Drakenstein Municipality v Lolo and Others (625/2023) [2026] ZASCA 145 (29 October 2026)

70 Reportability
Constitutional Law

Brief Summary

Constitutional Law — Housing obligations — Municipality's failure to provide emergency housing — Appellant (Drakenstein Municipality) appealed against High Court's finding of breach of constitutional obligations to provide housing — Court held that the municipality had not adequately fulfilled its statutory and constitutional duties regarding emergency housing, particularly for evictees — Appeal upheld, High Court order set aside.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy





THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case no: 625/2023


In the matter between:
DRAKENSTEIN MUNICIPALITY APPELLANT
and
ERIC LOLO FIRST RESPONDENT
BERRENICE FRANSMAN SECOND RESPONDENT
THE MEMBER OF THE EXECUTIVE
COUNCIL FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS,
WESTERN CAPE THIRD RESPONDENT
THE MINISTER OF
HUMAN SETTLEMENTS FOURTH RESPONDENT
GREEN WILLOW
PROPERTIES 2 (PTY) (LTD) FIFTH RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Drakenstein Municipality v Lolo and Others (625/2023)
[2026] ZASCA 145 (29 October 2026)

Coram: DAMBUZA and SMITH JJA and KOEN, COPPIN and
BLOEM AJJA
Heard: 15 November 2024
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of
Appeal and released to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -down of the
judgment is deemed to be 11h00 on 29 October 2026.
Summary: Constitutional Law – whether the appellant ( the Municipality of
Drakenstein) had breached its statutory and constitutional obligations to take
reasonable measures to provide emergency housing for residents, particularly,
the first and second respondents, and to make reasonable provision from its own
financial resources for that purpose – whether s 5.2.2 of the appellant’s housing
selection policy is constitutionally invalid – appeal upheld.

ORDER

On appeal from: Western Cape Division of the High Court, Cape Town
(Martin AJ, sitting as the court of first instance):
1 The appeal is upheld.
2 The order of the high court is set aside and is replaced with the following
order:
‘The application is dismissed’


JUDGMENT

Dambuza JA (Smith JA and Koen, Coppin and Bloem AJJA concurring):

Introduction
[1] This appeal emanates from eviction proceedings brought by the fifth
respondent (Green Willows Properties 2 (PTY) Ltd (Green Willows) , in the
Drakenstein Magistrates ’ Court (eviction proceedings), against the first
respondent Mr Eric Lolo (Mr Lolo) and his daughter, the second respondent
(Ms Bernice Fransman) (the respondents) from Farm Langkloof Roses in
Wellington, Drakenstein (the farm). The eviction proceedings were brought in
terms of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (the Act) . The
eviction proceedings are still pending in the magistrate’s court.

[2] The municipality was cited in the eviction proceedings as the authority
charged with the responsibility of providing emergency housing which persons

evicted from their homes are entitled to access.1 In its response, the municipality
accepted its responsibility to provide housing and presented to the court
evidence of its efforts and difficulties it experience s in relation to providing
different types of housing in Drakenstein. It s tated that it was unable to supply
the respondents with an emergency house at that time and it was unable to say
with certainty when emergency accommodation would be available. It however
said arrangements could be made to provide such housing. It explained that the
number of people looking for accommodation in Drakenstein at the time, at
approximately 19 500, far exceeded availability. Meanwhile i t had created
between 400 and 800 formal ‘housing opportunities’ per year with the funding it
had received from the Western Cape Provincial Government (the province).

[3] In response to the report filed by the municipality in the eviction
proceedings, the respondents brought an application in the Western Cape
Division of the High Court, Cape Town ( high court) against the municipality,
seeking ten declarators to the effect that the municipality had breached its
obligations in relation to supplying emergency and formal housing to the
community it serves, and in particular, in relation to evictees from farms within
the municipal area . The high court granted the order sought and also granted
leave to appeal to this Court.


1Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) does not, in itself, impose the obligation. Section
9(2)(d) (iii) of that Act provides: The Court may make an order for eviction of the occupier provided if the
person in charge has, after the termination of the right of residence, given the municipality in whose area of
jurisdiction the land in question is situated . . . not less than two calendar months written notice of the order of
the intention to obtain an order of eviction, which notice shall contain the prescribed particulars and set out the

grounds on which the eviction is based: Provided that if a notice of application to the court has, after the
termination of residence been g iven to the occupier, the municipality and the head of the relevant provincial
office of the Department of Rural Development and Land Reform not less than two months before the date of
commencement of the hearing of the application.’ The obligation on the municipality arises from s 26(2) of the
Constitution to the effect that: ‘The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve progressive realisation of access to adequate housing.’ Section 9 of the Housing
Act 107 of 1997 places a duty on municipalities to promote access to emergency adequate housing within the
national and provincial frameworks. Part 3 of the 2009 National Housing Code, Emergency Housing
Programme regulates provision of temporary emergency housing assistance to people who become homeless or
face exceptional housing need through circumstances beyond their control .

