SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTHWEST DIVISION-MAHIKENG
Reportable / Not Reportable
Case No: 913/2022
In the matter between:
I[...] P[...] PLAINTIFF
and
C[...] P[...] FIRST DEFENDANT
C[...] P[...] N.O. SECOND DEFENDANT
I[...] P[...] N.O. THIRD DEFENDANT
L[...] P[...] N.O. FOURTH DEFENDANT
Coram: Maree AJ
11..6.
.......
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Heard: 11 November 2025, 20 January 2026, 22 January 2026, 25 - 27
March 2026, 3-5 June 2026, and 8 July 2026
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically, circulated to the
parties’ representatives via email, uploaded to CaseLines, and released to
SAFLII. The date and time for the handing down of the judgment are deemed to
be 10h00 on 29 October 2026.
JUDGMENT
Maree AJ
Introduction
[1]. This is an action for divorce instituted by the plaintiff against the first
defendant. Ancillary relief is sought against the second to fourth
defendants, the trustees of the P[...] Family Trust, for a declaration that
the value of the trust be included in the first defendant’s estate for
purposes of calculating the accrual.
[2]. At the close of argument the parties were ad idem that:
a. the marriage has broken down irretrievably.
b. the parties’ major children, N[...] and E[...], are in need of
maintenance.
c. the marriage is subject to the accrual system and the estates fall
to be dissolved on that basis.
d. The issues for determination are:
i. the duration and quantum of maintenance payable to the
plaintiff.
ii. whether the plaintiff is entitled to additional claims for
medical-aid contributions and the replacement of a motor
vehicle every five years.
iii. the proper valuation of the first defendant’s estate for
accrual purposes, specifically:
1. the value of the shares in K[...] Sentrum (Pty)
Ltd;
2. the inclusion of the value of a Bitcoin holding and
provident fund;
3. whether capital gains tax is deductible; and
4. whether an amount of R1 ,000,000.00 paid into a
Money Maximiser account in the name of the
parties’ son forms part of the first defendant’s
estate.
iv. whether the value of the P[...] Family Trust must be
taken into account as an asset of the first defendant; and
v. costs of suit.
[3]. Before I deal with the evidence in this matter, I set out the relevant
common cause issues.
Common Cause Issues
[4]. The parties were married on 16 March 2002, out of community of
property with the accrual system. The parties’ antenuptial agreement
and the values portra yed therein are common cause. It is furthermore
common cause that the accrual is applicable to the dissolution of the
marriage relationship between the parties.
[5]. From the parties, two children were born, a daughter named E[...] and a
son named N[...]. Both children have reached the age of majority, but
are still dependent and in need of maintenance.
[6]. The parties do not dispute that the marriage relationship has
irretrievably broken down, although each party assigns blame to the
other and offers different reasons for the breakdown.
[7]. The Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter.
[8]. The first defendant appointed Mr HW Regenass (Chartered
Accountant) and Mr JP Venter (Industrial Psychologist) as experts.
Neither expert’s expertise is in dispute.
[9]. The report of Mr Venter is accepted by the plaintiff, albeit not in its
entirety.
[10]. Mr Regenass prepared a calculation of the accrual. Each entry used in
the calculation is marked chronologically from 1 to 37. Save for items
31 (the value of the shares in K[...] Sentrum (Pty) Ltd ) and 32 (the
deduction of capital gains tax), and the limited disputes concerning the
value of the first defendant’s estate as identified above, the plaintiff
does not challenge the balance of the calculation.
Evidence
Summary of the Plaintiff’s Relevant Evidence
Chief examination:
[11]. At the commencement of the trial, the plaintiff was an unemployed 49 -
year-old woman.
[12]. The plaintiff confirmed that she was married to the first defendant and
referred to the marriage certificate and antenuptial contract in support
of her evidence. Neither document was disputed. The commencement
values recorded in the antenuptial contract were R40 ,000.00 for the
plaintiff and R300,000.00 for the first defendant.
[13]. The parties were married on 16 March 2002. Following the birth of
their first child in 2004, the plaintiff ceased working and became a full-
time mother and homemaker. She continued in that role for
approximately 22 years, during which the first defendant was the sole
breadwinner.
[14]. The first defendant’s principal source of income was derived from a
Pick ‘n Pay franchise in which he participated. The franchise was held
by K[...] Sentrum (Pty) Ltd (‘ K[...] Sentrum’), in which the first
defendant held a 29% shareholding.
