Capitec v Ubuntu Family Health Centre Grayston (Pty) Ltd (328/2025) [2026] ZASCA 123 (23 September 2026)

78 Reportability

Brief Summary

Company Law — Business Rescue — Moratorium on legal proceedings — Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not apply to vindicatory proceedings for the return of property unlawfully possessed by a company in business rescue — Capitec Bank seeking recovery of a Porsche from Ubuntu Family Health Centre, which defaulted on payment obligations — High Court ruling that moratorium applied, but Supreme Court of Appeal overturning this decision, affirming that possession becomes unlawful upon cancellation of the agreement.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter was an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa concerning the scope of the general moratorium on legal proceedings during business rescue, as provided for in section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008.


The appellant was Capitec Bank Limited (Capitec), a financier and owner (until full payment) of a motor vehicle sold on instalment sale terms. The respondent was Ubuntu Family Health Centre Grayston (Pty) Ltd (Ubuntu), the purchaser and possessor of the vehicle and, at the relevant time, a company that had entered business rescue.


The dispute originated in an urgent application brought by Capitec in the Gauteng Division of the High Court. That court dismissed Capitec’s application for return of the vehicle (although it made an adverse costs order against Ubuntu). Capitec obtained leave to appeal, and the appeal before the Supreme Court of Appeal was limited to the dismissal of the application.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the moratorium in section 133 prevented Capitec from pursuing vindicatory relief (repossession/return) for a vehicle that Capitec owned and that Ubuntu retained after Capitec had cancelled the instalment sale agreement due to Ubuntu’s breach, in circumstances where Ubuntu had commenced business rescue shortly thereafter.


2. Material Facts


Ubuntu concluded an instalment sale agreement with Capitec under which Capitec advanced funding for Ubuntu to purchase a 2020 Porsche 911 Carrera S Coupe for a purchase price of R2 350 000.00. Ubuntu’s repayment obligations included monthly instalments over a 60-month period, together with a substantial amount payable by the final month. The agreement expressly provided that ownership remained vested in Capitec until Ubuntu paid all amounts due.


Capitec performed under the agreement and Ubuntu obtained possession of the vehicle. Ubuntu then defaulted on its payment obligations. Capitec sent a letter of demand on 26 October 2023, warning that failure to remedy the arrears would result in cancellation. Ubuntu did not meet the stated commitments to settle the arrears.


On 17 November 2023, Capitec issued a written notice cancelling the agreement with immediate effect. It was common cause before the Supreme Court of Appeal that the agreement was validly cancelled on that date and that this occurred before the commencement of Ubuntu’s business rescue proceedings.


After cancellation, Capitec attempted to obtain possession of the vehicle. Ubuntu’s director refused to allow removal of the vehicle and declined to disclose its whereabouts. Further undertakings to pay arrears and facilitate viewing were made by Ubuntu but were not fulfilled. When Capitec’s agent sought to take possession on 1 December 2023, access was refused, Ubuntu insisting that a court order was required.


Capitec launched an urgent application on 4 December 2023 seeking, among other relief, the return of the Porsche. Shortly before that application was launched, on 29 November 2023, Ubuntu adopted a resolution commencing business rescue and appointing a practitioner. Capitec was notified of that business rescue only after it had already launched the urgent application. The application was heard on 24 April 2024.


Subsequently, Ubuntu was liquidated on 24 May 2024. The High Court nevertheless delivered judgment on 10 February 2025, dismissing Capitec’s application on the basis that the section 133 moratorium applied because Ubuntu was said to be lawfully in possession of the vehicle for purposes of section 133.


A key disputed point in the High Court’s reasoning (and central to the appeal) was the meaning of “lawfully in its possession” in section 133. The High Court treated “unlawful possession” as requiring a form of criminal unlawfulness (such as theft, robbery, fraud, or possession acquired “by force or stealth”), rather than possession being “unlawful” merely because contractual rights to possess had ended following cancellation.


