Salungano Group Ltd v Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others; Ndalamo Coal (Pty) Ltd v Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others (CCT 37/25; CCT 38/25) [2026] ZACC 38 (7 October 2026)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Companies Act 71 of 2008 — Business rescue proceedings — Voting rights of creditors — Court determining that post-commencement creditors do not have the right to vote on the adoption of a business rescue plan — Appeal upheld, declaring that the amended business rescue plan was not supported by the required majority of creditors' voting interests — Matter remitted for a fresh vote.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


These consolidated matters were applications for leave to appeal and appeals to the Constitutional Court against a judgment and order of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA). The core dispute concerned the interpretation and application of Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, specifically sections 152 and 153, within ongoing business rescue proceedings.


In CCT 37/25, the applicant was Salungano Group Limited. In CCT 38/25, the applicant was Ndalamo Coal (Pty) Limited. The principal respondents across both matters were Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Limited, the business rescue practitioner (Mr Phahlani Lincoln Mkhombo N.O.), and related parties including Arnot Opco (Pty) Limited and Wescoal Mining (Pty) Limited. The International Women’s Insolvency and Restructuring Confederation of South Africa Network NPC participated as amicus curiae.


The litigation history was as follows. Urgent proceedings were brought in the High Court (Gauteng Division, Johannesburg) after disagreement arose about the validity of a vote on a business rescue plan taken at a creditors’ meeting on 28 July 2023. The High Court made declaratory orders in favour of the adoption of the plan and directed implementation. On appeal, the SCA set aside that order and directed that voting begin afresh, having concluded that post-commencement creditors could vote and that the vote was factually unreliable due to irregularities. The present appeals challenged both the SCA’s legal interpretation of voting rights and its treatment of the disputed vote.


The general subject-matter was therefore the voting rights of creditors in business rescue, and in particular whether post-commencement creditors (creditors whose claims arise after the commencement of business rescue) fall within the class of “creditors” entitled to vote on the adoption of a business rescue plan under section 152.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that Arnot Opco (Pty) Limited owned and operated the Arnot coal mine and that Arnot was placed into business rescue on 10 October 2022 at the instance of Wescoal Mining (Pty) Limited. Wescoal was an indirect shareholder in Arnot and a creditor, and Wescoal was a wholly owned subsidiary of Salungano Group Limited, which was also a creditor. Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Limited was a creditor of Arnot by virtue of having taken cession of claims from several former creditors.


In terms of section 151, the practitioner convened a virtual creditors’ meeting for 28 July 2023 and simultaneously published a proposed business rescue plan. The plan (as presented for voting) afforded voting rights to both pre-commencement and post-commencement creditors, and it presented multiple options including an option involving a sale of the business as a going concern (Option B) and, if that option succeeded, a subsequent vote on competing acquisition proposals (including a proposal by Ndalamo Coal (Pty) Limited).


At the meeting on 28 July 2023, the practitioner reported that Option B achieved 75.4% support of creditors’ voting interests and was therefore approved. The practitioner then reported that Ndalamo’s bid received 88% support and proceeded to engage Ndalamo about implementation. Wescoal and Salungano supported Option B and supported Ndalamo’s offer, while Mashwayi voted against Option B.


A significant factual development occurred shortly thereafter. The practitioner later asserted that there had been material irregularities in the voting process and that, after reassessment (with forensic assistance), the 75% threshold had not been met. The irregularities identified included that certain votes were counted more than once, some creditors attempted to retract their votes by email, some creditors voted as a group and later submitted individual votes, and certain proxies were received after the deadline and were not considered. On this basis, the practitioner treated the July plan vote as not duly accepted and sought to convene a further creditors’ meeting on 21 August 2023 with a revised plan and updated voting schedule.


The High Court litigation was triggered by the applicants’ challenge to this course. Although a broader contest existed between the parties as to the consequences of the July vote, the Constitutional Court treated as material the fact that the practitioner’s later position was that, properly tallied, the vote did not meet the statutory threshold, and that this was said to follow from identified voting discrepancies.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was one of statutory interpretation, namely whether the term “creditor” in Chapter 6 of the Companies Act, and in particular in sections 145 and 152, includes post-commencement creditors for the purpose of voting on a business rescue plan, or whether voting is confined to pre-commencement creditors (those whose claims existed at the start of business rescue).


This was a pure question of law engaging the Court’s general jurisdiction, because it required determining the meaning and scope of statutory language through text, context, and purpose, and because lower courts had reached opposing conclusions.


A related legal-and-factual question concerned the validity of the 28 July 2023 vote under section 152(2): whether the plan in fact obtained the required support of “holders of more than 75% of the creditors’ voting interests that were voted”, once the identified irregularities and the correct class of eligible voters were taken into account. This aspect required the application of the statutory threshold to a disputed tally and involved a remedial question of whether the matter should be remitted for a fresh vote.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Court approached the interpretive dispute by emphasising that no statutory provision is interpreted in isolation and that the meaning of “creditor” had to be derived from the text, context, and purpose of Chapter 6. It accepted that the Companies Act does not define “creditor” for Chapter 6, and it considered whether that omission supported the SCA’s reliance on an ordinary grammatical meaning or, instead, pointed towards a meaning anchored in the statutory structure of business rescue.


The Court considered the scheme of Chapter 6 as a structured mechanism designed to facilitate the rescue of financially distressed companies while balancing stakeholders’ interests. In that structure, post-commencement finance is addressed specifically by section 135, which establishes an incentive system of preferential ranking for post-commencement claims. The Court treated this preference regime as the principal method by which the Act protects post-commencement financiers, rather than by granting them governance power through voting on the plan.


Textually, the Court attached particular weight to provisions that locate the relevant creditor body at the commencement of business rescue. It relied on section 150(2)(a)(ii), which requires the business rescue plan to include “a complete list of the creditors of the company when the business rescue proceedings began”, including their insolvency-law ranking and whether claims have been proved. The Court reasoned that this statutorily required list supplies a reference point for participation and valuation and indicates that the plan is structured around the creditor body as it existed at the start of proceedings. The Court treated the omission of any requirement to identify post-commencement creditors in the plan as supporting the inference that they were not intended to be part of the voting constituency under section 152.


The Court further relied on section 145, which regulates creditor participation and the calculation of voting interests. It read the statutory architecture as contemplating a defined pool of creditors whose voting interests are capable of identification and valuation for purposes of a section 151/152 meeting. It also relied on the wording in section 145(1)(c), which provides that each creditor is entitled to formally participate “to the extent provided for in this Chapter”, as allowing that not all persons who may be owed amounts during business rescue necessarily enjoy identical participatory rights, including voting.


In addition, the Court regarded it as significant that employees’ post-commencement claims are not treated as voting claims but are instead treated as post-commencement finance under section 135, while employee voting rights in business rescue are tied to their status as creditors in relation to pre-commencement entitlements. This internal differentiation was treated as an indicator that the Act’s design distinguishes between pre-commencement voting constituencies and post-commencement priority protection.


The Court also reasoned that including post-commencement creditors in the voting pool would create substantial practical and structural difficulties. It considered that voting interests could become unstable and fluctuating if claims arising during business rescue could continually alter the voting base, complicating compliance with the notice requirements and the ability to fix voting interests in advance of a meeting. The Court also accepted concerns (raised in the High Court and revisited in its own analysis) that an expansive interpretation could invite opportunistic behaviour, allowing post-commencement claim acquisition shortly before voting to influence outcomes.


On comparative material, the Court criticised the SCA’s dismissal of foreign restructuring regimes on the basis that “generally accepted practical needs” in South Africa were different, holding that the SCA did not explain that conclusion. While maintaining that foreign law is not determinative, the Court treated comparative examples as supporting its conclusion that excluding post-commencement creditors from voting is not anomalous in restructuring systems and is consistent with a policy distinction between priority protection and decision-making power.


Turning to the factual issue, the Court accepted that the record disclosed multiple irregularities affecting the reliability of the July 2023 voting outcome. It noted that once the identified errors were taken into account, the threshold of 75% support was not achieved on the recalculated figures relied upon by the practitioner and referenced in the SCA’s reasoning. It held that these irregularities undermined the legitimacy of concluding that the plan had been properly adopted, and it agreed with the SCA that the proper course was to require a fresh vote.


Although the Act does not expressly provide for remittal in the form of a re-vote, the Court accepted that a remittal mechanism could be accommodated within the practitioner’s powers and duties, referring to the structure of section 153(1)(a)(i) (dealing with steps after rejection of a plan) together with the practitioner’s broad functions under section 140. The Court described remittal for a new vote as a just and equitable response given that the voting process itself was compromised and that the practitioner alleged the irregularities.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Constitutional Court granted leave to appeal in both matters and upheld both appeals. It set aside the SCA’s order and replaced it with declaratory relief clarifying that Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not permit post-commencement creditors to vote on the adoption of a business rescue plan.


The Court further declared that the amended business rescue plan presented on 28 July 2023 was not supported by holders of more than 75% of creditors’ voting interests as required by section 152(2). The matter was remitted to the business rescue practitioner for a fresh vote.


In both matters, the respondents were ordered to pay the applicants’ costs, including the costs of two counsel, in the High Court, the SCA, and the Constitutional Court.


Cases Cited


The judgment referred to the following key cases: Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard [2014] ZACC 16; 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC); 2014 (8) BCLR 869 (CC); Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA); Capitec Bank Holdings Limited and Another v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd [2021] ZASCA 99; 2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA); Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd t/a Balanced Audio v Greeff [2014] ZAWCHC 78; 2014 (4) SA 521 (WCC); Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd v Wescoal Mining (Pty) Ltd [2025] ZASCA 5; (3) SA 441 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


The judgment referenced the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (notably sections 7(k), 128, 133, 135, 140, 143, 144, 145, 147, 150, 151, 152, 153, and 154) and the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (notably section 167(3)(b) and, in the parties’ argument, sections 9 and 25). The judgment also referred to comparative foreign legislation, namely the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 6 November (United States); Corporate Reorganization Act 154 of 13 December 2002 (Japan); Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 40 of 2018 (Singapore); The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 31 of 28 May 2016 (India); and the Companies Act of 8 November 2006 (United Kingdom).