[15]. The plaintiff testified that, although she was not employed and
managed the household, she received a monthly income of
approximately R30,000.00 from K[...] Sentrum.
[16]. According to the plaintiff, the parties enjoyed a high standard of living
throughout the marriage, including a large family home with a
swimming pool and annual overseas holidays.
[17]. The parties’ daughter (a student at North -West University,
Potchefstroom) initially resided with the plaintiff but has since moved
to her own dwelling near the university. The parties’ son (also a student
at North-West University, Potchefstroom) lived with the first defendant
but has recently also moved to his own dwelling near the university.
[18]. The plaintiff testified that the marital relationship between her and the
first defendant had broken down irretrievably. In summary, she
attributed the breakdown to the following:
a. During 2017 and 2018, the relationship between the parties
became increasingly distant, and the first defendant began
spending extended periods away from the family home.
b. In 2020, the plaintiff discovered that the first defendant had an
active Tinder account (Tinder being an online dating platform ).
She made this discovery after accessing the contents of his
phone while he was in the shower. After the first defendant
returned from a holiday on which the plaintiff had not
accompanied him, she found condoms in his luggage. She also
discovered an email in which he expressed an intention to
amend his will so as to limit her rights in relation to the
matrimonial property.
[19]. The plaintiff testified that, at 49 years of age, her prospects of re -
entering the workforce are minimal. She attributed this to her outdated
qualifications, limited practical work experience and skills, and 22-year
absence from the teaching profession. She further testified that her
thyroid had been removed and that she continued to experience anxiety,
depression, and difficulty concentrating, which she associated with the
breakdown of the marriage. In support of her evidence regarding her
limited employment prospects, she described her unsuccessful attempts
to secure stable employment since May 2022. She testified that she had
performed pro bono work at Hoër V olkskool in Potchefstroom and
secured a temporary contract in Beaufort West in 2025. Regarding her
attempts to secure further employment, she testified that she had sent
out approximately 20 copies of her curriculum vitae but had been
unsuccessful. She also identified changes in the school system and
curriculum as reasons why she could not find suitable employment.
[20]. The plaintiff testified that she was assessed by Mr Venter, the first
defendant’s industrial psychologist. She testified about the information
she provided to him, including, inter alia, a copy of her curriculum
vitae, a list of references, and a completed questionnaire. She had two
telephonic sessions with Mr Venter, lasting 90 and 50 minutes
respectively. She complained in particular about the second session,
during which, she said, Mr Venter was rude and strict. Mr Venter,
however, apologised for his behaviour.
[21]. The plaintiff persisted in her evidence that her age counted against her
in obtaining future employment.
[22]. In support of her claim that the assets of the P[...] Family Trust (‘the
trust’) should be included in the accrual, the plaintiff testified as
follows:
a. The trust was established after her brother -in-law, the fourth
defendant, instructed her to sign the trust documents and
explained that its purpose was to protect the family home.
b. Although she had been a trustee since the trust’s establishment
in 2006, she was a trustee in name only. She had never attended
a trustees’ meeting, signed minutes or resolutions, or been
consulted about any decision.
c. The first defendant exercised complete control over the family
finances and managed the trust without her knowledge or input.
This included decisions relating to the acquisition of shares in
Interactive Trading (Pty) Ltd and Strawberry Twister (Pty) Ltd.
She testified that the first defendant initially used Salvus
Trading (Pty) Ltd , a company of which she was the sole
director but into whose affairs she had no insight, to issue false
invoices to K[...] Sentrum, the holding company of the Pick n
Pay franchise in which he held a 29% shareholding, thereby
supplementing his income. She stated that the first defendant
subsequently caused the trust, acting unilaterally, to issue
similar invoices to K[...] Sentrum. According to her, the first
defendant admitted that this conduct amounted to money
laundering.
[23]. She further testified that the first defendant paid R1 ,000,000.00 into
their son’s Money Maximiser account for no apparent reason, of which
she was not aware. This amount was also not included in Mr
Regenass’s calculation.
Cross-examination:
[24]. Regarding the breakdown of the marriage, the plaintiff testified in
cross-examination that:
a. She conceded that her conduct in accessing the first defendant’s
phone while he was showering violated the trust in their
relationship.
b. She further conceded that she had involved the parties’ then-16-
year-old daughter in the marital conflict over the first
defendant’s Tinder account.
c. The plaintiff testified about a family meeting with the first
defendant, at which their daughter was present. During the
meeting, the first defendant apologised for his conduct and was
forgiven.
d. The plaintiff conceded that, regarding the condoms found in the
first defendant’s bag, he had informed her that a friend had
placed them there as a prank. It was further put to her that the
first defendant’s friends frequently played such pranks on him,
including placing elephant dung in his suitcase on a previous
trip. The plaintiff could not recall such an event.
e. The plaintiff further conceded that the family home had always
been held by the trust and had never been transferred from one
entity to another.
