Strydom v Van Der Merwe (660/2025) [2026] ZANCHC 93 (30 October 2026)

60 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Contempt of Court — Urgent application — Respondent found in contempt of court for violating an interim interdict prohibiting defamatory statements — Applicant required to prove existence of order and non-compliance — Respondent admitted knowledge of the order but failed to provide credible explanation for non-compliance — Court held that respondent's actions constituted wilful contempt, imposing a suspended term of imprisonment to ensure future compliance.

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Strydom v Van Der Merwe (660/2025) [2026] ZANCHC 93 (30 October 2026)
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THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTHERN CAPE
DIVISION, KIMBERLEY)
Reportable
/Not
Reportable
Case no: 660/2025
In the matter between:
PIETER
HENDRIK
STRYDOM
Applicant
and
CAREL
ARON VAN DER
MERWE
Respondent
In
re:
JOHANNES
ZACHARIUS HUMAN
MÜLLER
1
st
Applicant
DEON
MARIUS
BOTHA
2
nd
Applicant
PIETER
HENDRIK STRYDOM
3
rd
Applicant/Intervening Party
and
CAREL
ARON VAN DER
MERWE
1
st
Respondent
SHANIE
VAN DER
MERWE
2
nd
Respondent
ERIC
TORR
3
rd
Respondent
SKY
TAILOR
4
th
Respondent
PROVINCIAL
COMMISSIONER (NORTHERN
CAPE)
SOUTH AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
N.O.
5
th
Respondent
PROVINCIAL
COMMISSIONER (GAUTENG)
SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
N.O.
6
th
Respondent
THE STATION COMMANDER,
SOUTH AFRICAN
POLICE
SERVICE, FRASERBURG
N.O.
7
th
Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Strydom
v Van der Merwe; In re: Müller and Others v Van der Merwe and
Others
(660/2025) 30 October 2026.
Coram:
Mamosebo J.
Heard:
16/10/2026.
Delivered:
30/10/2026.
Summary:
Urgent application
–
Contempt of court
–
Application
for condonation of late filing of answering and replying affidavits
–
Existing interim interdict prohibiting the
publication of false, defamatory or reputation-damaging statements
remained extant and
binding pending the determination of Part B of
the main application and the counterapplication
–
Principles governing civil contempt restated
–
Applicant required to prove beyond reasonable
doubt the existence of the order, service or notice thereof, and
non-compliance with
its terms
–
Upon
proof of those requisites, evidentiary burden shifted to the
respondent to establish that the non-compliance was not wilful
and
mala fide
–
Respondent admitted
knowledge of the order and its contents
–
Publications
and re-postings made after the granting of the order constituted
conduct falling within the ambit of the prohibitions
contained in the
order
–
Respondent failed to advance
a credible explanation demonstrating that his non-compliance was not
deliberate and in bad faith
–
Wilfulness
and mala fides established
–
The
court’s authority and the rule of law require compliance with
extant court orders
–
Respondent
accordingly held to be in contempt of court
–
Suspended
term of imprisonment imposed to secure future compliance and
vindicate the authority of the court.
ORDER
1.
The application is urgent, and the ordinary
forms and service provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court are
dispensed with.
2.
Condonation for the late filing of the
respondent’s answering affidavit in the contempt application is
granted.
3.
The respondent is declared to be in
contempt of paragraphs 5.1 and 5.4 of the order granted by Roach AJ
on 04 April 2025 under Case
Number 660/2025.
4.
The respondent is committed to prison for a
period of ninety (90) days, such imprisonment is wholly suspended for
a period of one
(1) year or the final determination of Part B of the
main application or the counterapplication, whichever is the earlier,
on the
following conditions:
(a)   
That the respondent complies with paragraphs 5.1 and 5.4 of the
interim order of Roach AJ granted on 04 April
2025 pending the
finalisation of Part B of the application and the counterapplication;
(b)   That the
respondent removes all posts and publications concerning the
applicant which contravene paragraphs 5.1
and 5.4 of the order of
Roach AJ, including on Facebook, more particularly, on the ‘Genoeg
is Genoeg’ Facebook page,
pending the finalisation of Part B of
the main application referred to in (a) above; and
(c)   
That the respondent refrains from publishing any statements
prohibited by paragraph 5.1 of the order granted
by Roach AJ on 04
April 2025 including Facebook regarding the applicant pending the
finalisation of Part B of the main application
and the
counterapplication referred to in (a) above.