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Court held that, properly interpreted in context and purpose, Chapter 6 of the Companies Act confines voting on a business rescue plan under section 152 to pre-commencement creditors, and post-commencement creditors are not entitled to vote. It held further that the 28 July 2023 plan was not validly adopted, because the required statutory threshold was not met once voting irregularities were taken into account, and that the appropriate remedy was to remit the matter to the practitioner for a fresh vote.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A statutory term left undefined must be interpreted through the established approach that considers text, context, and purpose, rather than through literalism detached from statutory structure. The judgment applied the principle that interpretation is not mechanical and that individual words must be understood within the statutory scheme in which they operate.


Within the business rescue framework under the Companies Act, the voting constituency for adoption of a business rescue plan under section 152 is anchored to the creditor body identifiable at the commencement of business rescue, as reflected in the plan’s required content under section 150(2)(a)(ii) and the Act’s design for determining voting interests. The judgment treated section 135’s super-preference regime as the principal mechanism protecting post-commencement financiers, rather than granting them voting rights that could distort the balance between stakeholder groups contemplated by the Act.


Where material irregularities undermine the credibility of a vote on a business rescue plan, the legitimacy of the process requires corrective procedural relief. The judgment accepted that, even though the Act does not expressly provide for remittal for a re-vote, remittal for a fresh vote may be ordered as a just and equitable remedy consistent with the practitioner’s functions and the framework governing rejected plans and practitioner obligations.

CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA


Case CCT 37/25

In the matter between:


SALUNGANO GROUP LIMITED Applicant

and

MASHWAYI PROJECTS (PTY) LIMITED First Respondent

PHAHLANI LINCOLN MKHOMBO N.O. Second Respondent

ARNOT OPCO (PTY) LIMITED Third Respondent

NDALAMO COAL (PTY) LIMITED Fourth Respondent

WESCOAL MINING (PTY) LIMITED Fifth Respondent

and

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S INSOLVENCY
AND RESTRUCTURING CONFEDERATION
OF SOUTH AFRICA NETWORK NPC Amicus Curiae


Case CCT 38/25

And in the matter between:


NDALAMO COAL (PTY) LIMITED Applicant

and

MASHWAYI PROJECTS (PTY) LIMITED First Respondent

PHAHLANI LINCOLN MKHOMBO N.O. Second Respondent

ARNOT OPCO (PTY) LIMITED Third Respondent

WESCOAL MINING (PTY) LIMITED Fourth Respondent

SALUNGANO GROUP LIMITED Fifth Respondent

and

INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S INSOLVENCY AND
RESTRUCTURING CONFEDERATION OF
SOUTH AFRICA NETWORK NPC Amicus Curiae



Neutral citation: Salungano Group Ltd v Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others;
Ndalamo Coal (Pty) Ltd v Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others
[2026] ZACC 38

Coram: Mhlantla ADCJ, Dambuza J, Kollapen J, Majiedt J, Mathopo J,
Nuku AJ, Opperman AJ, Rogers J and Savage J


Judgment: Mathopo J (unanimous)

Heard on: 19 February 2026

Decided on: 7 October 2026

Summary: Companies Act 71 of 2008 — sections 152 and 153 — business
rescue proceedings — voting rights — post-commencement
creditors

Interpretation — entitlement to vote — no right for
post-commencement creditors to vote on a business rescue plan




ORDER



On applications for leave to appeal from the Supreme Court of Appeal (hearing an
appeal from the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Johannesburg):

In Case CCT 37/25 Salungano Group Ltd v Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is set aside and replaced with
the following:
“(a) It is declared that Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does
not permit post -commencement creditors to vote on the adoption
of the business rescue plan.
(b) It is declared that the amended business rescue plan presented on
28 July 2023 was not supported by holders of more than 75% of
creditors’ voting interests as required by section 152(2) of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008. As a result, the matter is remitted to
the business rescue practitioner for a fresh vote.”
4. The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs, including the costs of two
counsel in the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and in this Court.

In Case CCT 38/25 Ndalamo Coal (Pty) Ltd v Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is set aside and replaced with
the following:
“(a) It is declared that Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does
not permit post -commencement creditors to vote on the adoption
of the business rescue plan.
(b) It is declared that the amended business rescue plan presented on
28 July 2023 was not supported by holders of more than 75% of
creditors’ voting interests as required by section 152(2) of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008. As a result, the matter is remitted to
the business rescue practitioner for a fresh vote.”

4
4. The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs, including the costs of two
counsel in the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and in this Court.



JUDGMENT




MATHOPO J (Mhlantla ADCJ, D ambuza J, K ollapen J, M ajiedt J, Nuku AJ,
Opperman AJ, Rogers J and Savage J concurring):


Introduction
[1] This matter concerns two separate applications for leave to appeal against the
judgment and order of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) . These applications have
been consolidated because the parties are the same in both matters, and they are
challenging the same SCA judgment on the same bas es. There are two issues in this
appeal – a legal one and a factual one. Legally, these applications concern a narrow
issue of voting rights of creditors in business rescue proceedings. What is implicated is
the right to vote in a meeting in terms of sections 1521 and 153 of the Companies Act 2
(the Act), more particularly, whether post-commencement creditors are included in the
definition of “creditor” in terms of section 152 of the Act, and thus entitled to vote on a

1 Section 152(1)(e) and 152(2) read:
(1) At a meeting convened in terms of section 151, the practitioner must—
. . .
(e) call for a vote for preliminary approval of the proposed plan, as amended if
applicable, unless the meeting has first been adjourned in accordance with
paragraph (d)(ii).
(2) In a vote called in terms of subsection (1)(e), the proposed business rescue plan will
be approved on a preliminary basis if—
(a) it was supported by the holders of more than 75% of the creditors’ voting
interests that were voted; and
(b) the votes in support of the proposed plan included at least 50% of the
independent creditors’ voting interests, if any, that were voted.”
2 71 of 2008.

MATHOPO J
5
business rescue plan under Chapter 6 of the Act. Factually, the question is whether the
business rescue plan presented to creditors on 28 July 2023 was properly adopted in
accordance with section 152 of the Act.

The parties
[2] The applicants are Salungano Group Limited (Salungano) and Ndalamo Coal
(Pty) Limited (Ndalamo). The overlapping respondents in both applica tions are
Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Limited (Mashwayi), the business rescue practitioner
Mr Phahlani Lincoln Mkhombo (practitioner), Arnot Opco (Pty) Limited (Arnot) and
Wescoal Mining (Pty) Limited (Wescoal). Arnot was formed as a joint venture between
Wescoal and Arnot Investco (Pty) Limited. Arnot Investco (Pty) Limited and Wescoal
are presently undergoing business rescue proceedings and are not actively involved in
this matter. The International Women’s Insolvency and Restructuring Confederation
of South Africa Network NPC was admitted as an amicus curiae (friend of the court).
With this in mind, reference s to “the applicants” are to Salungano and Ndalamo
collectively. Reference s to “the respondents” are to Mashwayi and the practitioner
collectively.

Relevant statutory provisions
[3] Below are relevant provisions of the Act. Section 7(k) provides that:

“[t]he purposes of this Act are to—
. . .
(k) provide for the efficient rescue and recovery of financially distressed
companies, in a manner that balances the rights and interests of all relevant
stakeholders”.

[4] Chapter 6, titled “Business Rescue and Compromise with Creditors”, contains
the following relevant provisions. Section 128 includes the following definition:

“(1) In this Chapter—

MATHOPO J
6
(a) ‘affected person’, in relation to a company, means—
(i) a shareholder or creditor of the company;
(ii) any registered trade union representing employees of the
company; and
(iii) if any of the employees of the company are not represented by
a registered trade union, each of those employees or their
respective representatives.”

[5] Section 135, entitled “Post-commencement finance”, stipulates:

“(1) To the extent that any remuneration, reimbursement for expenses or other amount of
money relating to employment becomes due and payable by a company to an employee during
the company’s business rescue proceedings, but is not paid to the employee—
(a) the money is regarded to be post-commencement financing; and
(b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection (3)(a).
. . .
(2) During its business rescue proceedings, the company may obtain financing
other than as contemplated in subsection (1), and any such financing—
(a) may be secured to the lender by utilising any asset of the company to
the extent that it is not otherwise encumbered; and
(b) will be paid in the order of preference set out in subsection (3)(b).
(3) After payment of the practitione r’s remuneration and expenses referred to in
section 143, post-commencement financing, and other claims arising out of the
costs of the business rescue proceedings, all claims contemplated—
(a) in subsection (1) will be treated equally, but will have preference over-
(i) all claims contemplated in subsection (2), irrespective of
whether or not they are secured; and
(ii) all unsecured claims against the company,
. . .
(b) in subsection (2) will have preference in the order in which they were incurred
over all unsecured claims against the company.

MATHOPO J
7
(4) If business rescue proceedings are superseded by a liquidation order, the
preference conferred in terms of this section will remain in force, except to the
extent of any claims arising out of the costs of liquidation.”