[25]. The plaintiff conceded that the parties did not replace their motor
vehicles every five years during the marriage.
[26]. The plaintiff conceded that she was capable of working, but testified
that her lack of current experience and skills made it difficult for her to
cope in the workplace.
[27]. She further testified that, notwithstanding her 22 -year absence, Hoër
V olkskool was satisfied with her qualifications when she was
appointed, on a pro bono basis, to teach Life Orientation. In addition,
the school principal gave very favourable testimony concerning her
employment there. The same was admitted in respect of the school in
Beaufort West.
[28]. The plaintiff accepted a tender made on behalf of the first defendant to
enrol her in a 12 -month skills-upgrading course at the first defendant’s
expense.
[29]. She persisted in her evidence that she had neither participated in nor
exercised any influence over the management of the trust or Salvus
Trading.
[30]. She conceded that she had appointed her own experts to value the
estate and had declined to furnish their report to the first defendant
because she was dissatisfied with its conclusions.
[31]. The plaintiff was re -examined, but nothing material turned on the
evidence presented during re-examination.
[32]. The plaintiff called no other witnesses in support of her case.
Summary of the First Defendant’s Relevant Evidence
Examination-in-chief:
[33]. The first defendant confirmed that two children were born of the
marriage, both of whom have reached the age of majority.
[34]. The parties’ son, N[...], resided with the first defendant but has since
moved to a dwelling near North -West University, Potchefstroom. The
first defendant provides for all his needs and, through the trust, pays
R18,000.00 per month towards his maintenance. The plaintiff makes no
contribution to his maintenance.
[35]. Regarding the parties’ daughter, E[...], the first defendant testified that
the trust pays her maintenance in the amount fixed in the Rule 43
application. He confirmed that, for the past two years, their relationship
had broken down. The breakdown began when she became involved in
the marital disputes between the first defendant and the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding the breakdown in their relationship, he would
continue paying the maintenance amount awarded in the Rule 43
application until the end of 2027, when she was expected to graduate.
[36]. The first defendant confirmed that the marital relationship had broken
down irretrievably, but attributed the breakdown to the following:
a. The first defendant regarded the plaintiff’s conduct in involving
the parties’ then -16-year-old daughter in the dispute over his
Tinder account as unacceptable. According to him, this conduct
led their daughter to cease communicating with him entirely.
b. The parties had not shared the same marital bed since 2021.
c. The plaintiff moved out of the marital home in May 2022.
[37]. Regarding the plaintiff’s claim for maintenance, the first defendant
testified that:
a. He was 57 years old and could continue working for
approximately three to five years, after which he would retire
and receive a pension. His pension would comprise a provident
fund, the value of the Pick n Pay shares, and an investment at
ABSA Bank.
b. Before the marital relationship broke down, the plaintiff was
paid a salary of R29,000.00 per month by K[...] Sentrum.
c. K[...] Sentrum’s Pick n Pay income had been significantly
reduced, resulting in a decrease in the first defendant's salary
from R59,911.25 to R38,365.00 per month.
d. He was willing to pay rehabilitative maintenance to the plaintiff
in the amount fixed in the Rule 43 application, namely
R43,853,00, until December 2027. In addition, he tendered to
pay for a 12 -month skills -upgrading course to enable her to
return to the labour market.
[38]. Regarding the plaintiff’s claim for a new motor vehicle, the first
defendant testified that only four vehicles had been purchased during
the 22-year marriage: two new and two second-hand.
[39]. Regarding the trust:
a. The first defendant described it as an informal family trust
primarily intended to protect the family home from business
risks.
b. The trust property consisted of the dwelling house, a 10%
shareholding in Interactive Trading (Pty) Ltd ( the holding
company from which Pick n Pay rented ), and a 20%
shareholding in Strawberry Twister (Pty) Ltd ( the holding
company of the solar -power installation at the Pick n Pay
centre). The shares in Interactive Trading were purchased by
the first defendant using his personal funds and through his
loan account. The shares in Strawberry Twister were purchased
using his personal funds and funds loaned to him by his brother.
c. He further testified that the plaintiff was aware of the trust’s
operation and that they had informal discussions about it.
d. He testified that he was responsible for preparing the trust’s
invoices and making payments from the trust. He further
conceded that the scheme of issuing invoices from Salvus
Trading and, later, from the trust to K[...] Sentrum was intended
to supplement his income. He described this, however, as a
normal practice among the partners to reduce the company’s
profitability for tax purposes and generate cash flow.
e. He sought the removal of the plaintiff as trustee and trust
beneficiary because of a serious breach of the relationship of
trust between them.
