REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO.: 2026-207663
In the matter between:
VILI KRASIMIROV GEORGIEV APPLICANT
and
THE MINISTER OF JUSTICE AND CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT FIRST RESPONDENT
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF JUSTICE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT SECOND RESPONDENT
THE NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS THIRD RESPONDENT
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS,
EASTERN CAPE FOURTH RESPONDENT
THE MINISTER OF HOME AFFAIRS FIFTH RESPONDENT
THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL: DEPARTMENT OF
HOME AFFAIRS SIXTH RESPONDENT
THE REFUGEE APPEALS AUTHORITY OF
SOUTH AFRICA SEVENTH RESPONDENT
Delivered: This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading it to the electronic file
of this matter on CaseLines. In the event that there is a discrepancy between the date the
judgment is signed and the date it is uploaded to CaseLines, the date t he judgment is
uploaded to CaseLines is deemed to be the date that the judgment is handed down.
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: NO
Date: 2 September 2026 E van der Schyff
2
JUDGMENT: PART A
VAN DER SCHYFF J
Introduction
[1] This is an urgent application for interim relief. The applicant seeks the suspension
of the first respondent’s decision of 15 August 2026, taken under section 11(a) of the
Extradition Act 67 of 1962, ordering his surrender to the Republic of Bulgaria, pend ing the
determination of the review in Part B.
[2] After the application was argued, I reserved judgment. I indicated that the judgment
would be handed down on or before 7 September 2026. I issued an interim order
interdicting the applicant's extradition pending judgment.
[3] At this stage the Court is not called upon to determine finally whether the surrender
decision is lawful, whether the Minister was under a duty in all cases to invite
representations, whether the applicant ultimately qualifies for protection under the
Refugees Act 130 of 1998, or whether the risks alleged by him are established. Findings
are made only to the extent necessary to determine the interim relief.
Urgency
[4] The respondents contend that the urgency is self -created because the applicant
knew, after the conclusion of the appe al process concerning his committal, that surrender
was likely. I disagree.
[5] The operative urgency arose when the Minister made the surrender decision , and
the applicant became aware of it. According to the founding papers, the applicant first
became aware of the decision on 24 August 2026 and, under the bail arrangement then
regulating his position, was required to surrender himself into custody within approximately
48 hours of written notice. Before the Minister’s decision, there was no operative surrender
order to suspend or review.
[6] The chronology immediately preceding the decision is material. On 30 July 2026 the
applicant’s attorneys wrote directly to the Minister and the Director -General under the
3
heading “URGENT REPRESENTATIONS FOR MR VILI KRASIMIROV GEORGIEV”. They
recorded that they had instructions to file urgent representations “for the attention of The
Minister to consider prior to deciding regarding the surrender of our client to the Bulgaria n
authorities” and that the representations were being finalised for submission. On 12 August
2026 the applicant’s present attorneys again informed the Department that comprehensive
representations were being compiled for submission to the Minister. Neither communication
was answered before the decision was taken.
[7] On 14 August 2026 the Magistrates’ Court released the applicant on bail in terms of
section 10(5) of the Extradition Act, pending the Minister’s decision under section 11. The
following day, 15 August 2026, the Minister signed the surrender order. The prox imity of
those events, against the background of the two letters stating that representations were
being prepared for the Minister, is relevant to urgency and to the prima facie case, without
determining the review.
[8] The first respondent further states that after signing the surrender order, the original
signed order was delivered to Interpol to facilitate the applicant’s surrender. Thus, on the
first respondent’s own version, a step directed at implementation had already been taken
before these proceedings were instituted.
Miscellaneous
[9] The notice of motion and the amended notice of motion created unnecessary
confusion regarding the time periods for opposition and for filing answering papers. That
confusion was inexcusable. It does not, however, appear to have caused prejudice to any
party. The respondents were able to file a substantive answering affidavit and to appear
and argue the matter.
[10] Minister of Home Affairs and Others v Tsebe and Others; Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development and Another v Tsebe and Others 2012 (5) SA 467 (CC)
provides a useful, although not determinative, illustration. In para 1 fn 1, the Constitutional
Court recorded that there was “confusion in the Notice of Motion and the Founding Affidavit”
as to whether the application was one for direct access or direct appeal, but proceeded to
treat it as an application for direct appeal under r ule 19. The case does not establish that
4
procedural requirements may be disregarded. It does illustrate that procedural confusion
which causes no prejudice need not prevent a court from determining the real matter before
it. In the present case the defects in the notice of motion and amended noti ce were
inexcusable, but no prejudice has been demonstrated. The respondents delivered
substantive opposition and were able fully to argue the application. No further consequence
should therefore follow from the irregularity.