[6] Section 145, headed “Participation by creditors”, states:

“(1) Each creditor is entitled to—
(a) notice of each court proceeding, decision, meeting or other relevant
event concerning the business rescue proceedings;
(b) participate in any court proceedings arising during the business rescue
proceedings;
(c) formally participate in a company’s business rescue proceedings to the
extent provided for in this Chapter; and
(d) informally participate in those proceedings by making proposals for a
business rescue plan to the practitioner.
(2) In addition to the rights set out in subsection (1), each creditor has—
(a) the right to vote to amend, approve or reject a proposed business rescue
plan, in the manner contemplated in section 152; and
(b) if the proposed business rescue plan is rejected, a further right to—
(i) propose the development of an alternative plan, in the manner
contemplated in section 153; or
(ii) present an offer to acquire the interests of any or all of the
other creditors in the manner contemplated in section 153.
(3) The creditors of a company are entitled to form a creditors’ committee, and
through that committee are entitled to be consulted by the practitioner during
the development of the business rescue plan.
(4) In respect of any decision contemplated in this Chapter that requires the
support of the holders of creditors’ voting interests—
(a) a secured or unsecured creditor has a voting interest equal to the value
of the amount owed to that creditor by the company; and
(b) a concurrent creditor who would be subordinated in a liquidation has
a voting interest, as independently and expertly appraised and valued

MATHOPO J
8
at the request of the practitioner, equal to the amount, if any, that the
creditor could reasonably expect to receive in such a liquidation of the
company.
. . .
(6) Within five business days after receiving a notice of a determination
contemplated in subsection (5), a person may apply to a court to—
(a) review the practitioner’s determination that the person is, or is not, an
independent creditor; or
(b) review, re -appraise and re -value that person’s voting interest, as
determined in terms of subsection (5)(b).”

[7] Section 150, under Part D,3 is titled “Proposal of business rescue plan”. It says:

“(1) The practitioner, after consulting the creditors, other affected persons, and the
management of the company, must prepare a business rescue plan for
consideration and possible adoption at a meeting held in terms of section 151.
(2) The business rescue plan must contain all the information reasonably required
to facilitate affected persons in deciding whether or not to accept or reject the
plan, and must be divided into three Parts, as follows:
(a) Part A—Background, which must include at least—
(i) a complete list of all the material assets of the company, as
well as an indication as to which assets were held as security
by creditors when the business rescue proceedings began;
(ii) a complete list of the creditors of the company when the
business rescue proceedings began, as well as an indication as
to which creditors would qualify as secured, statutory
preferent and concurrent in terms of the laws of insolvency,
and an indication of which of the creditors have proved their
claims;

3 Part D is titled “Development and approval of business rescue plan”.

MATHOPO J
9
(iii) the probable dividend that would be received by creditors, in
their specific classes, if the company were to be placed in
liquidation;
(iv) a complete list of the holders of the company’s issued
securities;
(v) a copy of the written agreement concerning the practitioner’s
remuneration; and
(vi) a statement whether the business rescue plan includes a
proposal made informally by a creditor of the company.
(b) Part B—Proposals, which must include at least—
(i) the nature and duration of any moratorium for which the
business rescue plan makes provision;
(ii) the extent to which the company is to be released from the
payment of its debts, and the extent to which any debt is
proposed to be converted to equity in the company, or another
company;
(iii) the ongoing role of the company, and the treatment of any
existing agreements;
(iv) the property of the company that is to be available to pay
creditors’ claims in terms of the business rescue plan;
(v) the order of preference in which the proceeds of property will
be applied to pay creditors if the business rescue plan is
adopted;
(vi) the benefits of adopting the business rescue plan as opposed
to the benefits that would be received by creditors if the
company were to be placed in liquidation; and
(vii) the effect that the business rescue plan will have on the holders
of each class of the company’s issued securities.”

[8] Sections 151 and 152 provide methods through which a creditors’ meeting is
convened and a proposed business rescue plan is voted upon. Of contention i n this
matter are the following provisions in section 152:

MATHOPO J
10

“(2) In a vote called in terms of subsection (1)(e), 4 the proposed business rescue
plan will be approved on a preliminary basis if—
(a) it was supported by the holders of more than 75% of the creditors’
voting interests that were voted; and
(b) the votes in support of the proposed plan included at least 50% of the
independent creditors’ voting interests, if any, that were voted.
(3) If a proposed business rescue plan—
(a) is not approved on a preliminary basis, as contemplated in
subsection (2), the plan is rejected, and may be considered further only
in terms of section 153;
. . .
(4) A business rescue plan that has been adopted is binding on the company, and
on each of the creditors of the company and every holder of the company’s
securities, whether or not such a person—
(a) was present at the meeting;
(b) voted in favour of adoption of the plan; or
(c) in the case of creditors, had proven their claims against the company.”
(Footnote added.)

[9] Section 153, titled “Failure to adopt business rescue plan”, provides:

4 Section 152(1)(e) of the Act provides:
(1) At a meeting convened in terms of section 151, the practitioner must—
. . .
(e) call for a vote for preliminary approval of the proposed plan, as amended if
applicable, unless the meeting has first been adjourned in accordance with
paragraph (d)(ii).
Section 152(1)(d)(ii) of the Act states that:
(1) At a meeting convened in terms of section 151, the practitioner must—
. . .
(d) invite discussion, and entertain and conduct a vote on any motions to —
. . .
(ii) direct the practitioner to adjourn the meeting in order to revise the plan for
further consideration

MATHOPO J
11

“(1) (a) If a business rescue plan has been rejected as contemplated in section
152(3)(a) or (c)(ii) (bb) the practitioner may—
(i) seek a vote of approval from the holders of voting interests to
prepare and publish a revised plan; or
(ii) advise the meeting that the company will apply to a court to
set aside the result of the vote by the holders of voting interests
or shareholders, as the case may be, on the grounds that it was
inappropriate.
(b) If the practitioner does not take any action contemplated in
paragraph (a)—
(i) any affected person present at the meeting may—
(aa) call for a vote of approval from the holders of voting
interests requiring the practitioner to prepare and
publish a revised plan; or
(bb) apply to the court to set aside the result of the vote by
the holders of voting interests or shareholders, as the
case may be, on the grounds that it was
inappropriate.”

[10] Finally, section 154, titled “Discharge of debts and claims”, states:

“(1) A business rescue plan may provide that, if it is implemented in accordance
with its terms and conditions, a creditor who has acceded to the discharge of
the whole or part of a debt owing to that creditor will lose the right to enforce
the relevant debt or part of it.
(2) If a business rescue plan has been approved and implemented in accordance
with this Chapter, a creditor is not entitled to enforce any debt owed by the
company immediately before the beginning of the business rescue process,
except to the extent provided for in the business rescue plan.”

MATHOPO J
12
Factual background
[11] The facts are common cause and similar in both applications. Arnot owns and
operates the Arnot coal mine located in Middelburg, Mpumalanga. Wescoal holds an
indirect 50% shareholding in Arnot. Wescoal is a wholly owned subsidiary of
Salungano and was placed under supervision and business rescue on 23 August 2023.
Wescoal and Salungano are Arnot’s creditors. Arnot was placed under business rescue
on 10 October 2022 at the instance of Wescoal. Mashwayi is a creditor of Arnot, being
the cessionary of claims from several other former creditors of the company. Ndalamo
is the party whose offer was accepted at a creditors’ meeting on 28 July 2023,
purportedly in accordance with section 151 of the Act. Although not a creditor of Arnot,
Ndalamo intervened in the proceedings based on its direct and substantial interest in the
matter.

[12] In terms of section 151 of the Act,5 the practitioner delivered a notice calling a
creditors’ meeting to be held virtually at 10h00 on 28 July 2023 via Microsoft Teams .
The notice was sent to all affected persons, and the practitioner simultaneously
published the proposed business rescue plan. In his notice, the practitioner informed
those affected that a Microsoft Teams link for the meeting would be shared on
18 July 2023. He encouraged creditors to send in their completed and signed proxy
forms so they could vote on the different bids.


5 Section 151 reads:
“(1) Within 10 business days after publishing a business rescue plan in terms of section
150, the practitioner must convene and preside over a meeting of creditors and any
other holders of a voting interest, called for the purpose of considering the plan.
(2) At least five business days before the meeting contemplated in subsection (1), the
practitioner must deliver a notice of the meeting to all affected persons, setting out —
(a) the date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) the agenda of the meeting; and

(a) the date, time and place of the meeting;
(b) the agenda of the meeting; and
(c) a summary of the rights of affected persons to participate in and vote at the
meeting.
(3) The meeting contemplated in this section may be adjourned from time to time, as
necessary or expedient, until a decision regarding the company’s future has been taken
in accordance with sections 152 and 153.”

MATHOPO J
13
[13] According to section 152(2)(a)6 of the Act, a business rescue plan can only be
approved at a meeting specifically convened for the adoption of the business rescue plan
and if it receives support from holders of at least 75% of the creditors’ voting interests.
In this matter, the proposed business rescue plan afforded voting rights to both
pre- and post-commencement creditors. Four options were presented: Option A
involved allocating capital for the refurbishment of facilities and the continued
operation of Arnot’s business; Option B entailed the sale of the business as a going
concern with the proceeds distributed to creditors; Option C was the rejection of the
business rescue plan; and Option D allowed for abstention from voting. Should Option
B be approved, creditors would then consider four alternative acquisition proposals,
including one submitted by Ndalamo.

[14] At the meeting of 28 July 2023, the options were voted upon, and Option B , as
reported by the practitioner, was supported by 75.4% of the creditor s’ voting interests.
The bids in respect of Option B were then voted upon. Wescoal and Salungano, which
had voted in favour of Option B, supported Ndalamo’s offer. Mashwayi voted against
Option B . At the meeting, the practitioner stated that 88% of creditors supported
Ndalamo’s bid (July plan) and then met with Ndalamo to discuss its implementation.

[15] Four days after the July plan vote was shared with creditors, circumstances
changed significantly. The practitioner alleged that there were material irregularities in
the voting process. Additionally, the practitioner advised the parties that, with support
from a forensic accountant, it was found that several creditors had sent emails retracting
their votes, certain votes were recorded more than once and some creditors initially
voted as a group before submitting individual votes. Furthermore, some proxies were

voted as a group before submitting individual votes. Furthermore, some proxies were
received after the deadline and were therefore not considered . Consequently, the
practitioner stated that the 75% threshold had not been met. According to the
practitioner, the July plan was therefore not duly accepted. Wescoal and Salungano

6 Section 152(2)(a) has been quoted in [8] above.

MATHOPO J
14
objected, contending that the statutory threshold had been met and that the July plan
had been validly adopted.

