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Introduction and the parties’ cases
[1] The applicants seek an order in the following summarised terms;
1.1. That an acknowledgment of debt dated 30 July 2024 be made an
order of Court;
1.2. That the respondent be directed to pay the sum of R1 287 728-04;
1.3. Costs of suit on a scale as between attorney and client.
[2] The first applicant describes herself as a director of the second applicant, a
Close Corporation duly registered in terms of the laws of the Republic of South
Africa. The respondent is an adult female person also the sole director of
Westbury Investment 3CC.
[3] The applicants’ case is that on 20 July 2024 the parties (first applicant and
the respondent), concluded a written acknowledgment of debt. The
acknowledgment of debt, it is the applicants’ case, was preceded by various oral
agreements before culminating into a written one. The agreements were in
respect of personal loan agreements and payments to third parties at the special
instance and request of the respondent. This occurred after the respondent’s
income dried out as a result of the COVID pandemic.
[4] The first applicant acts in her personal capacity and also duly represents
the second applicant on the one hand and the respondent represents herself as
well as an entity on the other. In the acknowledgement of debt, the respondent
acknowledged her indebtedness to the applicants in the sum of R 1,287,728.04.
and made an undertaking to repay it.
[5] When the respondent failed to meet her obligations as per the
acknowledgment of debt, the applicants caused a letter of demand in terms of
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section 129 and 130 of the National Credit Act, to be written and served on her by
registered mail1. In the letter the applicants demanded that the respondent pay the
claimed amount within 10 days, which the respondent failed to do, hence the
application to make the acknowledgment of debt an order court.
[6] In opposing the application, the respondent first raised a point in limine the
essence of which was that there was a misjoinder or non-joinder. She pleaded in
the answering affidavit that she was a sole member of a juristic entity called
Westbury Investment 3 CC (Westbury), on behalf of which she was duly
authorised to act. As a result, she asserted that she personally did not have any
direct or substantial interest in the matter. The registered address of Westbury
was said to be situated on the premises belonging to the second applicant, thus it
was pleaded, it should have been joined as a party in these proceedings.
[7] The respondent denied that she ever entered into any verbal agreements
whatsoever with the applicants. She also denied that she requested financial relief
and/or assistance in respect of a series of alleged personal loans and/or payments
to third parties, as alleged by the applicants.
[8] The respondent gives elaborate details, about how the first applicant was
insistent to be of help to her at a time when she had financial difficulties. One of
the examples she mentioned, is the one of rent which is subject to litigation at the
Magistrates Court. The nub of the denial of the applicants’ claim is that the
respondent never approached them for financial assistance. The following are
some of what the respondent contends are at the core of the denial;
some of what the respondent contends are at the core of the denial;
8.1. that in February 2022 when Westbury was moving offices, she was
offered office space at the second applicant’s premises. Rental issues were
1 The National Credit Act, 34 2005
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briefly discussed and deferred by the first applicant for later consideration
after seeking counsel from her bookkeeper. She was however given a go
ahead to in the meantime move in, which she did. Later, she was advised
that the suggested or proposed rental was R5 000-00. When she indicated
to the first applicant that she could not afford the rent and would rather
move out, the first applicant suggested generously and unconditionally that
she should not move out. She instead offered her the rental space for free;
8.2. in July 2021 when Westbury struggled financially owing to the
COVID pandemic, its loan and overdraft repayments were a challenge for
Westbury so much so that they fell into arrears;
8.3. although she complained many times to the first applicant about the
stress she was under around the financial distress period, she never
requested to be assisted financially either personally or on behalf of
Westbury;
8.4. the applicant was however insistent on being helpful during that period
and offered unconditionally to assist, even though she knew that she had
no idea if and when business will improve and if and when Westbury will
be able pay whatever was due. The first applicant insisted that the
respondent could repay the money whenever business improved, amid
assurances that Westbury had nothing to worry about;
8.5. the respondent very vociferously insisted that the first applicant was
very pressing and persistent. Not that it matters but I need to point out that
the respondent for some reason was very repetitive on the following;
8.5.1. she had nothing to do with the financial assistance;
8.5.2. that she offered to move out of the rented premises which offer
the first applicant resisted;
8.5.3. she mentioned that Westbury was struggling financially
sixteen times in 16 different subparagraphs in the affidavit;
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8.5.4. generously and unconditionally was mentioned repeatedly;
8.5.5. accepted in good faith, equally so;
8.5.6. unconditionally freely and voluntarily as well.
