SAFLII Note: Certain personal/private det ails of parties or witnesses have been redacted from this document in
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NUMBER: 2024/037681
Reportable: NO
Circulate to Judges: NO
Circulate to Magistrates: NO
Circulate to Regional Magistrates NO
In the matter between:-
CITY OF TSHWANE
METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY APPLICANT
And
MOKOTEDI MARIA BONTLENG FIRST REPSONDENT
NEMAVHADWE PHINIAS SECOND RESPONDENT
NGOPE SARIA THIRD RESPONDENT
KEKAE JOHANNAH FOURTH RESPONDENT
NOKO JACK MATHAKGANE FIFTH RESPONDENT
MATHIBA EPHRAIM SIXTH RESPONDENT
MAKUA AUBREY SEVENTH RESPONDENT
MODISE PATRICK EIGHTH RESPONDENT
TSUKUDU BENNY NINTH RESPONDENT
TSUKUDU IGNITIUS TENTH RESPONDENT
GAFANE PRETTY ELEVENTH RESPONDENT
MASANGO DELIWE TWELFTH RESPONDENT
MASHAU PHILIMON THIRTEENTH RESPONDENT
JAFTHA LUCAS FOURTEENTH RESPONDENT
MOKGALE FRANCE FIFTEENTH RESPONDENT
MALATJI SIMON SIXTEENTH RESPONDENT
KGWATHA CONSTANCE SEVENTEENTH RESPONDENT
MAKGETHA MPHO EIGHTEENTH RESPONDENT
APHANE STEVE NINETEENTH RESPONDENT
MODAKU ELISAH TWENTIETH RESPONDENT
ALL OTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF
ERF 5[...]2, 1[...] M[...] STREET,
HENNOPSPARK, CENTURION, 0172 TWENTY -FIRST RESPONDENT
ALL OTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF
ERF 5[...]3,1[...] M[...] STREET,
HENNOPSPARK, CENTURION, 0172 TWENTY-SECOND RESPONDENT
ALL OTHER UNLAWFUL OCCUPIERS OF
ERF 5[...],1[...] M[...] STREET,
HENNOPSPARK, CENTURION, 0172 TWENTY-THIRD RESPONDENT
Disclaimer: This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it on Case Lines.
The date of the judgment is deemed to be 4 September 2026.
JUDGMENT
TROMP AJ
Introduction
1. This is an opposed eviction application brought by the City of Tshwane
Metropolitan Municipality against Mokotedi Maria Bontleng and 22 others (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "the Respondents").
2. It is common cause that the applicant, a municipality, is the registered owner or
person in charge of the immovable property comprising Erven 5[...]2, 5[...]3, and 5[...],
situated at 1[...] M[...] Street, Hennopspark, Centurion (hereinafter referred to as "the
property").
3. It is also not in dispute that the respondents are currently in occupation of the
property.
4. In these proceedings, the applicant seeks an order evicting the respondents from
the property on the grounds that they are in unlawful occupation. The application is
brought in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of
Land Act, 19 of 1998 (the PIE Act). The application of the PIE Act in this matter is not in
dispute.
5. To mitigate any potential adverse consequences, including the risk of
homelessness, that. may result from the granting of an eviction order by this Court, the
applicant seeks an order that the eviction be suspended for a period of six months from
the date of the order being granted.
6. The application is opposed by the respondents, who are all being represented by
SM Sibiya Incorporated Attorneys and which representation was also confirmed during
the hearing of this matter.
7. As part of their opposition, the respondents raised the following points in limine:
7.1 Non-compliance with Sections 4(2) and 7(2) of the PIE Act,
7.2 Non- compliance with Rule 41A(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
Legal framework and principles
8. This eviction application is brought in terms of the PIE Act.
9. In the matter of Davidan v Polovin NO and Others [2021] 4 All SA 37 (SCA), para
[11] the SCA held that:
"The starting point is to establish whether the appellant is an unlawful occupier
under PIE. The key question is whether the appellant enjoyed a right of
occupation? PIE applies not only to occupants who occupied land without the
initial consent of the owner or person in charge, it also applies to occupants who
had consent to occupy but such consent was subsequently terminated. In both
instances the occupants would be unlawful occupiers within the meaning of PIE.
Consent in eviction applications is a valid defence."