[16] In light of the aforesaid events, on 11 August 2023, the practitioner issued a letter
stating that a circular would be provided in which he intended to schedule a creditors’
meeting for 21 August 2023 to approve his revised business rescue plan and the updated
voting interests schedule. On the same day, the practitioner sent an email confirming
that a section 151 meeting was scheduled for 21 August 2023. The practitioner attached
a revised plan and issued a formal notice to reconvene a meeting of creditors on 21
August 2023.

Litigation history
High Court
[17] Unhappy with the practitioner’s conduct, Wescoal and Salungano instituted
urgent proceedings on 13 August 2023. They ultimately amended their relief to seek
declaratory orders that the July plan had been validly adopted and that Ndalamo’s offer
had been accepted, with an order directing the practitioner to implement the plan.
Ndalamo was granted leave to intervene as an applicant and launched a
counter-application seeking declaratory orders , namely, that the July plan had been
adopted and that its offer had been accepted. Mashwayi was also allowed to intervene.
Mashwayi, Arnot and the practitioner filed counter-applications for declaratory relief,
arguing that the July plan had not been validly adopted.

[18] The main issue before the High Court was whether the business rescue plan had
been validly adopted in terms of section 152 of the Act , which regulates the
consideration of a business rescue plan. It was tasked with determining whether the
word “creditor” used in Chapter 6 of the Act includes post-commencement creditors,
that is, persons that become creditors after the commencement of the business rescue
proceedings, or whether it is limited to pre-commencement creditors, that is, persons
that were creditors of the company at the time the business rescue proceedings

MATHOPO J
15
commenced. The High Court noted that, in terms of section 145 of the Act, creditors
have a right to participate in business rescue proceedings. It bemoaned the fact that the
Legislature had not bothered to define creditor. It held, however, that, in the context of
the relevant legislative provisions as a whole, creditors were confined to
pre-commencement creditors.

[19] The High Court held that permitting creditors to acquire an interest shortly before
a section 152 meeting would allow speculators to prey on business rescue proceedings,
block the adoption of business rescue plans and force liquidations where they could be
avoided. It noted that section 152(2) of the Act requires that a business rescue plan
contain a complete list of the company’s creditors when the business rescue proceedings
begin.

[20] The High Court referred to s ection 135 of the Act , which deals with
post-commencement finance. It pointed out that post-commencement creditors are not
styled as “creditors”, but as “lenders” that advance finance to a company in business
rescue in return for a preferential claim against the company. It held that
post-commencement financiers are rewarded with enhanced security and thus do not
have a right to vote for the adoption of a business rescue plan.

[21] On the facts, the High Court concluded that the business rescue plan had reached
the required threshold for approval, given that Mashwayi – which had voted against the
plan – should not have been treated as a creditor for voting purposes as only creditors
with claims predating the commencement of the business rescue were eligible to
participate in the process . It confirmed that Option B was properly approved and
Ndalamo’s bid adopted in accordance with section 152(2) of the Act . It ordered the
practitioner to implement the plan and give effect to Ndalamo’s bid to purchase Arnot’s
business.

[22] Aggrieved by that decision , the respondents sought and were granted leave by

[22] Aggrieved by that decision , the respondents sought and were granted leave by
the High Court to appeal to the SCA.

MATHOPO J
16

Supreme Court of Appeal
[23] Before the SCA, the present respondents argued that , because the Act does not
specifically exclude them, post -commencement creditors are allowed to vote on a
business rescue plan. They further contended that the High Court’s reasoning was
inconsistent with Chapter 6 of the Act. Moreover, they argued that excluding
post-commencement creditors’ rights would result in unbusinesslike outcomes and
inevitably discourage post-commencement financing, which is significant to the rescue
of companies in financial distress. They contended that excluding post-commencement
creditors from a voting interest would implicate the equality provisions of the
Constitution and erode their property rights.

[24] The present applicants argued in the SCA that post-commencement creditors are
excluded and have no voting interest because there is no specific provision in Chapter 6
of the Act that affords them the right to vote. Specifically, sections 45(2),7 135(2),
145(4)8 and 150(2)(a)(ii)9 of the Act do not address the voting rights of creditors that
come after the commencement of business rescue . They further argued that the
interpretation of the word creditor should be with reference to insolvency legislation.
Additionally, reliance was placed on foreign jurisdictions to provide guidance on the
question of whether post-commencement creditors are entitled to vote. In this regard,
reference was made to the United States of America (United States) , the United
Kingdom and Australia as countries that do not permit post -commencement creditors
to vote on arrangements akin to our business rescue regime.


7 Section 45(2) reads:
“Except to the extent that the Memorandum of Incorporation of a company provides otherwise,
the board may authorise the company to provide direct or indirect financial assistance to a
director or prescribed officer of the company or of a related or inter -related company, or to a

related or inter -related company or corporation, or to a member of a related or inter -related
corporation, or to a person related to any such company, corporation, director, prescribed officer
or member, subject to subsections (3) and (4).”
8 Section 145(4) has been quoted in [6] above.
9 Section 150(2)(a)(ii) has been quoted in [7] above.

MATHOPO J
17
[25] The other concern raised by the present applicants in the SCA was that
pre-commencement creditors could be outvoted by post -commencement creditors in a
manner that would violate the former’s right to property.

[26] The SCA held that the Act does not distinguish between
pre- and post-commencement creditors. Accordingly, the term creditor should be
interpreted in line with its ordinary grammatical meaning, and there should be no
distinction among various types of creditors, as this would contravene section 9 of the
Constitution and section 7(k) of the Act . The SCA said that post-commencement
creditors should be recognised as relevant stakeholders and creditors that are entitled to
participate in voting for the adoption of the business rescue plan. The SCA further held
that the creation of a list of creditors at the beginning of business rescue is for the
purpose of establishing the concursus creditorum (coming together of creditors), should
the company go into liquidation, and is therefore not relevant for the determination of
voting interests concerning the business rescue plan.

[27] In relation to foreign law, the SCA held that the applicants’ reliance on foreign
law was misplaced , as the law in those jurisdictions is informed by particular policy
considerations and socio-economic factors that do not necessarily apply in our country.
Furthermore, the SCA found that the foreign legislative provisions relied on do not
confirm “generally accepted practical needs and considerations ” in our country and do
not assist in the interpretati ve exercise.10 When drafting Chapter 6 of the Act , the
Legislature considered the United States’ Bankruptcy Reform Act (Bankruptcy Reform
Act)11 but elected to include only provisions suitable to a South African context, with
its own socio-economic challenges and legislation.

[28] In terms of the factual dispute, the SCA held that, given the discrepancies in the

[28] In terms of the factual dispute, the SCA held that, given the discrepancies in the
voting process, the poll could not be regarded as conclusive and directed that creditors

10 Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd v Wescoal Mining (Pty) Ltd [2025] ZASCA 5; (3) SA 441 (SCA) (SCA judgment)
at para 16.
11 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 6 November.

MATHOPO J
18
start afresh with the voting process. It further held that if Mashwayi’s vote had been
taken into account, the statutory threshold mentioned in section 152(2) of the Act would
not have been met. The SCA thus set aside the High Court order.

Parties’ submissions in this Court
Applicants
[29] The applicants contend that this Court’s jurisdiction is engaged under
section 167(3)(b)(ii) of the Constitution,12 in that the matter raises an arguable point of
law of general public importance concerning the interpretation of the meaning of the
word creditor. They also contend that this matter raises a constitutional issue because
it implicates violations of section 25 of the Bill of Rights. They argue that balancing
stakeholders’ rights supports their interpretation and it would be untenable for
post-commencement creditors, whose claims are not compromised by a business rescue
plan, to potentially outvote, and limit or even entirely preclude , the claims of
pre-commencement creditors. This would amount to an arbitrary deprivation of
property.

[30] In addition, the applicants submit that the term creditor has “been defined already
through practice and through jurisprudence” in the insolvency setting. The applicants
state that, by omitting to define the term, the Legislature intended the word to be
construed as it was prior to the Act’s enactment instead of its unlimited grammatical
meaning. Relying on Cool Ideas,13 the applicants submit that the SCA’s reliance on the
grammatical meaning is misplaced because it offends rules of statutory interpretation,
which dictate that words in a statute be interpreted according to text, context and
purpose. The contention advance d is that pre - and post -commencement creditors

12 Section 167(3)(b) of the Constitution provides that this Court—
“(i) may decide constitutional matters; and
(ii) any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on the grounds that

(ii) any other matter, if the Constitutional Court grants leave to appeal on the grounds that
the matter raises an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to
be considered by that Court.”
13 Cool Ideas 1186 CC v Hubbard [2014] ZACC 16; 2014 (4) SA 474 (CC); 2014 (8) BCLR 869 (CC).

MATHOPO J
19
occupy different positions during the business rescue and must not be placed on the
same footing regarding the voting for the business rescue plan. The applicants say it is
only pre -commencement creditors’ claims that will be compromised by a business
rescue plan involuntarily. They add that post -commencement finance creditors also
enjoy a preference in liquidation.

[31] Finally, the applicants submit that Mashwayi is not a creditor of the company,
but a post -commencement financier that enjoys the protection afforded to it by
section 135 of the Act, which grants it a super -preference above all other creditors in
liquidation. Thus, the applicants submit that leave to appeal to this Court should be
granted; the appeal should be upheld; and the order of the SCA should be set aside and
the High Court’s order reinstated.