[9] The respondent argued that the first applicant’s insistence to be of help, in
circumstances where she was contemplating and offering to close down
Westbury, left her with an impression that money was not a problem to the
applicants.
[10] Another indicator of the first applicant not having money problems or
flaunting it was in August of 2022. On that occasion the first applicant’s life
partner walked in with what appeared to be stacks of R200-00 bank notes tied in
a roll with an elastic band. The money was placed in a plastic bag and handed
over to her by the first applicant. It turned out to be the sum of R20 000-00. She
accepted the money in good faith, she submits and was grateful for the gesture.
[11] She denied entering into an acknowledgment of debt with the applicants;
denied admitting to anything; denied liability for any payment and denied that
she signed any acknowledgment of death in her personal capacity and asserted
that any payment made, was made to Westbury, unconditionally, freely and
voluntarily and of this the first applicant was aware.
[12] The respondent also went into irrelevant details about how she at some
point helped the first applicant with challenges she had, as she put it, in good
faith. The challenge that was there, it would seem, was opposite the first
applicant’s premises and pertained to a competitor who was operating illegally
and stealing customers of the first applicant. The respondent says in her affidavit
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that she used this particular experience as a quid pro quo for the unconditional
and generous kindness shown towards Westbury by the applicants.
[13] As part of setting out the chronology of events leading up to this
application, the respondent pleaded that on 16 June 2024 she received an
unexpected and unpleasant call from the first applicant about her non-payment
of rent. The attitude of the first applicant left her flabbergasted, she pleaded. The
change in attitude of the first applicant surprised her and she there and then took
a decision to move out of the applicants’ premises.
[14] On 24 June 2024 she took a decision to communicate her decision to move
out but was met by a changed attitude again from the first applicant. The first
applicant was calm and friendly she said. She was promised by the first applicant
that there was nothing to worry about on the rental issue, she therefore continued
to rent as before.
[15] On 19 July 2024 she received an e-mail from the first applicant to which
was attached approximately 9 pages detailing a summary or schedule of money
loaned. The respondent was asked to compare it to her own records. The
respondent further pleads that it has always been the intention of Westbury to pay
back the money when its financial status improved. In fact, at paragraph 10.2. of
the answering affidavit the respondent stated the following2;
“Westbury always had intention to pay the Applicants back if and when it would be in
the position to do so, and which was accordingly, in line with what the Applicants had
always led me to believe.”.
2 CaseLines 04-16 paragraph 10.2.
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[16] On 30 July 2024 the respondent went to the applicant and on her version,
was hurriedly given a set of papers including a page 9 and told to sign. After
signing, the first applicant asked her sister, who was in the room, to sign as a
witness. On her part she did not question anything. She puts it thus3;
“I obliged in good faith because it was never in dispute that the Applicants had
unconditionally, freely and voluntarily been assisting Westbury in its financial
obligations.”
[17] The applicants filed a replying affidavit dealing with the contents of the
answering affidavit starting with the point in limine of non-joinder or misjoinder
contending that it should be dismissed, as it lacked merit for the following brief
reasons;
17.1. that the point in limine fails to meet requirements of a general rule in
that it failed to show that Westbury will be prejudiced by the judgment of
the court;
17.2. that the respondent failed to advance any substantiating reasons for
the joinder;
17.3. that the application to make the acknowledgment of debt an order of
court is directed at the respondent and is based on an acknowledgment of
debt which the respondent personally signed. In it the following is stated;
“I Lee-Ann Jansen van Nieuwenhuizen acknowledge herewith, that I owe the
above amounts to Mrs. Magdaleen Malan and C and M Landscaping Supplies
CC for monies loaned and advanced to me and/or payments made on my behalf
to me and my business creditors on my specific instance and request.”.
[18] The applicants identified the following as common cause facts; that the
respondent could not meet the rental obligations; financially struggled during
3 CaseLines 04-12 paragraph 10.6.
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COVID; the first applicant made payments to the respondent and made payments
on behalf of the respondent even to third parties; that the respondent conceded
she would repay the paid amounts at a later stage once in a position to do so; that
the respondent was humble and thankful of the generosity which she accepted in
good faith; that on 19 July 2024 the respondent was given a summary of money
loaned; that the respondent always had the intention to pay the money back and
that the acknowledgment of debt was signed at the first applicant’s office in front
of a witness.
