SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Case No: AR 158/2022
In the matter between:
SABELO MKHIZE FIRST APPELLANT
LINDOKUHLE MCHUNU SECOND APPELLANT
SBONISO KHUBISA THIRD APPELLANT
and
THE STATE RESPONDENT
ORDER
On appeal from: KwaZulu-Natal Local Division of the High Court, Durban
(Ntshulana AJ sitting as court of first instance):
1. The appeal against both conviction and sentence is dismissed.
2. The cross -appeal succeeds to the extent that the order of the trial court in
respect of counts 7 and 8 is set aside and is replaced with the order below:
‘2.1 All three accused are found guilty of contravening s 4(1)(a) read with ss
1, 103, 117, 120(1) (a), s 121 read with Schedule 4 and s 151 of the
(1) Reportable: Yes
(2) Of interest to other Judges:
Yes/No
(3) Revised: Yes/No
____________ ______________
Signature Date
2
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, further read with s 250 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 19 77 and s 51(2) (a) Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the
General Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 – possession of a prohibited
firearm: a fully automatic firearm.
2.2 Counts 7 and 8 are taken together for the purpose of sentence and all
three accused are sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.
2.3 The sentences in counts 7 and 8 of 15 years’ imprisonment is ante -
dated to 06 July 2018 and shall run concurrently with the sentence of
life imprisonment imposed in count 1.’
JUDGMENT
Notyesi AJ (Poyo Dlwati JP and Singh J concurring)
Introduction
[1] The three appellants stood trial in the Durban High Court, before Ntshulana
AJ (the trial court), on twelve counts comprising of murder, attempted murder, two
counts of robbery, two counts of kidnapping, five counts of possession of firearms
and ammunition, including possession of an AK47 rifle referred to in counts 7 and 8
of the indictment, and theft of a firearm. The doctrine of common purpose was
invoked. All three appellants pleaded not guilty and were legally represented
throughout the trial. At its conclusion, all three were convicted on counts 1 to 6. The
second appellant was additionally convicted and sentenced on counts 11 and 12. All
three were acquitted on counts 7 to 10.
[2] The indictment alleged that counts 1 (murder), 2 (attempted murder), 3 and 4
(robbery) fell within s 51(1) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 ( the
CLAA), which prescribes life imprisonment unless substantial and compelling
circumstances justify the imposition of a lesser sentence. The aggravating
circumstances alleged were that the murder was planned or premeditated and that
firearms were used against law enforcement officers.
3
[3] Having convicted the appellants on counts 1 to 6, and the second appellant
additionally on counts 11 and 12, the trial court found no substantial and compelling
circumstances warranting a departure from the prescribed sentence. On count 1,
each appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment; on count 2, to five years’
imprisonment; and on counts 3 and 4, taken together, to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
Counts 5 and 6 were likewise taken together and each appellant was sentenced to
five years’ imprisonment. The second appellant was sentenced to fifteen years’
imprisonment on count 11 and twelve months’ imprisonment on count 12. All the
sentences were ordered to run concurrently with the life sentence.
[4] The appeal is against both the convictions and sentences in respect of
counts 1 to 6. The State cross-appeals against the acquittals on counts 7 to 10. Both
appeal and cross -appeal are before this Court with the leave of the trial court. The
second appellant was refused leave to appeal in respect of counts 11 and 12.
[5] The appellants submit before this Court that the State failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the identification of the appellants by its witnesses was
reliable. They submit that they were incorrectly identified as the perpetrators and that
the trial
court therefore erred in relying on the identification evidence.
[6] In relation to the sentence, the appellants contend that the sentence
imposed by the trial court is shockingly inappropriate.
[7] In respect of the cross -appeal, the State contends that, although the AK47
was seen in the possession of the third appellant, the evidence as a whole
establishes that all three appellants were in possession of the firearm. The State
submits that the trial court erred in failing to apply the principles governing joint
possession. The State contends that it had established facts from which it can be
inferred that the group intended to exercise possession of the firearm through the
inferred that the group intended to exercise possession of the firearm through the
third appellant; and that the third appellant intended to hold the AK47 on behalf of
the group.
[8] The State c oncedes that the evidence regarding counts 9 and 10 was
4
materially contradictory and that convictions on those counts ought to be set aside.
[9] Both counsel agreed that, should the appeal fail and the cross -appeal
succeed, this Court may impose the sentence in respect of counts 7 and 8 without
remitting the matter to the trial court.
Summary of substantial facts
[10] According to the statement of substantial facts presented by the State, on or
about 22 September 2015, the three appellants conspired to lure police officers from
Inanda Police Station to a homestead in Namibia, Inanda. Upon their arrival, the
appellants allegedly stripped the officers of their uniforms and robbed them of their
firearms and personal belongings. They were armed with an AK47 rifle and a 9mm
semi-automatic pistol. During the robbery, two police officials, being the deceased in
count 1 was shot dead, whilst the complainant in count 2 was seriously injured.
The State's evidence against the appellants
[11] The State called twenty -seven witnesses. Sergeant (Sgt) Jojisa and Ms
Noluthando Dlamini identified the appellants on two occasions: at the scene in
Namibia and at an identification parade. The State also relied on circumstantial
evidence, including stolen items found at the first appellant’s house, and statements
made by relatives of the appellants.
[12] Sgt Jojisa testified that, on 22 September 2015, she was on duty with Sgt
Moyana, (the deceased in count 1), in the General Enquiries Office at Inanda Police
Station. Their duties, included taking dockets to court, assisting members of the
public with service of domestic violence orders and letters of demand, attending to
missing-persons files, and executing warrants of arrest.
[13] Shortly after reporting for duty, Sgt Jojisa and the deceased drove to
Ntuzuma Police Station to deliver a file. On their return to Inanda, at the instruction of
Warrant Officer Mbhele, they found four people waiting for assistance.
Warrant Officer Mbhele, they found four people waiting for assistance.
[14] The four individuals required assistance with service of documents and were
invited to travel in the police vehicle. They first drove to Africa, where an elderly
5
woman and her granddaughter were left after the person to be served was found to
be absent. The male passenger then moved to the front of the vehicle.