The background
[4] The factual basis on which the order of breach of constitutional
obligations was sought is the following. Mr Lolo had been living and working
on the farm since , at least, 1996.2 He asserted that in 2006 he registered on the
housing waiting list. There is no evidence on what happened to that registration.
In the founding affidavit Mr Lolo only asserted that he, together with Ms
Fransman live in rural areas and qualify for state-subsidised formal housing, and
that they needed emergency housing. At the time of instituting the application to
which this appeal relates , Mr Lolo lived at the farm with Ms Fransman and her
son. In August 2015, Green Willows launched the eviction proceedings in terms
of the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA). The reason was
that Mr Lolo’s right to occupy the premises he lived in was terminated when he
was retrenched in 201 3. Mr Lolo opposed the eviction application . The
proceedings were ultimately stayed pending the high court application against
the municipality, the third respondent (the Member of the Executive Council for
Human Settlements, Western Cape – MEC), the fourth respondent (Minister of
Human Settlements -Minister) and Green Willows (respondents).

The high court proceedings
[5] In the high court the respondents sought declarators to the effect that the
municipality had failed to comply with its obligations to take reasonable
measures to provide emergency and formal housing to its residents. They
contended that the municipality had no emergency housing policy. They also
sought a declarator that the municipality must use its resources to meet its
obligations in relation to emergency housing instead of relying on allocations
from the province . The y contended that s 5.2.2 of the municipality’s housing
selection policy, dated 28 October 2014, is unconstitutional and invalid, to the

2 Mr Lolo first worked on the farm from 1976 until 1983 and then again from 1996 until his retrenchment in
2013.

extent that it ‘precludes’ farm residents who had been registered on the housing
database for a substantial period of time from benefiting from the 20 per cent
quota set aside for farm workers and farm residents in municipal housing
projects. I discuss the background to this clause in the municipal policy in the
paragraphs that follow.

[6] The relief sought by the respondents in the high court was premised on
the significant increase in the scale of evictions in Drakenstein . They described
the increase as constituting a crisis. In contrast, there was a dire shortage of
emergency housing for evictees. These facts align with the municipality’s own
description of the circumstances resulting from evictions in the Drakenstein
area.

[7] According to the respondents, the municipality d id not prioritise the
provision of emergency housing. At the same time however, they acknowledged
that the municipality had taken measures to address the disadvantage s peculiar
to its rural residents regarding provision of emergency housing by prescribing in
s 5.2.2 of its housing selection policy , that 20 per cent in every new formal
housing project must be reserved for residents from rural communities
(farmworkers and farm residents) who ha ve lived on farms for more than ten
years.

[8] The respondents contended, both in the high court and in this Court, that
these measures are insufficient because rural residents who ha d been registered
on the housing database for a ‘substantial period of time’ w ill still not benefit
from the 20 per cent quota. They asserted that the municipality had been unable
to provide emergency housing since 2013. Relying on an extensive legal
framework, including s 26, s 152, and s 153(a) of the Constitution, together
with s 9 of the Housing Act 109 of 1997 (the Housing Act) and s 4(2) (j), s 23

and s 73(1) of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 200 0 (the
Systems Act) . They argued that they were in an emergency, that the
municipality had failed to meet its obligation to provide housing, and was
unable to say when housing would be available for its communities. They
maintained that an amount of R 1 million, set aside in the municipality’ s
business plan for housing , was mere tokenism because no provision was made
for such expenditure in its budget. In addition, none of the sites that the
municipality had earmarked for emergency housing was readily available.

[9] In opposing the application, the municipality objected to the institution of
new, ‘premature’ proceedings in the high court while the eviction proceedings
remained pending in the magistrate’s court . It argued that, in any event, the
constitutional challenge was built on a ‘hopelessly vague and baseless ’
foundation. It referred to Green Willow’s answering affidavit in the same
proceedings, explaining that , subsequent to Mr Lolo’s retrenchment from the
farm he approached the CCMA for relief and a financial settlement was reached
with him, thus settling the contestation regarding compliance with the
provisions of ESTA.