[19] The grounds of opposition that the respondent relied on were canvassed.
They were summarised as follows;
19.1. that she never requested financial assistance from the applicants;
19.2. that she denies entering into an acknowledgment of debt;
19.3. that she denies that payments were made on her behalf or to her in
her personal capacity;
19.4. that the loans or payments were made unconditionally, freely and
voluntarily to Westbury;
19.5. that she was made to sign a document without knowing that it was an
acknowledgment of debt;
19.6. that indebtedness is denied.
[20] The applicants further dealt with other issues such as absence of a
condonation application on the part of the respondent when filing a notice of
intention to oppose. I do believe that the point is now moot and should not be
dealt with in detail. There is merit in the submission that the payments listed in
the summary of debts or loans, which consisted of over 100 transactions between
2022 and June 2024, could never have been made out of the goodness of the
heart. I am of the view that there would have had to be involvement of someone
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under a practical or formalized structure in place. The respondent as the sole
member of Westbury.
[21] The applicants pointed to contradictions that are glaring in the respondent’s
own defence. Such as the fact that the respondent denied entering into an
acknowledgment of debt, while at the same time stating that she was enticed into
signing one, thus contradicting herself. Also, while admitting that she signed the
acknowledgment of debt, in the same affidavit she indicated that the
acknowledgment of debt was manufactured. Lastly, while stating that she was
enticed into signing the acknowledgment of debt, the respondent gave no details
of such enticement. She also failed to dispute the signature on the
acknowledgment of debt as hers. It was submitted that on her own version her
opposition of the matter should fail.
[22] There are many common cause issues between the applicants’ and the
respondent’s respective cases but there are also many irrelevant matters
mentioned by the parties given what the court is called upon to determine.
Common cause yet irrelevant factors are not helpful to the court’s determination
of the issues or even decision making.
[23] This matter in the main, is about making an acknowledgment of debt an
order of court. The founding affidavit succinctly set out what case the respondent
had to meet. In meeting that case, the respondent had to keep her ‘response to the
case’, in other words to what the applicant alleged. The respondent in this case
did exactly the opposite. She gave irrelevant information which did little to assist
this court in making a determination and in turn, offered information that did not
respond to the case placed before her in full.
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[24] The applicants’ case comprised of the following sticking points;
24.1. there were a series of verbal agreements of loan between the
applicants and the respondent;
24.2. the COVID pandemic placed financial strain on the respondent’s
finances to a point where the applicants had to make loans to her and
payments to third parties;
24.3. the respondent undertook on more than one occasion to repay the
loans;
24.4. on 30 July 2024 an acknowledgment of debt was concluded and the
terms speak for themselves;
24.5. there is a rental issue which is being dealt with at the Magistrates
Court;
24.6. the respondent breached her undertakings, the applicants thereafter
sent a section 129 letter of demand and soon thereafter instituted these
proceedings.
[25] In response to the summarised case of the applicants the respondent
pleaded in the following summarised way;
25.1. that there was a misjoinder or non-joinder;
25.2. that the respondent denied any verbal agreement between the
applicants and her;
25.3. that she further denied making any requests for financial assistance,
denied that loans were advanced and also denied that payments were made
by the applicant to third parties on her behalf;
25.4. the respondent went into detail about moving in at the applicants’
premises in February 2022, as well as rent negotiations that ensued. She
stated that when a rental amount was proposed she could not afford it which
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is why she tendered to move out, at which point it was agreed that she could
stay rent free;
25.5. that the offer was generous and unconditional and that she had no
reason not to accept it in good faith;
25.6. that the first applicant and the respondent had a close relationship to
the point of sharing confidential information;
25.7. that she never requested financial assistance be it for herself or even
for Westbury.
[26] An issue which I believe should not detain this court further is that of
absence of a condonation application, to file a notice of intention to oppose the
application. The applicants relied in the main on four judgments, the cornerstone
of which was the principle that the court has the inherent jurisdiction to regulate
and protect its processes.4 As is obvious, all the matters are Road Accident Fund
matters. In all the matters, the notices of intention to defend were filed out of
time, mostly a few days before applications where default judgment was sought
were to be heard, conduct which was identified as an attempt to delay processes
and buy time. Essentially an abuse of court processes. For example, in the case
of Delport v RAF, being one of the cases relied on, the defendant (RAF), filed
their notice of intention to defend three years and four months out of time.