[40]. He further testified that the share price of K[...] Sentrum had declined
because Pick n Pay franchises were experiencing financial difficulty
across South Africa, with 56 franchises having closed in 2025. He also
testified that he would need to sell some of his shares to pay the
plaintiff her accrual.
Cross-examination:
[41]. The first defendant admitted that the plaintiff received a salary of
R29,000.00 from K[...] Sentrum.
[42]. In cross-examination, the first defendant testified as follows regarding
the trust:
a. The plaintiff had never performed any duties as trustee.
b. There had been no formal resolution by the trustees. The first
formal resolution was adopted only after the plaintiff left the
marital home.
c. He was responsible for the trust’s invoicing and payments.
d. He had made decisions regarding the acquisition of assets, such
as shares in Interactive Trading and Strawberry Twister, and
loans to other entities without formally consulting the trustees.
e. The invoicing scheme, whereby the trust invoiced K[...]
Sentrum (previously by Salvus Trading), enabled the partners to
share in the profits and reduce the company’s profitability.
f. He and the plaintiff could not work together , and the plaintiff
did not trust him . In addition to this evidence, the factual
allegations in his counterclaim regarding why the plaintiff
should be removed as trustee were put to him during cross -
examination, and he confirmed them.
[43]. Regarding the value of the shares held in K[...] Sentrum, the first
defendant confirmed that he had previously used multipliers of 2,0 and
2,4 to calculate their value. He conceded that these multipliers were
much higher than the 0,98 multiplier used by his appointed expert for
the same purpose.
[44]. The first defendant was re -examined, but nothing material turned on
his evidence.
Summary of the Evidence of the First Defendant’s Expert Witness, Mr H W
Regenass (Chartered Accountant)
Examination-in-chief:
[45]. Mr Regenass is a qualified chartered accountant, having qualified in
1984. He lectured at the University of Pretoria and was promoted to
Associate Professor. He later left academia and established his own
practice. He has been a member of SAICA for the past 40 years and has
conducted forensic and special investigations for at least 30 years.
[46]. Mr Regenass was provided with source documents to calculate the
accrual. These included bank account records, investment account
records, annuity investments, the financial statements of K[...]
Sentrum, and the financial statements and tax records of the P[...]
Family Trust.
[47]. Mr Regenass compiled two reports, the second of which was an
updated report. For the updated report, and in valuing the K[...]
Sentrum shares, he used the company’s 2025 financial statements.
[48]. Regarding the valuation of the first defendant’s shares in K[...]
Sentrum:
a. Mr Regenass used the guideline method, as is normally applied
when Pick n Pay franchises change hands. Under this model,
monthly turnover is multiplied by a factor that changes over
time in response to economic conditions. The guideline he
received from Pick n Pay was to apply a factor of 0,98.
Applying this factor and the first defendant’s shareholding
percentage, he arrived at a value of R4,166,484.00.
b. Mr Regenass testified that several methods could be used to
determine the value of the shares, apart from the method used
by Pick n Pay. These methods could be categorised into two
approaches: an income approach and an asset approach. Each
approach comprised different valuation methods. Under the
income approach, the most common methods were the
discounted cash -flow method and the market approach. The
discounted cash flow method projected the company’s future
income and discounted it at a fair rate of return, depending on
the industry and the risks involved. Different industries,
however, developed their own valuation models, which were
usually simple and effective.
c. To conduct a reasonableness test, different models were tested
against one another.
d. Mr Regenass used the model developed by Pick n Pay because
it reflected what had actually occurred in the market and was
considered the most accurate, as that method had been used in
previous transactions. He also conducted a reasonableness test
using the discounted cash-flow method. Under that method, the
value was approximately R3,600,000.00, which was lower than
the value calculated using the industry method.
e. He also deducted capital gains tax when calculating the value
of the shares. He did so because, he testified, this accorded with
the applicable financial standards used in South Africa. Capital
gains tax is a deferred tax that becomes payable on the sale of
the asset, and a provision should therefore be made for it to
avoid overvaluing the asset. The liability would not disappear:
it would become payable either upon sale of the asset or upon
death. Because the first defendant indicated that he would have
to sell some of his shares to pay the accrual, capital gains tax
had to be accounted for.