10. Section 4 of the PIE Act regulates the eviction of unlawful occupiers by an owner
or person in charge. The procedural provisions are contained in Sections 4(2), (3), (4),
and (5), while the substantive provisions are found in Sections 4(6), (7), and (8).1
11. The procedural provisions relate to the notice which, in terms of Section 4(2) of
the PIE Act, must be given to the unlawful occupier and the municipality with jurisdiction,
at least fourteen (14) days before the hearing of the proceedings. An ex-parte
application is required in order to obtain the court's directions regarding the manner and
service of the notice contemplated in Section 4(2) of the PIE Act. Section 4(5) of the PIE
Act prescribes the content of the notice.
12. Once the procedural requirements have been satisfied, the applicable
substantive provisions depend on the duration of the occupiers' occupation of the
property. If the occupiers have been in occupation for less than six months, the
provisions of Section 4(6), read with Section 4(8), are applicable. If the occupation
exceeds six months, the provisions of Section 4(7), read with Section 4(8), are
triggered.
13. I agree with counsel's submission that Sections 4(7) and 4(8) of the PIE Act are
applicable to the present application. In the matter of City of Johannesburg v Changing
Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and Others 2012 (6) SA 294 (SCA) the SCA offered the following
interpretation of these provisions at paragraph 12:
"In terms of s 4(7) of PIE an eviction order may only be granted if it is just and
equitable to do so, after the court has had regard to all the relevant
circumstances, including the availability of land for the relocation of the occupiers
1 Ndlovu v Ngcobo, Bekker and Another v Jika (Jika) 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA) paras [11] to [12].
and the rights and needs of the elderly, children, disabled persons and
households headed by women. If the requirements of s 4 are satisfied and no
valid defence to an eviction order has been raised the court 'must', in terms of s
4(8), grant an eviction order. When granting such an order the court must, in
terms of s 4(8)(a) of PIE, determine a just and equitable date on which the
unlawful occupier or occupiers must vacate the premises."
14. Therefore, once the procedural requirements set out in section 4 have been met
and the unlawful occupiers raise no valid defence to the eviction, a court may grant an
eviction order only if it is just and equitable to do so.
15. In determining whether such. an order is just and equitable, the court must
consider all relevant circumstances, including the risk that the eviction may render the
unlawful occupiers homeless.
16. In eviction proceedings, both the applicant and the respondents bear a duty to
place all relevant circumstances before the court in order to enable the court to make
this determination.
17. In the matter of Lochner NO v Gardener and Others (6026/2023) [2024]
ZAWCHC 39 (13 February 2024) the court with reference to the Changing Tides matter
held as follows in this regard at paragraph 18:
"While an applicant seeking an eviction order in terms of PIE bears the onus to
place sufficient information before the court to justify the eviction order that it
seeks, there is also an obligation on the respondents in such proceedings to
place sufficient information before the court to enable the court to discharge its
duty to enquire into all the relevant circumstances for the purposes of the enquiry
required by PIE. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Changing Tides qualified the
onus that rests on an appli cant in PIE proceedings by stating that applicants for
evictions are obviously not required to go beyond what they know or what is
reasonably ascertainable."
18. In the matter of FHP Management (Pty) Ltd v Theron NO & Another 2004 (3) SA
392 (C) at 4041 - 4058 the court held:
''As regards the effect of s 26(3) of the Constitution (as quoted above), read
together with s 4(7) of PIE, it would appear from the judgment of Harms JA in
Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika (supra in paras [17] - [19]) that it is
not necessary for an applicant, in proceedings to evict an unlawful occupier from
such applicant's property, to place more before the Court by way of evidence
than the facts that such applicant is the owner of the property in question and
that the respondent is in unlawful occupation of such property. It is then up to the
occupier to disclose to the Court 'relevant circumstances' to show why the owner
should not be granted an order for the eviction of the occupier"
19. Likewise, the SCA in Bekker and Another v Jika (Jika) 2003 (1) SA 113 (SCA).
held at paragraph 12:
"Another material consideration is that of the evidential onus. Provided the
procedural requirements have been met, the owner is entitled to approach the
court on the basis of ownership and the respondent's unlawful occupation.
Unless the occupier opposes and discloses circumstances relevant to the
eviction order, the owner, in principle, will be entitled to an order for eviction.
Relevant circumstances are nearly without fail facts within the exclusive
knowledge of the occupier and it cannot be expected of an owner to negative in
advance facts not known to him and not in issue between the parties. Whether
the ultimate onus will be on the owner or the occupier we need not now decide."