5.
Should the respondent fail to comply with
the conditions in (a), (b), and (c) above, the applicant is
authorised to apply on the
same papers, duly supplemented, if
necessary, for an order for the enforcement of the suspended order in
4 above or any appropriate
order.
6.
The respondent is ordered, within 48 hours
of service of this judgment and order upon him, to post an unredacted
copy thereof on
the ‘Genoeg is Genoeg’ Facebook page.
Such post shall remain visible on that page for a continuous period
of ninety
(90) days.
7.
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs
of this application on scale C.
JUDGMENT
Mamosebo J
Introduction
[1]
This is a contempt of court application
brought on an urgent basis in which the applicant seeks a declarator
finding the respondent
to be in wilful contempt of Roach AJ’s
order granted on 04 April 2025, particularly paragraphs 5.1 and 5.4
of the order.
The applicant asked this Court to condone his
non-compliance with the prescribed time limits, forms, and service,
and to hear the
application as urgent in terms of Rule 6(12) of the
Uniform Rules of Court. That the respondent be committed to direct
imprisonment
for a period of 18 (eighteen) months, alternatively,
such sentence that this Court may deem fit. The applicant contended
that he
would not be afforded substantial redress in the ordinary
course. The application is opposed.
[2]
Roach AJ’s order, in relevant part,
is to this effect:
“
5. 
Pending the final outcome of the application for the relief sought by
the applicants in Part B and the first respondent’s

counterapplication:
5.1. The first, second,
third and fourth respondents are interdicted and restrained from
making, posting or publishing any false
or defamatory statements or
comments, or any statements or comments which cause or which are
designed to cause harm to the reputation
of the applicants or the
business entities in which the first and second applicants are
engaged namely Tshwane Trust Co. (Pty)
Ltd and Corporate Liquidators
(Pty) Ltd (“the Corporate Entities”):
5.1.1  on any social
media platform including the Facebook Page; and
5.1.2  on any other
media platform including print media, radio, television, YouTube or
any other streaming platform.
5.2  The first,
second, third and fourth respondents are ordered to remove or ensure
the removal of the statements, posts and
comments which are annexure
NOM1.1
to
NOM 1.4
to the notice of motion delivered by
the first and second applicants and annexures
SA16.1, SA17.1,
SA18.1, SA19.1, SA20.1, SA21.1, SA22, SA23, SA24, SA25, SA26
and
SA27
to the supplementary affidavit filed by the first
and second applicants (“the Impugned Statements”) from
the Facebook
Page within 24 hours of service on them of an order
granted by this Court, which service is authorised to take place in
terms of
paragraph 3 above.
5.3  The first,
second, third and fourth respondents [are] ordered to remove or
ensure the removal of the statements, posts
and comments which are
annexures
PHS1
to
PHS8
(“the Further Impugned
Statements”) to the notice of motion filed by the third
applicant from the Facebook Page within
24 hours of service on them
of an order granted by this Court, which service is authorised to
take place in terms of paragraph
above.
5.4  That the first,
second, third and fourth respondents are directed to deliver
affidavits to the first and second applicants’
attorney of
record and the third applicants’ attorney of record within 7
days of service of this order in terms of paragraph
4 above, in which
they confirm that they have complied fully with the provisions of
paragraphs 5.2 and 5.3 above and removed or
ensured the removal of
the Impugned Statements, and the Further Impugned Statements from the
Facebook Page.
5.5  The applicants
are granted leave to make application to the urgent motion court, on
the same papers duly supplemented,
for an order declaring the first,
second, third, and the fourth respondents to be in contempt of court
and imposing such sanctions
in respect of such persons found to be in
contempt of Court (including incarceration for as long as the
contempt is not purged)
as the Court may deem appropriate.”