3. Legal Issues


The appeal required determination of the proper interpretation and application of section 133(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, specifically whether the statutory moratorium extends to vindicatory proceedings for the return of property that does not belong to the company in business rescue and/or is not lawfully in its possession.


Closely connected to that enquiry was the interpretive and application question of what constitutes property “lawfully in [the company’s] possession” for purposes of section 133(1), and whether “unlawful possession” is confined to instances of criminal unlawfulness or includes possession that is unlawful in the civil-law sense because the company no longer has a right to possess.


The dispute primarily concerned questions of law (statutory interpretation and the legal characterisation of possession post-cancellation), together with the application of law to largely common-cause facts, including the fact of valid cancellation prior to business rescue.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The Supreme Court of Appeal approached the matter through the language, purpose, and context of section 133, read alongside related provisions, and through the binding force of prior authority interpreting the moratorium in the business rescue scheme.


The Court reiterated that section 133 creates a general moratorium: during business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding (including enforcement action) against the company, or in relation to property belonging to the company or lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or proceeded with except with the practitioner’s written consent or with leave of the court. The Court emphasised, however, that the reach of the moratorium is limited by its wording to property belonging to the company or lawfully in its possession.


A central aspect of the Court’s reasoning was that the issue had already been determined by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Timasani (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) and Another v Afrimat Iron Ore (Pty) Ltd, which held that the moratorium does not apply to proceedings relating to property that belongs to someone other than the company in business rescue or that is unlawfully possessed by the company. The Court relied on Timasani’s construction that “property belonging to the company” refers to property belonging to the company in a legally valid sense, such as property owned by it, and is expressly distinguished from property merely “lawfully in its possession”. On that construction, the moratorium cannot sensibly be understood as preventing recovery of property that does not belong to the company or that it does not lawfully possess.


The Court found further contextual support in section 134(1)(c) of the Companies Act, which restricts the exercise of rights in respect of property in the lawful possession of the company during business rescue unless the practitioner consents. The Court treated this as reinforcing that statutory protection is directed at property that is lawfully possessed, and that the Act does not protect the company’s retention of property where possession is unlawful.


In addressing the High Court’s approach, the Supreme Court of Appeal rejected the notion—implicit in the High Court’s reasoning—that “unlawfully in possession” for purposes of section 133 requires identification of a crime or statutory offence. The Supreme Court of Appeal’s reasoning proceeded on the basis that once the right to possession has been validly terminated (for example, by valid cancellation of an agreement), continued possession becomes unlawful for the purposes of section 133. The Court treated this conclusion as consistent with its own earlier authority, including Cloete Murray and Another NNO v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank, which held that cancellation itself is not “legal proceedings” or “enforcement action” within section 133, and that cancellation can render the company’s continued possession unlawful.


The Court also relied on Timasani’s approval of the principle (endorsing Kythera Court v Le Rendez-Vous Café CC and Another) that vindicatory proceedings, or proceedings for repossession of property in the unlawful possession of a company in business rescue, are permissible. In the Court’s view, no purpose connected to business rescue justifies extending moratorium protection to a company in respect of property it neither owns nor lawfully possesses.


On the facts, the Court regarded it as dispositive that it was common cause that the agreement had been validly cancelled on 17 November 2023, before Ubuntu commenced business rescue. From that point, Ubuntu’s continued possession of the Porsche was characterised as unlawful, entitling Capitec to bring vindicatory proceedings for its return. As a result, the moratorium in section 133 did not bar the application.


The Court further held that, in these circumstances, Capitec did not require the consent of the business rescue practitioner to launch the application, and it was not necessary to join the practitioner. The Court noted, additionally, that the practitioner was aware of the urgent application but took no steps in relation to it.


Finally, in relation to costs, the Court recorded that Ubuntu filed a notice to abide the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal, but did not abandon or concede the High Court judgment and order; Capitec therefore still had to pursue the appeal to obtain the setting aside of the dismissal. In those circumstances, the Court applied the general approach that costs follow the result.