[10] The high court granted the order sought by the respondents. It however
granted the municipality l eave to appeal to this Court. In granting the
declarators to the effect that the conduct of the municipality was in breach of its
constitutional obligations,3 the high court considered the reports prepared by the

3The order of the high court reads:
‘1 The First respondent is declared to be in breach of its constitutional and statutory obligations by failing
to take reasonable measures to provide people living within its area of jurisdiction with emergency housing;
2 The First respondent’s policy, alternatively, practice of relying primarily, on grants and other funding
received from the Provincial Government in order to provide emergency housing is declared unlawful.

3 The First Respondent is declared legally obliged to make reasonable provision[s] from its own
financial resources, excluding Funds received from the Provincial Government, or other external sources, for
emergency housing;
4 The First Respondent is directed to make reasonable provision from its own financial resources,
excluding housing grants received from Provincial Government, for emergency housing;

municipality in 2013 and 2016 and filed in Goosen v The Mont Chevaux Trust
(Goosen).4 In those reports, the municipality acknowledged that it had n o
approved land available for housing development, and had no readily available
emergency accommodation. However, it expected that it would have emergency
housing available in the period between June and December 2014 on a piece of
land identified as erf 584 Dromedaris . In the meantime, the municipality
undertook to make necessary arrangements to provide emergency housing when
the need arose for allocation of emergency housing to particular individuals .
Against this background, this Court in Goosen, in dismissing an appeal against
an order of eviction made by the Land Court, granted a supervisory order that
the municipality would report to it regarding its progress in providing homes to
the homeless.5

[11] In its 2016 report, which the municipality also filed in the present
proceedings (see paragraph 2 above ), it disclosed that it had been cited in 340
other cases of evictions and it estimated that the number of families confronted
with evictions would increase to approximately 1 500. By the time the 2016
report was filed, the municipality had identified three sites, in Gouda, Paarl and
Simondium (areas within its jurisdiction) for housing developments . However,
preparation of these sites was beset by difficulties. The Gouda site , which had
already been declared, was invaded by members of the local community , who

5 Section 5.2.2 of the first respondent’s housing selection policy, dated 28 October 2014, is declared
unconstitutional and invalid, to the extent that it precludes farm residents who have been registered on the
Municipality database for a substantial period of time from benefitting from the 20 per cent quota set aside for
farm workers and farm residents in future municipal projects;
6 The declaration of invalidity in part 5 of this order is suspended until 27 February 2023 pending the

First Respondent complying with part 7 of this order by that date;
7 The First Respondent is directed to remove and reformulate section 5.2.2 of its Housing Selection
Policy so as to render it constitutionally compliant by 27 February 2023;
8 The First Respondent is directed to provide the court with a written report setting out the measures and
or steps it has taken in compliance with this order on 27 February and 31 August each year.
9 The First Respondent is directed to make a copy of each report referred to in Part 6 of this order
available to the Applicants and to publish the report on its website at least 21 days in advance of each of the
dates prescribed in part 6 of this order;
10 The First Respondent shall pay the Applicants’ costs, including the costs of two counsel.’
4 Goosen v Mont Chevaux Trust[2017] ZASCA 89; 2017 JDR 1135 (SCA).
5 Goosen v The Mont Chevaux Trust para 37..

erected informal structures in protest of what they viewed as planned
occupation of their community by ‘outsiders’ – the persons requiring emergency
accommodation. The municipality had instituted eviction proceedings against
such land invaders, which were still pending in court at the time.

[12] The Paarl site, known as Vlakkeland, which would cater for 2 500
houses, of which 500 would be emergency housing units , was delayed because
of the cost of the bulk services infrastructure (estimated at about R 40 million)
and relocation of small -scale fa rmers that were occupying the site. The
Department of Human Settlements had provided for the funds in its 2016 /2017
financial year. However, as I discuss in more detail later, the project had to be
abandoned at the instance of the Provincial Department of Human Settlements ,
a development also discussed later in this judgment.

[13] The Simondium site was under consideration for establishment of a
formal housing development . However, the owner of the site which had been
originally earmarked for emergency h ousing did not want to sell the targeted
properties. The project failed for that reason. Talks were underway in relation to
securing an alternative site for emergency housing. It was estimated that these
difficulties could be resolved in a period of about 24 months.