Respondents
[32] Conversely, the respondents oppose these applications on the basis that they do
not raise any constitutional issue or an arguable point of law of general public
importance. Furthermore, the respondents state that statutory interpretation is confined
to the legislative context and does not implicate constitutional considerations. To this
end, the respondents argue that not all statutory interpretation qualifies as a
constitutional matter or warrants a hearing by this Court. Consequently, the respondents
argue that it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal, as there are no
reasonable prospects of success.

[33] On the merits, the respondents embrace the reasoning of the SCA and submit
that by not defining the word creditor, the Legislature intended it to be understood
according to its grammatical and literal meaning as “any person or entity owed a debt,
irrespective of when the debt arose”. This interpretation, they submit, is in line with the
principles of interpretation set out in Endumeni,14 which states that consideration must

principles of interpretation set out in Endumeni,14 which states that consideration must
be given to the language used in light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax, the

14 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality [2012] ZASCA 13; 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA).

MATHOPO J
20
context in which the provision appears, the apparent purpose to which it is directed and
the material known to those responsible for its production.15 Moreover, the respondents
contend that section 145(2) of the Act gives “each creditor” the right to vote to amend,
approve or reject a proposed business rescue plan. The respondents say that on a plain
reading of this section, the words “each creditor” do not limit rights under
section 145(2) of the Act to pre -commencement creditors but also include
post-commencement creditors.

[34] Furthermore, the respondents contend that on a proper textual reading of
section 145(2) of the Act , which grants “each creditor” the authority to vote on the
amendment, approval and rejection of the business rescue plan, read with section 145(4)
of the Act , which establishes the method by which creditors’ voting interests are
determined, it is impermissible to interpret the impugned provisions as conferring
voting rights only to pre -commencement creditors. They argue that the distinction
adopted by the Hig h Court is inconsistent not only with the above provisions but also
with section 7(k) of the Act.

[35] Dealing with the question of whether post-commencement creditors have voting
rights, the respondents assert that an analysis of the impugned provisions, namely
sections 128, 145 and 152 of the Act, includes post-commencement creditors as affected
persons and creditors of the company that deserve to be included within the class of
creditors entitled to vote on the business rescue plan. Additionally, they assert that
post-commencement creditors are stakeholders that should be treated equally to all other
creditors, consistent with the objectives of the Act, as set out in section 7(k).

[36] Addressing the applicants’ reliance on insolvency legislation, the respondents
submit that “[b]usiness rescue is a new regime, introduced precisely to avoid

submit that “[b]usiness rescue is a new regime, introduced precisely to avoid
liquidation”. In insolvency, it is the concursus creditorum principle that fixes the rights
of creditors at the date of sequestration. However, they argue that business rescue “does

15 Id at para 18.

MATHOPO J
21
not trigger a concursus, does not fix creditors’ rights at a single point in time and does
not divest the company of its status as a going concern”. The theoretical underpinning
of the concursus creditorum principle, the respondents contend, is inapposite in
business rescue. As a result, insolvency legislation cannot override the plain meaning
of the text.

[37] Advancing their argument on context, the respondents contend that a
consideration of other provisions of Chapter 6 of the Act suggests that the Legislature
intended to give all creditors voting rights and that the statutory design centres creditors’
rights, protections and decision-making power. As business rescue’s primary objective
is to restore a company to solvency or afford creditors better returns than liquidation,
both pre- and post-commencement financiers are essential. The respondents submit that
the Legislature opted for an inclusive process and that the relationship between
pre- and post-commencement creditors is not one of opposition but mutual dependence.
They argue that post -commencement creditors are invested in the success of the
business rescue. To disenfranchise them would distort the intended inclusive legislative
scheme and deter post-commencement financing. The preference in section 135 of the
Act is not a substitute for voting rights because if the business rescue plan failed, the
company would enter into liquidation, whereupon the post -commencement creditors’
priority would be diminished by various other claims against the company.

[38] Concerning foreign law, the respondents state that, while United States law does
preclude post-commencement lenders from voting, courts in that country ensure that
business rescue plans treat all creditors fairly and afford them the same treatment as in
liquidation. The respondents criticise the applicants’ reliance on British and Australian
statutes as irrelevant for the purposes of assessing our country’s generally accepted

statutes as irrelevant for the purposes of assessing our country’s generally accepted
business rescue regime standards.

[39] As a fall -back, the respondents contend that if their principal arguments are
unsuccessful, the factual matter relating to the votes must be remitted to the business

MATHOPO J
22
rescue practitioner, owing to the alleged irregularities and discrepancies in the voting
process which have been identified by the SCA.

Amicus curiae
[40] The amicus curiae supports the respondents’ contentions, reiterating that since
the Legislature did not define the word creditor in the Act, it should be accorded its
widest meaning. In the context of this matter and particularly the role of
post-commencement creditors in the adoption of the business rescue plan, there should
be no distinction between various classes of creditors. It contends that it would be
inequitable to exclude post-commencement creditors that have injected liquidity for the
rescue of the company from participating in the vote.

Issues for determination
[41] The overarching issue is whether the Act bestows voting rights in a meeting
convened in terms of section 152 of the Act exclusively on company creditors that
existed at the initiation of the business rescue or whether creditors that acquire claims
after the commencement of the business rescue may also participate in voting on the
approval of the business rescue plan. At the heart of this matter is the proper
interpretation of section 145(2) of the Act.

Jurisdiction
[42] For this Court’s jurisdiction to be engaged, the matter must either be a
constitutional matter or raise an arguable point of law of general public importance that
ought to be considered by this Court. This matter engages our general jurisdiction, on
the basis that it concerns the interpretation of the term “creditor” in relation to Chapter 6
of the Act. This is a pure question of law rather than a factual dispute. The issue is
plainly arguable, as demonstrated by the fact that the High Court and the SCA reached
opposite conclusions on the same statutory provisions.

MATHOPO J
23
[43] The next enquiry is whether the issue is one of general public importance. The
answer is yes. The interpretation of Chapter 6 of the Act governs the operation of
business rescue proceedings, a mechanism of substantial importance to the national
economy and the business community. The question of who may vote on a business
rescue plan affects a wide range of stakeholders, including distress ed companies and
pre- and post-commencement creditors and financiers, such as employees, suppliers
and lenders, as well as business rescue practitioners. Clarification of this legal position
will have consequences extending well beyond the immediate parties and will guide
future business rescue proceedings.

[44] The final question on jurisdiction is whether the issue ought to be considered by
this Court. It should. Conflicting interpretations by lower courts have created
uncertainty in the application of the business rescue regime. Authoritative resolution
by this Court would promote coherence and predictability in the law. I am of the view
that this matter engages this Court’s general jurisdiction.

Leave to appeal
[45] In assessing whether it is in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal, both
the prospects of success and the importance of the issue must be considered.

[46] As will become apparent, there are reasonable prospects of success. There is
also a substantial public interest in the outcome of the matter. The decision will
influence how business rescue proceedings are conducted throughout South Africa and
could affe ct the willingness of creditors and investors to participate in restructuring
processes. For these reasons, the interests of justice favour the granting of leave to
appeal.

MATHOPO J
24
Analysis
The scheme of the Act
[47] The scheme of Chapter 6 of the Act evinces a statutory preference for the
turnaround of financially distressed companies, balancing the interests of the company,
its stakeholders and its creditors. The purpose of business rescue is to assist financially
distressed companies to either recover and continue operating or at least achieve a better
outcome for creditors, employees and stakeholders than immediate liquidation would
provide. This is done through the placement of the financially distressed company
under the supervision of a business rescue practitioner, who attempts to restructure the
company’s affairs, debts, operations and obligations.

[48] What happens at the commencement of business rescue proceedings is that
additional funding is sought either from the existing creditors or new creditors that are
willing to extend further credit under these challenging circumstances.
Post-commencement cre ditors deploy this funding in anticipation that their financial
assistance will help in facilitating the distressed company’s recovery. This increases
their chances of recovering a greater or the full value of their claim.
Post-commencement financiers assume this risk because of the protection afforded to
them by the Act.

[49] Section 135 of the Act sets out the framework for post-commencement finance.
It recognises three kinds of post -commencement financiers: employees, in respect of
amounts that become due during (that is, following commencement of) business rescue
proceedings; financiers (lenders); and claims arising out of the costs of the business
rescue proceedings (for example, amounts payable to landlords and suppliers for the
continuation of the company’s business). This section sets out the order of preference
for post-commencement claims.

[50] It must be understood that throughout the course of business rescue proceedings,
the fundamental objective is to ensure the safeguarding of the rights and priorities of

MATHOPO J
25
existing creditors to the extent that this is reasonably possible. Under section 7(k) of
the Act, a necessary balance must be maintained in addressing the entitlements of
creditors with pre - and post-commencement claims. Thus, awarding
post-commencement financiers preferential treatment encourages them to assume the
risk associated with extending credit to a financially distressed company.

[51] Chapter 6 of the Act creates a structured framework. Section 133 of the Act
introduces a moratorium on legal proceedings against the company to stabilise the
company’s estate. Section 135 of the Act establishes a priority regime to encourage
post-commencement financing. Sections 145 and 152 of the Act then regulate creditor
participation and voting. These provisions form a coherent legislative design for the
stabilisation of the company, incentivisation of new funding and inclusive participation
in decision -making. Section 7(k) of the Act emphasises balancing the rights and
interests of all stakeholders in achieving the rescue of distressed companies.

[52] The term creditor is not defined in the Act. The lack of a legislative definition
of creditor warrants an examination of the Act’s text, context and purpose to ascertain
the scope and meaning of the term. In terms of section 128(1)(a) of the Act, the term
“affected person”, for purposes of business rescue proceedings under Chapter 6 of the
Act, includes “a shareholder or creditor of the company”. The definition of an
“independent creditor” in section 128(1)(g) of the Act is of no assistance, because it
simply refers to “creditor”. Sections 5 and 7 of the Act provide instructive context and
purpose when considering the relevant provisions of Chapter 6 of the Act. In terms of
section 5(1) of the Act, the Act must be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives
effect to the purposes of the Act as set out in section 7. The word “stakeholders”,

effect to the purposes of the Act as set out in section 7. The word “stakeholders”,
referred to in section 7 of the Act, is not confined to a particular category. In normal
parlance, “stakeholders” means persons that have an interest in the company’s affairs.
This is not helpful in the interpretative exercise.