Cross-examination:
[49]. Mr Regenass testified that he had not calculated the value of the trust
because he had been instructed that it did not form part of the accrual.
He further testified that, should the trust be found to form part of the
accrual, his calculation could be adjusted to include its value.
[50]. During cross -examination, Mr Regenass conceded that he had not
considered or investigated whether the trust was merely the alter ego of
the first defendant.
[51]. He agreed that, if K[...] Sentrum’s expenses were inflated, this would
reduce its profit and, in turn, the value of the shares.
[52]. He conceded that the turnover -based multiplier of 0,98 was derived
from information provided by the first defendant, who had obtained it
from a Pick n Pay franchise manager. Mr Regenass conceded that he
had not verified its accuracy and had no direct knowledge of the
underlying franchise sales.
[53]. It was put to Mr Regenass that he had merely accepted information
obtained indirectly from the franchise manager. He responded that he
had not merely accepted it but had compared it with the discounted
cash flow method , using the February 2025 financial statements. On
comparison, the Pick n Pay method was more favourable because it
produced a higher value.
[54]. Mr Regenass testified that, regardless of the scenario or circumstances,
the reasonableness test he applied using the discounted cash flow
method was based on the actual income stream of the specific store.
Applying this method to the Pick n Pay store in Potchefstroom yielded
a less favourable result than the industry method used by Pick n Pay.
[55]. Regarding capital gains tax, he testified that he had included it not
because the first defendant indicated he would have to sell some of his
shares, but because the asset was subject to capital gains tax.
[56]. He further conceded that the industry norm for multipliers used to
determine the value of company shares was between 2,00 and 2,5.
[57]. Mr Regenass testified that although he had not been instructed to
include the trust in the accrual, its calculated value amounted to
R2,900,000.00.
[58]. He acknowledged that his report did not include the first defendant’s
provident fund, valued at R70 ,000.00, or a Bitcoin asset valued at
R60,000.00, because he became aware of their existence only at trial.
[59]. Mr Regenass was re -examined, but nothing material turned on his
evidence.
Summary of the Evidence of the First Defendant’s Expert Witness, Mr J P
Venter (Industrial Psychologist)
Examination-in-chief:
[60]. Mr Venter is an industrial psychologist and has been involved in
medico-legal court work since 2009.
[61]. The purpose of his report was to assess the plaintiff’s career prospects
and employability.
[62]. Mr Venter described the process used to assess the plaintiff. It included
a questionnaire and two telephonic interviews. The questionnaire was
adapted from a form ordinarily used for motor vehicle accident victims
and was intended to obtain a historical overview of the plaintiff’s
qualifications, background, family background, and hobbies. The
information supplied in the questionnaire was sufficient for him to
form a general view, while information omitted from it was obtained
during the consultation process. According to Mr Venter, he obtained
sufficient information from the plaintiff throughout the process.
[63]. Mr Venter had two consultations with the plaintiff. The second was
difficult because some of the issues discussed triggered emotional
responses, and he struggled to obtain direct answers from the plaintiff.
Nevertheless, he testified that this did not materially affect the outcome
of his report.
[64]. Regarding the plaintiff’s possible career prospects, Mr Venter testified
that he reached his conclusion after considering her completed
questionnaire, her background, and consultations with colleagues and
her clinical psychologist.
[65]. Mr Venter indicated that remedial education would suit the plaintiff,
but that ordinary teaching would also suit her if she was not interested
in remedial education.
[66]. When asked about the effect of the 12 -month upgrading course
tendered by the first defendant, Mr Venter described it as an excellent
opportunity that would give the plaintiff a strong prospect of improving
her skills.
[67]. When the plaintiff’s view of her employability was put to him —
namely, that her age counted against her and that she had been outside
the education system for 22 years —Mr Venter referred to her more
recent employment at Hoër V olkskool and in Beaufort West and
indicated that she was able, and would be able, to obtain employment.
He concluded that, given time and additional training, the plaintiff was
likely to secure employment and earn the income postulated in his
report, namely a mid-level income of R28,000.00.
Cross-examination:
[68]. Mr Venter testified that, despite the difficulties the plaintiff experienced
during her employment in Beaufort West, she nevertheless produced
acceptable work.
[69]. It was put to Mr Venter that the postulated earnings of R28 ,000.00 per
month were speculative. He denied this, stating that the postulation was
not speculative but represented a likely scenario.
