleas in
limine. The first special plea was that this court lacked authority to decide the
discrimination dispute because it had never been referred to conciliation nor
conciliated by the CCMA as required by section 10 of the Employment Equity
6
Act. In the alternative, the second plea was that , even if the discrimination
dispute had been conciliated, it had been referred to this court outside the
statutory 90-day time limit without an accompanying application for
condonation, depriving the court of jurisdiction.
[17] Dyantyi delivered a replication asserting that she had referred both an unfair
constructive dismissal ‘ and a discrim ination matter by completing or marking
section 11 of the referral form.’ She referred also to the statement of facts
annexed to her referral form in which she mentions the grievance she had
lodged against ‘ bullying, victimisation and abuse of power’ by the director in
question and that the firm had failed to protect her, vilified her, alienated her,
tainting her reputation and making her continued employment intolerable. She
pleaded that it was plain from the referral form that she had referred an unfair
discrimination dispute, which unfair discrimination also resulted in her
constructive dismissal.
[18] In relation to the firm’s contention that her referral to this Court was also late,
she argued that the 90-day period in s 191 (11)(a) of the LRA did not apply to a
discrimination claim under the EEA.
[19] At a pretrial conference, the parties agreed that the special pleas would be
separated from the main action and determined in limine.
[20] Further, on 10 April 2026, the parties concluded and signed a joint practice note
regulating the determination of the special pleas. In that joint practice note, the
parties recorded their agreement that neither party would call witnesses, that
the special pleas would be argued solely with reference to what the pleadings
state, and that the documents annexed to the pleadings were admitted being
what they purported to be.
[21] The firm delivered its heads of argument on the special pleas on 16 April 2026.
Dyantyi delivered her heads of argument on 23 April 2026. The special pleas
Dyantyi delivered her heads of argument on 23 April 2026. The special pleas
subsequently served before this court for hearing and determination on 29 April
2026.
[22] Shortly before the hearing, in late April 2026, Dyantyi delivered her application
for condonation in respect of the late referral to this court.
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The evidentiary material relevant to the special pleas
[23] When the special pleas were argued a t the hearing, Dyantyi ’s attorney
suggested that whether the discrimination dispute was conciliated ought
properly to be determined by hearing oral evidence from those who attended
the conciliation pr oceedings. However, on 10 April 2026, the parties had
concluded a formal joint practice note regulating the determination of the
special pleas. Paragraph 2 thereof records that:
‘The parties have agreed that neither party will call witnesses and
that the special pleas will be argued with reference to what the
pleadings say and that the documents annexed to the pleadings are
what they purport to be.’
[24] It is trite law that a pretrial agreement constitutes a binding contract that
circumscribes the issues and c onfines both the parties and the court, as
authoritatively affirmed recently by the Labour Appeal Court in Telkom SA SOC
Ltd v Van Staden and others 1 In Fuel Retailers Association of SA v Motor
Industry Bargaining Council 2, the Labour Court stated the following in relation
to an agreement between parties on the method of determining facts:
‘[15] A pre -trial agreement is binding on the parties (Shoredits
Construction (Pty) Ltd v Pienaar NO and others [1995] 4 BLLR 32
(LAC) and Checkers Shoprite (Pty) Ltd v Busane1 (1996) 17 ILJ
(LAC)). It cannot be retracted unless there are proper, recognised
grounds for doing so. Moreover, where the pre-trial agreement
permits the ascertainment of certain facts in a particular manner,
which it is agreed will form the basis of a court’s judgment, the
findings cannot be attacked, in this case, except on the basis of
fraud. MIBCO does not allege fraud in this matter, merely that the
results of KPMG’s audit are unreliable. I am not permitted to reopen
a factual issue which the parties have resolved.’
(emphasis added)
1 (2021) 42 ILJ 869 (LAC) at paragraphs 16 to 24. See also Filta Matix (Pty) Ltd v Freudenberg and
others 1998 (1) SA 606 (SCA) at 613H-614D.
2 [2001] 6 BLLR 605 (LC).