[53] What then is one to make of the Legislature’s omission to define creditor? In
Cool Ideas, this Court stated a tenet of statutory interpretation is that the words in a

MATHOPO J
26
statute must be given their ordinary grammatical meaning, unless to do so would result
in an absurdity .16 The mode of construction, however, should never be to interpret a
particular word in a statute in isolation. The answer to this question requires a close
analysis of the relevant provisions of the Act. The applicants say that the rationale for
this omission demonstrates that the Legislature was aware of the negative implications
of including post -commencement creditors in the term creditor for creditors that
provided finance prior to the initiation of the business rescue. In essence, they assert
that it was the intention of the Legislature to accord the term its meaning as in
insolvency proceedings.

[54] It is important that the term creditor be interpreted in a way that is contextually
appropriate, in line with Chapter 6 of the Act . We must acknowledge that the
Legislature did not provide a specific definition for the term as it appears in the statute.
In examining the term in the context of business rescue, it is important to ask whether
it should be interpreted and distinguished from that which is applicable in liquidation
proceedings of an insolvent company. The applicants invite us to follow this approach.
They say that in liquidation, a concursus creditorum is established at the date of
liquidation, with creditors strictly regulated by the Act and the relevant sections of the
Insolvency Act. Business rescue does not involve a concursus creditorum.

[55] The respondents, in turn, contend that if one approaches the word creditor in its
ordinary sense and unhampered by ingenious statutory arguments, the word should be
interpreted, in its literal and grammatical meaning, as one to whom a debt is unpaid.
The respondents say that there is no reason not to treat both types of creditors equally
and on the same footing regarding their participation in the business rescue and in
determining the company’s fate during business rescue.

determining the company’s fate during business rescue.

[56] It needs to be clearly understood that no statutory provision is made in a vacuum;
there is always a setting in which it has to be placed. In Capitec Bank, the SCA affirmed

16 Cool Ideas above n 14 at para 28.

MATHOPO J
27
that statutory interpretation is not a mechanical exercise in textual formulation, but a
deliberative process aimed at giving effect to the intention of the Legislature. 17 The
High Court answered the question of whether creditor includes post -commencement
creditors in the negative; the SCA reversed that decision and agreed with the
respondents that post-commencement creditors are entitled to vote on the adoption of
the business rescue plan.

[57] Before I proceed with the interpretative exercise, it is important to say
something. Some significance was attached to the distinction to be drawn between
pre-and post-commencement creditors. Reference was made to certain sections in the
Act as supporting either position. To decide what significance should be attached to
this apparent distinction, it is necessary to consider the meaning of creditor in the Act
and the degree of precision and consistency of terminology of the Act.

[58] The first consideration in the interpretative exercise is the definition of
“affected person” in section 128 of the Act . This is a broad category of persons that
includes creditors, registered trade unions, employees and shareholders. These are
persons directly impacted by the commencement of business rescue. It is important to
note that section 128 of the Act does not define the meaning of “creditors” but includes
them as an “affected person”. The reference to “affected person” in section 128 of the
Act demonstrates that the manifest purpose of the statute is to bring these affected
persons into a collaborative effort aimed at rescuing the company. Although only
creditors vote at a meeting under section 152 of the Act, the broader design of the Act
appears to encourage all stakeholders affected by the commencement of the process to
engage with one another in seeking the company’s rehabilitation. This is in conformity
with the overall purpose of business rescue, which is to preserve the social value of the

with the overall purpose of business rescue, which is to preserve the social value of the
business as a going concern and avoid the destruction of that value. This broad category
of persons is a further reason why creditor should not be given an extensive meaning
wide enough to include post -commencement creditors because this will make drastic

17 Capitec Bank Holdings Limited and Another v Coral Lagoon Investments 194 (Pty) Ltd [2021] ZASCA 99;
2022 (1) SA 100 (SCA) at para 25.

MATHOPO J
28
inroads upon the normal procedure for the determination of claims and their recovery
thereof.

[59] Second, an important textual point for consideration is the plain language of
section 145 of the Act, which sets out how voting interests of creditors for the business
rescue plan are to be determined. It mentions only three categories of creditors : a
secured creditor, which has a voting interest equal to the value of the amount owed to
that creditor by the company; an unsecured creditor, which likewise has a voting interest
equal to the value of the amount owed to it by the company ; and a concurrent creditor
whose claim would be subordinated in a liquidation . The words in the section “owed
to that creditor by the company” in liquidation clearly exclude post -commencement
creditors. Construing this section differently seems forced, as a post -commencement
creditor is not ordinarily a creditor with voting rights.

[60] In terms of section 145 of the Act , “creditors” have a right to participate in
business rescue proceedings. This includes the right to vote to approve, amend or reject
a proposed business rescue plan at a meeting called by the practitioner under section 152
of the Act. In terms of section 145(1)(c) of the Act, each creditor is entitled to formally
participate in a company’s business rescue proceedings to the extent provided for in
Chapter 6 of the Act . The Legislature carefully elected the words “ to the extent
provided”, thus allowing for the possibility that not all creditors are allowed to vote.
One must not overlook section 128 of the Act , which defines “‘affected person’, in
relation to a company”. The only practical effect of this provision is that it excludes
post-commencement creditors as persons affected by the company. In the context of
this section, the word is used to strictly refer to creditor at the time of the business
rescue. An interpreter of a statute must proceed upon the assumption that the

rescue. An interpreter of a statute must proceed upon the assumption that the
Legislature is well aware of the existing law and particularly of the content of legislative
measures for which it has itself been responsible.

[61] It is inconceivable to me that when it left the word creditor undefined, the
Legislature lost sight of what it enacted in the insolvency legislation. There is no reason

MATHOPO J
29
for supposing that the Legislature was not conversant with the currency that the term
creditor had acquired in liquidation proceedings. It is therefore unsurprising that the
Legislature did not define the term creditor, having used it against the backdrop of an
established insolvency law framework in which its meaning was already well settled.
Similarly, it cannot be validly suggested that the Legislature thought that
post-commencement creditors are so obviously included in voting for the adoption of
the business rescue plan that it was not necessary to mention them in the definition
specifically.

[62] There is another line of interpretation that brings one to the same conclusion.
Section 145(2)(a) of the Act makes this position clear. It says: “[i]n addition to the
rights set out in subsection (1), each creditor has the right to vote to amend, approve or
reject a proposed business rescue plan, in the manner contemplated in section 152”.
Section 151 of the Act permits the practitioner to convene and preside over a meeting
of creditors and holders of a voting interest to consider the business rescue plan.
Significantly, the voting prescribed by this section is limited to holders of a voting
interest, and such voting interests are determined by reference to the admitted or proved
claims identified in the business rescue plan. In carrying out this function, the
practitioner must send a notice to all affected persons mentioned in section 128 of the
Act. The Legislature must have assumed that there would be a clear understanding of
the meaning of the term creditor. As I pointed out earlier during my discussion of
“affected person”, this must mean creditors of the company that existed at the initiation
of the business rescue.

[63] It should be borne in mind that the fact that a person is reflected in the books or
records of a company as a creditor does not automatically grant that person voting rights

records of a company as a creditor does not automatically grant that person voting rights
for the adoption of the business rescue plan. The aforesaid rights are limited to creditors
with certain voting rights. This position was made clear in Tuning Fork, where the
High Court held that a surety, whilst a contingent creditor, is not a creditor that has a

MATHOPO J
30
voting interest for the purposes of voting on a business rescue plan. 18 By parity of
reasoning, the fact that a post -commencement creditor is reflected in the books of the
company does not mean that it automatically has voting rights for the purpose of voting
on a business rescue plan. The simple answer is that voting inter ests are determined
with reference to claims that are admitted for business rescue proceedings.

[64] Third, another textual interpretation to consider is section 150(2)(a)(ii) of the
Act, which requires a business rescue plan to contain a complete list of the creditors of
the company “when the business rescue began”, together with an indication as to which
creditors would qualify as “secured, statutory preferent and concurrent in terms of the
laws of insolvency”, and an in dication of which “of the creditors have proved their
claims”. There is a reason why providing a list of creditors at the initiation of the
business rescue is essential. The list promote s predictability, certainty and regulation,
as pre-commencement creditors will know at that stage who other creditors are and what
preference they may have in receiving the funds. Furthermore, the qualification “when
the business rescue began” is a clear indication that the Legislature intended to include
only pre-commencement creditors. Another factor pointing towards the exclusion of
post-commencement creditors is that according to the section, a plan is not required to
make any reference to post-commencement creditors.

[65] The specific reference to a list of creditors at commencement of the business
rescue establishes that post-commencement creditors were not intended to have a voting
interest in the business rescue plan. If they were meant to vote, the Act would be
expected to require that they be identified and accounted for in the business rescue plan.
Yet the statute contains no indication that any creditors other than those existing at the

Yet the statute contains no indication that any creditors other than those existing at the
beginning of the business rescue must be included. The business rescue plan is not
required to say anything to or about them. I agree with the High Court’s observation
that the omission is deliberate. Post -commencement creditors are not contemplated as
participants in the voting architecture because the business rescue plan is structured

18 Tuning Fork (Pty) Ltd t/a Balanced Audio v Greeff [2014] ZAWCHC 78; 2014 (4) SA 521 (WCC) at para 43(ii).

MATHOPO J
31
around the creditor body as it existed at the commencement of the business rescue.
Their protection lies instead in section 135 of the Act, which affords them preferential
treatment, rather than voting rights.

