Minister of Electricity and Energy v African Climate Alliance and Others (516/2025) [2026] ZASCA 146 (30 October 2026)

70 Reportability
Constitutional Law

Brief Summary

Constitutional Law — Environmental Rights — Minister of Electricity and Energy's determination for 1500 MW coal-fired power generation challenged — Respondents arguing infringement of constitutional rights of children under sections 24 and 28 — High Court declaring decisions invalid due to lack of consideration for environmental impact — Appeal dismissed as moot due to subsequent publication of Integrated Resource Plan 2025, which excludes coal-fired power.

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case No: 516/2025
In the matter between:
MINISTER OF ELECTRICITY AND ENERGY APPELLANT

and

AFRICAN CLIMATE ALLIANCE FIRST RESPONDENT
VUKANI ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE
MOVEMENT IN ACTION SECOND RESPONDENT
THE TRUSTEES FOR THE TIME BEING
OF GROUNDWORK TRUST THIRD RESPONDENT
MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES FOURTH RESPONDENT
NATIONAL ENERGY REGULATOR OF
SOUTH AFRICA FIFTH RESPONDENT
MINISTER OF FORESTRY, FISHERIES &
THE ENVIRONMENT SIXTH RESPONDENT
THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA SEVENTH RESPONDENT
CENTRE FOR CHILD LAW AMICUS CURIAE

Neutral citation: Minister of Electricity and Energy v African Climate Alliance
and Others (516/2025) [202 6] ZASCA 146 (30 October
2026)

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Coram: SCHIPPERS, MBATHA and COPPIN JJA and
MPHAHLELE and MOOKI AJJA
Heard: 19 August 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation
to the parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of
Appeal website and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down of the
judgment is deemed to be 11h00 on 30 October 2026.
Summary: Constitutional Law – decisions challenged – procurement by
Minister of 1500 megawatts of coal-fired power under Electricity Regulation Act
4 of 2006 – concurrence by National Energy Regulator – publication of Integrated
Resource Plan 2019 (IRP 2019) – infringement of s 24 and best interests of child
standard in s 28(2) of the Constitution – IRP 2019 superseded by IRP 2025 –
which makes no provision for coal-fired power – s 16(2) of Superior Courts Act
10 of 2013 – whether decision on appeal has a practical effect or result.

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________________________________________________________________
ORDER
________________________________________________________________

On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Van der
Westhuizen J, sitting as court of first instance):
1 The appeal is dismissed under s 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act.
2 The appellant shall pay the costs of appeal of the first, second and third
respondents, including the costs of two counsel.

________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
________________________________________________________________
Schippers JA (Mbatha and Coppin JJA and Mpha hlele and Mooki AJJA
concurring)

Introduction
[1] On 25 September 2020, the appellant, the Minister of Electricity and
Energy (the Minister), published a notice in the Government Gazette in terms of
s 34(1) of the Electricity Regulation Act 4 of 2006 (ERA), in which he determined
that new generation capacity was necessary for the energy security of the country,
which included 1 500 megawatts (MW) to be generated from coal (the Minister’s
determination), amongst other energy sources.1 That determination was made in
consultation with t he National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) , as
required by the ERA. The Minister also published the Integrated Resource Plan
on 18 October 2019 (IRP 2019).2


1 The Minister’s determination was published under GN 1015, GG 43734, 25 September 2020.
2 Published under GN 1360, GG 42784, 18 October 2019.

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[2] In 2023 the first, second and third respondents (the respondents) launched
an application in the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (High Court),
for an order declaring the Minister’s determination, NERSA’s concurrence in that
determination, and IRP 2019 (the impugned decisions), inconsistent with the
Constitution and invalid, to the extent that those decisions included 1 500 MW of
coal-fired power as an energy source.

[3] The High Court (Van der Westhuizen J) granted the relief sought , with
costs. It upheld the constitutional challenge to the impugned decisions, solely on
the basis that they ‘impact negatively on the rights of children under sections 24
and 28 of the Constitution in the absence of cogent facts to the contrary ’. The
court concluded that the rule 53 record and evidence by the Minister and NERSA
‘is ominously silent on any considerations given to the effect that the additional
1 500 MW new coal-fired power will have on the environment and the health of
the nation, in particular that of children ’. The court went on to find t hat the
Minister and NERSA failed to justify the limitation of those rights under s 36 of
the Constitution. Nothing in the judgment indicates how the High Court arrived
at these conclusions. Consequently, the impugned decisions were reviewed and
set aside to the extent that they provide for 1 500 MW of coal -fired electricity
generation.