Re-examination:
[70]. In re -examination, Mr Venter confirmed the view of the plaintiff’s
clinical psychologist, Ms Kirsten, that, given appropriate recovery time
and professional support, the plaintiff would be a suitable candidate to
undertake training and remedial teaching, and to seek and secure
employment.
Discussion:
Irretrievable Breakdown of the Marriage Relationship
[71]. The parties do not dispute that the marriage relationship has
irretrievably broken down. Having heard the evidence of both parties, I
am satisfied that the marriage relationship has broken down
irretrievably.
Maintenance of the Major Children
[72]. Both N[...] and E[...] are major, but it is undisputed that they still need
support as they complete tertiary education and become self -
supporting.
[73]. The plaintiff’s evidence as to E[...]’s needs was seriously challenged
during cross-examination. However, before the trial concluded, the first
defendant tendered payment to E[...] of the amount awarded to her in
the Rule 43 application, namely R2 3,000.00 per month. In the absence
of further evidence, this Court can do no better than to rely on the
evidence presented during the Rule 43 application and the need
established thereby.
[74]. It was not disputed that the first defendant is solely responsible for
N[...]’ care. There was also no evidence tendered that the first
defendant will derelict his duties towards N[...]. I therefore do not find
it necessary to make a monetary order for payment of maintenance to
N[...].
[75]. The situation concerning E[...] is somewhat different. The first
defendant and E[...] have no relationship. It is undisputed that E[...]
requires maintenance and that the first defendant tendered payment of
R23,000.00. It will, therefore, be necessary to make an order to this
effect.
Maintenance for the Plaintiff
[76]. It is not disputed that the plaintiff is in need of maintenance. What is
disputed is the duration and quantum thereof.
[77]. The plaintiff currently receives R43 ,853.00 per month under a Rule 43
order. She testified that this amount meets her present needs. The first
defendant has tendered to fund a 12-month skills upgrade course and to
continue paying that sum until the end of 2027.
[78]. The plaintiff contended that, by reason of her age (49), her long
absence from the teaching profession (22 years), and alleged physical
and psychological difficulties, she is unemployable and requires
lifelong maintenance. The plaintiff’s evidence was that, since 2022, she
has attempted to secure stable employment but has failed to do so. The
plaintiff only managed to secure a teaching position at Hoёr Volkskool
on a pro bono basis and temporary employment in Beaufort West in
2025. In addition, the plaintiff testified that notwithstanding several
attempts to find stable employment, she failed to do so. The plaintiff is
of the view that her prospects of re -entering the workforce are minimal
and that time is against her. The plaintiff, however, presented no expert
evidence to substantiate the alleged health impediments and their effect
on her employability.
[79]. The first defendant called an industrial psychologist, Mr Johannes
Petrus Venter. Mr Venter’s evaluated the plaintiff and his opinion is
that the plaintiff is capable of earning a mid -level income of
approximately R28 ,000.00 per month after a 12-month upskilling
programme, and that she should obtain employment within 3 to 6
months of completing that programme. Although the plaintiff disagrees
with Mr Venter’s opinion, she failed to present any expert evidence to
contradict his opinion. It is trite that a Court is not bound by an
expert’s evidence. However, I find no reason to depart from Mr
Venter’s expert opinion. Mr Venter’s expertise was not challenged, and
his view that the plaintiff could obtain employment was bolstered by
the plaintiff’s evidence that she secured employment, albeit
temporarily and pro bono.
[80]. Section 7(2) of the Divorce Act 1 requires the Court, when considering
a maintenance order, to have regard, inter alia, to the parties’ existing
and prospective means, their earning capacities, and the period for
which maintenance should be paid. The purpose of rehabilitative
maintenance is to enable a spouse who has been economically
disadvantaged by the marriage to become self -supporting within a
reasonable time.
[81]. On the evidence , I am not persuaded that the plaintiff is permanently
unemployable. The first defendant’s tender of a twelve -month skills
1 Act 70 of 1979.
course at the North -West University (or another suitable tertiary
institution), coupled with continued payment of R43,853.00 per month,
affords her a realistic opportunity to re -enter the labour market. I am,
however, mindful that, according to Mr Venter, the plaintiff will most
likely obtain employment within 3 to 6 months after completing a
twelve-month skills course. I am of the view that this delay in
obtaining employment should be taken into account when determining
the period for which the first defendant should pay rehabilitative
maintenance. I am of the view that the first defendant should pay the
plaintiff rehabilitative maintenance until six months have elapsed after
the completion of the one-year skill upgrade course. Premise d on the
evidence, this will entail payment of rehabilitative maintenance until
the end of June 2028.