20. When a municipality seeks an eviction order, it bears a constitutional obligation to
engage meaningfully with the affected occupiers of the property. In the matter of
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road, Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg v City
of Johannesburg and Others 2008 (3) SA 208 (CC), para [15] - [18], the court held as
follows:
"[15] Engagement has the potential to contribute towards the resolution of
disputes and to increase understanding and sympathetic care if both sides are
willing to participate in the process. People about to be evicted may be so
vulnerable that they may no t be able to understand the importance of
engagement and may refuse to take part in the process. If this happens, a
municipality cannot walk away without more. It must make reasonable efforts to
engage and it is only if these reasonable efforts fail that a municipality may
proceed without appropriate engagement. It is precisely to ensure that a city is
able to engage meaningfully with poor, vulnerable or illiterate people that the
engagement process should preferably be managed by careful and sensitive
people on its side."
21. In the matter of Setsoto Local Municipality v Various Individual Unlawful
Occupiers and Intended Unlawful Occupiers of the Remaining Extent of Ficksburg Dorp
Grande 75, (Commonly Known as Peach Farm & lmperani Mountain in Ficksburg) and
Others (5154/2023) [2024] ZAFSHC 299 (19 September 2024) it was highlighted that
engagement with affected occupiers by a municipality's legal representatives is
permissible and acceptable for purposes of fulfilling the municipality’s obligations.
22. Another obligation resting on a municipality in the context of eviction proceedings
is the duty to provide temporary emergency accommodation in circumstances where the
eviction is likely to result in homelessness. in Dladla and Another v City of
Johannesburg and Others 2018 (2) SA 327 (CC), the Constitutional Court made it clear
that such accommodation is not intended to be permanent but rather serves as
temporary housing to address the immediate need.
Application of the facts relevant to this eviction application
The respondents are unlawful occupiers.
23. It is common cause that the applicant in this matter is the registered owner of the
property or the person in charge of the property. It is further not denied that the
respondents are in occupation of the property.
24. In paragraph 27 of the founding affidavit, the applicant alleged that at all material
times, the respondents neither had nor currently have the requisite consent to occupy or
remain in occupation of the property. The applicant further alleges that the respondents
are in unlawful occupation of the property.
25. In response to this allegation, the respondents merely allege:
"The contents of these paragraphs are denied. The applicant is put to the proof
thereof."
26. It is trite that bare denials, such as those advanced by the respondents, do not
give rise to real or genuine disputes of fact and are therefore to be rejected on the
papers. Accordingly, the respondents' bare denial of the allegation that they do not have
the applicant's consent to occupy the property, and that their occupation is lawful, is
rejected.
27. Further and in their answering affidavit, the respondents do not allege that they
ever received consent from the applicant to occupy the property. They merely allege,
without any proof that during the 80's they were informed that a certain Mr Boswel
would be vacating the farm and that the municipality would be taking over the farm and
would undertake a process of building adequate housing for the people who were
residents of the farm after Mr Boswel's departure from the property and that the
municipality bestowed upon the residents of the farm the authority to manage the farm
after Mr Boswel's departure.
28. The applicant, as is common cause, was not the owner of the property at that
stage. Ownership of the property only vested in the applicant's predecessor, the Town
Council of Centurion, from 1994 onwards. It is not the respondents' case on the papers
that they had consent of the applicant to occupy the property.
29. In view of the averments made in the affidavits filed in this matter, there is no
evidence on the papers indicating that the respondents ever obtained consent from the
applicant to occupy the property. Accordingly, it is found that the respondents are
unlawful occupiers within the meaning of the PIE Act.
Compliance with the procedural requirements
30. In this matter, the applicant obtained an ex parte order on 05 July 2024 directing
that the notice contemplated in Section 4(2) of PIE be served in accordance with Rule
4(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
31. In the matter of Unlawful Occupiers, School Site v City of Johannesburg 2005 (4)
SA 199 at par 22 to par 24, the Supreme Court of Appeal held that not every deviation
from the literal prescription is fatal. The question remains whether, in spite of the defects
in the section 4(2) notice, the object of the statutory provision had been achieved. In the
present instance there were no defects in the section 4(2) notice in terms of the PIE Act
as it complied with the requirements of section 4(5) of the PIE Act. The court further
held that the purpose of s 4(2) is to afford the respondent s in an application under PIE
an additional opportunity, apart from the opportunity they have already had under the
rules of court, to put all the circumstances they allege to be relevant before the court.