[4] The appeal is with the leave of the High Court. NERSA did not participate
in the appeal. The Centre for Child Law, which was admitted to the proceedings
as an amicus curiae, presented written and oral submissions on appeal.

[5] The respondents, in their heads of argument, rightly conclude that the
Government’s plans for new coal -fired power stations are now history . On
28 October 2025 the Minister published the Integrated Resource Plan 2025

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(IRP 2025) which makes no provision for coal-fired power.3 Thus, IRP 2025 is
not merely a draft awaiting approval. It has been formally published in the
Government Gazette and is being implemented.4 Given these developments, the
parties were asked to file submissions as to whether the appeal has been rendered
moot.

[6] On 7 October 2026 the Minister announced the proposed approach to the
first determination under the plan, involving 4 600 MW of battery energy storage
and 5 000 MW of gas -to-power capacity. This is evidence of active
implementation, which is consistent with IRP 2025 and can be implemented
under the current statutory framework.

[7] The Minister contends that the appeal has not been rendered moot, in sum,
for the following reasons. The true issue is whether a plan or policy devised by
Government, which has not yet been implemented, is reviewable. The High Court
erred in interfering with a plan or policy of the Government, which violates the
doctrine of separation of powers and ‘set a dangerous precedent’. The Minister’s
determination in relation to the other sources of energy contained therein, still
stands until it is set aside. Therefore, a decision on the issue will still have a
practical effect or result because the Minister may deviate from an integrated
resource plan in an emergency or if it is necessary to do so in the national interest.

[8] The respondents submit that the Minister’s determination has not been
rendered moot by the IRP 2025, essentially for two reasons. First, the Minister’s
determination, which includes 1 500 MW of new coal-fired power as an energy
source, has not been withdrawn and has continuing legal effect. Second, while
IRP 2019 has now been replaced by IRP 2025, rendering it practically moot, it
remains in the interests of justice to decide the validity of the inclusion of

3 Integrated Resource Plan 2025 was published under GN 6767, GG 53596, 28 October 2025.
4 Ibid.

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1 500 MW of new coal-fired power, because this raises discrete legal questions
of wider public importance.

Will a decision have a practical effect or result?
[9] The central issue on this appeal is whether a decision will produce a
practical result. Section 16(2)(a) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (the
Superior Courts Act) provides:
‘(i) When at the hearing of an appeal the issues are of such a nature that the decision sought
will have no practical effect or result, the appeal may be dismissed on this ground alone.
(ii) Save under exceptional circumstances, the question whether the decision would have no
practical effect or result is to be determined without reference to any consideration of costs.’

[10] The Minister’s determination states that new generation capacity must be
procured from the following energy sources : (a) 6 800 MW from renewable
energy sources (Photovoltaic (PV) and wind. Solar panels contain PV cells that
convert sunlight directly into electrical energy .); (b) 513 MW from storage;
(c) 3 000 MW from gas; and (d) 1 500 MW from coal. The respondents’ challenge
to the impugned decisions was confined to the inclusion of 1 500 MW of
electricity to be generated from coal (the 2020 coal determination) by
constructing power stations , which they contended would result in harmful
carbon emissions that would have adverse effects on the environment and
contribute to climate change.