[14] In this (2016) report, the municipality also intimated that although
emergency housing is delegated to local government, the delegation was not
accompanied by dedicated funding from national government . It stated that,
although it accepted the constitutional responsibilities allocated to it ‘in terms of
precedent’, it was not the custodian of ESTA and the engagement and
facilitation processes attendant to ESTA, together with the budget allocations

and other resources that enabled the realisation of the rights conferred through
ESTA, were a function of the Department of Rural Development and Land
Reform. For that reason , its Framework engaged with the other spheres of
government for financial assistance under the Intergovernmental Relations
Framework Act 13 of 2005.

[15] The high court found that the municipality had failed to fund its
emergency housing programme; and that instead of establishing ‘well planned
and executed measures’ to progressively realise the constitutional right to access
housing, it relied on ‘ad hoc measures’, which were ‘no substitute’. It found that
the failure of the municipality’s efforts to develop Vlakkeland , because of a
‘provincial government veto’ and its choice of a site that lies within a 100 -year
flood plain exclusion area, were evidence of the unreasonableness of its general
conduct and its reliance primarily on funding from the provincial or national
government, while making minimal contribution from its own resources. The
high court also found that the lack of funds was not a valid excuse for the
municipality’s failure to provide emergency housing. Having made the
declaratory orders, the high court ordered the municipality to provide it with a
written report on 27 February and 31 August in each year , regarding the
measures it had taken to comply with its order.

Appeal Discussion
The arguments made in this appeal
[16] The municipality contended in the high court, and in this Court, that the
respondents did not make out a proper case for the relief they sought. In
particular, it contends this appeal, that, first, the facts upon which their case was
founded we re vague such that no proper case was made in their founding
papers. Further, it contends that the high court misconstrued the approach to the
inquiry as to whether the state had complied with its obligations or the approach

to the inquiry into the reasonableness of its polic ies or their implementation. In
this regard the high court found that unless the municipality could demonstrate
that the respondents’ claim was frivolous , ‘it [bore] the onus of proof’ to
establish the reasonableness of the measures taken . In other words, on the
approach set by the high court, the respondents were entitled to only make bare
allegations of unreasonableness or non -compliance on the part of the
municipality, and the onus shift ed to the municipality or the state to refute the
claims, unless it could demonstrate that the claim is frivolous.

[17] The submission on behalf of the municipality is that the high court’s
approach when applying the law to the facts must have been guided by the
incorrect approach, to reach the incorrect decision. In addition, the high court’s
failure to apply the correct test constitutes a fundamental misdirection which
‘irredeemably colours all the findings it made’.

[18] The respondents argue that the municipality’s description of the approach
adopted by the high court is incorrect. Furthe rmore, the municipality failed to
account openly to the Court. Additionally, the continued challenge to high
court’s order of constitutional invalidity of s 5.2.2 of the Housing Selection
Policy is at odds with the concessions made by the municipality in the high
court, that it needed to reformulate the policy , to give it more clarity. The
respondents also defend the interdict and supervisory order made by the high
court.

The Law
[19] The principal source of the responsibilities on the municipalities is s 9(1)
of the Housing Act.6 In terms of this section every municipality must take all

6 Section 9(1) of the Housing Act 107 of 1997 states that;
‘Functions of municipalities

reasonable steps within the framework of the national and provincial housing
legislative framework, on a progressive basis, to ensure that its residents have
adequate housing. It must: (1) set housing delivery goals for its area, (2) identify
and designate land for housing development, (3) create and maintain an
environment conducive to financially and socially viable housing development,
(4) facilitate the resolution of conflicts arising in the housing development
process, (5) provide bulk engineering services, and (6) manage land use and
development. The determination of whether a municipality has complied with
these responsibilities is viewed through the prism of s 26(2) of the Constitution
– the obligation on the state to ‘take reasonable legislative and other measures,
within its available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of [the right
to access adequate housing].’7

[20] Generally, housing is a concurrent national and provincial competence. 8
The municipal responsibilities in relation to housing is an assigned rather tha n
original competence. Section 156(4) of the Constitution provides:
‘The national government and provincial governments must assign to a municipality, by
agreement and subject to any conditions, the administration of a matter listed in Part A of
Schedule 4 or Part A of Schedule 5 which necessarily relates to local government, if-