Roach AJ’s order
remains extant and enforceable pending the outcome of Part B of the
main application and the respondent’s
counterapplication.
The parties
[3]
The only parties in this contempt of court
application are the applicant, admitted in the previous hearing as
the intervening party,
Mr Pieter Hendrik Strydom (hereinafter
referred to as the applicant), and the respondent, Mr Carel Aron Van
der Merwe, hereinafter
referred to as the respondent. The other
parties did not participate in this application.
[4]
The issue before this Court is not to
determine finally whether the publications are actionable as
defamation. The issue is whether
the publications, objectively
construed, fall within the category of statements interdicted by
paragraph 5.1 of the order and whether
the respondent knowingly
persisted in publishing such material notwithstanding the restraint
imposed upon him.
[5]
The respondent brought an application for
leave to appeal Roach AJ’s order, which was unsuccessful.
He subsequently contended
that the applicant should not have referred
to the leave to appeal judgment and order, nor attached it to the
papers, as that was
done to create an atmosphere. The submission is
without merit, as it is normal for a party to refer to steps taken
after judgment
was granted or refused. These safeguards exist for a
reason.
Condonation
[6]
According to the Notice of Motion dated 15
September 2026, the respondent had until 18 September 2026 to file
his notice of intention
to oppose the application and until 02
October 2026 to file his answering affidavit, and the applicant had
until 12 October 2026
to file his replying affidavit. Despite having
prepared a condonation application for the late filling of the
answering affidavit,
Mr D Olivier, for the respondent, intimated that
because of the agreement between the parties, he would not seek
condonation on
behalf of his client. Only after Ms Schoeman, for the
applicant, denied the agreement and clarified that the applicant
would abide
by the Court’s decision, was a substantive
application made.
[7]
It
is settled that condonation is not there for the taking. The
Constitutional Court has held that the standard for considering
an
application for condonation is the interests of justice.
[1]
The respondent explained that he lives in Sutherland and his access
to electronic communication facilities was restricted. The
delay was
not extensive, and neither party raised nor suffered prejudice. The
applicant’s replying affidavit was also filed
a day out of
time, but the respondent took no issue thereto. I therefore find that
it is in the interests of justice to grant condonation
for the late
filing of the answering affidavit.
Urgency
[8]
Ms
Schoeman, relying on
Bogartman
[2]
,
argued that contempt of court inherently involves an element of
urgency. Counsel further submitted that the nature of the
application,
with the repeated infringements which tarnish the
reputation of the applicant, undermines the authority of the Court
and the rule
of law, necessitating that the matter be heard on
urgency. The applicant maintained that he is not on social media and
only became
aware of the publications when alerted by friends, family
and colleagues. Mr Olivier contended that the application is not
urgent
and that the papers have not made any reference to paragraph
5.5 of Roach AJ’s order. Counsel argued that the applicant has

failed to explain why it took him two weeks to bring the application.
Counsel further argued that since the applicant had stated
that the
harm was already done and cannot be purged, there is no reason why he
cannot be afforded substantial redress in future.
Ms Schoeman argued
that, with the respondent being an unrehabilitated insolvent, a claim
for damages in the ordinary course would
ring hollow as compensation
for the reputational harm and loss of income that the applicant would
have suffered. Therefore, the
applicant would not be able to obtain
substantial redress in due course, so argued Counsel.
[9]
Cameron
JA, writing for the majority in
Fakie
NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[3]
insightfully remarked:
“
It
is a crime unlawfully and intentionally to disobey a court order.
This type of contempt of court is part of a broader offence,
which
can take many forms, but the essence of which lies in violating the
dignity, repute or authority of the court.  The
offence has, in
general terms, received a constitutional ‘stamp of approval’,
since the rule of law - a founding value
of the Constitution -
‘requires that the dignity and authority of the courts, as well
as their capacity to carry out their
functions, should always be
maintained’.”