[11] Accordingly, the Minister’s defence of the impugned decisions was limited
to the 2020 coal determination. In summary, and for present purposes, it is this:
(a) Since 1998 Parliament has enacted six statutes to give effect to the
environmental rights and its constitutional duty envisaged in s 24 of the
Constitution, including the National Environment Management Act 107 of
1998 (NEMA) and the National Environment Management: Air Quality
Act 39 of 2004 (Air Quality Act) . The NEMA provides a general

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framework to ensure environmental compliance by all developments
across all spheres of government . Any development, including the
construction of power plants that have any impact on the environment,
must comply with the requirements of the NEMA. The objects of the Air
Quality Act include taking reasonable measures for the prevention of
pollution and ecological degradation ; securing ecologically sustainable
development; and providing national norms and standards to regulate air
quality monitoring, management and control by all spheres of government.
This Act also requires all Eskom’s coal-fired and liquid fuel-fired power
stations to meet the Minimum Emissions Standards Regulations published
under the Act.
(b) The procurement process for the construction of power stations
contemplated in s 34(1)(e) of the ERA has not commenced: their location
has not been determined; the types of technologies that may be deployed
have not been specified ; and the costs thereof were not determined.
Consequently, the decisions were not ripe for review.
(c) The respondents’ challenge to the impugned decisions was impermissibly
abstract and could not be determined outside a factual matrix to ground a
constitutional complaint.
(d) IRP 2019 is not reviewable. It is untenable to declare the inclusion of new
coal-fired power generation in IRP 2019 unconstitutional, when the use of
coal for that purpose remains lawful in the Republic, and coal continues to
account for the bulk of the country’s electric ity generation. The
respondents’ challenge should have been directed at the constitutional
permissibility of coal-fired electricity generation.
(e) South Africa has complied with the nationally determined contributions it
has undertaken pursuant to the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, to
which it is a party.

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[12] NERSA’s defence to the impugned decisions in the High Court, included
the following:
(a) The NEMA gives effect to the rights invoked by the re spondents. They
should have challenged the constitutionality of NEMA or relied upon its
provisions to establish their case. They could not rely directly on the
provisions of the Constitution.
(b) NERSA is satisfied that the Minister’s determination ‘is in line with South
Africa’s CO2 emissions constraints, based on its commitments to reduce
emissions in terms of the Paris Agreement’.

[13] The High Court failed to consider, let alone determine, the defences raised
by the Minister and NERSA. If this Court now decides them, it would effectively
be undertaking a first -instance adjudication of substantial constitutional and
administrative law questions . As a rule, our courts have declined to decide on
appeal, issues not determined by the court of first instance .5 This applies in the
present case for three reasons . First, this Court is deprived of the benefit of the
High Court’s analysis and conclusions on issues which may be dispositive of the
appeal. This is inimical to the proper discharge of the appellate function. Second,
there is no sufficient public-interest justification to determine the appeal, despite
its mootness. And third, if the 1 500 MW of new coal-fired power is not part of
IRP 2025, the Court would be deciding an appeal in the context of a historical
allocation, without resolving any presently operative dispute about future
generation capacity that entails coal as a source of energy. I revert to these aspects
below.

[14] The inquiry under s 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act is whether the
order sought would have a practical consequence for the parties or others. The
absence of a live controversy does not, however, invariably preclude appellate

5 Premier, Gauteng and Others v Democratic Alliance and Others [2021] ZACC 34; 2021 (12) BCLR 1406 (CC);
2022 (1) SA 16 (CC) paras 217-219.

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adjudication. An appellate court retains a d iscretion to determine an otherwise
moot appeal where the interests of justice so require. In exercising that discretion,
the Court must consider , among other things , the nature and extent of any
practical effect the order may have, the importance and complexity of the issues,
the fullness of the argument advanced and the public interest in their
determination. The Court must also guard against deciding abstract or academic
questions where their resolution would serve no useful purpose.6

[15] Applied to the present case, the Minister’s contention that the appeal is not
moot, because the true issue for determination is whether a policy devised by
Government is reviewable, is unsound. It does not address the practical effect of
a decision on appeal. In any event, the general principle of reviewability of public
power has been settled in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association.7 There, the
Constitutional Court established that the exercise of public power is subject to
constitutional control, including the requirement of legality and objective
rationality, even where the decision does not constitute administrative action. The
respondents’ challenge to the determination was whether the Minister’s power
under s 34 of the ERA to determine new generation capacity , was lawfully
exercised in terms of the principle of legality and the Promotion of Administrative
Justice Act 3 of 2000.