Judging this case on its own facts, as all cases should be and given the timelines
involved, it is my view that in this case there was no ulterior motive. The parties
were able to, right from the beginning of proceedings, put their respective cases
before court and there was no prejudice on the part of the applicants. This point
deserves no further attention.
4 Delport, Stephanus Phillipus v Road Accident Fund, Johannesburg case number 10978/2020 by Kilian AJ on 8
December 2023; Mandlankosi Philane v Road Accident Fund, Johannesburg case number 11267/2022 by Block AJ on
11 April 2024; Seronica Nathram v Road Accident Fund, Pretoria case number 46876/3030 by Davis J on 26 April 2024;
and Madiphoso Dinah Mabaso v Road Accident Fund, Johannesburg case number 35849/2021 by Kriel AJ on 4 July
2024.
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[27] Turning to the case of the respondent. There are a few things in the
respondent’s case that are not in harmony with each other. The respondent denies
making any loan requests for herself. At the same time her case is that the
applicants paid her two employees’ salaries. She protested at that because she did
not know when she would be in a better financial position to repay the applicants.
At the same time her version is that the first applicant insisted on assisting her
financially to a point of being forceful at times. She pleaded that the loans or
payments were made freely, voluntarily and unconditionally to Westbury and to
meet its obligations. This while pleading at the same time that no payments were
made to Westbury. She also admits to receipt of R20 000-00 which was given to
her but adds that she received it on behalf of Westbury. Lastly, she pleaded that
in helping the applicants with a problem they had with a business competitor, she
believed it was a quid pro quo, for all the generosity and unconditional kindness
that had been shown to Westbury.
[28] On the day of signing the document, 30 July 2024, her other version is that
she was presented with one page of a document and told to sign without any
explanation particularly that it was an acknowledgment of debt. In the opposing
affidavit she mentions it twice that she was sent an email on 19 July 2024 to
which was attached a document comprising of 9 pages5. She also pleaded at the
same time that on 30 July 2024 she was presented with what appeared to be the
last page (page 9) “of the email to sign6. This she alleges occurred covertly after
she was enticed and made to sign. It is one thing to plead that one did not sign a
document, but it is another to plead you were made to sign. The respondent
alleges both things side by side.
5 CaseLines 04-16 paragraph 10.
6 CaseLines 04-17 sub-paragraph 10.4.
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[29] The schedule that was e-mailed to the respondent detailing various
payments, shows that on a number of occasions payments were made to the
respondent personally, Westbury as well as a number of entities. For the
applicants to be able to do that would surely have involved respondent’s active
involvement. She is the one who would have had to supply the applicants with
banking details, reference numbers and amounts. Some of the amounts are
globular, while others are very specific down to even cents. I believe it is simply
opportunistic and convenient at this moment to offer the explanation that it was
all for Westbury, who had the intention to at some point in the unknown future
repay the loans.
[30] Another issue which needs scrutiny is the other version that the respondent
pleaded. The version is that after receiving a call from the first applicant, she
soon thereafter offered to the applicant to have a discussion about Westbury with
the involvement of her attorney. This suggests that the respondent knew very well
about the loans. It is therefore difficult decipher how she could allege she was
enticed, in a covert manner and made to sign a document without being told about
it (although she knew of it) and without her either reading it or asking any
questions about its contents. The respondent has not explained why she calls what
occurred “covert”. She also does not explain how she was enticed and also how
she was “made to sign”. The page on which she signed the acknowledgment of
debt, just above the signing area (page 9), where the acknowledgment of
indebtedness is made, states that it is an acknowledgment of debt. It is therefore
not difficult to spot. Besides the acknowledgment of debt was shared with her
much earlier.