[15] The male passenger, whom Sgt Jojisa identified at trial as the first appellant,
was to deliver a letter of demand at a homestead in Namibia. He was occupied with
his red cell phone during the journey and urged the police to drive faster saying that
he had arranged for someone to keep watch on the person to be served.
[16] On arrival at the homestead, the first appellant walked towards the house
and called for someone to open the door, saying that he was accompanied by police.
Sgt Jojisa then heard the deceased say, “ My brother what are you doing now.
Please do not kill me. ” As she attempted to draw her firearm, the third appellant
approached and pointed an AK47 or similar large firearm at her, saying: “ Hey whore,
what are you doing?” Another unidentified man removed her firearm from its holster.
That person was later identified as the second appellant.
[17] Sgt Jojisa testified that she and the deceased were forced into the house
and ordered to remove their clothes and uniforms. They were then taken at gunpoint
to the police vehicle. The first appellant drove, with the third appellant and another
assailant in front. At an isolated place, the first appellant placed a piece of paper in
the petrol tank and fired two shots into it. He then opened the rear of the vehicle and
shot the deceased several times before shooting Sgt Jojisa. She lost consciousness,
later regained it and crawled from the vehicle in search of assistance. The place was
later identified as Ngcungcwini.
[18] Sgt Jojisa testified that three males were involved. She identified the first
appellant as the person who had sought assistance at Inanda Police Station and the
third appellant as the person who had pointed the large firearm at her. She could not
identify the other assailant.
identify the other assailant.
[19] At the identification parade, Sgt Jojisa again identified the first and third
appellants. She testified that the incident occurred in broad daylight with clear
visibility and that she had several opportunities to observe the first appellant at the
police station, at the scene and while he drove the police vehicle. She observed the
6
third appellant at close range when he pointed the firearm at her.
[20] Ms Dlamini was one of the persons who had sought assistance at Inanda
Police Station. She remained in the back of the police vehicle when the first
appellant and the police officers proceeded to the house in Namibia.
[21] Ms Dlamini testified that she met the first appellant at the police station and
observed him using his red cell phone. She confirmed the journey to Africa and
thereafter to Namibia, where the first appellant and the police officers alighted.
[22] From the back of the vehicle, Ms Dlamini saw two men pointing firearms at
the police officers and also saw the first appellant carrying a firearm.
[23] Ms Dlamini identified all three appellants. She identified the second appellant
as the person carrying a small firearm which he pointed at the deceased , and the
third appellant as the person carrying a large firearm which he pointed at Sgt Jojisa.
She identified the first appellant as the person she had seen at the police station and
in Namibia carrying a small firearm. She testified that she had a clear and
unobstructed view of them and sufficient opportunity to observe them. She later saw
the three appellants taking the police officers from the house and placing them in the
police vehicle before she walked to the police station to report the incident.
[24] At a subsequent identification parade, Ms Dlamini again identified all three
appellants.
[25] The State also called the first appellant’s sister, Ms Nokuthula Madlala. On
23 September 2015, she found all three appellants at her home. They appeared tired
and dirty. The first appellant told her that they had been involved in a shootout with
the police and that one police officer had died. They needed money to escape and
offered to sell her a cell phone. She contacted her brother, Mr Mbongeni Madlala,
who is a member of the police forum.
[26] When the police approached the house, Nokuthula saw the three appellants
[26] When the police approached the house, Nokuthula saw the three appellants
remove firearms and place them in a bucket. Mbongeni, who had just arrived, locked
7
them in a room. The police subsequently entered, assaulted the appellants and took
them to Marianhill Police Station. Nokuthula confirmed that she had a good
relationship with all three appellants. Mbongeni’s evidence substantially corroborated
hers.
[27] Several police officers testified. Captain (Cpt) Ngcobo attended the scene on
22 September 2015 and found the deceased lying motionless and Sgt Jojisa critically
injured. He observed cartridges, a petrol cap and a piece of paper inserted into the
petrol cap and secured the scene before handing it over to the L ocal Criminal
Record Centre (LCRC).
[28] Warrant Officer Ngobese, the scene photographer, attended the
Ngcungcwini and Namibia scenes. C pt Hlongwa, the investigating officer, testified
that he attended the shooting scene at approximately 13 h30. A police vehicle
bearing registration number B[...] was found with spent cartridges and bullet holes.
The deceased was in the rear of the vehicle, partially clothed and with multiple
gunshot wounds. A piece of paper found nearby was later identified as the original
letter of
demand.
[29] The investigating team thereafter proceeded to Namibia. The team
photographed the house, and after securing it, entered . A police uniform , cap, a
jersey bearing the name of one of the officers, and the AK47 firearm seen through a
window were found inside. The items were photographed and placed in exhibit bags.
Cpt Hlongwa testified that he maintained a diary to establish the link between the two
scenes.
[30] On 23 September 2015, Cpt Hlongwa received information that suspects
had been arrested at Mpola, Marianhill. He proceeded there to interview them and
conduct further investigations. He testified that he did not see the appellants being
assaulted.
[31] The first appellant’s father, Mr Bheki Bafana Mkhize, testified that the first
appellant resided at the Namibia house. He questioned him about the shooting, and
8
the first appellant admitted that he had been involved in a shootout with the police.
[32] Ms Sbongile Yvonne Nzama, a clerk at Ntuzuma Magistrate’s Court, testified
that she assisted a person on 22 September 2015 to complete a letter of demand.
She identified that person as the first appellant and recalled that she had previously
assisted him. After preparing the letter, she gave him copies and advised him to
attend the police station for assistance with service. She later identified him to the
investigating officer and at trial.
[33] The arresting officers testified that the second appellant was arrested by
Constable Zondi, who found a firearm in his possession; the third appellant was
arrested by Constable Mahlangu, who found an unlicensed firearm in his
possession; and the first appellant was arrested by Constable Ngcamu, who also
found a firearm in his possession. All three officers denied that the appellants were
assaulted.
[34] Police officers who conducted the identification parade testified that it was
properly conducted and largely confirmed the evidence of the identifying witnesses.
[35] The State led further evidence, including formal evidence and admissions,
which need not be repeated. The State witnesses were extensively cross-examined.