(1) Every municipality must, as part of the municipality's process of integrated development planning, take all
reasonable and necessary steps within the framework of national and provincial housing legislation and policy
to-
(a) ensure that-
(i) the inhabitants of its area of jurisdiction have access to adequate housing on a progressive basis;
(ii) conditions not conducive to the health and safety of the inhabitants of its area of jurisdiction are
prevented or removed;
(iii) services in respect of water, sanitation, electricity, roads, stormwater drainage and transport are provided

in a manner which is economically efficient;
(b) set housing delivery goals in respect of its area of jurisdiction;
(c) identify and designate land for housing development;
(d) create and maintain a public environment conducive to housing development which is financially and
socially viable;
(e) promote the resolution of conflicts arising in the housing development process;
(f) initiate plan, co -ordinate, facilitate, promote and enable appropriate housing development in its area of
jurisdiction;
(g) provide bulk engineering services, and revenue generating services in so far as such services are not
provided by specialist utility suppliers; and
(h) plan and manage land use and development.’
7 Section 26(1) and s (2) of the Constitution.
8 See Schedule 4 Part A to the Housing Act.

(a) that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and
(b) the municipality has the capacity to administer it.’

[21] Municipalities are required, as part of their Integrated Development
Plans, to set out housing delivery goals and land designation planning
obligations as required under s 9 of the Housing Act. 9 In City of Johannesburg
Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlighting Prop erties 39 (Pty) Ltd and
Another 10(Blue Moonlighting ) the Constitutional Court considered s 9 of the
Housing Act together with the Housing Code and held that municipalities must
plan and budget for emergency housing. They cannot escape responsibilit y for
emergency housing by pointing at provincial and national government roles.

[22] With regard to the approach to determination of reasonableness of the
measures put in place by a municipality, the basic principle that an applicant in
motion proceedings must make out a proper case for the relief he or she seeks
must apply. The applicant may not simply allege unreasonableness of conduct,
failure to take reasonable measures or failure to implement without pleading,
with reasonable clarity, the facts to ground such allegations. In cases of alleged
unreasonableness of measures taken by the state to meet constitutional
obligations this must entail identification of the right engaged and the
applicant’s entitlement to it, the identification of the measure taken by the state
or the failure said to be unreasonable, an explanation of the purpose of the right
and the impact of the failure on the person(s) affected.

[23] With regard to the approach to be adopted by courts in assessing the
reasonableness of the measures taken, in Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg

9 Sections 9(1)(b) and (c) of the Housing Act.
10 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlighting Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and ZACC 33;
2012 (2) BCLR 150 (CC); 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC).

(Mazibuko) 11, the Constitutional Court held that when challenged on the
policies on socio -economic rights, the state mus t ‘explain why the policy [and
implementation] is reasonable and disclose what it has done to formulate the
policy; its investigation and research, the alternatives considered, and the
reasons why the option underlying the policy was selected.’ The C ourt
cautioned however, that ‘the Constitution does not require government to be
held to an impossible standard of perfection,’ and courts should not assume the
task that, in a democracy , should properly be reserved for the democratic arms
of governments.

[24] Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others (Khosa)
12 reaffirms that reasonableness is context specific. The inquiry in relation to
socio-economic rights requires consideration of the nature and the purpose of
the right in a specific context. The courts have not laid a principle that ‘a degree
of intervention [is required from courts] which has significant implications for
pre-existing policy and resource distribution’ as the high court found.

Determination of measures taken
[25] I agree with the submission on behalf of the municipality that the high
court followed an incorrect approach. There is no onus on the state , when
asserting vagueness and lack of the necessary averments, to prove that the
applicant’s claim is frivolous. The onus on the state is to set out the measures it
has put in place in the discharge of its obligations as discussed in para 22 above.

[26] I also agree that in this case the respondents’ founding affidavit fell short
of the required standard . As stated, Mr Lolo’s founding affidavit only goes as
far as him having registered for formal housing in 2006. There is no explanation

11 Mazibuko v City of Johannesburg 2010 (4) SA 1 (CC).
12 Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development and Others, Mahlaule and Another v Minister of Social

Development [2004] ZACC 11; 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); 2004 (6) BCLR 569 (CC) para 49.

of what happened thereafter. Nor is there an asserted nexus between his
registration on the municipal database and the alleged failure by the
municipality to take reasonable steps to provide formal housing.

[27] The case relating to the failure to take reasonable steps to provide
emergency housing emanates from the reports filed by the municipality. The
application in the high court was launched without the respondents having
approached the municipality to register on the database or apply for emergency
housing. As stated, a lthough the municipality said in the reports that it did not
have readily available emergency housing and could not say when such housing
could be available, it made an undertaking to make arrangements for emergency
housing if and when the need arose.