[16] The Minister submits that a decision on appeal will have a practical result
in relation to the 2020 coal determination, since he may deviate from an IRP in
an emergency or if he considers it necessary to do so in the national interest. The
respondents submit that the IRP 2025 has not rendered the appeal moot, because
the Minister’s determination has continuing legal effect , ‘by reserving a

6 Independent Electoral Commission v Langeberg Municipality [2001] ZACC 23; 2001 (3) SA 925 (CC); 2001
(9) BCLR 883 (CC) para 11.

(9) BCLR 883 (CC) para 11.
7 Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association of South Africa and Another: In re Ex Parte President of the Republic
of South Africa and Others [2000] ZACC 1; 2000 (2) SA 674 (CC); 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC).

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1 500 MW p ortion of the energy mix for new coal’ . These submissions are
however incorrect, for the reasons stated below.

[17] The question is not simply whether the 2020 coal determination remains in
existence. Rather, it is whether that determination, which expressly linked the
1 500 MW of new coal -fired power to IRP 2019 , can lawfully be implemented
under IRP 2025, which has replaced IRP 2019 as the operative national electricity
plan. IRP 2025 does not provide for t he 1 500 MW of additional coal -fired
capacity.

[18] The starting point is to identify what the Minister's determination
authorised concerning coal-fired electricity generation, and the conditions
governing its implementation. That determination, made under s 34(1) of the ERA
prior to its amendment in 2025 , provided for 1 500 MW of new coal -fired
generation and expressly linked that capacity to the allocation for coal in Table 5
of IRP 2019 for 2023-2027. The requirements for its procurement included the
following. The electricity had to be purchased from independent power producers
and sold to the designated buyer (Eskom), in accordance with power purchase
agreements and other project contracts. The aim was to connect the new coal-
fired power to the national grid in line with the IRP 2019 timetable.

[19] Thus, the Minister’s determination created a legal basis for the specified
procurement, subject to its terms and the applicable law. The next question is
whether that basis is sufficient under the ERA as amended, and IRP 2025.

[20] There is no tran sitional provision in either the ERA or IRP 2025 that
preserves the continued validity of the 2020 coal determination; or that allows for
its implementation under the current statutory framework. The relevant
amendments to s 34, which came into effect on 1 January 2025, are the following:

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(a) Section 34(1) provides that the Minister may make a determination in the
event of market failure or an emergency, or for the purpose of ensuring the
security of energy supply in the national interest, after consultation with
NERSA and the Minister of Finance.
(b) Section 34(2) prescribes matters which a determination concerning new
generation capacity must address. These include the capacity required; the
permitted energy sources or technologies ; the identity or status of
generators; purchasing arrangements; and where applicable, procurement.
(c) Section 34(6)(a) states that the Minister, in making a determination, must
have regard to the IRP . Section 34(6)(b) then expressly authorises deviation
from that plan only in an emergency , or where necessary in the national
interest.
(d) Section 34(7) requires prior publication of a notice inviting public
comment on a proposed deviation, while s 34(8) permits departure from
that requirement only if it is reasonable and justifiable in the circumstances.
(e) Section 34(9) expressly provides for powers necessary or incidental to give
effect to a determination, including conducting procurement processes and
entering into the relevant contracts, subject to the applicable statutory
constraints.

[21] These provisions of the ERA do not empower the Minister to implement
the 2020 coal determination . Section 34(6) is not a free -standing power to
disregard IRP 2025.8 It permits deviation in an emergency where necessary in the
national interest, but it applies in the statutory context of making a determination.

8 Section 34(6) provides:
‘(6) In making a determination in terms of this section, the Minister-
(a) must have regard to the content of the integrated resource plan and the transmission development plan,
as the case may be; and
(b) may deviate from the integrated resource plan or transmission development plan in an emergency or if it
is necessary to do so in the national interest.’

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The Minister cannot rely on s 34(8) as if it dispenses with the substantive
conditions for deviation under s 34(6).

[22] This interpretation is consistent with the meaning of an IRP. Under the
ERA as amended, an IRP is defined as:
‘a forward -looking, indicative plan for electricity generation reflecting national policy on
electricity planning, energy sources and generation capacities that reflects national policy on
electricity planning and specifies the energy sources and technologies from wh ich electricity
may be generated, together with the amounts allocated to each.’