The appellants’ evidence
[36] The first appellant denied the allegations. He denied being at Ntuzuma on 22
September 2015 and disputed Ms Nzama’s evidence. He testified that he was at
Mtshebeni Carwash until approximately 1 3h30 or 14 h00, after which he went to
Ntsakalo High School where he met the second and third appellants. They were
visiting their girlfriends. After receiving a call from his father informing him that he
was a suspect in the shooting of police officers, they returned to Mtshebeni and later
went to Sbu’s Lounge, where they consumed alcohol. That evening they went to
Ntuzuma
and slept at Phume’s home. He also testified that he was 25 years of age.
Ntuzuma
and slept at Phume’s home. He also testified that he was 25 years of age.
[37] On 23 September 2015, the appellants went to Mpola, where they were
9
arrested. The first appellant denied possessing a firearm and denied discussing the
shooting with his sister. He admitted residing at the Namibia house but denied
robbing the police of their uniforms and firearms. He maintained that he had left the
house on 22 September 2015, locking it and leaving the key on top of a wardrobe.
[38] The second appellant testified that he was 20 years old and in standard 10
when arrested. He stated that he was at Mtshebeni Carwash until about 11 h30 and
thereafter went home and was with the first appellant. Later they visited their
girlfriends. He denied the allegations against him but admitted stealing the firearm
referred to in count 11 from his home for protection. He made admissions in respect
of counts 11 and 12.
[39] The third appellant testified that he was 22 years old and had been 19 at the
time of the incident. He was in grade 12. He denied the allegations and stated that
he was at home on 22 September 2015 until the second appellant visited him at
about noon. They went to Ntsakalo School to visit their girlfriends and met the first
appellant
there. He could not recall his girlfriend’s surname or exact home address.
The trial-within-the-trial
[40] There was a trial within a trial concerning the admissibility of confessions ,
pointing out evidence and the allegations of police assault. The trial court rejected
the State’s contention that the appellants had not been assaulted and found that they
had
been assaulted. It consequently found that the State had failed to prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the pointing -out statements were made freely and voluntarily
and rejected reliance on warning statements containing admissions.
The trial court findings
[41] The trial court accepted the evidence of Sgt Jojisa and Ms Dlamini identifying
the appellants. It also accepted that the identification parade was properly conducted
and that the appellants were correctly identified. In reaching this conclusion, it relied
10
on R v Masemang,1 where it was held:
‘The positive assurance with which an honest witness will sometimes swear to the identity of
an accused person is in itself no guarantee of the correctness of that evidence. One often
finds that a woman who was totally unable to point out her assailant on an identification
parade will, when the accused is arrested on the strength of other evidence, swear positively
at the trial that she recognises him as her assailant…’
[42] In assessing the reliability of the identification evidence, the trial court
applied the factors in S v Mthetwa 2 and found that the witnesses had ample
opportunity to identify the appellants. It also considered their identification at the
parade and the circumstantial evidence, including that the Namibia house was the
first appellant’s residence and that the police uniforms and other items, including the
AK47 rifle were found there. The accepted evidence was that the attack commenced
at that house.
[43] The trial court rejected the evidence of all three appellants, finding it
improbable, false and inherently poor. It noted material contradictions in their
versions.
Sentencing by the trial court
[44] In sentencing the appellants, the trial court considered the ir personal
circumstances; the seriousness of the offences of which the appellants had been
convicted; and the interests of society. It took into account that the prescribed
punishment is statutorily ordained. In the judgment of the trial court, reliance was
placed on S v Malgas 3 and it is apparent that the court considered the factors and
guidance set out in that case. The trial court found no substantial and compelling
circumstances that would justify departure from the prescribed minimum sentence.
The issues before this Court
[45] The issues on appeal are:
(a) The identification of the appellants;
(b) The appeal against sentence; and
1 R v Masemang 1950 (2) SA 488 (A) at 493.
2 S v Mthetwa 1972 (3) SA 766 (A) (Mthetwa).
1 R v Masemang 1950 (2) SA 488 (A) at 493.
2 S v Mthetwa 1972 (3) SA 766 (A) (Mthetwa).
3 S v Malgas 2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) (Malgas).
11
(c) The cross-appeal.
The contentions of the parties before this Court
[46] The appellants contend that they were incorrectly identified as the
perpetrators. Counsel submitted that the trial court failed to approach the
identification evidence of Sgt Jojisa and Ms Dlamini with the necessary caution and
that an apparently honest and credible witness may nevertheless give unreliable
identification evidence.
[47] Counsel criticised the identification of the second and third appellants by Sgt
Jojisa at the identification parade. This submission is incorrect. Sgt Jojisa identified
only the first and third appellants. She did not identify the second appellant either at
the parade or in Namibia.
[48] The essence of the appellants’ submissions is that the trial court failed to
exercise sufficient caution in evaluating the identification evidence and incorrectly
rejected their versions, which counsel contended were reasonably possibly true.
[49] Regarding the cross -appeal, counsel for the appellants submitted that the
appellants were correctly acquitted. It was argued that the AK47 was recovered in
their absence and that there was no evidence establishing their possession. In
respect of counts 9 and 10, counsel relied on the contradictory evidence concerning
the recovery of the firearms and submitted that the evidence of Ms Nokuthula
Madlala that the appellants had placed the firearms in a bucket was inconsistent with
the version of the police that firearms were recovered from their persons.
[50] The State submitted that the appellants had not identified adequate grounds
upon which this Court could interfere with the trial court’s acceptance of the evidence
of Sgt Jojisa and Ms Dlamini.
[51] Counsel for the State submitted that the trial court correctly found the
identification evidence of the two witnesses reliable. It was argued that the evidence
of both Sgt Jojisa and Ms Dlamini was corroborated by other acceptable evidence,
of both Sgt Jojisa and Ms Dlamini was corroborated by other acceptable evidence,
including admissions made by relatives of the first appellant, and by the recovery of
12
the police uniforms and other stolen items from the first appellant’s house. Counsel
further relied on the fact that the incidents occurred in broad daylight, with clear
visibility and sufficient opportunity for the witnesses to observe the perpetrators.
[52] The State accordingly supported the trial court’s findings.