[31] The respondent makes the point and this came out during argument that
that which is referred to as an acknowledgment of debt is in-fact not an
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acknowledgment of debt. Pages 1 to 8 thereof, do not have signatures it was
argued. Also, the R140 000-00, appearing on page 9, it was further argued, is not
part of pages 1 to 8. Page 9 which is signed, it was further argued was
surreptitiously, introduced to lure her into signing. The lettering on the document,
pages 1 to 8 appear different to page 9, it was further argued. In fact, the
respondent pleaded that she was specifically given page 9 to sign on arrival at the
first applicant’s office on 30 July 2024. The appearance of letters on the
document were never part of the respondent’s pleaded case. They do not deserve
further attention by this court.
[32] Because of the denial that the document is an acknowledgment of debt, the
court must make a determination of what the document is or amounts to. In
Adams v SA Motor Industry Employers 7 an acknowledgment of debt was
described as follows; “it is a written contract between a debtor and a creditor in
terms of which they agree that the debtor will undertake unconditionally to pay
an existing debt to the creditor on the terms set out in such acknowledgment of
debt”. It is however the respondent’s case that what the applicants contend is an
agreement, does not meet the formalities of an agreement, those being consensus;
formalities; legality; possibility of performance and certainty. The contention by
the respondent is that there was no meeting of the minds between the parties.
Also, that there was an onus on the applicants, as the persons who allege that a
contract or agreement exists, to show its existence, which onus they failed to
discharge8.
[33] On the other hand, appearance of the respondent’s signature on a document
serves as prima facie proof of consensus and serves as proof that the respondent
agreed to the terms of the agreement. The respondent contends that the applicants
failed to discharge the onus resting on them, to prove the existence of a contract
7 Adams v SA Motor Industry Employers 1981 (3) SA 1189 (A).
7 Adams v SA Motor Industry Employers 1981 (3) SA 1189 (A).
8 Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA (Pty) Ltd 1964 SA 669 (W) and Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt
1986 (4) SA 523 (C) at 526
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or agreement therefore, the case should be dismissed with costs on a scale as
between attorney and client.
[34] As a result of the above, the applicant took a posture that even on the
respondent’s own version, she received a benefit and in signing the
acknowledgment of debt took or accepted responsibility to pay therefor. The
disputed acknowledgment of debt is a very short document. It comprises a
schedule of payment and page 9 which is the last page and is signed by the
respondent. The respondent gives contradictory accounts and /or defences around
the signing of the document. One of the accounts or defences she pleaded was
that she did not sign the document. Another is that she did sign albeit after being
made to do so. The two defences ostensibly cannot co-exist. In addition, the
respondent does not dispute that the signature belongs to her. The portion of the
acknowledgment of debt dealing with “acknowledgment of indebtedness”, is
brief and does not contain much information. That is of no moment. The
respondent is a sole member of Westbury and pleaded that she was duly
authorised by it to act on its behalf. However, in the acknowledgment of debt,
the respondent bound herself in her personal capacity. That portion reads as
follows;
“I Lee-Ann Jansen van Nieuwenhuizen acknowledge herewith, that I owe the above
amounts to Mrs. Magdaleen Malan and C and M Landscaping Supplies CC for monies
loaned and advanced to me and/or payments made on my behalf to me and my business
creditors on my specific instance and request.”
[35] The document (acknowledgment of debt), is to be read together with the
schedule attached to it because on its own it simply mentions, ‘the above
amounts’ and that would not make sense. The ‘above amounts’ would naturally
mean the attached schedule or amounts mentioned in the schedule. The schedule
contains no terms and conditions. Plasket J in a leave to appeal matter, Kruuse v
Hillhouse (83/2015) [2015] ZAECGHC 96 (7 July 2015), on facts that are not
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dissimilar to the facts in this matter, quoted extensively from his own judgment
that was appealed against, where the law was succinctly set out;
“[6] In my judgment, I dealt with these defences thus:
‘[10] The immediate problem confronting the defendant is that the acknowledgment of
debt is an unconditional acknowledgment of his indebtedness personally to the plaintiff
– he states that ‘I . . . acknowledge that I am indebted to IAN HILLHOUSE’ in respect
of ‘money due, owing and payable by me to the creditor’. In construing the agreement,
the inevitable point of departure is the language of the document itself. It is not
ambiguous in any way. Its terms are crystal clear. It is not capable of bearing any
meaning other than that the defendant assumed personal liability for the debt.