[82]. The plaintiff’s claim for the provision of a new motor vehicle every
five years is not supported by the evidence. The first defendant’s
uncontradicted testimony is that the parties’ lifestyle during the
marriage did not include the regular purchase of new vehicles at five -
year intervals.
[83]. The plaintiff’s claim for an additional medical -aid contribution is
likewise unsustainable. Her legal representative correctly conceded that
the Rule 43 amount of R43 ,853.00 already includes provision for
medical aid. The plaintiff herself described that amount as acceptable.
No additional medical-aid order is therefore warranted.
Accrual Calculation
[84]. The remaining disputes concern the proper composition and valuation
of the first defendant’s estate.
Ad Shares in K[...] Sentrum (Pty) Ltd.:
[85]. Mr Regenass valued the shares by applying a multiplier of 0.98
furnished by the Pick ’n Pay franchisee and tested against independent
reasonableness checks. The plaintiff contended that a multiplier of 2.0
(said to be the industry standard and previously used by the first
defendant) should be applied.
[86]. Mr Regenass explained that the lower multiplier reflects current
economic conditions affecting Pick ’n Pay franchises and that his
reasonableness tests confirmed the fairness of the figure. The plaintiff
obtained her own valuation but elected not to place it before the Court
or to call her valuator. In the absence of contradictory expert evidence,
I accept Mr Regenass’s valuation as fair and reliable.
Ad Bitcoin and Provident Fund:
[87]. The value of the first defendant’s Bitcoin holdings and his provident
fund must be included in the calculation of his estate. There is no legal
basis for their exclusion.
Ad Capital Gains Tax:
[88]. The first defendant contended that the capital gains tax should be
deducted because he intends to sell his shares to pay the plaintiff the
accrual. The plaintiff contends otherwise, i.e. that capital gains tax is
not deductible.
[89]. To my understanding, i f there is credible evidence that the shares will
be sold, transferred, or realised as part of the divorce arrangements, the
tax consequences may be material to the valuation or net estate
calculation. The Court should then examine the actual transaction
contemplated, the applicable tax provisions, the timing and the
evidence supporting the calculation2.
[90]. The first defendant testified that he would need to sell some of his
shares to satisfy the plaintiff’s accrual claim. No evidence was
provided as to how many shares he would need to sell, when he intends
to sell them, or how the transaction will be structured. Irrespective of
the limited evidence regarding the possible sale of shares, the first
defendant contends that capital gains tax should be deducted from the
total value of the shares ( rather than the portion he intends to sell) in
K[...] Sentrum.
[91]. Premised on the lack of evidence before this Court, I find that capital
gains tax is not deductible from the shares’ value for accrual purposes;
no such liability has been established. The deduction is accordingly
disallowed.
Ad R1 000 000 Paid Into the Money Maximiser Account:
[92]. The plaintiff contended that an amount of R1 ,000,000.00 paid by the
first defendant into a Money Maximi ser account in the name of the
2 S.L.M. v H.A.C (18281/2021) [2025] ZAGPJHC 687 (19 June 2025)
parties’ son should be treated as the first defendant ’s asset . The first
defendant’s counsel put certain propositions to the plaintiff in cross -
examination concerning this payment , but the first defendant himself
never testified to any agreement that would exclude the sum from his
estate. In the absence of such evidence , I find that the R1 ,000,000.00
forms part of the first defendant’s assets for accrual purposes.
Ad The P[...] Family Trust:
[93]. One of the central questions is whether the assets of the P[...] Family
Trust must be treated as assets of the first defendant for the calculation
of the accrual.
[94]. In Badenhorst v Badenhorst 3 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that
the assets of a trust may be taken into account in the division of
matrimonial property where the claimant proves that the other spouse
exercised de facto control over the trust so that, “but for the trust, [he]
would have acquired and owned the assets in his own name.” The
Court must examine both the trust instrument and the manner in which
the trust was administered during the marriage4.
[95]. The evidence establishes that the first defendant exercised exclusive
control over the Trust. Although three trustees were formally
3 Badenhorst v Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA) at para 9.
4 See also P A F v S C F (788/2020) [2022] ZASCA 101; 2022 (6) SA 162 (SCA) (22 June
2022) paras 41 to 42.
appointed, no formal trust meetings were held , and the independent
trustee (the fourth defendant) played no meaningful role. The first
defendant took unilateral decisions, including the payment of his
maintenance obligations to the plaintiff and the children from Trust
funds. He further caused fabricated invoices to be issued so that rental
income, in substance his own profit , was channelled through an entity
of his nomination.