[10]
Roach AJ expressly granted the applicants
leave in paragraph 5.5 of the order to approach the urgent motion
court for appropriate
relief in the event of non-compliance. The
respondent’s contention that the applicant failed to rely
expressly on paragraph
5.5 is therefore misplaced. More
fundamentally, the order remains extant, valid and binding unless and
until it is set aside by
a competent court. The respondent’s
submission that the matter lacks urgency because the alleged harm has
already occurred
cannot be sustained. The complaint is not confined
to past conduct. The applicant alleges ongoing and repeated
publications made
after the order was granted, which publications are
said to constitute continuing non-compliance therewith. Continued
publication
of material allegedly falling within the prohibitions
contained in the order gives rise not only to a continuing
infringement of
rights for which the applicant seeks protection, but
also to concerns regarding obedience to a subsisting court order. In
contempt
proceedings, the interests sought to be protected extend
beyond those of the litigants and include the preservation of the
authority
of the courts and the rule of law. In these circumstances,
I am satisfied that the applicant has established sufficient grounds

for the matter to be entertained as one of urgency.
Salient facts
[11]
In
the main application, the first and second applicants, Messrs
Johannes Zacharias Human Muller and Deon Marius Botha, who are
not
participants in this contempt of court application, approached the
Court on an urgent basis, seeking interim relief restraining
the
first respondent
[4]
therein from
posting or publishing any false or defamatory statements or comments,
or statements or comments which are designed
to cause harm to the
reputation of the applicants, or to the business entities in which
the applicants are engaged. The first and
second applicants are
liquidators and trustees of various insolvent estates. The applicant,
Mr Hendrik Strydom, applied for and
was granted leave to intervene as
the third applicant by Roach AJ. The applicant is an insolvency
attorney. He argued that although
the respondent removed some of the
posts attached to the notice of motion in the main application, he
did not remove all of them.
Further that the respondent continued to
post and repost defamatory statements or comments even after being
warned not to. The
applicant averred in his founding affidavit that
the publication of the posts and comments does not only harm his name
but also
his firm, Strydom & Bredenkamp Inc.
Requirements for civil
contempt
[12]
The
requirements for civil contempt are settled in our law.
[5]
For the applicant to succeed in his contempt application, he must
show the following beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the existence
of
a court order; (b) service or notice thereof; (c) non-compliance
with the terms of the order; and once the applicant
has shown (a),
(b) and (c), the evidentiary burden shifts to the respondent to show
that (d) the non-compliance was not wilful
and mala fide. The
respondent admits at paragraph 22 of his answering affidavit that he
was present in court when the order was
made; he does not dispute its
existence and is aware of its contents. It therefore follows that
requisites (a) and (b) are common
cause and need not be proven. The
remaining requirement that the applicant must establish is (c).
[13]
The applicant argued that paragraph 5.1 of
the interim order interdicted and restrained the respondent from
making, posting, or
publishing any false or defamatory statements or
comments designed to cause harm to his reputation. Notwithstanding
that he is
admitted as an applicant and intervening party in his
personal capacity, the defamatory statements and comments made affect
his
firm, Strydom & Bredenkamp, of which he is a director. While
the respondent conceded that paragraph 5.1 of the order is applicable

to the applicant, he denies that it extends to his firm. I raised
this with the respondent’s counsel and invited argument
on the
fact that the applicant is a legal practitioner and that any
negative, adverse, or defamatory statements or utterances about
his
firm would undoubtedly also affect his personal reputation. It was
contended that the applicant was not referred to by name
and his firm
is not a party in this litigation. Accepting this submission would
elevate form above substance.
[14]
The applicant relies on posts published
between 8 and 31 August 2026. These are some of the statements made
to substantiate the
averment of non-compliance with the order. On 29
August 2026, the respondent published the following on
Genoeg
is Genoeg
:
“
Landbank
het geen reg om voort te gaan om boere, hul gesinne en werkers te bly
teister nie. Landbank en hul sindikaat het hul plig
versaak om
wetende dat hul verkeerd is, so baie skade aan boere te verrig.”