8
[25] The grounds for resiling from an agreement of this nature are the same
grounds on which a party may resile from any other contract, such as fraud,
misrepresentation, or duress . No application to resile from the agreement
recorded in the joint practice note has been made, nor are contractual vitiating
factors present. The practice note, which was signed by both parties, embodied
a clear agreement setting parameters on what they could rely on in arguing the
special ple as. In the absence of an amendment to that agreement or an
application to resile from it, this court must respect the parameters agreed on.
Merits of the special pleas
[26] In argument, Dyantyi suggested that the firm attracted the burden of proof by
raising the jurisdictional objection. However, as held in Malherbe v Britstown
Municipality3, the overall legal onus of proving a court’s jurisdiction to
adjudicate a matter rests on Dyantyi as dominus litis. The firm’s plea amounts
to a denial of the jurisdictional facts upon which Dyantyi relies. Prior conciliation
is an indispensable statutory jurisdictional fact under section 10 of the EEA, and
the burden of showing compliance rests squarely on Dyantyi.
First Special Plea
[27] Section 10(2) of the EEA allows a party to an unfair discrimination dispute to
refer it in writing to the CCMA, while section 10(5) requires the CCMA to try to
resolve it through conciliation. Only where the dispute is still unresolved
following conciliation does a party acquire the statutory right under section
10(6)(a) to refer it to this court for adjudication. The Constitutional Court in
National Union of Metalworkers of SA v Intervalve (Pty) Ltd 4 held that
conciliation is an indispensable statutory precondition to jurisdiction. Likewise,
the Labour Appeal Court in National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa obo
Members v SAA Technical SOC Ltd 5 similarly reiterated the universal
requirement that all matters must pass through conciliation.
requirement that all matters must pass through conciliation.
3 1949 (1) SA 281 (C) at pages 287 to 288
4 2015) 36 ILJ 363 (CC) at paragraphs 32 and 40
5 [2024] 12 BLLR 1259 (LAC) at paragraph 22
9
[28] In September and others v CMI Business Enterprise CC 6, the Constitutional
Court laid down that the referral form and certificate of outcome constitute
prima facie evidence of the nature of the dispute conciliated, but where the true
dispute is alleged to be different, parties may adduce evidence to establish that
fact. As pointed out above, in this instance, because the parties agreed to
confine the evidence that could be relied on to the pleadings and
documentation, that is the only evidence the court can consider.
[29] An examination of the CCMA referral form, Form LRA 7.11, and the certificate
of outcome dated 11 September 2024 reveals that under item 3, Dyantyi
marked the box for dismissal and identified the category as constructive
dismissal under section 191 of the LRA, omitting to tick the box specifically
provided for unfair discrimination under section 10 of the EEA. Under item 5,
she recorded 31 July 2024, her resignation date, as the date the dispute arose.
Under item 11, she circled affirmatively in response to whether she tried to
resolve the dispute i nternally. She attached a document titled ‘ Constructive
dismissal facts of the dispute’ , in which she concluded (at paragraph 3.2) that
the employer made her continued employment intolerable, leaving her no
choice but to resign. The certificate of outcome issued on 11 September 2024
expressly describes the unresolved dispute as constructive dismissal under
section 186(1) of the LRA.
[30] Dyantyi submits that circling affirmative under item 11 and recounting
allegations of bullying and victimization shows an inte ntion to refer an unfair
discrimination dispute under section 6(3) of the EEA . That contention ignores
section 10(1) of the EEA, which provides that a dispute under section 10
excludes a dispute about an unfair dismissal. The legislature created two
distinct and separate statutory causes of action. In a constructive dismissal
distinct and separate statutory causes of action. In a constructive dismissal
referral, averments of bullying or racial abuse are pleaded to show the factual
foundation that continued employment had become intolerable under section
186(1)(e) of the LRA. They do not transform an unfair dismissal referral into an
independent claim under Chapter II of the EEA.
6 (2018) 39 ILJ 987 (CC) at paragraph 52
10
[31] While the Constitutional Court in September cautioned against formalistic
reliance on administrative forms and held that the crucial inquiry is whether the
true dispute became plain during conciliation, the facts in September were
entirely different . The applicants in that matter, were employed as general
mechanical workers on mining projects across Africa. During their employment,
they were subjected to system ic, egregious racial discrimination, verbal
degradation (including severe racial slurs), physical assaults, and appalling
living conditions while their white colleagues were accommodated in fully
equipped guest houses . They resigned sending a message to the employer
that they could no longer tolerate the abusive and racially discriminatory
conditions.