[11] To the extent that the history of the matter as given by the defendant may be
relevant and admissible, it does not assist him: it is to the effect that he had planned to
create entities to conduct his farming business – a trust and a private company – but
that these entities were never formed. The defendant’s averment that he signed the
document because the plaintiff wanted some form of reassurance and that he stupidly
did not believe that he was assuming personal liability for the debt only has to be stated
to be rejected. As the entities referred to above did not exist, he was the only person
who could have acknowledged the debt and who could have been liable for its
repayment.
[12] It cannot, in my view, be accepted that the defendant could have laboured under
any misapprehension as to the consequences of signing the acknowledgment of debt.
Even were this totally improbable scenario to have been the case, he has n ot asserted
that his misconception was induced by the plaintiff or anyone else. As was submitted
by Ms Beard, it is trite that contracting parties are bound by their written agreements
not wrongfully induced by another, and the caveat subscriptor rule binds a party to a
not wrongfully induced by another, and the caveat subscriptor rule binds a party to a
contractual document which he or she has signed, whether he or she read it or not.”
[36] In so far as the unequivocal and clear terms of the acknowledgment of debt
are concerned, the similarities between this matter and Kruuse are very telling.
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36.1. the argument that the document was not an acknowledgment of debt
was raised in both matters, while the wording on the document was clear
and unambiguous. Because the wording on the document was clear and
unambiguous, it therefore could not be read and understood to mean
anything other than that the respondent bound herself in her personal
capacity;
36.2. in Kruuse, the respondent alleged that money received was for the
benefit of an entity yet to be formed. In this matter the allegation is that the
money was for the benefit of Westbury and that it was understood that
Westbury would at some point in the future repay the loan. Such an
argument is unhelpful to the respondent just as it was not in Kruuse;
36.3. the respondent gave a long history of her relationship with the first
applicant. The lead up to rental, confiding in the respondent and assisting
the respondent with business competition were all part of it. All these issues
are in the main irrelevant;
36.4. the respondent is a sole member of Westbury, a corporate entity. No
one could have acted on its behalf other than the respondent. Besides, the
respondent pleaded that she was duly authorised to act on its behalf,
another similarity with Kruuse;
36.5. the many and contradictory defences advanced by the respondent
makes it improbable that things unfolded as asserted by her;
36.6. whether the respondent read the document or not, she appended her
signature to it and is therefore bound by it.
[37] Having dealt with the grounds for leave to appeal, Plasket J found that those
were not weighty enough to displace his judgment and dismissed the application.
Equally, I find that there is no merit in the defences raised by the respondent and
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that the document which the respondent contends is not an acknowledgment of
debt, is in fact one.
[38] There is one other remaining issue to deal with briefly just for refinement,
the point in limine of misjoinder/non-joinder. The respondent is the sole member
of Westbury. In her answering affidavit where the point in limine of
misjoinder/non-joinder is raised, the respondent pleaded that; the Respondent is
however the only member of a juristic person, namely WESTBURY INVESTMENT 3
CC, and as such, is duly authorized to act on behalf of same.9 The point in limine is
defeated by at least four points of argument. Firstly, the respondent pleaded that
as a sole member of Westbury she was duly authorised to act on its behalf.
Secondly, there is no relief sought against Westbury who have no direct and
substantial interest in the matter. Carrying on business at or renting premises from
the applicants is not such direct and substantial interest as commonly understood.
Thirdly, the respondent signed the acknowledgment of debt binding herself
personally. Lastly, the abandonment of the point in limine after full argument.
The point in limine must therefore fail.
Conclusion
[39] I have carefully considered the papers filed of record. I have equally
listened to the submissions made. In some of the afore going paragraphs I have
made certain findings. I conclude that the applicants have made a case for the
relief sought.
Costs
[40] In the notice of motion the applicants sought costs on a scale as between
attorney and client. In opposing the application, the respondent also sought costs
on the same scale. I have found for the applicants and naturally costs must follow
the result. What remains to be considered is the scale of such costs. The
9 CaseLines 04-4 paragraph 1.2.
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For Respondent : ADV. ClD BENNETT,
Instructed by : JOHAN-WALKER - VAN JAARSVELD INC
PRETORIA
Date of judgment: 31 AUGUST 2026 - This judgment was handed down
electronically by circulating to the parties’ legal representatives by e-mail, by being
uploaded to the CaseLines platform of the Gauteng Division and by release to SAFLII.
The date and time of hand down is deemed to be 10:00 on 31 AUGUST 2026.