5. Outcome and Relief


The Supreme Court of Appeal upheld the appeal with costs.


It set aside paragraph 1 of the High Court’s order (the dismissal of the application) and replaced it with an order directing Ubuntu to forthwith deliver to Capitec the 2020 Porsche 911 Carrera S Coupe identified by chassis and engine numbers as set out in the order.


The Court made an order for costs of the appeal in favour of Capitec. The appeal was expressly limited to the High Court’s dismissal of the application; the Supreme Court of Appeal’s order replaced that part with an order compelling delivery of the vehicle.


Cases Cited


Timasani (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) and Another v Afrimat Iron Ore (Pty) Ltd [2021] ZASCA 43; [2021] 3 All SA 843 (SCA).


Kythera Court v Le Rendez-Vous Café and Another 2016 (6) SA 63 (GJ).


Southern Value Consortium v Tresso Trading 102 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 501 (WCC).


Cloete Murray and Another v FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank [2015] ZASCA 39; 2015 (3) SA 438 (SCA).


Madodza (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Limited and Others [2012] ZAGPPHC 165.


JVJ Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 448 (KZD).


Thallos CC t/a Alfa Tool and Equipment (in business rescue) v Toyota Financial Services (South Africa) Ltd (7035/2019) [2021] Limpopo Division, Polokwane (2 June 2021).


Clark NO v Sibanye Gold Ltd 2021 JDR 0765 (GJ).


Actom (Pty) Ltd v Acton Repair Services (Pty) Ltd and Another 2022 JDR 1084 (GJ).


BAIC Automobile SA (Proprietary) Limited v Samaritan Car Cover (Proprietary) Limited and Another 2024 JDR 0066 (GJ).


ABSA Bank Ltd and Another v Tube-Mech Services (Pty) Ltd 2026 JDR 2622 (GJ).


Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart and Another NNO [2015] ZASCA 112; 2015 (6) SA 424 (SCA).


Kobusch and Others v Whitehead [2025] ZASCA 24; 2025 (3) SA 403 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 133.


Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 134 (including section 134(1)(c)).


Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 136.


Companies Act 71 of 2008, section 152.


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the section 133 moratorium in the Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not extend to vindicatory proceedings for return of property where the company in business rescue does not own the property and is in unlawful possession of it.


It held further that once an agreement conferring a right of possession has been validly cancelled, the company’s continued possession becomes unlawful for purposes of section 133, with the result that proceedings for recovery of the property are not barred by the moratorium.


On the common-cause facts that the instalment sale agreement had been validly cancelled before business rescue commenced, Capitec was entitled to an order compelling Ubuntu to deliver the vehicle forthwith, and the High Court erred in dismissing the application.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The moratorium in section 133(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 is limited by its terms and does not apply to legal proceedings relating to property that does not belong to the company in business rescue or that is not lawfully in its possession.


The expression “lawfully in its possession” in the business rescue provisions is applied so that once the company’s contractual or legal entitlement to possess property has ended (including by valid cancellation of the underlying agreement), continued possession is unlawful for purposes of section 133, and vindicatory proceedings for recovery are not barred.


Cancellation of an agreement is not itself “legal proceedings” or “enforcement action” for purposes of section 133, but valid cancellation may affect whether continued possession is lawful or unlawful within the statutory scheme.


The statutory framework (including section 134(1)(c)) supports the position that business rescue protects the company only in relation to property it owns or lawfully possesses; it does not protect retention of property in unlawful possession, and no business rescue purpose justifies such protection.

SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
compliance with the law and SAFLII Policy





THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not Reportable
Case no: 328/2025

In the matter between:

CAPITEC BANK LIMITED APPELLANT

and

UBUNTU FAMILY HEALTH CENTRE
GRAYSTON (PTY) LTD RESPONDENT


Neutral citation: Capitec v Ubuntu Family Health Centre Grayston (Pty) Ltd
(328/2025) [2026] ZASCA 123 (23 September 2026)
Coram: KATHREE-SETILOANE, NORMAN, PETSE and DLODLO JJA and
MOOKI AJA
Heard: 28 August 2026
Delivered: 23 September 2026
Summary: Company law – general moratorium in s 133 of the Companies Act 71
of 2008 (the Act) – no application to vindicatory proceedings – for return of property
– in unlawful possession of a company in business rescue.

2

3


ORDER


On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Johannesburg (Van der Walt
AJ, sitting as court of first instance):

1 The appeal is upheld with costs.
2 Paragraph 1 of the order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the
following order:
‘1. The respondent is ordered to forthwith deliver to the applicant a 2020 Porche 911
Carrera S Coupe motor vehicle with chassis number W[...] and engine number
D[...].’


JUDGMENT


Kathree-Setiloane JA (Norman, Petse and Dlodlo JJA and Mooki AJA
concurring)


[1] This appeal turns on whether the moratorium in s 133 of the Companies Act
71 of 2008 (the Act) 1 extends to vindicatory proceedings. The dispute arose when

1 Section 133 of the Act provides:
‘General moratorium on legal proceedings against company
(1) During business rescue proceedings, no legal proceeding, including enforcement action, against the company, or
in relation to any property belonging to the company, or lawfully in its possession, may be commenced or proceeded
with in any forum, except-
(a) with the written consent of the practitioner;
(b) with the leave of the court and in accordance with any terms the court considers suitable;
(c) as a set -off against any claim made by the company in any legal proceedings, irrespective of whether those
proceedings commenced before or after the business rescue proceedings began;
(d) in criminal proceedings against the company or any of its directors or officers;
(e) in proceedings concerning any property or right over which the company exercises the powers of a trustee; or

4

Capitec Bank Ltd (Capitec), having financed a motor vehicle, sought its recovery
from Ubuntu Family Health Centre Grayston (Pty) Ltd (Ubuntu), which remained in
its possession. Van der Walt AJ, sitting in the Gauteng Division of the High Court,
Pretoria (the high court), held that the general moratorium in s 133 of the Act did
indeed apply.

[2] The respondent, Ubuntu, concluded an instalment sale agreement with the
appellant, Capitec, in terms of which the latter agreed to advance R2 115 000.00 to
Ubuntu to finance the purchase of a 2020 Porsche 911 Carrera S motor vehicle (the
Porsche) for a purchase price of R2 350 000.00 (the agreement). In terms of the
agreement, Ubuntu was required to repay the principal debt, together with interest
calculated over a period of 60 months, in 59 equal monthly instalments of
R31 638.68. In addition to the monthly instalments, Ubuntu would pay R634 500.00
on or before the last month of the 60 -month period. Ownership of the vehicle
remained vested in Capitec until Ubuntu paid all amounts due to Capitec in terms of
the agreement.

[3] Capitec duly performed in terms of the agreement and Ubuntu obtained
possession of the vehicle. It, however, breached the agreement by defaulting on its
payment obligations. On 26 October 2023, Capitec sent a letter of demand to Ubuntu
which indicated that failure to settle the arrears within seven days would result in
cancellation of the agreement. In response, Ubuntu undertook to settle the arrears by

(f) in proceedings by a regulatory authority in the execution of its duties after written notification to the business
rescue practitioner.
(2) During business rescue proceedings, a guarantee or surety by a company in favour of any other person may not be
enforced by any person against the company except with leave of the court and in accordance with any terms the court
considers just and equitable in the circumstances.

considers just and equitable in the circumstances.
(3) If any right to commence proceedings or otherwise assert a claim against a company is subject to a time limit, the
measurement of that time must be suspended during the company’s business rescue proceedings.

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13h00 on Friday, 17 November 2023, but failed to do so. On that date, Capitec issued
a written notice to Ubuntu cancelling the agreement with immediate effect and
reserving its right to recover all outstanding amounts.