[53] In respect of the cross-appeal, the State conceded that the evidence
concerning counts 9 and 10 was materially contradictory and did not pursue the
appeal in respect of those counts. The concession was properly made. Ms
Nokuthula Madlala initially testified that the appellants threw the firearms on the floor
before the police arrived but later stated that they had placed them in a bucket. Mr
Madlala testified that the firearms were recovered after the appellants had been
taken outside and that none were found on their persons, whereas the police
testified that firearms were found on the appellants during searches.
[54] The evidence therefore did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that the
appellants were in possession of the firearms referred to in counts 9 and 10. I agree
that the cross -appeal in respect of those counts should be dismissed. The
contradiction pertaining to counts 9 and 10 renders the evidence to be unreliable.
[55] The State submitted, however, that counts 7 and 8 stand on a different
footing. Both Sgt Jojisa and Ms Dlamini testified that the third appellant was armed
with a rifle at Namibia and that he used it to prevent Sgt Jojisa from intervening while
the deceased was confronted by the second appellant with a pistol.
[56] The State further relied on the recovery, on the same day, of the AK47 from
the first appellant’s locked house. It submitted that the appellants retained control
over the firearm. He had secured the house to ensure the safety of the firearm.
[57] The State contended that the trial court erred in its analysis of the evidence
[57] The State contended that the trial court erred in its analysis of the evidence
and application of the principle of joint possession where common purpose had been
invoked. Reliance was placed on S v Nkosi 4 and S v Mbuli.5 The State accordingly
4 S v Nkosi 1998 (1) SACR 284 (W) (Nkosi) at 286H-I.
5 S v Mbuli 2003 (1) SACR 97 (SCA) (Mbuli).
13
submitted that the cross-appeal in respect of counts 7 and 8 ought to succeed.
Applicable legal principles
[58] The acceptable legal principle is that a court of appeal will be slow to
interfere with the factual findings of a trial court unless such findings are clearly
wrong. In S v Francis6 it was stated:
‘The powers of a Court of appeal to interfere with the findings of fact of a trial Court are
limited. In the absence of any misdirection the trial Court’s conclusion, including its
acceptance of a witness’ evidence is presumed to be correct. In order to succeed on
appeal, the appellant must therefore convince the Court of appeal on adequate grounds that
the trial Court was wrong in accepting the witness’ evidence – a reasonable doubt will not
suffice to justify interference with its findings. Bearing in mind the advantage which a trial
Court has of seeing, hearing and appraising a witness, it is only in exceptional
circumstances that the Court of appeal will be entitled to interfere with a trial Court’s
evaluation of oral testimony.’
[59] The present appeal is predicated on the ground that the trial court
misdirected itself in assessing the reliability of the identifying witnesses, Ms Dlamini
and S gt Jojisa. The appeal therefo re turns on the evaluation of evidence of
identification.
[60] Evidence of identification must be approached with caution for the reason
that experience has shown that it is very easy for the identifying witnesses to be
mistaken.7
[61] In Mthetwa,8 the Appellate Division cautioned against the temptation of
simply accepting the evidence of an identifying witness when it stated:
‘…It is not enough for the identifying witness to be honest: the reliability of his observation
must also be tested. This depends on various factors, such as lighting, visibility, and
eyesight; the proximity of the witness; his opportunity for observation, both as to time and
eyesight; the proximity of the witness; his opportunity for observation, both as to time and
situation; the extent of his prior knowledge of the accused; the mobility of the scene;
corroboration…’
6 S v Francis 1991 (1) SACR 198 (A) (Francis) at 198I-199A.
7 PJ Schwikkard et al Principles of Evidence 5 ed (2023) (Principles of Evidence) at 626-627.
8 Mthetwa at 768A-B.
14
[62] When dealing with evidence of identification, the courts should be reminded
of the salutary warning stated in S v Sithole and Others9 where the court stated:
‘In the present case the learned magistrate quite correctly reminded herself of what was said
in R v Shekelele and Another 1953 (1) SA 656 (T) concerning evidence of identification. It
was pointed out in that case that an acquaintance with the history of criminal trials reveals
that gross injustices are not infrequently done through honest but mistaken identification. A
court must always bear in mind, then, that in all such cases there is an inherent prospect that
even an honest witness might mistakenly identify a person. The fact that witnesses who
attend identification parades sometimes point out persons who are known not to have
committed the offence serves to underline the potential which exists for error.
Where a conviction depends on that evidence alone, a court must quite obviously be
satisfied that the witness is truthful. What is perhaps more important, though, is that there
must be no reasonable doubt that the witness is not mistaken. In our view , that will generally
require something more than the mere assertion by the witness that he has correctly
identified the culprit, if the inherent risk of error is to be guarded against. It may be that the
person concerned is well known to the witness or it may be that the person has some
distinctive feature. But once one accepts that there is an inherent potential for mistaken
identification, which a court is bound to do, it would seem to us that without something more,
the mere assertion by a witness that he recognises the offender will seldom suffice.’
[63] The State had also supported the findings of the trial court based on the
identification of the appellants at the identification parade. Although the appellants
had not attacked the lawfulness of the identification parade, it is relevant briefly to
had not attacked the lawfulness of the identification parade, it is relevant briefly to
discuss it. An identification parade is held in terms of rules of practice which are
based on standards of fairness in order to secure a reliable result. A court will more
readily accept evidence of identification by a witness where such has been
confirmed at a properly conducted parade. It is therefore essential that a court
should be satisfied that there were no material irregularities at the parade.10
[64] The trial court had also relied on circumstantial evidence for convicting the
appellants. The principles applicable to the admission of circumstantial evidence are
set out in R v Blom11 where it was held:
9 S v Sithole and Others 1999 (1) SACR 585 (W) at 591B-F.
10 Principles of Evidence at 627-628 and the cases cited therein.
11 R v Blom 1939 AD 188 (Blom) at 202-203.
15
‘(1) The inference sought to be drawn must be consistent with all proven facts . If it is not, the
inference cannot be drawn.
(2) The proved facts should be such that they exclude every reasonable inference from them
save the one sought to be drawn…’
[65] When indicting the appellants, the State had relied on the doctrine of
common purpose. The principles applicable to the doctrine have been settled.