[11] The respondents submitted that Interpol ought to have been joined as a party. That
submission does not survive scrutiny. The order does not bind Interpol. It directs the first
respondent, who is before the court, to take steps within her own power. Nor could the
applicant have joined Interpol when these proceedings were instituted. He was not aware
that the signed surrender order had already been delivered to Interpol. This fact emerged
only from the first respondent’s answering affidavit.
Statutory and constitutional context
[12] Sections 10 and 11 of the Extradition Act allocate different functions to the
magistrate and the Minister. Under section 10 , the magistrate determines whether the
person is liable to be surrendered and, if so, commits that person to await the Minister’s
decision. Section 11 thereafter confers the surrender decision upon the Minister, who may
order surrender or refuse it on the grounds specified in that section.
[13] In Director of Public Prosecutions: Cape of Good Hope v Robinson 2005 (4) SA 1
(CC), the Constitutional Court held that a section 10 committal does not compel surrender.
At para 51, it said that such a finding “places no obligation whatsoever whether directly or
indirectly upon the Minister”. At para 52 the Court held that whether the person would
become the victim of an unfair trial “must be weighed in the equation” when considerati on
is given to whether there should be a surrender, and that “[i]t is premature to take this factor
into account any earlier”.
into account any earlier”.
[14] Khama v Director of Public Prosecutions, Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg
and Others 2023 (2) SA CR 588 (GJ) likewise emphasises the distinction between the
limited function of the magistrate and the broader discretion of the Minister. At paras 72 –
73, the Court held that, in extradition to foreign States, the extradition decision lies solely
5
within the Minister’s discretion, and that considerations such as an unfair trial or trumped -
up charges are exclusively within the Minister's discretion. Of particular relevance, at para
83 the Court said that “it is open to an affected person to make her representations to the
correct authority, namely the Minister” and concluded that “fairness is adequately catered
for in the scheme of the Act”.
[15] Forum De Monitoria Do Orçamento v Chang and Others [2022] 2 All SA 157 (GJ) is
relevant for the further proposition that an executive extradition decision remains subject to
legality and rationality review and that material considerations cannot simply be ignored. At
para 64 the Court held that the procedu re by which the Minister’s decision was taken had
failed to give “serious consideration” to relevant undisputed facts. At para 96 , it held that
important extradition decisions “cannot be decided on a whim” and “have to be carefully
and rationally reasoned”.
[16] The Refugees Act 130 of 1998 may also be relevant to the review, but no final
conclusion is required at this stage. Section 2 expressly prohibits extradition where the
statutory non-refoulement conditions are satisfied. Section 24B provides for an appeal to
the Refugee Appeals Authority, while section 27A affords an asylum seeker the right to
remain in the Republic pending finalisation of the asylum application. Section 28 permits
removal of a refugee or asylum seeker only subject to section 2.
[17] Mohamed and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others
(Society for the Abolition of the Death Penalty in South Africa and Another Intervening)
2001 (3) SA 893 (CC) does not determine the present case. It does, however, establish for
present purposes that constitutional obligations attach to the substance and consequences
of removal from the Republic. At para 53, the Constitutional Court held that where removal
of removal from the Republic. At para 53, the Constitutional Court held that where removal
by the State occurs in circumstances that “threaten the life or human dignity” of the person,
the Bill of Rights is implicated. At paras 55–60 it recognised the principle that extradition or
removal may not occur where substantial grounds establish a real risk of torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment.
[18] Those authorities are sufficient, without deciding the review, to show that the
Minister’s section 11 function is an independent one and that material bearing upon the
consequences and lawfulness of surrender may be relevant at that stage.
6
[19] I have also had regard to the first respondent’s submission that the surrender
decision is an exercise of executive power and that courts must be slow to restrain the
Executive by interim order. That caution is important, particularly in extradition matter s
which engage international relations and comity. It does not, however, place executive
action beyond judicial control.