[28] Evidently, when they launched the high court proceedings the
respondents were unaware that the municipality does have an Emergency
Housing Policy. Mr Lolo asserted that the municipality did not have an
emergency housing policy. That this was incorrect was brought to the
respondents’ attention in the municipality’s answering affidavit. As a result, the
averments such as those made by the respondents that the municipality had
failed to self -fund for emergency housing and had considered itself not
responsible for funding emergency housing, were also wrong. The high court, it
would appear, also proceeded on the assumption that the municipality did not
have an emergency housing policy , and did not realise that the emergency
housing policy in place provided for self -funding of emergency housing to
supplement provincial funding.

[29] Once the Emergency Housing Policy was brought to their attention, the
respondents’ case in reply pivoted to the attack on the municipality’s
implementation of the emergency housing policy. Furthermore, the attack on the

municipality’s formal housing policy did not refer to specific aspects of that
policy that were considered deficient.

[30] The shortcomings in the respondents’ pleadings cannot be waved away
on the basis that the municipality was able to plead to the case made by the
respondents, as the high court did (in the judgment on the application for leave
to appeal). As the Constitutional Court held in Public Servants Association obo
Ubogu v Head of the Department of Health, Gauteng and Others (Ubogu),13
‘orders of constitutional invalidity have a reach that extends beyond the parties .
. . holding the parties to the pleadings is not pedantry . . . [but rather an] integral
part of the principle of legal certainty which is an element of the rule of law’.

[31] Although in its reports the municipality had confessed to not having
ready emergency housing, it had undertaken to provide such housing in case of
need. The high court found that the municipality did not have a plan and
provided emergency housing on an ad hoc basis . There was a plan. The
difficulty was implementation. The high court’s finding does not take into
account that the municipality had explained its plans in relation to the
Dromedaris project and the challenges it had experienced with regard to
implementing its housing projects. There was also the difficulty that funds could
not be allocated without land having been secured.

[32] It was submitted on behalf of the municipality that the high court’s view
that the municipality had the onus to prove that the respondents’ case has
frivolously coloured all its findings. Indeed , there is ample reason for concern
with the approach adopted by the high court, particularly its disregard of the
substantial evidence tendered by the municipality in its 2016 report. Its finding

13 Public Servants Association obo Ubogu v Head of the Department of Health, Gauten g and Others; Gauteng
and others: Head of the Department of Health, Gauteng and another v Public Servants Association v Public

Servants Association obo Ubogu 2018(2) SA 365 (CC) para 50.

that the municipality should have tendered the evidence of a budgeting expert
adds to the apprehension that the disregard of the evidence tendered formed part
of the misunderstanding of the relevant test.

[33] The high court concluded that:
‘the factual material that the Municipality provided does not displace its admissions in both
Housing Reports in revealing a dismal failure on its part to achieve a progressive realisation
of the constitutional right of access to adequate housing. The Municipality’s malperformance,
particularly concerning emergency housing, is characterised by a failure to implement
proactive planning measures, as well as those plans which it did formulate, being scuppered
by its failure to self-fund’.

[34] This conclusion does not take into account the following evidence. The
municipality explained that housing projects are approved on a five year
‘housing pipeline’. Once approved , a project would take three years to get to
implementation stage. Once there is budget approval , a project moves to
business plan stage. However , land availability ofte n becomes a problem
because of issues such as litigation or resistance from local communities.

[35] Having acknowledged in the 2013 report, that farmworker evictions were
reaching crisis proportions, the municipality list ed the housing projects that it
undertook thereafter, including:
(1) Dromedaris site – erf 5[…] - 1 567 formal housing opportunities and the
related ‘temporary emergency accommodation;’
(2) New Siyazama - 236 housing units at a cost of R 19 million;
(3) Gouda - 150 formal houses at a cost of R 18 million to which the
municipality contributed 10 per cent plus the cost of a reservoir – about R 2,3
million;
(4) Project 59 – 975 formal housing completed in 2012 at a cost of R 57
million;

(5) Fairyland project – which won an award in the category of Western Cape
Upgrade of Informal Settlement;
(6) Ongoing projects: Vlakkeland – 2 500 formal housing opportunities over
3 to 5 years with a budget of R 375 million (the project was later abandoned);
(7) Kingston upgrade of an informal settlement;
(8) Erf 6[…], Paarl – 1200 GAP and social housing opportunities for about
R400million;
(9) Fairlyland upgrade of an informal settlement – 259 top structures of
which 179 were completed for total budget of R 31millon;
(10) Erf 5[…] formal housing for R 50 million; and
(11) Siyahlala 1 and 2 upgrade of informal settlements -243 top structures of
which 150 were completed with a budget of R 29 160.000.