[4] Later that day, Capitec’s attorney, Mr D waine Brooks (Mr Brooks)
accompanied by representatives of Capitec , went to Ubuntu’s premises with the
cancellation notice to enforce termination of the agreement and to take possession
of the Porsche. Ubuntu’s director, Mr Ridwaan Adams (Mr Adams), who had made
a payment of R100 000.00 as payment towards the arrears, refused to allow them to
remove the Porsche. He also declined to disclose its whereabouts. After a discussion
with Mr Adams, Capitec granted Ubuntu an indulgence until Tuesday, 21 November
2023, to raise funds and present a settlement proposal.

[5] At Mr Adams’s request, a meeting was convened at Capitec’s offices on
21 November 2023 to discuss settlement of Ubuntu’s indebtedness under the
agreement. At the meeting, Mr Adams proposed to pay R500 000 .00 by
28 November 2023 to settle the arrears, with further discussions to follow regarding
settlement of the remaining debt over six months. Ubuntu also agreed to arrange a
viewing of the Porsche. None of these undertakings were fulfilled.

[6] On 1 December 2023, Capitec’s appointed agent, WH Auctioneers, went to
Ubuntu’s premises to take possession of the Porsche . Mr Adams refused access,
insisting that a court order was required. Mr Brooks subsequently sent a letter to
Ubuntu and Mr Adams recording the events of 1 December 2023 and advising that,
unless unrestricted access was granted by 16h00 that day, Capitec would approach
the high court on an urgent basis for the return of the Porsche. Ubuntu failed to
furnish a response, and access was consequently denied.

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[7] On 4 December 2023, Capitec approached the high court for , inter alia, the
return of the Porsche. The high court dismissed the application but ordered Ubuntu
to pay the costs on the attorney and client scale. The appeal is before this Court with
leave of the high court. It is limited to the dismissal of the application.

[8] On 29 November 2023, shortly before the urgent application was launched in
the high court, Ubuntu adopted a resolution to commence business rescue
proceedings and appoint a business rescue practitioner. Capitec was only notified of
this four days after launching its urgent application. The urgent application in the
high court was heard on 24 April 2024. A month later, on 24 May 2024, Ubuntu was
liquidated. The high court handed down judgment on 10 February 2025.

[9] The high court found that Ubuntu was in lawful possession of the Porsche and
that the moratorium in s 133 of the Act applied. On the meaning of the term ‘lawfully
in possession’ in s 133 of the Act, the high court held that possession will be unlawful
for purposes of s 133 when it is acquired ‘by force or stealth’ or is ‘obtained or
maintained through fraud, theft or robbery’. In other words, there must be ‘criminal
unlawfulness’ as opposed to ‘civil unlawfulness’, i.e. when the possessor has no
right vis-à-vis the claimant that justifies its possession.

[10] The high court considered this to be the preferred interpretation of the term
‘unlawfully in possession ’ in s 133 of the Act as, according to it, it ‘furthers the
objective of business rescue proceedings’. It held that ‘for a claimant to show that
something is unlawfully in possession of the company in business rescue, it would
have to, as a first step, identify the crime or statutory offence that renders it so .
Capitec has not done so ’. The high court therefore f ound that the Porsche was
lawfully in Ubuntu’s possession and dismissed Capitec’s application for its return.

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It granted Capitec leave to appeal its order to this Court. Ubuntu abides the decision
of this Court on appeal.