[23] IRP 2025 is exhaustive of the types of energy sources and technologies
from which electricity may be generated; and indicates the amount attributable to
each. Section 34(6)-(8) of the ERA expressly regulates deviations from the IRP
– the clearest indication that any departure from the operative plan requires
statutory justification. In other words, s 34(6)-(8) gives legal effect to IRP 2025.

[24] Parliament has expressly stated in what circumstances the Minister may
deviate from the operative plan and has prescribed the procedural requirements
for that deviation. Consequently, the submission that the 2020 coal determination
can still be implemented in an emergency or in the national interest, or that it has
continuing legal effect, is unsustainable in the absence of any savings provision
in the ERA or IRP 2025, and in the light of the current statutory framework.

[25] It follows that if the Minister wishes to pursue the same 1 500 MW of
coal-fired electricity generation, he cannot simply rely on the 2020 coal
determination to bypass the current framework. A new determination under s 34
of the ERA would be required for that purpose, and any deviation from IRP 2025
would have to comply with the requirements of s 34(6)-(8).

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[26] What is clear is that IRP 2025 has superseded IRP 2019. On the evidence,
this renders any decision on the constitutionality or otherwise of IRP 2019 of no
practical effect, firstly because setting aside the High Court’s order will not alter
any existing legal position. There has been no procurement process for the
1 500 MW of coal -fired generation, no contracts have been concluded, and
Eskom has acquired no rights under the 2020 coal determination through such a
process. Secondly, the original implementation timetable cannot be realised. The
determination required procurement of 1 500 MW of coal -generated power for
connection to the national grid as soon as reasonably possible, in accordance with
the timetable in IRP 2019, which contemplated commencement of connections
during 2023–2027.

[27] Thirdly, a decision on the constitutionality of IRP 2019 would be academic.
The order sought on appeal would not restore IRP 2019 as the operative national
electricity plan. The undisputed evidence is that IRP 2019 was the starting point
for the Minister ’s determination and was used ‘as a pathway to determine what
electricity capacity is needed and the energy sources from which the electricity
would be generated’. Th at determ ination was not an independent decision to
procure coal regardless of future electricity policy. It specified 1 500 MW of new
coal-fired generation by reference to the capacity allocated in IRP 2019 and
prescribed an implementation process linked to that plan. IRP 2025 has
superseded that plan and makes no provision for 1 500 MW of coal-fired capacity.
Neither would setting aside the High Court’s order restore the original
implementation timetable , nor can the 2020 coal determination lawfully be
implemented under the current statutory framework.

[28] In these circumstances, setting aside the High Court's order would remove
the declaration of invalidity, but would not enable the proposed procurement to

the declaration of invalidity, but would not enable the proposed procurement to
proceed lawfully. The Minister would still have to comply with the statutory

14


requirements for any further deter mination or other lawful authority required to
procure additional coal-fired capacity.

[29] Consequently, the removal of the declaration of invalidity would not, on
the material before the Court, establish a presently available lawful basis
for procuring the additional 1 500 MW of coal -fired capacity. Any further
determination or procurement would remain subject to the statutory requirements
applicable to it. This conclusion does not depend on the proposition that every
decision taken under a superseded IRP automatically ceases to have legal effect.
It depends on the narrower proposition that the parties have not demonstrated
how the determination under challenge could lawfully be implemented under the
current statutory framework.

[30] Neither have the parties identified any material consequence that a
successful appeal would produce for them or others. They have not demonstrated
that the appeal would restore a presently exercisable power, remove a legal
impediment to the 2020 coal deter mination, materially alter any existing legal
right or obligation, or determine a question that would govern an identified
subsequent decision. The possibility that a judgment might influence future
decisions or litigation is relevant to the discretion of this Court to determine a
moot appeal, but does not, without an identifiable practical consequence,
establish that the order sought would have a practical effect or result.

[31] In the circumstances, the parties have not established what lawful action
the Minister or NERSA would be enabled to take, or what material change in the
legal position of any affected person would follow, if the appeal succeeded. The
appeal would accordingly determine the validity of deci sions made under a
superseded planning framework without demonstrated operative consequences
under the statutory framework now in force. The appeal has therefore not been

15


shown to retain a practical effect or result within the meaning of s 16(2) (a)(i) of
the Superior Courts Act.