[96]. These facts demonstrate that the first defendant paid scant regard to the
distinction between Trust assets and his personal assets. The
requirements of Badenhorst are satisfied. The value of the P[...] Family
Trust must therefore be included in the first defendant’s estate for the
calculation of the accrual.
Ad Calculation of Accrual:
[97]. In determining the accrual payable to the plaintiff, this Court relied on
Mr Regenass’s calculation annexed to his report . In my calculation of
the first defendant’s estate , I took into account the values of the
provident fund, Bitcoin holdings, and the P[...] Family Trust, as well as
the amount paid into N[...]’ account. The value of the shares in K[...]
Sentrum was accounted for in accordance with Mr Regenass’s
calculation. No deduction was made for capital gains tax.
Consequently, I calculate the accrual payable to the plaintiff at
R6,241,910.00. This amount is calculated on the basis that:
a. The value of the P[...] Family Trust is included in determining
the first defendant’s estate, which is valued at R2,900,000,00.
b. The value of the first defendant’s Bitcoin holdings is included
for purposes of determining the value of the first defendant’s
estate in the amount of R60,000.00.
c. The value of the first defendant’s provident fund is included for
purposes of determining the value of the first defendant’s estate
in the amount of R70,000.00.
d. The sum of R1,000,000.00 paid into the Money Maximiser
account of N[...] P[...] is included for purposes of determining
the value of the first defendant’s estate.
e. The shares in K[...] Sentrum (Pty) Ltd are valued at
R4,166,484.00 in accordance with Mr Regenass's report.
f. No deduction is made for Capital Gains Tax.
Removal of Plaintiff as Trustee of the P[...] Family Trust
[98]. I have concluded that the value of the trust should form part of the first
defendant’s estate for purposes of calculating the accrual.
[99]. I am of the view that the plaintiff should be removed as a trustee and
trust beneficiary from the trust for the reasons that follow. The first
defendant’s evidence regarding the breach of the trust relationship
between him and the plaintiff is uncontested. It is further not contested
that the plaintiff played no role in the administration of the trust. As a
consequence of this judgment, the plaintiff will receive the full
monetary benefit awarded under the accrual , which includes the value
of the trust . Continued beneficiary status serves no remaining purpose
in the parties' financial arrangements. The continued trust relationship
may obstruct the administration of the trust or result in litigation, as the
plaintiff and first defendant ha ve an
irreconcilable conflict of interest that would prevent them, as
trustees, from properly performing their duties. The exclusion of the
plaintiff would not unlawfully deprive her of vested rights or prejudice
other beneficiaries, including the children.
Costs of Suit
[100]. Both parties achieved a measure of success. In the exercise of the
Court’s discretion under section 10 of the Divorce Act, each party will
pay his or her own costs.
ORDER
In the result, I make the following order:
[1]. A decree of divorce is granted.
[2]. The first defendant is ordered to contribute towards the children’s
maintenance requirements until such time as they have completed their
tertiary education and are self-supporting, by:
a. Continuing to maintain N[...] P[...]; and
b. Payment to E[...] P[...] of the amount of R23,000.00 per month.
[3]. The first defendant is ordered to pay rehabilitative maintenance to the
plaintiff as follows:
a. payment to the plaintiff of the amount of R43,853.00 per month
up until the end of June 2028;
b. payment of a twelve -month skills -upgrade course for and on
behalf of the plaintiff at the North -West University,
alternatively such other and similar tertiary institution chosen
by the plaintiff.
[4]. The value of the P[...] Family Trust, the first defendant’s Provident
fund and his Bitcoin holding is to be taken into account as part of the
first defendant’s assets in calculating the accrual.
[5]. The amount of R1,000.000.00 paid by the first defendant to N[...] P[...]
is to be taken into account as part of the first defendant’s assets in
calculating the accrual.
[6]. The first defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of
R6,241,910.00, being the difference between the accruals of the
plaintiff’s and the first defendant’s estates.
[7]. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own legal costs.
__________________________________
GV MAREE
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
APPEARANCES
For the Plaintiff: Mr J Le Grange
Instructed by: Johan Le Grange Attorneys
E-mail: legrange@lantic.net
For the First, Second
And Fourth Defendants: Adv S Nel
Instructed by: Johan van der Vyver Attorneys
E-mail: riana@vandervyver.co.za