The respondent refers to
the applicant as “Landbank and its syndicate”. Whereas
the respondent argued that no mention
is made of the applicant, and
Landbank is also not a party in this application, Ms Schoeman
referred to the interview that the
respondent had with Mr Izak Du
Plessis on a Podcast on 03 August 2026, marked PHS20, where the
respondent stated:
“
Rondom
2021, Juniemaand . . . Mei/ Juniemaand, kry ons ‘n skrywe van
Landbank af, en hulle prokureurs wat vir hulle daai tyd
opgetree het,
en nou nog optree was Strydom… en is Strydom & Bredenkamp,
en hulle doen ‘n Artikel 345 aanmaning
op ons, wat beteken dat
jy kan nie jou skuld aan Landbank betaal nie. Met ander woorde, met
R240 miljoen bates kan ons nie R7.2
miljoen skuld aan Landbank betaal
nie, en hulle gaan ons likwideer omdat ons nie die skuld kan betaal
nie.”
[15]
The respondent’s contention that
references to the applicant’s firm fall outside the ambit of
the interim order because
the firm is not cited as a party to these
proceedings is unpersuasive. It is unnecessary to determine whether
Strydom & Bredenkamp
enjoys protection under paragraph 5.1
independently of the applicant. The relevant enquiry is whether the
publications would reasonably
be understood, directly or indirectly,
as referring to the applicant and affecting his reputation. The
evidence, including the
podcast interview relied upon by the
applicant, establishes a clear association between the applicant and
the firm of which he
is a director. In those circumstances,
publications concerning the firm are capable of simultaneously
identifying and affecting
the applicant. While the applicant
instituted these proceedings in his personal capacity, that does not
preclude the Court from
considering the context in which the impugned
statements were made and the manner in which an ordinary reader would
understand
them. The respondent further argued that the applicant
impermissibly sought to expand his case in reply by emphasising his
association
with Strydom & Bredenkamp Inc. I do not agree. The
applicant’s professional connection to the firm formed part of
the
factual matrix from the outset and does not constitute a new
cause of action. The submissions made in reply merely elaborated upon

existing allegations and did not alter the essential basis upon which
the contempt application was brought.
[16]
The
applicant also relied on an unreported judgment of Sher J
[6]
which dealt with allegations similar in character to those raised by
the respondent.
[17]
The respondent maintained that annexures
PHS7 (the final protection order granted by the magistrate in favour
of the applicant)
and PHS8 (the judgment of Sher J) are irrelevant
because they do not establish a breach of paragraph 5.1 of the order.
There is
merit in the proposition that neither document is proof of
contempt in these proceedings. They are therefore not relied upon for

that purpose. At most, they provide contextual background to the
dispute between the parties and demonstrate that the allegations

concerning the applicant have previously been the subject of judicial
consideration. The determination of whether the respondent
is in
contempt depends exclusively on the evidence before this Court
regarding compliance or non-compliance with the order granted
by
Roach AJ.
[18]
The objective import of the publications,
read in context and against the backdrop of the restraint order,
demonstrates that they
were reasonably capable of causing
reputational harm. It is unnecessary to decide whether the respondent
was formally the administrator
of the Facebook page. On his own
version, he was a regular contributor who posted and reposted content
on the platform. The evidence
demonstrates that the impugned
publications relied upon by the applicant were either authored by the
respondent, reposted by him,
or disseminated with his approval. The
respondent cannot avoid responsibility on the basis that another
person held administrative
privileges.
[19]
The
respondent’s continued posting and reposting after the Roach AJ
order amounts to non-compliance with same. More importantly,
whilst
the respondent claims to be teaching the followers of the Facebook
page, he does not redirect them from untruths being published,
nor
does he publish verified true facts himself. Rather than distancing
himself from the impugned publications, the respondent
amplified and
perpetuated their dissemination. The admonishments by the Supreme
Court of Appeal to Mr Nicholas Harman in
Francois
Jurie Nicolaas Harman v Pieter Hendrik Strydom
[7]
apply with equal force in this instance.
Was the respondent
wilful and mala fide
[20]
The onus to prove the first three
requirements lies with the applicant. Differently put, once the
applicant has succeeded in proving
the existence of the order, that
the contemnor was aware of the order and the non-compliance by the
contemnor with the order, the
evidentiary burden shifts to the
contemnor to prove that he was not wilful or mala fide.