When a respondent receives the s 4(2) notice they therefore already know what case
they have to meet.
32. Pursuant to the order of 5 July 2024, the notice, together with the main
application, was served on all the respondents except the tenth respondent, as
evidenced by the returns of service annexed to the replying affidavit. Nonetheless, all of
the respondents, through their attorney of record, opposed this eviction application. All
the respondents are aware of the application, have opposed the application, know what
case they have to meet and have had the opportunity to put all relevant facts before
court. Consequently, it is found that the purpose of section 4(2) has been served and
complied with.
Duty to place the relevant circumstances before the court by both the applicant
and respondents:
33. It is common cause that, on 21 June 2022, the applicant's attorneys of record
transmitted a letter to the respondents' attorneys. The purpose of the letter was to
confirm whether the respondents continued to be represented by SM Sibiya Attorneys.
In the event that they were, the letter extended an invitation to SM Sibiya Attorneys to
attend a roundtable meeting for the purpose of engaging on the issue of alternative
accommodation and to obtain information regarding each respondent's personal
circumstances.
34. On 18 August 2022, the respondents' attorneys replied and confirmed that they
continued to represent the respondents. They also accepted the applicant's invitation to
the roundtable discussion and proposed dates on which they would be available to
attend. Pursuant to the above, a meeting was convened on 21 September 2022 at the
offices of the applicant's attorneys. The meeting was attended by the applicant's legal
representatives, the respondents' attorney, Mr Matthew Sibiya, and certain of the
respondents.
35. At the meeting, both the respondents and their legal representative, Mr Sibiya,
offered the following information:
35.1. There were two permanent structures on Erf 5[...]2 together with 35
houses consisting of permanent structures and non-permanent structures.
35.2. There are approximately 118 people occupying these houses. These
people make up 23 houses consisting of occupiers who have known the farm to
be their home for more than 30 years in some cases. On average, it was around
3 people per shack/dwelling and about 6 to 11 people in the permanent
structures.
35.3 These two permanent structures supply electricity and other amenities to
the non-permanent temporary structures. That is to say, the entire community of
illegal occupants receive their water and electricity from two permanent
structures.
35.4 Further, the school which the children attend is 5 km away, additionally
each household has an average of 1 breadwinner, most of whom are low income
earners (±R4 000.00 per month) in the informal sector.
35.5 Some of the respondents have occupied the property since early 1980.
The first generation of occupiers arrived on the property as farmworkers working
for one Mr Boswell, who according to the occupiers and Mr Sibiya owned and
managed the property as Rainbow Chicken and Livestock Farm.
35.6 Mr Boswell vacated the farm and the City and its predecessor took over
the farm. The first respondent and her husband (a former employee of the
applicant and/or its predecessor) were informed to look after the farm. According
to them, they were verbally promised by the City and/or its predecessor that if
they were vacated, the City would build houses for them.
35.7 As far as alternative housing is concerned Mr Sibiya, maintained that:
35.7.1. First: Formalisation of the occupation and systems by the
City with building structures that comply with municipal bylaws;
35.7.2. Second: Consider supplying the occupiers with housing
under the City's Housing Policy with some grants/loan of some sort;
35.7.3. Third: Permanent accommodation within the boundaries of
Centurion.
36. It is also not in dispute that, on 25 January 2023, the applicant's legal
representative, together with Mr Charles Marumo and Mr Khazamola Baloyi of the
applicant, visited the property to conduct an inspection. The purpose of the visit was to
verify the accuracy of the information provided by the respondents' attorneys and
certain respondents during the meeting held on 21 September 2022, and, where
necessary, to gather additional information.
37. The inspection revealed that the area was not overpopulated. This is borne out
by an inspection report by Mr Marumo. It is not disputed that when some of the
respondents were asked to provide details regarding their personal circumstances, they
informed the applicant's officials and legal representatives that they should not engage
with them directly but rather communicate through their legal representatives,
confirming legal representation again.
38. It is further not in dispute that, in light of the respondents' stance, the applicant's
attorneys transmitted an email to the respondents' attorneys on 27 January 2023,
enclosing a questionnaire aimed at eliciting the personal circumstances of each
occupier which questionnaire remains unanswered by the respondents.
39. From the foregoing, it is clear that the applicant made a genuine effort to engage
meaningfully with the respondents and to obtain information regarding the personal
circumstances of the individual occupiers.