It is not in the interests of justice to decide the appeal
[32] Although the Court retains a discretion to determine a moot appeal, that
discretion must be exercised in accordance with the interests of justice.9 Relevant
considerations include whether the proposed order would have a practical effect
on the parties or others ; the nature and extent of that effect ; the importance and
complexity of the issues; the fullness of the argument; and the value of resolving
questions that may affect future litigation.

[33] The importance of an issue is relevant, but does not by itself require the
Court to determine a dispute that has ceased to present a live controversy. The
respondents’ reliance on the public importance of the issues must be considered
in that broader conte xt. Electricity planning, constitutional compliance and
environmental protection are matters of considerable public importance. The
question, however, is not whether those interests warrant judicial protection, but
whether their protection requires this Court to determine this appeal now, despite
the absence of a demonstrated practical consequence.

[34] In my view, it does not. The impugned decisions have not been
implemented, the High Court declared the Minister’s determination
unconstitutional, and the planning framework has since changed. The parties have
not established that a successful appeal would restore a presently available lawful
basis for the proposed procurement of 1 500 MW of coal -fired capacity,
materially alter the parties’ legal positions under the current framework, or
determine a legal question whose resolution is necessary to decide an existing or

9 Independent Electoral Commission fn 6 para 11; Normandien Farms (Pty) Ltd v South African Agency for
Promotion of Petroleum Exportation and Exploitation SOC Ltd and Another [2020] ZACC 5; 2020 (6) BCLR

748 (CC); 2020 (4) SA 409 (CC) paras 46-56.

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sufficiently identified future controversy. The Court would accordingly be
required to decide substantial legal questions without a demonstrated
corresponding practical benefit.

[35] In this regard, t he reasoning in President of the R SA v Democratic
Alliance,10 is instructive. There, the Constitutional Court declined to determine
an otherwise moot appeal notwithstanding the contention that an authoritative
ruling would provide guidance for future exercises of executive power. The Court
considered, among other fa ctors, the absence of practical utility in the order
sought, the relationship between the legal question and the underlying
proceedings, and the availability of a future case in which the issue could
appropriately be determined. The judgment does not estab lish that public
importance is irrelevant to the exercise of the discretion. It establishes that the
prospect of providing guidance, without a sufficient practical or judicial purpose,
does not necessarily justify appellate adjudication.

[36] Those considerations apply here. The respondents’ challenge was solely
directed at the allocation of 1 500 MW of new coal -fired generation under IRP
2019, the Minister’s determination and NERSA’s concurrence. It was not a
challenge to the legality of every future decision to procure coal-fired generation,
nor did it seek a general prohibition on such generation. IRP 2025 does not
contain the particular allocation under challenge. The legality of any subsequent
coal procurement would therefore have to be ass essed by reference to the
statutory powers, planning instruments, decisions and procedural requirements
applicable to that procurement.

[37] A determination of the validity of the impugned decisions under the
superseded plan would not resolve those future questions. More specifically, it

10 President of the Republic of South Africa v Democratic Alliance and Others [2019] ZACC 35; 2019 (11) BCLR
1403 (CC); 2020 (1) SA 428 (CC).

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would not determine whether the Minister could lawfully depart from IRP 2025
in the circumstances contemplated by s 34(6) of the Electricity Regulation Act,
whether the procedural requirements governing such a departure had be en
satisfied, or whether a subsequent procurement decision complied with the
applicable law. Nor would the judgment dispense with any statutory requirements
applicable to a fresh determination or procurement. The parties have not
identified a sufficiently concrete future decision whose legality would materially
turn on the determination of this appeal.

[38] The absence of first -instance findings on the defences advanced by the
Minister and NERSA reinforces that conclusion. To the extent that those defences
raise substantial questions capable of affecting the validity of the impugned
decisions, their absence from the High Court’s findings leaves the appellate court
without a determination of issues potentially material to the outcome. That
consideration does not independently preclude the exercise of the discretion. It
does, however, weigh against deciding the appeal where the original allocation
has been omitted from the successor plan and the parties have not demonstrated
a practical consequence that requires an appellate court to resolve those questions
now.