[36] With regard to the Simondium project, the municipality’s evidence was
that, because of the refusal of the owner of the adjacent land to sell his property,
and the simmering tensions with the local community (in relation to both
Simondium and Gouda) , the municipality decided to allocate ‘opportunities’
that had been earmarked for emergency housing to formal housing only.

[37] By 2016 the bulk of the land allocated to the municipality for emergency
housing was in th e Vlakkeland project . The project had 2556 housing
opportunities of which 500 were earmarked for an emergency accommodation
project known as Temporary Relocation Area (TRA). The total budget for this
project was R 375 million, with a further R 34 million required for installation
of bulk sewage and stormwater infrastructure. The province contributed R 30
million to the cost of the engineering services and the balance was to be borne
by the municipality.

[38] However on 27 September 2016, at a meeting of the Project Progress &
Co-ordination Committee , the representatives from the province reversed the
decision to reserve a portion of the Vlakkeland project for the TRA. The reason
was that an emergency housing arrangement would allow ‘queue jumping’
ahead of applicants who had been on the formal housing list for longer. This
sentiment was confirmed by the provincial administration in a letter from Ms
Phila Mayisela, dated 29 June 2017, which forms part of the record. Thus , the
TRA portion of the Vlakkeland project came to an end. The municipality refers
to other ongoing efforts to secure land for housing development, including the
Bio Delta Farm and Schoongezicht. The municipality was finally able to
develop 344 emergency houses in Schoongezicht. This was achieved despite
members of the ‘backyard dwellers ’14 stopping construction, objecting to the
land being use d for emergency housing. The matter was settled by
accommodating 67 of them in the TRA project and the remainder of the 344
sites were allocated to emergency housing. The high court makes no mention of
these developments in its judgment.

[39] The high court found that the municipality should have overridden the
decision of the provincial administration on the Vlakkeland project. It criticised
the municipality for having secured land located on a 100 flood plain. 15
However, it was not in dispute that the municipality made all these efforts to
secure land to develop emergency and formal housing. Regarding overriding the
decision of the province , the municipality correctly contends that such view is
impermissibly interventionist; it ignore s settled principles with regard to co -
operative governance and disregards polycentric decision making and
implementation.

14 ‘Backyard dwellers’ are households that occupy room s or an informal structure in a property owned by

someone else . People living in overcrowded formal conditions: ‘Backyarders’ in formal housing areas and
people living in overcrowded conditions in formal structures in formal housing areas.
15 The municipality’s engineers rejected development on this site because it is located in a 100 year flood plain.

[40] The judgment of the high court also missed the evidence relating to the
self-funding or contributions made by the municipality towards the provision of
emergency housing. These efforts are far from negligible. The municipality
contributed R 29 million of its funds to the Vlakkeland project which the
provincial administration decided to scrap. Apart from the projects already
referred to, i t also contributed its own funds to the following projects: (1)
Nieuwenhoop – R 1 440 000; (2) New Beginnings – R 1 350 000; and (3)
Dietman Street – R 1 175 000. The conclusion that the municipality acted
unreasonably when it failed to self -fund is therefore not supported by the
evidence. It is informed by the erroneous impression that all that the
municipality did was to provide R 1 million in its annual plan and there was no
provision made for this amount in the municipal budget.

[41] There is no legal basis for the high court’s finding that municipalities are
compelled to primarily fund their emergency housing obligations from their
own resources to the exclusion of funding received in terms of the Division of
Revenue Act 6 of 2011 (DORA) or any other external source. There is also no
legal basis for the finding that municipalities must self -fund before resorting to
other sources. What the courts have said is that municipalities may not rely
exclusively on provincial funds to meet their emergency housing obligations. 16
The municipality accepts this principle.

Constitutionality of s 5.2.2 of the Housing Selection Policy
[42] The high court granted an order that s 5.2.2 of the municipality’s Housing
Selection Policy was unconstitutional and invalid, to the extent that it precluded
farm residents who had been on the data base for a substantial period of time ,
from benefitting from the 20 per cent quota set aside for them in future

16 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Blue Moonlighting Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd para 57.

municipal housing projects. It ordered the municipality to reformulate the
section. In its terms the section provides:
‘5.2.2 Quota for fam residents including farm workers
A quota of 20% of opportunities in the project component will be set aside for farmworkers
and farm residents who are ordinarily resident in the Municipal area in all projects, provided
that they have in the past, or they continue to reside on farms outside of the towns in the
Municipality for a conti nuous period of 10 years or more unless otherwise decided by the
Mayoral Committee;
a) They are 55 years or older;
b) They have been up until recently not been registered on the database;
c) They have been (or are being) su bstantially excluded from housing opportunities,
despite the use of registration data measures listed.’