[66] The doctrine of common purpose was invoked by the State in the
indictment. ‘The essence of the common -purpose doctrine is that the conduct of
persons who act in concert is as a matter of law imputed to one another, regardless
of their actual degree of participation or causal contributions. It provides for a form of
complicity and finds application in group-based criminal activity where it dispenses
with the need to provide proof that the conduct of each participant contributed
causally to the ultimate unlawful consequence. The doctrine is of general
application, but is mostly couched in terms of which relate to consequence crimes,
such as murder, where it is often very difficult to determine which offender’s actions
were causally responsible for the death of the deceased.’12
[67] In S v Thebus and Another ,13 the Constitutional Court firmly confirmed this
principle as part of our law, when this was stated:
‘[19] The liability requirements of a joint criminal enterprise fall into two categories. The first
arises where there is a prior agreement, express or implied, to commit a common offence. In
the second category, no such prior agreement exists or is proved. The liability arises from an
active association and participation in a common criminal design with the requisite
blameworthy state of mind. In the present matter, the evidence does not prove any such
prior pact.’ (Footnotes omitted.)
[68] Recently, the Supreme Court of Appeal (the SCA) in Motsitsi v S14 stated:
‘The doctrine of common purpose is fully entrenched in our law. Common purpose takes two
‘The doctrine of common purpose is fully entrenched in our law. Common purpose takes two
forms: prior agreement amongst all the perpetrators before the commission of the offence,
or active association by each perpetrator in the conduct of the group of perpetrators. The
former may involve an express agreement or an implied one based on what was
12 S v Tilayi 2021 (2) SACR 350 (ECM) (Tilayi) para 18.
13 S v Thebus and Another [2003] ZACC 12; 2003 (2) SACR 319 (CC).
14 Motsitsi v S [2026] ZASCA 44 para 17.
16
contemplated by the group. The latter while not derived from a prior agreement, “can arise
on the spur of the moment and can be inferred from the facts surrounding the active
association with the furtherance of the common design”, as held in S v Safatsa and Others ,
and entails participation “with the requisite blameworthy state of mind”, as articulated in S v
Thebus and Another. Should the State rely upon “active association” to establish common
purpose, it is required to prove beyond reasonable doubt with regard to each individual
perpetrator that he:
“…[M]ust have been present at the scene where the violence was being
committed…must have been aware of the assault on the [victims] … must have
intended to make common cause with those who were actually perpetrating the
assault…must have manifested his sharing of a common purpose with the
perpetrators of the assault by himself performing some act of association with the
conduct of the others…must have had the requisite mens rea [ie, in the case of
murder]…he must have intended [the consequences of the offence] or must have
foreseen the possibility of [the person being killed] and performed his own act of
association with recklessness as to whether or not death was to ensue. ”’ (Footnotes
omitted.)
[69] The fact that the doctrine of common purpose falls into two categories must
never be understood to mean that the two forms are mutually exclusive. ‘In other
words, a finding that , the unlawful act in question falls outside an existing prior
agreed common design , does not mean that it cannot also be found to have been
done in the furtherance of a common purpose that arose spontaneously, or by active
association before, during or after the execution of the earlier agreed common
design. Furthermore, the execution of the agreed common purpose may also satisfy
the requirements for active association.’15
[70] In the cross-appeal, the State had contended that the trial court had erred by
[70] In the cross-appeal, the State had contended that the trial court had erred by
failing to convicting the appellants in respect of counts 7 and 8 relating to the
possession of the AK47 rifle which was found in the house of the first appellant. The
submission raises the question of joint possession.
[71] Just as more than one person may have the physical control of an article,
more than one person may also simultaneously have the mental element required for
15 Tilayi para 24.
17
possession. More than one person may, simultaneously (illegally) , possess a
firearm (which is a crime that does not require animus domini but only animus
detentionis). If they have the common purpose to commit murder, but only one of
them has the detention of the firearm, the mere fact that they have a common
purpose to commit a murder does not necessarily mean that all of them possess that
firearm. Such a deduction can only be made if the court finds that the perpetrator
who had the detention intended to possess it not only for himself but also on behalf
of the other(s), and that the other(s) had the intention that the perpetrator having
detention should exercise the physical detention on their behalf. Such a finding
cannot be made from the mere fact that the participants acted within a common
purpose to commit murder, because such common purpose may equally exist in a
situation in which the perpetrator having the detention of the firearm intends to
possess it only for himself.16
[72] The principles applicable to joint possession were considered in Nkosi and
further approved by the SCA in Mbuli.17 On these principles, I turn to consider the
parties’ submissions.
The identification of the appellants
[73] The trial court, in my view, correctly accepted the evidence of the State
witnesses with regard to the manner in which the incident of 22 September 2015 had
occurred and the unfolding events. The appellants, in their written and oral
submissions, did not raise any misdirections by the trial court on credibility findings.
In line with the principle in Francis, the credibility findings of the trial court must be
accepted. Reliability of the evidence still needs to be tested.
[74] The trial court carefully analysed the appellants’ respective versions and
correctly rejected their versions. The appellants’ versions of alibi were materially
contradictory and stood in stark contrast to the overwhelming and corroborated
contradictory and stood in stark contrast to the overwhelming and corroborated
evidence of the State witnesses. The trial court justifiably rejected their alibi as false
and not reasonably credible. I agree with this finding.
16 CR Snyman Snyman’s Criminal Law 7 ed (2020) at 56-57.
17 Nkosi at 286H-I; Mbuli para 71 and Tilayi paras 42-44.
18
[75] Considering the nature of the defence raised by the appellants, and the
absence of any countervailing evidence proffered by them, the facts are either
common cause or are not seriously challenged.
[76] Turning to the identification of the appellants. The uncontroverted evidence
is that the first appellant was identified at Inanda Police Station and during the
journey to Namibia, Inanda. Both Sgt Jojisa and Ms Dlamini confirmed that he had a
red cell phone which he was using. Both witnesses had ample opportunity to identify
him. Ms Dlamini was seated next to him at the police station , and they were together
at the back of the vehicle. Sgt Jojisa had also seen him at the police station and in
the police vehicle.