[21]
Ms Schoeman demonstrated, by highlighting the
statements or comments, that the allegation of non-compliance with
the said interim
order arose after the respondent’s application
for leave to appeal the interim order by Roach AJ was refused and
after service
of this application. The respondent lodged complaints
against the applicant with the Legal Practice Council (LPC) and the
South
African Restructuring and Insolvency Practitioners Association
(SARIPA). In the letter dated 10 June 2026 by the LPC to the
respondent,
no prima facie misconduct was found on the part of the
applicant or his firm. The respondent’s complaint against the
applicant
at SARIPA was also removed from its register because the
respondent did not revert to SARIPA. Both institutions investigated
the
respondent’s complaints, and the outcome was the
applicant’s exoneration.
[22]
The respondent admitted at PHS13 that he
referred to Landbank and its syndicate, but contended that Landbank
has many attorneys
and that he refers to “
regslui
”
or “lawyers” as a class. However, as referred to earlier,
in the Podcast interview, the respondent specifically
mentioned the
applicant and his firm as the Landbank attorney. His present attempt
to distance himself from that reference is inconsistent
with his
earlier statements. The applicant cannot be faulted for understanding
that the respondent was referring specifically to
him and his firm
when he referred to “
Landbank se
regslui
”.
[23]
This is what the respondent said in the
Podcast interview:
“
En
omdat hierdie likwidateure en die prokereur van Strydom &
Bredenkamp kop in een mus met Landbank is, reg van die begin af
in
hierdie hele skema, sit ons met ‘n situasie waar boere
gelikwideer word en die likwidateure nie hulle plig nakom om dan
nou
te bevind, ‘n onafhanklike bevining te doen of hule wel ‘n
vorderingsreg het en die wet nakom nie.”
[8]
To publish allegations
that the applicant and his firm are acting in concert with the
Landbank in a scheme against farmers supports
the inference that the
respondent knowingly persisted in conduct falling within the
prohibitions contained in paragraph 5.1 of
the order.
[24]
Brand
AJ, writing for the majority in
Le
Roux and Others v Dey (Freedom of Expression Institute and
Restorative Justice Centre as Amici Curiae)
[9]
explained:
“‘
Publication’
means the communication or making known to at least one person other
than the plaintiff. It may take many forms.
Apart from the obvious
forms of speech or print, the injurious information can also be
published through photographs, sketches,
cartoons or caricatures.”
The
Court further said:
[10]
“
Where
the plaintiff is content to rely on the proposition that the
published statement is defamatory per se, a two-stage enquiry
is
brought to bear. The first is to establish the ordinary meaning of
the statement. The second is whether that meaning is defamatory.
In
establishing the ordinary meaning, the court is not concerned with
the meaning which the maker of the statement intended to
convey. Nor
is it concerned with the meaning given to it by the persons to whom
it was published, whether or not they believed
it to be true, or
whether or not they then thought less of the plaintiff. The test to
be applied is an objective one. In accordance
with this objective
test the criterion is what meaning the reasonable reader of ordinary
intelligence would attribute to the statement.
In applying this test
it is accepted that the reasonable reader would understand the
statement in its context and that he or she
would have had regard not
only to what is expressly stated but also to what is implied.”
[25]
I am satisfied that the respondent included
the applicant when referring to the alleged “Landbank
syndicate” in PHS13.
That conclusion is supported by the
contents of the podcast interview recorded in PHS20, in which the
applicant and his firm were
expressly identified as attorneys acting
for the Landbank. The respondent’s subsequent attempt to
distance himself from that
association is inconsistent with his own
prior statements. Viewed objectively and in context, the references
to a “syndicate”,
parties acting “in cahoots”,
and participation in a “scheme” would reasonably be
understood by an ordinary
reader as imputing improper conduct on the
part of those concerned. Such statements are capable of causing
reputational harm and
fall within the category of publications
prohibited by paragraph 5.1 of the order. The respondent’s
reliance on the argument
that neither Landbank nor the applicant’s
firm is specifically named in the order does not answer the substance
of the complaint,
namely whether the statements would reasonably be
understood as referring to the applicant and thereby contravening the
restraint
imposed by the order.
