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[2026] ZAGPPHC 1042
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Tladi v Mekgoe (2026-089305) [2026] ZAGPPHC 1042 (10 September 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 2026-089305
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
(3)
REVISED:
YES
/NO
DATE
10/09/2026
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
OFENTSE
TLADI
Applicant
and
PHENYO
MEKGOE
Respondent
JUDGMENT
MBONGWE, J:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
This is an application for leave to appeal against the judgment and
order of this Court
delivered on 22 May 2026. In that judgment, the
Court granted a final interdict restraining the respondent in the
main application
from publishing defamatory statements concerning the
applicant.
[2]
The applicant for leave to appeal advances several grounds upon which
it is contended that
this Court erred. These grounds may broadly be
grouped under the following headings:
(a) the finding that the
matter was urgent;
(b) the treatment of the
alleged disputes of fact;
(c) the granting of final
interdictory relief; and
(d) the finding that no
adequate alternative remedy existed.
[3]
The applicable test is contained in
section 17(1)(a)
of the
Superior
Courts Act 10 of 2013
. Leave to appeal may only be granted where the
Court is of the opinion that the appeal would have a reasonable
prospect of success
or where some other compelling reason exists why
the appeal should be heard.
[4]
The threshold established by
section 17(1)(a)
is higher than that
which previously applied. It is not sufficient that another court may
come to a different conclusion. The applicant
for leave must
demonstrate a realistic and reasonable prospect that another court
would do so.
URGENCY
[5]
It was submitted that this Court erred in finding the matter urgent.
Reliance was placed
on the principles enunciated in
Luna
Meubel Vervaardigers Bpk v Makin and Another.
[1]
[6]
I am unable to agree that there is merit in this contention. Before
the Court was evidence
of continuing publication of statements
alleged to be defamatory and conduct said to pose an ongoing threat
to the respondent's
reputation and safety. The nature of the harm
complained of was continuing and ongoing. Such circumstances
justified the invocation
of
Rule 6(12).
[7]
The central question in urgency applications is whether substantial
redress can be obtained
in due course. Having considered the facts
before me, I was satisfied that continued publication would result in
ongoing harm for
which a remedy at a later stage would not constitute
adequate redress.
[8]
No basis has been advanced demonstrating that another court would
reasonably interfere
with that finding.
ALLEGED
DISPUTES OF FACTS
[9]
The applicant for leave to appeal further contends that this Court
failed properly to consider
disputes of fact and ignored allegations
relating to the publication of pornographic material allegedly
involving the respondent
in the main proceedings.
[10]
This submission misconceives the basis upon which the judgment was
delivered. The allegations concerning
the alleged publication of
pornographic material were not the subject matter of the relief that
was sought before this Court. The
Court expressly acknowledged the
seriousness of those allegations but found that they fell outside the
ambit of the relief sought
and would have to be pursued through
appropriate legal processes.
[11]
Furthermore, the disputes identified by the applicant for leave to
appeal were not of such a nature
as to prevent the Court from
determining the matter. The material facts were either common cause
or sufficiently established for
purposes of determining the
application.
[12] I
am therefore not persuaded that another court would conclude that the
matter should have been referred
for oral evidence or dismissed on
account of a material dispute of fact.
FINAL
INTERDICT
[13]
It was further argued that this Court erred in granting a final
interdict and in finding that the requirements
set out in
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
[2]
had been established.
[14]
The requirements for a final interdict are well
known:
(a) a clear right;
(b) an injury actually
committed or reasonably apprehended; and
(c) the absence of a
satisfactory alternative remedy.
[14]
The evidence established an ongoing threat to the safety or harm to
the respondent in this hearing. The
harm requirement was therefore
satisfied.
[15]
As to alternative remedies, whilst an action for damages may possibly
be available, such remedy would not
arrest the continuing publication
of the impugned statements. It would therefore not constitute an
adequate alternative remedy
in the circumstances.
[16]
The criticism that this Court failed properly to apply the
requirements for final interdictory relief is
unsupported by the
record and carries no reasonable prospect of success on appeal.
BALANCE
OF CONVENIENCE
[17]
Although the applicant for leave to appeal devoted attention to the
balance of convenience, that consideration
is principally associated
with interim interdicts. In any event, the judgment carefully
balanced the competing rights involved,
including the right to
freedom of expression.
[18]
Freedom of expression is a fundamental constitutional right. It does
not, however, extend to defamatory
speech or conduct that unlawfully
infringes the dignity and reputation of others. The findings reached
in the principal judgment
remain sound.
CONCLUSION
[19]
Having considered all the grounds advanced, individually and
cumulatively, I am not persuaded that there
exists a reasonable
prospect that another court would arrive at a different conclusion.
[20]
Nor has any compelling reason been demonstrated why an appeal should
be heard.
[21]
The application for leave to appeal accordingly
falls to be dismissed.
ORDER
[22]
The following order is made:
1. The
application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. The
applicant for leave to appeal shall pay the costs of the application,
including the costs of counsel on
scale B.
MPN MBONGWE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
GAUTENG
DIVISION
PRETORIA
APPEARANCES
For the Applicant:
ADV BMWM MAILA
Instructed by:
MBC Attorneys Inc.
For the Respondent:
ADV ML MAGOLEGO
Instructed by:
Magolego Attorneys
Date of Hearing:
10 September
2026
Date of
Judgment:
10 September
2026
THIS
JUDGMENT WAS ELECTRONICALLY TRANSMITTED TO THE PARTIES’ LEGAL
REPRESENTATIVES AND UPLOADED ONTO CASELINES ON 10 SEPTEMBER
2026.
[1]
1977
(4) SA 135 (W).
[2]
1914
AD 221.