[77] It bears mentioning that the robbery and the entire incident took place in
broad daylight just before 12h30. In its findings, the trial court concluded:
‘The Court is satisfied that Sergeant Jojisa had enough opportunity for looking or observing
the assailant whom they travelled with in front of the police van until they were attacked.
She had enough opportunity to observe the assailant in Namibia during the ordeal if one
considered the proximity of the assailant to her. If I consider carefully the evidence of
identification as discussed above, the identification parade results and all the factors as
articulated in the case of S v Mthethwa I am satisfied that Sergeant Jojisa and Ms
Noluthando Dlamini correctly identified the three accused on the day in question.’ (sic)
[78] It is self -evident that the trial court had considered and applied the factors
enunciated in Mthetwa. I cannot find fault with the reasoning and assessment of the
evidence of identification adduced by Sgt Jojisa and Ms Dlamini by the trial court.
There is no merit in the submission that the court did not caution itself about the
dangers inherent in evidence of identification. The appellants were correctly
identified.
identified.
[79] To buttress the point, the identification of all three appellants at the parade
was not contested by the appellants, and correctly so , in my view. Constable
Thomas had testified that he had conducted the identification parade together with
Colonel McGray. The appellants were legally represented during the identification
parade. Constable Thomas had confirmed that the identification parade was
conducted according to the rules and that there were no irregularities. Sgt Jojisa had
19
pointed the first and third appellants, whilst Ms Dlamini pointed all three appellants.
The trial court correctly accepted the evidence of identification at the parade.18
[80] This Court is also entitled to consider and assess the evidence in its entirety.
In S v Singh19 it was stated:
‘Because this is not the first time that one has been faced on appeal with this kind of
situation, it would perhaps be wise to repeat once again how a court ought to approach a
criminal case on fact where there is a conflict of fact between the evidence of the State
witnesses and that of an accused. It is quite impermissible to approach such a case thus:
because the court is satisfied as to the reliability and the credibility of the State witnesses
that, therefore, the defence witnesses, including the accuse d, must be rejected. The proper
approach in a case such as this is for the court to apply its mind not only to the merits and
the demerits of the State and the defence witnesses but also to the probabilities of the case.
It is only after so applying its mind that a court would be justified in reaching a conclusion as
to whether the guilt of an accused has been established beyond all reasonable doubt. The
best indication that a court has applied its mind in the proper manner in the abovementioned
example is to be found in its reasons for judgment including its reasons for the acceptance
and the rejection of the respective witnesses.’
[81] The trial court, in its reasons, stated that it also took into account the ballistic
results which were admitted into record in terms of s 220 of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA). According to the ballistic results, the firearm that the
second appellant stole from his grandfather was the same firearm that had been
used at the scene of Ngcugcwini.
[82] It bears mentioning that the uniform and other items that were taken from the
two police officers, Sgt Jojisa and the deceased, were found in the house of the first
two police officers, Sgt Jojisa and the deceased, were found in the house of the first
appellant where the police were first kidnapped.
[83] On the strength of Blom the inference is overwhelming that the appellants
were the perpetrators and for those reasons, the appeal against conviction cannot
stand.
18 Principles of Evidence at 626-628.
19 S v Singh 1975 (1) SA 227 (N) at 228E-H.
20
The appeal against sentence
[84] The task of imposing an appropriate sentence is the discretion of the trial
court. A court of appeal may only interfere if the sentence imposed is shockingly
inappropriate; there is an irregularity or misdirection on the part of the trial court. 20 In
S v Rabie21 it was stated:
‘1. In every appeal against the sentence, whether imposed by a magistrate or a Judge, the
Court hearing the appeal -
(a) should be guided by the principle that punishment is
“pre-eminently a matter for the discretion of the trial Court”;
and
(b) should be careful not to erode such discretion : hence the further principle that the
sentence should only be altered if the discretion has not been “judicially and properly
exercised”.
2. The test under (b) is whether the sentence is vitiated by irregularity or misdirection or is
disturbingly inappropriate.’
[85] The State, in the indictment, referred to the provisions of s 51(1) read with
Part 1 of Schedule 2 of the CLAA . The legislation prescribed minimum sentences
which include life imprisonment. The appellants were legally represented during the
trial and were warned about the consequences of invoking this section. The
aggravating factor was that the violence was used by the appellants against the law
enforcement agencies who were assisting them. The appellants had stripped the
police naked, and the deceased was shot in an execution style.
[86] In Malgas,22 it was held:
‘Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious that the Legislature
has ordained life imprisonment (or the particular prescribed period of imprisonment) as the
sentence that should ordinarily and in the absence of weighty justification be imposed for the
listed crimes in the specified circumstances…
The court is obliged to take into account all relevant factors as it retains its discretion when
passing a sentence.’
20 S v Singh and Others [2016] ZASCA 37; 2016 (2) SACR 443 (SCA) para 23; See also Malgas para
12.
12.
21 S v Rabie 1975 (4) SA 855 (A) at 857D-E; See also S v Kibido 1998 (2) SACR 213 (SCA) at 216G-
H.
22 Malgas para 25.
21
[87] The appellants’ counsel has buttressed the point that all three appellants are
of a relatively young age and that the second and third appellants are schooling. I
disagree. The circumstances of this particular case far outweigh the personal
circumstances of the appellants. The SCA has cautioned against any slight
inclination from prescribed minimum sentences for flimsy reasons.23
[88] In S v Vilakazi,24 the SCA held:
‘…In cases of serious crime the personal circumstances of the offender, by themselves, will
necessarily recede into the background. Once it becomes clear that the crime is deserving of
a substantial period of imprisonment the question s whether the accused is married or single,
whether he has two children or three, whether or not he is in an employment, are in
themselves largely immaterial to what that period should be, and those seem to me to be the
kind of “flimsy” grounds that Malgas said should be avoided…’
[89] On a careful consideration of the circumstances of this case, the interest s of
society, the personal circumstances of each appellant and the aggravating nature of
the case, I am of the view that the aggravating circumstances far outweigh the
mitigating factors. I agree with the trial court’s findings that there were no substantial
and compelling circumstances to justify deviation from the prescribed minimum
sentence. The grounds of appeal and the submissions about the personal
circumstances of the appellants constitute those flimsy grounds that the court has
been warned to avoid.