40. However, it seems that these efforts were frustrated by the respondents' refusal
to cooperate and their legal representatives' failure to respond to correspondence
specifically aimed at eliciting such information.
41. One would have expected the respondents, who have long been legally
represented, to set out their personal circumstances in their answering affidavit. Instead,
the affidavit contains only general allegations regarding their historical occupation of the
property. It fails to provide any meaningful information that would enable the court to
assess their individual circumstances, their needs, and, most importantly, whether the
eviction would render them homeless.
42. In the matter of Lochner NO v Gardener and Others (6026/2023) [2024]
ZAWCHC 39 (13 February 2024) the court has outlined how conduct of the kind
displayed by the respondents should be treated. At paragraph 20, the court held:
"ft is thus not open to respondents in eviction proceedings to fail and/or refuse to
place their personal circumstances before the court. Where the answering
affidavits in PIE proceedings are silent on matters which the respondents should
be able to addres s with relative ease, a satisfactory explanation should be
provided for the omission, and in the absence thereof a court will be justified in
drawing the inference that a bald assertion of impecuniosity or homelessness is
not genuine or credible"
43. The regrettable consequence of the respondents' failure to provide information
regarding their individual circumstances is that it deprives both the court and the
applicant of the opportunity to properly consider and reflect on the issue of potential
homelessness.
44. A court, when applying the 'just and equitability' requirement in terms of ss 4(7)
and 4(8) of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act
19 of 1998 (PIE). must essentially make three determinations: Firstly, whether an
eviction order should be granted, secondly, if the order is granted, the date by which the
property is to be vacated and thirdly, the date by which the eviction order may be
executed if the property has not been voluntarily vacated. All three determinations must
be 'just and equitable' (see the Changing Tides case at para 12; and Johannesburg
Housing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Unlawful Occupiers, Newtown Urban Village 2013 (1)
SA 583 (GSJ) at para 33 and 126).
45. Determination of the eviction date and execution of the order are discretionary.
When a court is clothed with a discretion, it can be either in a wide or narrow sense. A
discretion in the wide sense refers to a discretion being exercised from a range of
permissible options while a discretion in narrow sense leaves little room for varia tion.
The courts essentially support application of the discretion in the narrow sense in
evictions. See for instance, Machete and Others v Mailula and Others 2010 (2) SA 257
(CC) where Skweyiya J, delivering the unanimous judgment of the Constitutional Court
(CC), said: 'The application of PIE is not discretionary' (at para 15). In an earlier
decision the SCA, in Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika 2003 (1) SA 113
(SCA) favoured the same view. The discretion in the narrow sense, however, applies
only in theory because essentially an eviction does not have one possible justified
outcome.
46. Courts frequently decline or delay eviction orders because the order will allegedly
render occupiers homeless. Neither the SCA nor the CC have attempted to define the
term 'homeless'. In the Newtown case Willis J defined 'homeless' as (at para 85):
"Without any reasonable prospect, between the date of the court order which it is
proposed be made that the occupier is to vacate the property and the date upon
which the eviction order is to be effected (in the event that the occupier does not
vacate the property), of the occupier being able to find alternative
accommodation that is (a) of a comparable or better standard to and (b) at a
similar rental to and (c) within reasonable proximity to that of the property from
which the eviction is sought."
The mere fact that a person stands to be evicted does not necessarily mean that
he or she will be rendered homeless. To determine this fact, an inquiry into the
bona fides and detailed personal circumstances of occupiers is imperative.
47. The respondents have not placed any evidence before court to substantiate an
allegation that they would be rendered homeless should the eviction order be granted.
48. Nevertheless, in order to safeguard the respondents against potential
homelessness that may arise from the granting of an eviction order, the applicant
conceded that it is willing to permit the respondents to remain on the property for a
further period of six months from the date of the order.
Points in limine
49. First point in limine: Non-compliance with Section 4(2) of the PIE Act
It is alleged that the notice contemplated in Section 4(2) of the PIE Act was not served
on the respondents is factually incorrect. This point in limine has already been
addressed above, where it was demonstrated that the notice in terms of Section 4(2) of
PIE was duly served. Accordingly, the point in limine is dismissed.