[26]
The evidence establishes that,
notwithstanding the restraint imposed by Roach AJ, the respondent
continued to publish and republish
material concerning the applicant
which falls within the prohibitions contained in paragraph 5.1 of the
order. The respondent did
so despite having knowledge of the order
and despite unsuccessful attempts to challenge it. Such conduct
constitutes non-compliance
with the order and undermines the
authority of the Court.
[27]
The respondent’s reliance on the fact
that he was not the formal administrator of the Facebook page does
not avail him. As
stated earlier, it is unnecessary to determine who
exercised administrative control over the page. On the respondent’s
own
version, he was a regular contributor who posted and reposted
content on the platform. The evidence demonstrates that the
publications
relied upon by the applicant were authored, disseminated
or republished by the respondent himself. Responsibility for
compliance
with the order therefore cannot be avoided by attributing
administrative functions to another individual. For similar reasons,
I reject the submission that the applicant’s decision to
litigate in his personal capacity excludes from consideration
publications
that would reasonably be understood as referring to him
through his association with his firm. The proper enquiry remains
whether
the publications, objectively construed and viewed in
context, affected or were intended to affect the reputation of the
applicant
in a manner prohibited by the order.
[28]
For the respondent to claim that he is
teaching those who follow the Facebook page without ensuring the
truthfulness of what is
being taught is wilful and malicious. In
respect of PHS17, under the heading: “
DA
KRY GROENLIG
– Ondersoeke op
Landbank se prokureur en likwidateure kom!!!”, the respondent
claims that he was not the author of
the article by Maroela Media,
but he reposted it on the
Genoeg is
Genoeg
Facebook page on 12 August 2026
for the sake of interest. He contends that because the article does
not refer to the applicant by
name, it does not show his contempt for
paragraph 5.1 of the interim order.
[29]
We are concerned with the ordinary meaning
of the respondent’s statements and what a reasonable reader or
person of ordinary
intelligence would understand them to mean in
context, and that he or she would regard both what is expressly
stated and what is
implied. A publication is defamatory if it has the
“tendency” or is calculated to undermine the status, good
name or
reputation of the applicant. This Court was informed that the
respondent has removed some of the postings before the contempt
application
was heard. The postings which identify the applicant and
his firm as representing the Landbank, are inflammatory to the
farming
community, and if they are not managed, they can get out of
hand.
[30]
The respondent’s explanation does not
create a reasonable doubt regarding wilfulness and mala fides. On the
contrary, the
objective facts establish that he was fully aware of
the order, understood its operative provisions, and nevertheless
persisted
in publishing and republishing material falling within the
scope of the prohibition. His defence rests largely on technical
distinctions
between the applicant and his firm and on attempts to
distance himself from the Facebook page, despite his admitted
participation
and contribution thereto. Those explanations are
unpersuasive and do not rebut the inference/ presumption of
deliberate non-compliance.
[31]
Court orders are not advisory. Until set
aside by a competent court, they remain binding on those to whom they
are addressed. The
rule of law would be gravely undermined were
litigants permitted to decide for themselves which orders they will
obey and which
they will ignore. The applicant has proved beyond
reasonable doubt the existence of the order, the respondent’s
knowledge
thereof, and non-compliance with its terms. The respondent
has failed to place evidence before the Court sufficient to establish

that such non-compliance was not wilful and mala fide. A finding of
contempt is therefore unavoidable.
[32]
As to sanction, the Court must mark its
disapproval of the conduct while remaining mindful that committal for
contempt constitutes
a serious intrusion upon personal liberty. In
all the circumstances, a substantial suspended sentence will
adequately vindicate
the authority of the Court, secure future
compliance and afford the respondent an opportunity to purge his
contempt. Direct incarceration
would, at this stage, be
disproportionate.
[33]
In the result, the following order is made:
1.
The application is urgent, and the ordinary
forms and service provided for in the Uniform Rules of Court are
dispensed with.
2.
Condonation for the late filing of the
respondent’s answering affidavit in the contempt application is
granted.
3.