[32] As unrepresented laypersons unfamiliar with legal terminology such as
‘constructive dismissal ’, the applicants completed CCMA referral form 7.11
themselves, ticking the box for ‘ unfair discrimination section 10 of the
Employment Equity Act ’, requested that the employer ‘stop discriminating us ’,
and left Part B (applicable to dismissal disputes) uncompleted or c ancelled.
There was evidence that the conciliating commissioner extensively canvassed
the issue of whether their dispute was really about a constructive dismissal , but
when he issued the outcome certificate left the description of the dispute as one
of ‘unfair discrimination’ unchanged. They filed a statement of claim in the
Labour Court under sections 187(1)(f) and 191 of the Labour Relations Act 66
of 1995 (LRA), claiming an automatically unfair constructive dismissal . Default
judgment was handed down in their favour and the employer applied to rescind
the judgment on the basis that the automatically unfair dismissal dispute had
not been conciliated. The issue ended up before the LAC which rescinded the
default judgment for that reason. The Constitutional Court upheld their appeal.
default judgment for that reason. The Constitutional Court upheld their appeal.
In doing so, a critical factor in finding that the issue of constructive dismissal
was actively canvassed in the conciliation was the uncontroverted evidence of
the applicants (in their answering affidavit in the rescission application) to this
effect, which the employer did not dispute in its replying affidavit. Accordingly,
11
the applicant’s version of what was conciliated had to be accepted by the
court7.
[33] On 13 September 2011, the applicants resigned by sending a text message to
Mr Cronje, saying that they could no longer tolerate the abusive and racially
discriminatory working conditions.
[34] As unrepresented laypersons unfamiliar with legal terminology such as
‘constructive dismissal’, the applicants completed CCMA referral form 7.11 on
19 September 2011. They ticked the box for ‘ unfair discrimination section 10 of
the Employment Equity Act ’, asked that the employer ‘ stop discriminating us ’,
and left Part B (applicable to dismissal disputes) uncompleted/cancelled.
[35] In this instance, no evidence whatsoever was placed before this court to
establish that a standalone unfair discrimination dispute under the EEA was
ever raised, discussed, or conciliated at the CCMA , quite apart from the prima
facie evidence of the dispute described in the referral form and certificate of
outcome remains . Moreover, the legal ability of a qualified attorney of five
years’ experience cannot be equated with the legal competency of the
applicants in September’s case. Even if Dyantyi was not a labour law specialist,
identifying the appropriate statutory claim and pleading the correct cause of
action, ought not to have been beyond her abilities to research.
[36] This matter has parallels with the case of Tlou v University of Zululand 8. In
Tlou, an employee referred an unfair discrimination dispute under section 10 of
the EEA, but she later referred an automatically unfair dismissal claim under
the LRA to this court . Following September, this court held, absent evidence
showing that the dismissal dispute was conciliated, that this court lacked
jurisdiction, viz:
‘[22] Section 10(1) of the EEA provides that a dispute in terms of s 10
excludes a dispute about an unfair dismissal, which must be referred to the
appropriate body for conciliation and arbitration or adjudication in terms of
appropriate body for conciliation and arbitration or adjudication in terms of
chapter VIII of the LRA.
7 September at paragraph 77.
8 (2018) 39 ILJ 1841 (LC)
12
[23] The dispute the applicant referred in terms of s 10 of the EEA
does not constitute an unfair dismissal dispute. This is so not only
because it is specifically excluded in the EEA, but also because the
disputes are materially different and provided for in separ ate
legislation. An automatically unfair dismissal dispute is not merely a
different label for the dispute the applicant referred for conciliation.
[24] The applicant did not refer any unfair dismissal dispute for
conciliation.
[25] In view of September it is not only the referral form and
certificate of outcome that are to be considered. I have to consider
whether, at the conciliation, an automatically unfair dismissal dispute
was identified as a dispute between the parties and whether it was
conciliated.
[26] The applicant made no attempt to place any evidence before
this court to show that her automatically unfair dismissal dispute in
terms of s 187(1)(e) of the LRA was conciliated. The respondent’s
version is that the applicant’s claim for automatically unfair dismissal
was not canvassed at all during the conciliation proceedings.