[90] In my view, any sentence with a shorter term of imprisonment would over -
emphasise the personal circumstances of the appellants and under-emphasise the
seriousness of the cowardly and brazen manner in which the brutal murder of a
State law enforcement officer was meted out by the appellants on 22 September
2015.
[91] It follows that the appeal against sentence cannot stand.
The cross-appeal
[91] It follows that the appeal against sentence cannot stand.
The cross-appeal
[92] The submission of the State is that the trial court erred in not concluding that
23 Ibid para 9.
24 S v Vilakazi [2008] ZASCA 87; 2009 (1) SACR 552 (SCA) para 58.
22
the appellants were in the joint possession of the AK47 rifle. In my view, this
submission has considerable weight. The ambush of the police was carefully
planned. The first appellant had placed the second and third appellants in his house
in Namibia, Inanda. He lured the police under the false pretence that he was serving
a letter of demand to the house. It should be borne in mind that it was his house in
the first place.
[93] When the police arrived at the house, the first appellant was the first to jump
out of the police vehicle and approach the house , shouting to the second and third
appellants who were inside. Both the second and third appellants were armed. The
second appellant was armed with a pistol which he admitted he had stolen from his
grandfather. The third appellant was armed with an AK47 rifle. On these facts,
objectively viewed, it is apparent that those firearms were possessed on behalf of the
three appellants who had a common purpose to rob the police of their uniforms and
firearms. It is also true that both the first and second appellants used those firearms
in the execution of the agreed design. The third appellant pointed at Sgt Jojisa with
the AK47 rifle to prevent her from resisting or interfering in the holding up of the
deceased.
[94] The two police officers were forced to enter the house where they were
stripped of their uniforms and other items. The keys of the police vehicle were
removed from their possession when they were placed in the rear of the vehicle.
The appellants locked the house when they were leaving. On the same day, within a
few hours, according to the evidence, C pt Hlongwa, the police found the police
uniforms of Sgt Jojisa and the deceased in the same house with the AK47 rifle.
When the police arrived, the house was locked and secured, which indicated control
of the entrance to the house. That is a strong indication that the appellants retained
possession of the firearm and the items that were inside that house.
possession of the firearm and the items that were inside that house.
[95] I agree with the submission on behalf of the State that it would be far-fetched
to assume that some other person than the appellants might have left the said
firearm after the appellants had secured the house by locking it. Although the firearm
was found in the absence of the appellants, the only inference that can be drawn
from the facts is that the AK47 rifle that was recovered by Cpt Hlongwa is the same
23
AK47 rifle that was used by the third appellant during the robbery. On the objective
facts and the nature of execution of the plan, the third appellant possess ed the AK47
rifle on behalf of all the appellants as an instrument of effecting the common purpose
of all the appellants. In my view, the test set out in Blom is satisfied.
[96] I have considered the principles set out in Nkosi and agree that the mere fact
that an accused person participated in a robbery with others , who, for the purpose of
that enterprise, and to his knowledge, possessed firearms, does not sustain the
inference, beyond reasonable doubt, that the accused person possessed those
firearms jointly with them. The situation is different in the present case. The third
appellant had possessed the firearm as an instrument to carry out the joint
enterprise. In Nkosi,25 the court recognises such a scenario when it said:
‘At least two reasonable possibilities immediately present themselves. The first is that no
member of the group possesses a firearm and the group takes a group decision to acquire
firearms in order to effect their purpose. They acquire the firearms and having acquired them
it is decided that certain members of the group will carry the group's guns during the
robbery. In that event joint possession and the intention to jointly possess is clear.
But there is another possibility. That possibility is as likely as the first if not more likely. That
is some of the robbers possess guns when the robbery is planned. They indicate that when
the robbery is to take place they will bring their guns with them. The group know that they
are intended to be used in the robbery.
Assuming the second set of facts (as indicated as likely a scenario as the first) I do not think
that in the ordinary course either the gun-holders or the group as a whole would contemplate
the gun-holders yielding even partially their effective control and possession of their guns in
favour of the group. What would normally (or at least often) be contemplated is that the gun -
holder would control and use the weapon which he has brought along to further the
enterprise but would remain the sole person in control of the gun and would take it away with
him when the enterprise is completed. To put it another way, each gun -holder would use his
gun as he thought desirable or necessary; he could be expected to use it in accordance with
the broad plan agreed on and in execution of the common purpose to rob; but the gun would
be used (so the group would contemplate) only by the gun -holder himself; the gun -holder
would always retain physical possession of the gun and he would not intend to yield up his
right to possess the gun and to use it as he deemed fit. I am of the view that generally or at
25 Nkosi at 288A-F.
24
least often in the case that I postulate the individual gun -holder would not intend to cede one
iota of his “right” to control his gun to the group. Nor would the group intend to acquire such
right of direct control.’
[97] In the present case, the objective evidence shows that the use of the AK47
was part of the plan of the group and this can easily be inferred from the established
facts. In my view, the evidence excludes all inferences save the one to be drawn ,
which is that (a) the group as a whole had the intention of exercising possession of
the AK47 rifle through the third appellant on behalf of the group in order to overcome
the police resistance as they had planned to rob them. I therefore distinguish the
facts in Nkosi.
[98] I also agree with Van Zyl DJP in Tilayi26 when he said:
‘Conceptually the question must be asked whether joint possession and the requirements
formulated in Nkosi must at all find application in the context of an application of the
principles underlying the common- purpose doctrine. In the context of the present matter the
right question to ask may accordingly be whether the possession of the firearms and the
ammunition by one member of the group is a criminal act (actus reus) that falls within the
scope of the group's common design, and must as a result be imputed to all the other
members of the group. The doctrine, after all, rests upon the legal fiction that by association
one member of the group is held liable for the criminal act (actus reus) of another. Liability
for the act of another arises by operation of law and is not based on the individual acts of the
participants in the criminal design. A factual scenario that often seems to be the cause of
befuddlement is where it is not established on the evidence that one or more of the members
of a group were aware of another's possession of a firearm. The answer to that question, it is
suggested, will inevitably lie in the scope of the common purpose, and the element of mens
suggested, will inevitably lie in the scope of the common purpose, and the element of mens
rea as it applies to every other definitional element of the crime in question. Ultimately the
question in every case remains whether or not it can be concluded on the evidence beyond
a reasonable doubt that each individual accused had the required mens rea for the offence
in question.’ (Footnote omitted.)