[43] Indeed the section could have been framed more clearly. The
municipality readily admitted that. However , it is capable of an interpretation
which is consistent with the Constitution. ‘Quota’ is defined in the Housing
Selection Policy as ‘[a] portion of the opportunities available in a project
component reserved for households with particular characteristics.’ This is self-
explanatory. The purpose of prescribing the quota appears in section 3 of the
policy which explains the ‘overall policy principles. ’ One of the applicable
principles is ‘equity,’ meaning ‘all persons must have an equal opportunity in
applying for housing assistance.’

[44] The purpose of clause s 5.2.2 is to ameliorate the disadvantage to
residents and workers who live on farms located far from urban centres where ,
registration for accessing housing opportunities is provided. The aim is to
achieve equity, not only between farm and urban residents, but also among the
farm residents. The 10-year period is aimed at ensuring that rural residents who
have been disadvantaged for longer by distance from town o r city, get priority
in accessing housing.

[45] The clause must be understood to operate on the assumption that the data
of persons who were able to register on the municipal database , remains on that
repository until the allocation of housing. In terms of clause s 5.1.3 of the
policy, the allocation of households to housing opportunities is done acco rding
to registration date. Then under clause 5.2.2 b) provision is made for recent
registrations; and under clause 5.2.2 c) for those who have been systemically
excluded despite their attempts to register through the registration mechanism
provided. There is no textual basis in clause 5.2.2 for the contention that the
provision precludes residents who have been registered on the housing database
for a substantial period from benefitting from the 20 per cent quota. Nowhere
does Mr Lolo explain how this occurs.

[46] The municipality explained, in its answering affidavit, that the Provincial
Policy Framework on Selection of Housing Beneficiaries (the P PF) issued in
August 2009 prescribes a requirement that municipalities should ensure that
their policies are implemented in a manner that includes households located
outside of the towns in which housing projects are located. The PPF also directs
that municipalities ensure that households living in close proximity to housing
projects are not prioritised ‘to the degree that those living further away from the
projects are systematically excluded from receiving housing opportunities.’
Clause 5.2.2 aligns with s 9 of the Constitution and the i njunction contained in
the PPF.

[47] In their Notice of Motion the respondents sought a declarator that the
municipality had failed to take reasonable measures to ensure that the right of
access to housing for people living on rural land is provided for .17 This prayer

17 Prayer 5 of the Notice of Motion;

was abandoned. Indeed clause 5.2.2 constitutes reasonable measures by the
municipality to ensure that housing opportunities are provided, specifically, for
rural residents and workers.

[48] Further facts peculiar to this matter bear mention . As stated, Mr Lolo
never registered to access the emergency housing or housing provided for in the
rural housing quota dispensation. Therefore, he could not have been excluded
from the benefits available under these programmes . In addition, after
considerable toing and froing , Mr Lolo accepted an emergency housing offer
from the municipality but persisted with the high court application. Against this
background the municipality raised the non -joinder of the Minister of Rural
Development and Land Reform (Minister) on the basis that the housing policy
was adopted in terms of a ‘mandate’ from the national department. I agree with
the respondents’ contention that the fact that the Minister ‘mandated’ the
adoption of a policy does not necessitate his or her joinder in a dispute on the
content of the adopted policy. Nevertheless, for the reasons that I have stated in
the paragraphs above, the appeal must be upheld.

[49] On the Biowatch principle no costs order will be made against the
respondents in this Court and in the high court.

[50] The following order is made:
1 The appeal is upheld.
2 The order of the high Court is set aside and is replaced with the following
order:
‘The application is dismissed.’


‘Declaring that the first respondent has failed to take reasonable measures to ensure that the right of access to
adequate housing of people living on rural land within its area of jurisdiction is progressively reali sed.’

___________________
N DAMBUZA
JUDGE OF APPEAL

Appearances

For the appellant: N Greig with M Adhikari
Instructed by: Van Der Spuy & Partners
C/O Phatshoane Henney Attorneys
Bloemfontein

For the respondents: P Hathorn SC with S Khoza
Instructed by: J D Van der Merwe Attorneys
C/O Webbers Attorneys
Bloemfontein.