[20] Tsebe, paras 49–50, rejected the contention that Mohamed could be distinguished
because the Minister was acting under the Extradition Act or performing an act of State.
The Court reaffirmed that the constitutional obligation depends on the facts of the particular
case and the Constitution, not on the empowering legislation or extradition treaty. Where a
serious legality challenge is raised, and implementation may render the review ineffective
and academic, a narrowly tailored interim order preserving the position pending review
does not determine or substitute the executive decision; it preserves the subject matter of
the review.
Requirements for interim relief
Prima facie right
[21] The applicant must first establish a prima facie right, even if open to some doubt. He
does so for interim purposes.
[22] The applicant’s case is not merely that section 11 invariably obliges the Minister
formally to invite representations in every extradition matter. The narrower complaint is that
the Minister knew that representations were intended, that those representatio ns
concerned matters falling within the Minister’s section 11 remit and matters said to arise
under the Refugees Act and the Constitution, and that the surrender decision was
nevertheless taken before those representations were received or considered.
[23] The answering affidavit contends that the applicant could have raised these matters
during the section 10 enquiry and that the Minister was not obliged to afford him an
opportunity to make representations. At least prima facie , that submission does not
opportunity to make representations. At least prima facie , that submission does not
sufficiently recognise the distinction drawn in Robinson and Khama.
7
[24] Section 10 determines liability to surrender. Broader considerations of justice,
fairness and the consequences of surrender fall to the Minister under section 11. Robinson,
paras 50–52, makes clear that the magistrate’s finding does not effect extradition and that
the Minister must consider the matters reserved to section 11 at the surrender stage.
Khama, paras 72 –73, confirms the same statutory demarcation. The fact that some
evidence may already have been placed before the magistrate does not make it irrelevant
to the Minister’s later task.
[25] The first respondent further relies on the proposition that no new or further evidence
was identified during the extradition enquiry. That does not dispose of the present
complaint. The applicant says that he testified on oath about a specific threat to hi s life if
returned to Bulgaria and that evidence concerning the alleged circumstances of his
conviction was placed before the extradition court. The first respondent, in turn, says that
she made the surrender decision armed with the magistrate’s record. Section 10(4) requires
that record to be forwarded to the Minister. If material in that record raised matters which,
in law, were for the Minister to consider under section 11, that circumstance could itself
have alerted the Minister to the need to consider those matters at the surrender stage. That
consideration assumes added significance where, before the decision was taken, the
applicant had expressly asked that the Minister wait for representations which were being
prepared. I make no final finding on the existence or scope of any resulting duty . It is
sufficient that the point is reasonably arguable for present purposes.
[26] The respondents’ counsel also contends that the applicant cannot now rely on audi
because he did not make the representations within 15 days after the magistrate’s order.
No provision of the Extradition Act has been identified which imposes a 15 -day time limit
No provision of the Extradition Act has been identified which imposes a 15 -day time limit
for representations to the Minister under section 11. The 15 -day period in se ction 13(1)
regulates the lodging of an appeal against an order under section 10 or 12. At least prima
facie, it does not operate as a statutory deadline for representations directed to the
Minister’s distinct section 11 discretion.
[27] The first respondent goes further. She states: “Even if the applicant had tendered
his representations before the surrender decision was taken and confirmed on 15th August
2026, any changes I could have made, would have in effect, encroached on the doctrin e
8
particularly, that of the judiciary who, all dismissed the applicant’s appeals.” For purposes
of the interim enquiry, the fallacy in that reasoning is important.
[28] The judicial decisions determined whether the applicant was liable to be surrendered
under section 10; they did not determine whether he must be surrendered under section
11. Robinson, paras 50–52, expressly holds that the section 10 finding does not result in
extradition and places no obligation on the Minister to order surrender. Khama, paras 72–
73 and 83, likewise confirms that the final surrender decision and the considerations
reserved to that stage belong to the Minister. Considering representations directed to those
matters would therefore not amount to revisiting, overruling or encroaching upon the judicial
decisions. It would amount to performing the distinct statutory function entrusted to the
Minister.
[29] The proposition advanced in the answering affidavit thus appears, at least prima
facie, to invert the statutory scheme. It treats the judicial committal as constraining the very
discretion which section 11 requires the Minister independently to exercise. If the Minister
approached her task on the footing that prior judicial decisions effectively foreclosed a
different outcome, that raises a serious question as to whether she properly understood the
nature and ambit of her own power. I make no final finding in this regard. Its significance
here is that it materially strengthens the applicant’s prima facie case for preservation
pending Part B.