[99] On the strength of what is stated in Snyman and the principles developed in
Nkosi, Mbuli and in Tilayi, it must be accepted that once it is established either by
direct evidence or inferences drawn from the facts that all the accused persons had
knowledge of the firearm held by one of them and that firearm is intended by all of
26 Tilayi para 44.
25
the accused to be used as an instrument or to aid the furtherance of common
purpose, both elements of animus tenendi (the intention to keep the firearm) and
animus detentionis (the intention to exercise control over it) are present and
therefore, all the accused are guilty of joint possession. There could be no question
that either one of the accused had no intention to possess such a firearm.
[100] In the present case, the conclusion is irresistible that the planning of robbery
of police uniform, firearms, kidnapping of the police and finally shooting them was
orchestrated by all three appellants. The inference is also irresistible that the design
of luring the police to the house at Namibia, Inanda was carefully planned by all
three appellants. It is indubitable that both the first and second appellants knew that
the third appellant was in possession of an AK47 rifle whilst the second appellant
had gone all the way to steal his grandfather’s pistol. These firearms were intended
to and indeed, were used in the robbery of the police. The intention to possess has
been established.
[101] In my view, the fact that the AK47 rifle was recovered in the locked house of
the first appellant, together with the robbed uniforms and other belongings of the two
police officials, Sgt Jojisa and the deceased, within a space of two hours after the
robbery, in the absence of the appellants, is a strong indication that the AK47 rifle
was the same as the one that the third appellant used to overcome the resistance by
Sgt Jojisa during the robbery within the vicinity of the house in Namibia. It is
irrelevant that they were not present during recovery.
[102] The trial court was manifestly wrong in its conclusion that it cannot conclude
or infer that the said AK47 rifle found in the said house is the same big rifle Sgt Jojisa
and Ms Dlamini referred to in their testimonies. This conclusion is based on
misappreciation of facts or incorrect application of joint possession. The trial court
misappreciation of facts or incorrect application of joint possession. The trial court
was persuaded in its reasoning by the mere fact that the AK47 rifle was recovered in
the absence of the appellants. That reasoning is incorrect. Possession is concerned
with knowledge and control of the prohibited item. Both elements had been proved
beyond reasonable doubt on the facts. On application of the Blom test, it had been
established that the firearm used by the third appellant is the same firearm that was
found with the police uniform robbed from the police officers.
26
[103] I therefore agree with the submission of the State counsel that the trial court
had erred in not convicting the appellants in respect of counts 7 and 8, which pertain
to the possession of the AK47 rifle.
[104] Therefore, the order of the trial court in respect of counts 7 and 8 stands to
be set aside and substituted with a finding that all three appellants are guilty of the
possession of the AK47 rifle.
Findings
[105] The appeal against both conviction and sentence in respect of counts 1 to 6
should be dismissed. The cross -appeal should partially succeed insofar as it relates
to counts 7 and 8.
[106] I found misdirection in respect of acquittal of the appellants in respect of
counts 7 and 8. All three appellants are found guilty of possession of the AK47 rifle.
In respect of counts 9 and 10, the cross -appeal cannot succeed , and the result is
that the decision of the trial court stands.
Conclusion
[107] The trial court had found that there are no substantial and compelling
circumstances to justify a departure from the imposition of a minimum sentence
prescribed by legislation. The possession of the AK47 rifle pertains to the single
incident in which the appellants had been convicted and effectively sentenced to life
imprisonment. In these circumstances, where the court had found misdirection in
respect of the acquittal of the appellants in counts 7 and 8, this Court is in the same
position as the trial court.
[108] It is in the interests of justice that this Court, having found the appellants
guilty on counts 7 and 8, should finalise the sentence. I agree with both counsel in
this regard.
[109] The appellants should be convicted of possession of a prohibited firearm,
namely a fully automatic AK47 rifle, in contravention of s 4(1) (a), read with ss 1, 103,
27
117, 120(1) (a), 121 and schedule 4 and s 151 of the Firearms Control Act 60 of
2000, further read with s 250 of the C PA, and s 51(2)(a) Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the
CLAA. The minimum sentence applicable of 15 years imprisonment shall be
imposed by this Court. Counts 7 and 8 are to be taken together for the purposes of
sentencing and must run concurrently with the sentence in count 1.
Order
[110] The following order shall issue:
1. The appeal against both conviction and sentence is dismissed.
2. The cross-appeal succeeds to the extent that the order of the trial court in
respect of counts 7 and 8 is set aside and is replaced with the following order:
2.1 All three accused are found guilty of contravening s 4(1)(a) read with ss
1, 103, 117, 120(1) (a), s 121 read with Schedule 4 and s 151 of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000, further read with s 250 of the Criminal
Procedure Act 51 of 19 77 and s 51(2) (a) Part 2 of Schedule 2 of the
General Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 – possession of a prohibited
firearm: a fully automatic firearm.
2.2 Counts 7 and 8 are taken together for the purpose of sentence and all
three accused are sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment.
2.3 The sentences in counts 7 and 8 of 15 years’ imprisonment is ante -
dated to 06 July 2018 and shall run concurrently with the sentence of
life imprisonment imposed in count 1.
__________________
NOTYESI
AJ
I agree
__________________
POYO DLWATI JP
28
I agree
_________________
SINGH J
29
Appearances
Counsel for the appellants: P Daniso
Attorneys for the appellants: Legal Aid South Africa
The Marine Building
22 Dorothy Nyembe Street
DURBAN
Counsel for the respondent: S Mcanyana
Attorneys for the respondent: The Deputy Director of Public Prosecutions
Southern Life Building
Number 88 Joe Slovo Street
DURBAN
Date Heard: 21 August 2026
Date Delivered: 30 October 2026