[11] Section 133 of the Act places a moratorium on legal proceedings against a
company that is in business rescue. Once business rescue proceedings commence,
no one may commence or proceed with legal proceedings including enforcement
action against a company or against property it ow ns or lawfully possesses, except
with the written consent of the business rescue practitioner, and failing that, with the
leave of the court. Whether s 133 of the Act applies to the rei vindication was
determined by this Court in Timasani (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) and Another v
Afrimat Iron Ore (Pty) Ltd (Timasani).2 In relation to the interpretation of the phrase
‘property belonging to the company or unlawfully in its possession’ in s 133(1), this
Court stated:
‘The plain language of the words, ‘no legal proceedings in relation to any property belonging to
the company or lawfully in its possession may be commenced or proceeded with’, limits the reach
of the moratorium and renders it inapplicable to legal proceedings in relation to property belonging
to an entity other than the company in business rescue, or property unlawfully possessed by the
company.3 Property ‘belonging to the company’ in s 133(1), sensibly construed, can only mean
property belonging in a legally valid sense, such as property owned by the company, 4 which in
s 133(1) is expressly distinguished from property ‘lawfully in its possession’. Common sense
dictates that it could never have been intended that the restructuring of the affairs of a company
during business rescue should prevent recovery of property not belonging to it or unlawfully in its
possession.5


2 Timasani (Pty) Ltd (in business rescue) and Another v Afrimat Iron Ore (Pty) Ltd [2021] ZASCA 43; [2021] 3 All
SA 843 (SCA) paras 26-34.
3 Timasani at para 31, citing Kythera Court v Le Rendez-Vous Café and Another 2016 (6) SA 63 (GJ) para 9 at fn 17.

4 Timasani at para 31, citing Southern Value Consortium v Tresso Trading 102 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 501
(WCC) para 30 at fn 18 (Southern Value Consortium).
5 Timasani para 31, citing Southern Value Consortium para 35 at fn 19.

8

[12] This Court found contextual support for its interpretation of s 133 in
s 134(1)(c) of the Act. 6 The latter provision prohibits the exercise of any rights ‘in
respect of property in the lawful possession of the company during business rescue
proceedings, irrespective of whether the property is owned by the company, unless
the business rescue practitioner consents in writing. 7 It held that s 134(1)(c) ‘does
not prohibit the exercise of a right in relation to property in the unlawful possession
of the company’.8

[13] The Court in Timasani furthermore held that ‘no purpose connected to the
process of business rescue warrants the company under business rescue being
protected against proceedings to recover property that it ne ither owns, nor lawfully
possesses’.9 It did not confine the meaning of ‘lawfully in possession’ in ss 133 and
134(1)(c) of the Act to ‘criminal unlawfulness,’ as the high court did in the judgment
under appeal. It reaffirmed its holding in Cloete Murray and Another NNO v
FirstRand Bank Ltd t/a Wesbank 10 that, although the moratorium in s 133(1) of the
Act affords a company breathing space, the legislature did not intend to interfere
with the contractual rights and obligations of parties to an agreement. Cloete Murray

6 Timasani at para 32.
7 Section 134 provides:
‘Protection of property interests
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), during a company’s business rescue proceedings-
(a) the company may dispose, or agree to dispose, of property only-
(i) in the ordinary course of its business;
(ii) in a bona fide transaction at arm’s length for fair value approved in advance and in writing by the practitioner; or
(iii) in a transaction contemplated within, and undertaken as part of the implementation of, a business rescue plan that
has been approved in terms of section 152;
(b) any person who, as a result of an agreement made in the ordinary course of the company’s business before the

business rescue proceedings began, is in lawful possession of any property owned by the company may continue to
exercise any right in respect of that property as contemplated in that agreement, subject to section 136; and
(c) despite any provision of an agreement to the contrary, no person may exercise any right in respect of any property
in the lawful possession of the company, irrespective of whether the property is owned by the company, except to the
extent that the practitioner consents in writing.’
8 Timasani at para 32
9 Timasani at para 29.
10 Timasani at para 34; Cloete Murray and Another v FirstRand Bank t/a Wesbank [2015] ZASCA 39; 2015 (3) SA
438 paras 9, 14 and 15 (Cloete Murray).