[30] The pending asylum process adds to, but does not finally determine, that prima facie
case. The applicant alleges that an appeal to the Refugee Appeals Authority remains
pending. If that is so, the interaction between sections 2, 24B, 27A and 28 of the Refugees
Act and the Minister’s section 11 power is a substantial issue for Part B.
[31] Similarly, the applicant alleges a threat to his life or physical safety if returned to
[31] Similarly, the applicant alleges a threat to his life or physical safety if returned to
Bulgaria. Whether that allegation meets the threshold contemplated in Mohamed paras 53
and 55-60, or in section 2 of the Refugees Act is a matter for final determination on a proper
record. For present purposes, the allegation is sufficiently material to reinforce the need to
preserve the applicant’s position until the review is heard.
9
[32] I am accordingly satisfied that the applicant has established a prima facie right,
though open to doubt, sufficient for interim relief.
Irreparable harm
[33] The second requirement is a well -grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if
interim relief is refused and the applicant ultimately succeeds in Part B.
[34] If the surrender order is implemented, the applicant will be placed in the custody of
another sovereign State and beyond the immediate control of this Court. The fact that the
original surrender order has, on the first respondent’s version, already been de livered to
Interpol to facilitate surrender gives the apprehended harm an immediate and practical
dimension. The respondents submit that diplomatic channels would remain available. That
possibility is not equivalent to preserving an effective domestic reme dy before surrender
takes place.
[35] The alleged risks to the applicant’s life or physical safety are not decided at this
stage. Their relevance is that, if the applicant were surrendered before those allegations
and the pending statutory issues are properly determined, any later success in t he review
may come too late to afford effective protection. The requirement of irreparable harm is
satisfied.
Balance of convenience
[36] The balance of convenience favours preservation of the status quo. The applicant
expressly states in the founding affidavit that the interim relief sought would restore the
position obtaining on 14 August 2026, when he was released on bail pending the Minister’s
decision, and that he would remain subject to the stringent conditions of that bail order. He
also relies on his history of compliance with bail.
[37] South Africa’s international extradition obligations are important. But a temporary
suspension pending an expeditious review does not extinguish the extradition request or
prevent surrender if the review fails. By contrast, refusal of interim relief may su bstantially
impair the practical value of the review itself.
10
No satisfactory alternative remedy
[38] There is no satisfactory alternative remedy. The impugned decision is the Minister’s
section 11 surrender decision. Judicial review is the remedy invoked against it. Without
interim protection, implementation may precede the Court’s determination of whethe r that
decision was lawfully made.
[39] The requirements for interim relief are therefore established. Nothing in this
conclusion determines the merits of Part B.
Costs
[40] In determining the appropriate costs order, I considered that the relief granted is
interim only. It preserves the applicant’s position pending the review. It is prudent in these
circumstances for the costs to stand over to be determined together with the costs of the
review.
ORDER
In the result, the following order is granted:
1. The applicant’s non -compliance with the ordinary forms, service and time periods
prescribed by the Uniform Rules is condoned, and the application is heard as one of
urgency in terms of Rule 6(12).
2. Pending the final determination of Part B of this application, the decision of the first
respondent dated 15 August 2026, taken in terms of section 11(a) of the Extradition Act 67
of 1962, ordering the applicant’s surrender to the Republic of Bulgaria, is suspended.
3. Pending the final determination of Part B, the respondents are interdicted from
implementing or giving effect to the surrender decision, including by surrendering or
causing the applicant to be surrendered to the Republic of Bulgaria.
4. The first respondent is directed forthwith to bring this judgment and order to the
attention of Interpol and to take all reasonable steps within her power to ensure that no
surrender or other implementation of the decision occurs pending the final determination of
Part B.
11
5. The costs of Part A shall be costs in Part B.
__________ ______
E VAN DER SCHYFF
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
For the applicant: Adv. T Panda
With: Adv. Z Ntsulumbana
Instructed by: Mlonzi Attorneys Incorporated
For the first and second respondents: Adv. KM Mokotedi SC
With: Adv P Sekati
Instructed by: State Attorney, Pretoria
Date of the hearing: 1 September 2026
Date of judgment: 2 September 2026