50. Second point in limine: Non-compliance with Section 7(2) of the PIE Act
The respondents contend that there has been non -compliance with Section 7(2) of the
PIE Act. Section 7(2) provides as follows:
"7. Mediation. -(1) If the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction the land in
question is situated is not the owner of the land the municipality may, on the
conditions that it may determine, appoint one or more persons with expertise in
dispute resolution to facilitate meetings of interested parties and to attempt to
mediate and settle any dispute in terms of this Act: Provided that the parties may
at any time, by agreement, appoint another person to facilitate meetings or
mediate a dispute, on the conditions that the municipality may determine.
(2) If the municipality in whose area of jurisdiction the land in question is
situated is the owner of the land in question, the member of the Executive
Council designated by the Premier of the province concerned, or his or her
nominee, may, on the conditions that he or she may determine, appoint one or
more persons with expertise in dispute resolution to facilitate meetings of
interested parties and to attempt to mediate and settle any dispute in terms of
this Act: Provided that the parties may at any time , by agreement, appoint
another person to facilitate meetings or mediate a dispute, on the conditions that
the said member of the Executive Council may determine.
(3) Any party may request the municipality to appoint one or more persons in
terms of subsections (1) and (2), for the purposes of those subsections."
51. Section 7(2) of the PIE Act, is not peremptory as is clear from the use of the word
"may" by the legislature.
Third point in limine: Non -compliance with rule 41A(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of
Court
52. The respondents raise a point in limine contending that the applicant has not
complied with Rule 41A(2)(a) of the Uniform Rules of Court. In the matter of Firstrand
Bank Ltd v De Santos and Another (13329/2022) [2025] ZAGPPHC 606 (6 June 2025),
para [24] with reference to several authorities, confirmed that noncompliance with Rule
41A is not, in itself, fatal to the proceedings. Furthermore, the Court held t hat a party
alleging non-compliance with the Rule is required to file a notice in terms of Rule 30. It
is common cause in the present matter that no Rule 30 Notice has been filed. As a
result, this point in limine also fails.
Conclusion
53. The applicant, a municipality, is the registered owner or person in charge of Erf
5[...]2, 5[...]3, and 5[...], situated at 1[...] M[...] Street, Hennopspark, Centurion.
54. The Respondents are in unlawful occupation of the ·property without the
applicant's consent.
55. Their occupation is therefore unlawful in terms of the PIE Act.
56. The applicant has complied with all procedural requirements under the PIE Act,
including obtaining and serving the notice in terms of section 4(2).
57. The applicant engaged the respondents through their attorneys, held a
roundtable meeting, and conducted a site inspection to assess the occupiers'
circumstances. Despite repeated efforts, including sending a questionnaire, the
respondents failed to provide adequate information to assess their individual personal
circumstances including not providing necessary information in the opposing papers.
58. Although the respondents failed to disclose their personal circumstances, the
applicant nevertheless seeks a suspension of the eviction order for six months in case
an eviction order renders them homeless to afford the respondents the opportunity to
find alternative accommodation.
Accordingly, the following order is made:
1. The Respondents and all other persons who through the Respondents
occupy the immovable property situated at 1[...] M[...] Street, Hennopspark,
Centurion, 0172 at Erven 5[...]2, 5[...]3 and 5[...] ("the property") are declared to
be in unlawful occupation of the property.
2. The Respondents and all other persons who through the Respondents
occupy the property are ordered to vacate the property on or before 1 March
2027 to afford them reasonable opportunity to find alternative accommodation.
3. The Sheriff or his deputy is directed to remove any Respondent or
occupier who fail to vacate the property on the date determined by this
Honourable Court in terms of paragraph 2 hereof.
4. Each party is to pay their own costs.
TROMP AJ
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
DATE OF HEARING: 4 FEBRUARY 2026
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 4 SEPTEMBER 2026
APPEARANCES:
FOR APPLICANT:
Counsel for the Applicant: Adv V Mabuza
Brooklyn Chambers,
072 950 2307
adv@vincentmabuza.com
Attorneys for the Applicant: Diale Mogashoa Attorneys
Menlyn
Corner 1s and 2nd Floors 87
Frikkie De Beer Street
Menlyn
Pretoria
0181
Tel: (012) 346 5436
Ref: E.Matsimela/M14032
Email: mari@dm-inc.co.za
FOR THE FIRST RESPONDENT: SM Sibiya Incorporated
296 Pretorius Street
Office 315
Corner Pretorius Street and Lilian Ngoyi Street
Pretoria
0001
(012) 001 7083
Email: matt@smsibiyalegal.com
Ref: SZM SIBIYA/MELLO/H0005
COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS: SZM SIBIYA