[39] The constitutional and environmental importance of the dispute does not
alter this conclusion. Those interests remain capable of judicial p rotection
through proceedings challenging a concrete decision taken under the operative
planning and statutory framework. Such proceedings would permit the Court to
consider the specific decision, the legal authority invoked, the applicable
planning instruments, the relevant decision -making record and the grounds of
challenge. They would also provide an appropriate opportunity to determine any
recurring constitutional or administrative-law question that is necessary to resolve
the dispute before the Court.

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[40] I accordingly consider that the public-interest argument does not justify
exercising the discretion to determine this appeal despite its mootness. This
conclusion does not rest on the proposition that important constitutional questions
should be left unanswered, or that future proceedings will necessarily be brought.
It rests on the narrower conclusion that the parties have not demonstr ated
sufficient practical utility, a sufficiently concrete need for authoritative guidance,
or another compelling interest of justice that outweighs the absence of a live
controversy, the change in the statutory framework, and the limitations of the
record before the Court. The appeal should therefore not be de cided in the
exercise of the Court’s discretion.

Costs
[41] The costs referred to in s 16(2) (a)(ii) of the Superior Courts Act are the
costs incurred in the court against whose decision the appellant is seeking to
appeal, not the costs in the appellate court .11 The respondents are non -profit
organisations who describe themselves as advocates for climate - and
environmental justice. They enforced fundamental rights in the High Court ,
namely environmental and children’s rights and are thus entitled to the protection
against an adverse costs order as set out in Biowatch.12 Apart from this, they have
already incurred substantial costs, they were successful in the High Court and
were thus entitled to defend that judgment. Consequently, there are no exceptional
circumstances for this Court to reassess the costs order made by the High Court.
For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this judgment should be construed as
endorsing the High Court’s order on the merits.

[42] The same considerations apply in relation to the costs of appeal. The
overriding objective concerning costs in an appeal which has become moot or

11 John Walker Pools v Consolidated Aone Trade & Invest 6 (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation) and Another [2018] ZASCA
12; 2018 (4) SA 433 (SCA) para 8.

12; 2018 (4) SA 433 (SCA) para 8.
12 Biowatch Trust v Registrar Genetic Resources and Others [2009] ZACC 14; 2009 (6) SA 232 (CC); 2009 (10)
BCLR 1014 (CC).

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produces no practical effect or result, is to do justice to the parties. In this regard,
relevant considerations include the following: the point at which the appeal was
no longer relevant or practical; when the parties learnt about its mootness or may
have anticipated to learn about it; the size of the appeal record; the extent of the
costs already incurred and that will be incurred if the appellate proceedings are
not promptly terminated ; and the time it would probably take for an appellate
court to decide the merits of the moot appeal.13

[43] Applied to the present case, the appeal record and costs thus far incurred,
are substantial. In light of the publication of IRP 2025 on 28 October 2025, and
the exclusion of coal -fired electricity generation from that plan, the Minister
ought to have known that the appeal was no longer relevant nor practical. As
demonstrated above, the grounds upon which the Minister contends that the
appeal is not moot ar e untenable , and what is sought in effect is an advisory
opinion from this Court. In the circumstances, fairness dictates that the Minister
should pay the respondents’ costs of appeal.

[44] In the result, the following order is issued:
1 The appeal is dismissed under s 16(2)(a)(i) of the Superior Courts Act.
2 The appellant shall pay the costs of appeal of the first, second and third
respondents, including the costs of two counsel.



__________________
A SCHIPPERS
JUDGE OF APPEAL



13 John Walker fn 11 para 10.

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Appearances:

For appellant: M C Erasmus SC with M Bronkhorst and L Mokgoroane
Instructed by: State Attorney, Pretoria
State Attorney, Bloemfontein

For first, second and
third respondents: C Mcconnachie and T Pooe
Instructed by: Mchunu Attorneys, Rosebank
Phatshoane Henney Attorneys, Bloemfontein


For amicus curiae: R M Courtenay with M C Letsoalo III
Instructed by: Centre for Child Law, Pretoria
Phatshoane Henney Attorneys, Bloemfontein.