The respondent is declared to be in
contempt of paragraphs 5.1 and 5.4 of the order granted by Roach AJ
on 04 April 2025 under Case
Number 660/2025.
4.
The respondent is committed to prison for a
period of ninety (90) days, such imprisonment is wholly suspended for
a period of one (1)
year or the final determination of Part B of
the main application or the counterapplication, whichever is the
earlier, on the following
conditions:
(a)   
That the respondent complies with paragraphs 5.1 and 5.4 of the
interim order of Roach AJ granted on 04 April
2025 pending the
finalisation of Part B of the application and the counterapplication;
(b)   That the
respondent removes all posts and publications concerning the
applicant which contravene paragraphs 5.1
and 5.4 of the order of
Roach AJ, including on Facebook, more particularly, on the ‘Genoeg
is Genoeg’ Facebook page,
pending the finalisation of Part B of
the main application referred to in (a) above; and
(c)   
That the respondent refrains from publishing any statements
prohibited by paragraph 5.1 of the order granted
by Roach AJ on 04
April 2025 including Facebook regarding the applicant pending the
finalisation of Part B of the main application
and the
counterapplication referred to in (a) above.
5.
Should the respondent fail to comply with
the conditions in (a), (b), and (c) above, the applicant is
authorised to apply on the
same papers, duly supplemented, if
necessary, for an order for the enforcement of the suspended order in
4 above or any appropriate
order.
6.
The respondent is ordered, within 48 hours
of service of this judgment and order upon him, to post an unredacted
copy thereof on
the ‘Genoeg is Genoeg’ Facebook page.
Such post shall remain visible on that page for a continuous period
of ninety
(90) days.
7.
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs
of this application on scale C.
MC
MAMOSEBO
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
NORTHERN
CAPE DIVISION
Appearances
For the
Applicant                      

Adv. A.J Schoeman
Instructed
by:                            

Van de Wall Inc.
For the
Respondent:                  
Adv. A.D Olivier
Instructed
by:                            

Haarhoffs Inc.
[1]
Van
Wyk v Unitas Hospital and Another (Open Democratic Advice Centre as
Amicus Curiae)
[2007] ZACC 24
;
2008
(2) SA 472(CC)
para 20;
Grootboom
v National Prosecuting Authority and Another
2014 (2) SA 68
(CC) paras 22, 23 and 50;
Asla
Construction (Pty) Ltd v Buffalo City Metropolitan Municipality
[2017] 2 All SA 677
(SCA);
2017 (6) SA 360
(SCA) para 11.
[2]
Unreported
judgment neutral citation:
Tornovert
(Pty) Ltd t/a
Bogart
Man v Borelli (Pty) Ltd and Others
(2026-148124)
[2026] ZAWCHC 602
(14 October 2026) paras 16 - 19. See
also
Victoria
Park Ratepayers’ Association v Greyvenouw CC and Others
(511/03)
[2003] ZAECHC 19
(11 April 2003);
[2004] 3 All SA 623
(SE)
para 5.
[3]
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA) para 6.
[4]
Now
the only respondent in these contempt proceedings.
[5]
Fakie
NO v CCII Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA);
Pheko
and Others v Ekurhuleni City
2015 (5) SA 600
(CC) paras 25 -36;
Matjhabeng
Local Municipality v Eskom Holdings Ltd and Others
2018 (1) SA 1
(CC) para 67.
[6]
Shanie
Taljaard and Another v The Land and Agricultural Development Bank of
South Africa Ltd
(15365/2021) [2026] ZAWCHC (20 February 2026) paras 59 - 61.
[7]
(285/2024)
[2025] ZASCA 108
(18 July 2025).
[8]
Loosely translated: And because these liquidators and the attorney
from Strydom & Bredenkamp are in cahoots with the Land

Bank–right from the very start of this entire scheme–we
are faced with a situation where farmers are being liquidated,
yet
the liquidators fail to fulfil their duty to conduct an independent
assessment to determine whether a valid claim actually
exists and
fail to comply with the law.
[9]
2011
(3) SA 274
(CC) para 86.
[10]
Ibid
para 89.