[27] The respondent’s version is supported by another fact, namely
that the applicant’s case is that she was dismissed on 10 March
2017 and that is also the date on the referral form she indicated as
the date the dispute arose. The applicant referred her dispute to the
CCMA on 26 May 2017, well within the six -month period provided for
in s 10(2) of the EEA, but outside the 30-day period required by s
191(1) of the LRA.
[28] On the certificate of outcome issued on 26 June 2017, the
presiding commissioner indicated that condonation was not
applicable. This is indicative of the fact that an unfair dismissal
dispute was not canvassed at conciliation, as such dispute was
referred late and condonation had to be applied for and be granted,
before a certificate of outcome could have been issued. Had it been
discussed, the commissioner would have and should have drawn the
discussed, the commissioner would have and should have drawn the
applicant’s attention to the fact that an application for condonation
was required.
[29] The applicant did not apply for condonation for the late filing of
her unfair dismissal dispute and absent an application for
condonation and same being granted, the CCMA would not have
been in a position to issue a certificate of outcome in respect of such
dispute.
[30] In argument before court Mr Molea, for the applicant, conceded
that the applicant’s claim in terms of s 187(1)(e) of the LRA was not
conciliated.
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[31] On the facts before me, I am not satisfied that the applicant’s
unfair dismissal dispute was conciliated at all hence this court lacks
jurisdiction to adjudicate the applicant’s automatically unfair
dismissal dispute.’
[37] Comparatively, in this matter the dispute Dyantyi referred to conciliation was an
unfair constructive dismissal case under section 186 of the LRA. The case she
referred to court subsequently was an unfair discrimination claim concerning
alleged unfair discrimination up to the time of her resignation. In the CCMA
referral she identified the date of her termination as the date the dispute arose.
In her statement of case, she set out a litany of alleged acts of unfair
discrimination beginning in June 2023 more than a year before the date of her
termination on 31 July 2024.
[38] Dyantyi herself conceded in her amended s tatement of claim that she only
opted to approach this court because of the delay in enrolling her constructive
dismissal dispute by the CCMA. This supports an inference that the unfair
discrimination claim referred to court was an attempt to pursue a different
course of litigation, rather than reflecting a dispute she had always intended to
pursue as a separate claim once the conciliation had failed to settle it.
[39] The firm’s counsel, Mr G Leslie SC, made the point that the institution of an
unfair discrimination claim under the EEA, with a potentially uncapped claim for
compensation, presents an employer participating in conciliation with vastly
different legal and financial considerations from a claim for compensation for an
unfair dismissal which is limited to twelve months’ remuneration. Conciliation
cannot achieve its statutory purpose if an employer is deprived of the
opportunity to conciliate the actual claim later instituted in court.
[40] On the evidence which the parties agreed could be considered in determining
the special pleas, the unavoidable conclusion is that the unfair discrimination
the special pleas, the unavoidable conclusion is that the unfair discrimination
dispute referred to this court had not been contemplated as a distinct dispute
referred simultaneously for conciliation together with the unfair constructive
dismissal claim. Accordingly, it was not subject to a conciliation process, and
the Labour Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain it , so the first special plea must
be upheld.
14
[41] The firm had raised the second special plea relating to the failure to apply for
condonation for the late referral, strictly in the alternative. It falls away in light of
the special plea being upheld. In any event, if the first plea had not been
upheld, in view of a belated condonation application being filed, that would
have ceased to be an issue as it would be replaced by the need to decide the
condonation application.
[42] The firm sought costs including the employment of two counsel . Although the
referral was jurisdictionally defective, there is a genuine dispute between the
parties about whether unfair discrimination based on race occurred. It is
appropriate, considering principles of law and fairness , that each party bear
their own costs.
Order:
1. The firm first special plea in limine is upheld.
2. The referral is struck off the roll for lack of jurisdiction.
3. There is no order as to costs
_______________________
R Lagrange
Judge of the Labour Court of South Africa
Appearances:
For the Applicant: --- Mr T Buthelezi of TS Buthelezi Inc
For the Respondent: --- Mr G Leslie SC, assisted by Mr S Khoza
Instructed by: --- Deneys