[66] The High Court’s interpretation better reflects the internal logic and architecture
of Chapter 6 of the Act . Voting under section 152 of the Act presupposes a defined
pool of voting interests capable of prior identification and valuation. Because the
business rescue plan must furnish creditors with sufficient information to assess and
exercise their voting rights, the absence of any mechanism to identify or value
post-commencement creditors within that framework makes their integration into the
statutory thresholds conceptually difficult. Section 150 of the Act is not merely
descriptive. By requiring a “complete list” of creditors at commencement, it establishes
the reference point for participation and voting. Read together with the broader
structure of business rescue, business rescue is triggered at a defined date and anchored
by mechanisms such as the moratorium and the liquidation comparison. Therefore, the
voting constituency is coherently understood as fixed at commencement of the business
rescue.

[67] It must be stressed that post -commencement creditors are not left without
protection. Section 135 of the Act grants them super-preference over all other creditors.
This preference incentivises them to lend to a distressed company. If such financiers
were also entitled to vote on the business rescue plan, this would compromise the
operation of sections 150 and 152 of the Act by prejudicing the interests of
pre-commencement creditors. Because of their enhanced security and preferential
status, they would distort the collective decision -making of pre -commencement
creditors in a manner not contemplated by the Act. Nevertheless, it seems to me that
section 135 of the Act was designed only to offer protection to post -commencement

section 135 of the Act was designed only to offer protection to post -commencement
financiers by granting them super -preference above all other creditors but not to grant
them rights to vote on a business rescue plan. There are cogent reasons why this appears
to be so.

MATHOPO J
32
[68] Section 152(2)(a) of the Act makes it clear that, for a proposed business rescue
plan to be approved on a preliminary basis, it must be supported by holders of more
than 75% of the creditors’ voting interests that have voted. The Act does not use
creditors’ voting interests in a general sense, but creditors’ voting interests for specific
purposes and goes on to say, in section 152(2)(b) of the Act, that the votes in support of
the proposed business rescue plan must include at least 50% of the independent voting
interests, if any, that were voted. It is significant to note that these are creditors that
formed part of the list of creditors when the business rescue began. Additionally, this
list indicates different rankings of creditors in terms of the law of insolvency. However,
although one may borrow from the idea of the concursus creditorum to reason by
analogy that assets should be distributed fairly among creditors according to a strict,
prescribed order of preference, this concept does not extend to business rescue
proceedings.19

[69] Section 135 of the Act is carried through to section 152(4) of the Act , which
provides that, once adopted, a business rescue plan binds all creditors, whether or not
they attended the meeting, voted or proved their claims. Such a business rescue plan
will almost always compromise certain debts. Section 150(2)(b)(i) and (ii) of the Act
contemplates the inclusion of a moratorium and even the release of the company from
payment of some debts. It would be incoherent to grant a post-commencement financier
a preferent claim under section 135 of the Act if that claim could then be suspended or
extinguished by the business rescue plan. If one reads section 152(4) of the Act literally
and without qualification, then any creditor whose claim falls within the business rescue
plan may have that claim compromised, even if it enjoys statutory priority like

plan may have that claim compromised, even if it enjoys statutory priority like
post-commencement creditors. Their participation in the process would therefore
expose their claim to the plan’s restructuring mechanism.

[70] Although section 135 of the Act would continue to regulate the ranking of their
claim, the amount payable or the timing of payment could nonetheless be varied by the

19 SCA judgment above n 10 at paras 22-3.

MATHOPO J
33
adopted plan. No rational financier would advance funds on that basis. Rather, the
statutory scheme contemplates that post -commencement financiers enjoy a preferent
claim regardless of the plan, which serves to facilitate repayment, not to authorise its
compromise. These considerations strongly militate against the SCA’s approach which
it claims to be consonant with commercial reality. On the contrary, as I see it, the fact
that post-commencement financiers are granted a statutory preference, preserved even
in liquidation, is a powerful inducement to lend to a distressed company. 20 It makes
structural sense that the Legislature chose security rather than governance power as the
trade-off.

[71] It is true that, in the case of business rescue, there is not a concursus creditorum
in the strict insolvency sense of that term. 21 Nevertheless, the provisions of the Act
indicate that, in the context of a business rescue plan, Chapter 6 of the Act has in mind
creditors determined in substantially the same way as in insolvency proceedings,
namely those whose claims existed immediately prior to the commencement of the
business rescue proceedings.

[72] This should come as no surprise. Although a company in business rescue is not
thereby placed in liquidation, the context of a business rescue application is the
company’s financial distress. Liquidation is foreseen as a real danger, and an important
part of the purpose of business rescue is to achieve a better outcome than would follow
from liquidation. A business rescue plan must contrast the plan’s outcome with the
outcome for creditors in liquidation, and those creditors would be the creditors making
up the concursus creditorum. Chapter 6 of the Act envisages a transition from business
rescue to liquidation where the former has failed.

[73] If creditors were not limited to those existing at the time business rescue
proceedings commenced, creditors’ voting interests would constantly be fluctuating as

proceedings commenced, creditors’ voting interests would constantly be fluctuating as

20 Section 135(2)(b), (3)(b) and (4) of the Act.
21 Sections 150(2)(a)(ii)-(iii), 150(2)(b)(ii) and (iv) -(vi), 152(4) and 154(1) -(2) of the Act; SCA judgment above
n 10 at paras 22-3.

MATHOPO J
34
post-commencement claims were incurred or reduced. How then is the practitioner to
fix the voting interests in advance of any particular meeting? In terms of section 151(2)
of the Act, a meeting to determine the future of a company and vote on a business rescue
plan must be preceded by a notice given at least five business days before the meeting,
and such notice must state , among other things, “a summary of the rights of affected
persons to participate in and vote at the meeting”. 22 Yet the claims of post -
commencement creditors could fluctuate after the giving of notice but before the
meeting. A constantly shifting body of creditors would greatly complicate business
rescue proceedings.

[74] The argument that insolvency law must be ignored falters on several grounds.
First, a list of creditors of the company is determined according to the laws of
insolvency. It is a body of those creditors that must meet for the adoption of the business
rescue plan. Second, voting procedures and interests are also determined according to
the law of insolvency. Third, if the plan has been rejected under section 153, the
business rescue practitioner is obliged to seek a vote of approval from the holders of
voting interests to prepare and publish a revised business rescue plan. Fourth, Chapter 6
of the Act makes provision for proof of claims by creditors. 23 The proof of claims,
which is typical of insolvency proceedings, is something that typically happens
promptly after the commencement of the business rescue proceedings. 24

[75] Only debts incurred before the relevant date are capable of proof against the
company. In relation to a winding -up, the relevant date is the date on which the
winding-up is deemed to commence, which in the normal course of events is the date
taken as the commencement of the winding -up process, namely the first meeting of
creditors. A person is not entitled to vote as a creditor at a meeting of creditors unless

creditors. A person is not entitled to vote as a creditor at a meeting of creditors unless
its debt has been admitted wholly or in part by the relevant business rescue practitioner.

22 Section 151(2)(c) of the Act.
23 In terms of section 147(1) of the Act , the practitioner must, within 10 days of appointment, convene a first
meeting of creditors at which, among other things, the practitioner may receive “proof of claims by creditors”.
24 Section 147(1)(a)(ii) of the Act.

MATHOPO J
35
Votes are allocated according to the value of a particular creditor’s claim. That claim
must be proved and accepted by the business rescue practitioner before commencement
of the meeting. Post-commencement creditors come after all these processes have been
undertaken.

[76] Denying post-commencement creditors from voting on a business rescue plan
does not mean that they have no role to play or remedy in the business rescue of the
company. The Act protects their interests and the liquidity they have provided by
granting them preferential rights over other creditors in terms of section 135 of the Act.
This section is headed “post -commencement finance”. It does not refer to the
post-commencement financiers as “creditors” but instead refers to their claims and the
preference they enjoy. This includes post -commencement employment claims.
Evidently, in the context of this section, an unpaid post -commencement employment
claim is regarde d as a form of post -commencement finance. Employees’ rights are
limited too – they do not get to vote unless they are creditors under section 144 of the
Act, that is, in respect of their pre-commencement employment claims.

[77] Fourth, section 144 of the Act treats employees as preferred unsecured creditors
of a company in business rescue, but only to the extent of any remuneration, expenses
and reimbursement for expenses or other amounts of money relating to employment
which become due and payable to them before the beginning of the business rescue. 25
In respect of employees’ post -commencement claims, they are treated not as creditors
with a right to vote on the business rescue plan; instead, and like other
post-commencement creditors, they are given a special statutory preference under
section 135 of the Act . The post -commencement creditors help to keep the company
going during business rescue as part of a process to see whether, among other things,

going during business rescue as part of a process to see whether, among other things,
the business rescue will be more beneficial to the pre -commencement creditors
(including pre -commencement empl oyment creditors) than liquidation. For this
contribution, they receive a special statutory preference.

25 Section 144(2) of the Act.

MATHOPO J
36

[78] On the respondents’ construction, post -commencement creditors qualify as
creditors even though they were not affected persons at the time of the commencement
of the business rescue proceedings. This interpretation would lead to some absurdity.
The argument of the applicants is reinforced by the text, context and purpose of the Act.
It establishes certainty, efficiency and predictability, and all of these factors must be
given effect to. Construing the provisions to the effect that post -commencement
creditors are excluded reinforces the legislative intent. A literal or grammatical
meaning of the word creditor involves a radical departure from the proper interpretation
of the relevant impugned statutory provisions.