9

concerned whether a creditor’s cancellation of a sale agreement rendered unlawful
a company in business rescue’s continued possession of the goods described in the
agreement. The Court held that it did because the cancellation of an agreement does
not constitute ‘legal proceedings’ or ‘enforcement action’ within the meaning of
s 133 of the Act.11

[14] In Timasani, this Court also confirmed the holding of the high court in Kythera
Court v Le Rendez-Vous Café CC (Kythera Court) that: ‘vindicatory proceedings or
proceedings for the repossession or attachment of property in the unlawful
possession of a company in business rescue would be permi ssible’.12 The
proceedings in Kythera Court concerned the ejectment of a company in business
rescue which, following the cancellation of its lease agreement, was an unlawful
occupier.13

[15] It follows that continued possession of property belonging to persons or
entities other than the company in business rescue becomes unlawful for purposes
of s 133 of the Act once the right to possession has been validly cancelled. The
authorities referenced above, predate the judgment of the high court under appeal .
They make clear that the moratorium in s 133 does not extend to vindicatory
proceedings.14 By virtue of the doctrine of precedent, the high court was bound by
these decisions.

11 Cloete Murray at paras 31 and 33.
12 Timasani at para 34; Kythera Court v Le Rendez-Vous Café and Another 2016 (6) SA 63 (GJ) para 9.
13 Timasani at para 34; Kythera Court at para 1.
14 See also Madodza (Pty) Ltd v Absa Bank Limited and Others [2012] ZAGPPHC 165; JVJ Logistics (Pty) Ltd v
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 448 (KZD); Southern Value Consortium v Tresso Trading
102 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2016 (6) SA 501 (WCC); Thallos CC t/a Alfa Tool and Equipment (in business rescue) v
Toyota Financial Services (South Africa) Ltd (7035/2019) [2021] Limpopo Division, Polokwane (2 June

2021)(Thallos); Clark NO v Sibanye Gold Ltd 2021 JDR 0765 (GJ), Actom (Pty) Ltd v Acton Repair Services (Pty)
Ltd and Another 2022 JDR 1084 (GJ); BAIC Automobile SA (Proprietary) Limited v Samaritan Car Cover

10

[16] It is common cause that, owing to Ubuntu’s breach, the agreement was validly
cancelled on 17 November 2023 ; prior to the commencement of business rescue.
Ubuntu was thus in unlawful possession of the Porsche, entitling Capitec to institute
vindicatory proceedings for its return. The consent of the business rescue practitioner
was not required to launch this app lication,15 nor was it necessary to join the
practitioner as a party.16 In any event, the business rescue practitioner was aware of
the urgent application but elected to remain supine. The high court accordingly erred
in dismissing Capitec’s application for recovery of the Porsche.

[17] On 25 April 2025, Ubuntu gave notice to abide this Court’s decision in the
appeal. It did not abandon or concede the judgment and order under appeal,
necessitating Capitec’s approach to this Court to have the order set aside. In these
circumstances, costs must follow the result.17

[18] In the result, the following order is made:
1 The appeal is upheld with costs.
2 Paragraph 1 of the order of the high court is set aside and replaced with the
following order:
‘1. The respondent is ordered to forthwith deliver to the applicant a 2020 Porche 911
Carrera S Coup e motor vehicle with chassis number W[...] and engine number
D[...].’



(Proprietary) Limited and Another 2024 JDR 0066 (GJ) ; ABSA Bank Ltd and Another v Tube -Mech Services (Pty)
Ltd 2026 JDR 2622 (GJ).
15 Chetty t/a Nationwide Electrical v Hart and Another NNO [2015] ZASCA 112; 2015 (6) SA 424 (SCA) para 43.
16 Thallos at paras 37, 38 and 40.
17 Kobusch and Others v Whitehead [2025] ZASCA 24; 2025 (3) SA 403 (SCA) para 24.

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_______________________
F KATHREE-SETILOANE
JUDGE OF APPEAL

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Appearances

For appellant: WG Pretorius
Instructed by: Brooks & Braatvedt Inc. Attorneys, Johannesburg
Honey & Partners Incorporated, Bloemfontein

For respondent: No Appearance
Instructed by: DLBM Incorporated Attorneys, Pretoria.