[79] The finding by the SCA – that if the Legislature had intended to exclude
post-commencement financiers, it should have made this position clear – is not borne
out by the text, context and purpose of the Act. The Legislature said employees do not
have a right to vote as creditors except in respect of their pre -commencement claims.
Electing not to mention post -commencement financiers at all is an indication that the
Legislature must have known that it had created this new category of financiers under
section 135 of the Act with a particular super-preference. In relation to the employees,
they would have been in service of the company before the commencement of business
rescue, and their service for the company would most likely continue thereafter. In this
regard, there is no change in the employer -employee relationship. For this reason,
because employees would typically feature as both pre - and post -commencement
creditors, the Act has made it clear that they are only creditors with a right to vote to
the extent of their pre-commencement claims.

Factual considerations
[80] At a factual level, there were several irregularities relating to the tallying of the

[80] At a factual level, there were several irregularities relating to the tallying of the
votes. The irregularities in the voting process are pertinent to whether the plan was
validly adopted. These included the double-counting of certain votes, the failure to take
account of emails revoking votes, certain creditors voting as a group and subsequently
voting separately and the late receipt of certain proxies. Once these errors were

MATHOPO J
37
considered, the 75% threshold was not met. The forensic accountant, Mr Makhuvele,
initially calculated that 72,2% of creditors’ voting interests had been voted in favour of
Option B, which was subsequently amended to 70,5%.26 In light of these irregularities
and the resulting ambiguity regarding the ultimate voting outcome, we cannot conclude
that the plan was validly adopted. The SCA held that, because of the irregularities, the
High Court ought to have remitted the matter to the creditors to vote afresh.

[81] The finding of the SCA on the remittal point is unassailable. The question
regarding the manner in which the vote for the business rescue plan takes place lies at
the heart of the legitimacy of the business rescue plan. Further, the voting process is an
important procedural aspect for the adoption of the business rescue plan. More so when
the practitioner is the one who alleges irregularities in the voting process. This is a
factual issue that necessitates a finding that the aspect of the vote be remitted back to
the creditors to vote for the business rescue plan afresh. It further necessitates a finding
that the practitioner ensures that only those that are eligible to vote in fact vote.

[82] In deciding the remittal point, the SCA, however, acknowledged that the Act is
silent on the remittal of a business rescue plan back to a creditors’ meeting for a new
vote. As a basis for its finding, it relied on section 153(1)(a)(i) of the Act , which
stipulates that if a business rescue plan has been rejected, the practitioner may seek a
vote of approval from the holders of voting interests to prepare and publish a revised
business rescue plan. The SCA was correct to find that remittal is not provided for in
the Act. This notwithstanding, I am of the view that section 153(1)(a)(i) of the Act read
with section 140(3)(a), (b) and (c)(ii) of the Act can be read as the basis through which

with section 140(3)(a), (b) and (c)(ii) of the Act can be read as the basis through which
remittal can find expression. Section 153(1)(a)(i) of the Act deals with instances where
the business rescue plan had been rejected. In terms of section 140 of the Act , the
provision imposes broad obligations on the practitioner during business rescue, and
there is no reason why the said obligations should not apply during the adoption of the
business rescue plan. The question to be asked is whether the identified irre gularities

26 SCA judgment above n 10 at para 5.

MATHOPO J
38
affect the credibility and legitimacy of the adoption of the business rescue plan. In my
view, they do. In the present matter, the procedural irregularities raised by the
practitioner and the respondents necessitate that the vote be recast. It is theref ore only
just and equitable that the matter be remitted to the business rescue practitioner for a
fresh vote.

Foreign law considerations
[83] What remains is to determine whether the SCA correctly rejected guidance from
foreign jurisdictions. The SCA held that the legislative provisions relied on by the
applicants were not reflective of the “generally accepted practical needs and
considerations” relevant to our country and do not assist in the interpretative exercise.
It did not enumerate what those needs are and failed to state why our needs are different
from those in the rest of the world. This reasoning is unsustainable. Our restructuring
regime has its origin in the United States’ regime, so that country’s position and
experience should serve as a significant comparative consideration in our interpretative
exercise. The flaw in the SCA judgment lies in its failure to engage with foreign
jurisdictions and explain why those practices are untenable in our country.

[84] In some foreign jurisdictions that have restructuring regimes similar to our
business rescue regime, post-commencement creditors do not have a right to vote, even
though this state of affairs is not universal. In the United States, section 101 of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act excludes post-commencement creditors from the definition of
a creditor. 27 The definition encompasses only an “entity that has a claim against the
debtor that arose at the time of or before the order for relief concerning the debtor”.
Japan’s Corporate Reorgani zation Act28 concerns, as the name suggests, “corporate
reorganisation”, being the Japanese equivalent of business rescue. It generally militates

reorganisation”, being the Japanese equivalent of business rescue. It generally militates
against post-commencement creditors having a vote on the reorgani sation plan. There
is one exception, located in article 136, and that is for claims “with an uncertain due

27 Bankruptcy Reform Act above n 11.
28 Corporate Reorganization Act 154 of13 December 2002.

MATHOPO J
39
date that is to become due after the commencement of reorgani sation proceedings and
bears no interest”.

[85] Under section 108 of Singapore’s Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution
Act,29 the entitlement of a creditor to vote on a judicial restructuring plan is subject to
the judicial manager’s acceptance of that creditor’s claim. It would appear that
post-commencement debt only affords a right to vote to the extent that the debt stems
from an obligation incurred pre -commencement of the judicial restructuring plan .
India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 30 provides that post -commencement
financiers receive priority protection but do not participate in voting on the resolution
for adopting the business rescue plan. This appears from section 109(1), read with
sections 102, 104 and 109(4) of India’s Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code . I must also
add that the United Kingdom’s Companies Act31 does not allow post -commencement
creditors to vote in business rescue proceedings.

[86] There is no reason to believe that the position in South Africa should, as a matter
of policy, be any different. Providers of post-commencement finance typically protect
their interests by structuring their funding arrangements, for example, by making such
finance conditional upon the approval of a business rescue plan drafted to their
satisfaction. It would be inherently unfair for a post -commencement creditor, whose
rights are not limited or curtailed by the business rescue plan, to have the right to vote
on a business rescue plan that could potentially deprive pre -commencement creditors
(especially unsecured ones) of a substantial portion of their claims.

Conclusion
[87] In sum, the definition of “affected person” in section 128 of the Act includes
creditors alongside registered trade unions, employees and shareholders, as classes of

29 Insolvency, Restructuring and Dissolution Act 40 of 2018.
30 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 31 of 28 May 2016.

30 The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 31 of 28 May 2016.
31 The Companies Act of 8 November 2006.

MATHOPO J
40
stakeholders affected by the business rescue proceedings at the time of commencement.
The overall purpose of business rescue is to preserve the social value of a business as a
going concern and to avoid the destruction of that value that would come about if the
company were to be liquidated.32 Considering the text, context and purpose of the Act,
it would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of business rescue and the Act if
post-commencement creditors could vote at the section 152 meeting. Allowing such
creditors to vote would open the door to speculators preying on business rescue
proceedings and, in some instances, blocking the adoption of an appropriate business
rescue plan wi th their financial muscle, thereby forcing companies into liquidation
where this could be avoided. Furthermore, section 150(2)(a)(ii) of the Act requires that
a business rescue plan contains a complete list of creditors of the company when the
business rescue proceedings began. Post -commencement creditors do not fall within
this category.

[88] Accordingly, I find that a proper and purposive interpretation of Chapter 6 of the
Act excludes post-commencement creditors from participating in the vote on a business
rescue plan. To hold otherwise would distort the statutory scheme and undermine the
carefully calibrated balance between pre- and post-commencement interests.

Order
[89] The following orders are made:
In Case CCT 37/25 Salungano Group Ltd v Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is set aside and replaced with
the following:

32 Rajaram et al “Business Rescue: Adapt or Die” South African Journal of Economic and Management (2018),
available at https://sajems.org/index.php/sajems/article/view/2164/1666 .

MATHOPO J
41
“(a) It is declared that Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does
not permit post -commencement creditors to vote on the adoption
of the business rescue plan.
(b) It is declared that the amended business rescue plan presented on
28 July 2023 was not supported by holders of more than 75% of
creditors’ voting interests as required by section 152(2) of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008. As a result, the matter is remitted to
the business rescue practitioner for a fresh vote.”
4. The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs, including the costs of two
counsel in the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and in this Court.

In Case CCT 38/25 Ndalamo Coal (Pty) Ltd v Mashwayi Projects (Pty) Ltd and Others:
1. Leave to appeal is granted.
2. The appeal is upheld.
3. The order of the Supreme Court of Appeal is set aside and replaced with
the following:
“(a) It is declared that Chapter 6 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does
not permit post -commencement creditors to vote on the adoption
of the business rescue plan.
(b) It is declared that the amended business rescue plan presented on
28 July 2023 was not supported by holders of more than 75% of
creditors’ voting interests as required by section 152(2) of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008. As a result, the matter is remitted to
the business rescue practitioner for a fresh vote.”
4. The respondents must pay the applicant’s costs, including the costs of two
counsel in the High Court, the Supreme Court of Appeal and in this Court.

Case CCT 37/25

For the Applicant:



For the First Respondent:


For the Second and Third Respondents:


For the Fourth Respondent:


Case CCT 38/25

For the Applicant:


For the First Respondent:


For the Second and Third Respondents:


For the Fifth Respondent:



For the Amicus:


A Botha SC and S Mohapi instructed by
Mkhabela Huntley Attorneys
Incorporated

N Maritz SC and J Viljoen instructed by
MC Steyn Incorporated

S Symon SC and A Vorster instructed
by Cox Yeats Attorneys

I Miltz SC and D Block instructed by
Webber Wentzel



I Miltz SC and D Block instructed by
Webber Wentzel

N Maritz SC and J Viljoen instructed by
MC Steyn Incorporated

S Symon SC and A Vorster instructed
by Cox Yeats Attorneys

A Botha SC and S Mohapi instructed by
Mkhabela Huntley Attorneys
Incorporated

P Stais SC and L Acker instructed by
Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr Incorporated