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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA)
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OT:HER JUDGES: NO
{3) REVISED.
DATE:~.,,_, A~v.'J,.._.. J_o7-t ......,
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
IDEXIS (PTY) L T.D T/A SENTRA PHARMACY
RUAAN LOUW
and
NOVO NORDISK (PTY) LTD
SOUTH AFRICAN HEAL TH PRODUCTS
REGULATORY AUTHORITY
THE SOUTH AFRICAN PHARMACY cou,NCIL
In re:
NOVO NORDISK (PTY) LTD
And
IDEXIS (PTY) LTD TIA SENTRA PHARMACY
RUAAN LOUW
CASE NO: 130119/2024
First Applicant
Second Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
Third Respondent
Applicant
First Respondent
Second Respondent
SOUTH AFRICAN HEAL TH PRODUCTS
REGULATORY AUTHORITY
SOUTH AFRICAN PHARMACY COUNCIL
JUDGMENT: APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
The judgment and order are published and distributed electronically.
2
Third Respondent
Fourth Respondent
Summary; Application for leave to appeal. Notice of application for leave to appeal consisting of
87 pages with 341 paragraphs held to be an abuse of process. Further held that impugned order
is not final in effect, being a temporary interdict. Further held that it is not in the interest of justice
to grant leave to appeal. Application for leave to appeal refused.
PA VAN NIEKERK, J
INTRODUCTION:
[1] Applicants seek leave to appeal against the order and judgment of this court handed
down on 22 June 2026. In terms of that judgment this court granted an order restraining
the Applicants ("/dexis') from manufacturing or supplying, whether by compounding or
otherwise, medicine containing semaglutide. That order was granted in the form of an
interim interdict, operating pending any decision(s) to be taken by Third Respondent
("SAHPRA') and/or Fourth Respondent ("SAPC') in an investigation relating to
compounding practises and other related issues of ldexis, and/or any review application
against any such decision(s).
[2] ldexis applies for leave to appeal against that judgment and order and the application is
opposed by First Respondent ("Novo Nordisk').
3
THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL
[3] ldexis served a notice titled "Application for leave to appeal", therein giving notice that
ldexis applies in terms of section 17(1 )(a) and (b) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013,
read with Uniform Rule 49(1)(b), for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal
alternatively the Full Court of the Gauteng Division, Pretoria, against the whole of the
judgment and order (including cost order) of this court delivered on 22 June 2026.
[4] Rule 49(1 )(b) requires the Applicant, in an application for leave to appeal, to state the
grounds for that application. The reference to "the grounds for the application for leave to
appear has been interpreted to mean that the grounds for the application for leave to
appeal must be set out by the applicant, clearly and succinctly, in clear and unambiguous
terms so as to enable the court and the respondent to be fully informed of the case the
applicant seeks to make out and which the respondent is to meet in opposing the
application for leave to appeal. The sub-rule is peremptory in that regard. In Erasmus,
Superior Court Practice 1 reference is made to various authorities which confirms the
aforesaid principles. In that authority, specific reference is made to Songono. 2 a judgment
followed in various divisions, where the court referred to an application for leave to appeal
which consisted of 17 pages in the following terms:
"In attempted compliance therewith the applicant filed a document headed 'Application
for leave to appeal', in which he purported to set out the grounds upon which leave to
appeal was to be sought. These so- called 'grounds' constitute a diatribe of some 17
1 Erasmus, Superior Court Practice, 2nd ed, Van Loggerenberg, vol. 2 at D1 49-5.
2 Songono v Minister of Law and Order 1996 (4) SA 384 (E} at 3851-1.
4
pages criticising the judgment, analysing (at times incorrectly) certain of the evidence
and the findings made, putting forward certain ~ubmissions and quoting various
authorities. This lengthy, convoluted and at times disjointed criticism of the judgment
did not clearly and succinctly spell out the grounds upon which leave to appeal is
sought in clear and unambiguous terms - indeed, it served more to deceive,
particularly as, during the course of argument, there were several points which the
applicant's counsel, Mr Bursey, sought to raise which were not indicated in the
document.
It seems to me that, by a parity of reasoning, the grounds of appeal required under
Rule 49(1 )(b) must similarly be clearly and succinctly set out in clear and unambiguous
terms so as to enable the Court and the respondent to be fully and properly informed
of the case which the applicant seeks to make out and which the respondent is to meet
in opposing the application for leave to appeal. Just as Rule 49(3) is peremptory in
that regard, Rule 49(1)(b) must also be regarded as being peremptory. In my view the
lengthy and rambling notice of appeal filed in casu falls woefully short of what was
required. Mr Bursey suggested that grounds of appeal could be gleaned from the
notice but that is not the point - the point is that the notice must clearly set out the
grounds and it is not for the Court to have to analyse a lengthy document in an attempt
to establish what grounds the applicant intended to rely upon but did not clearly set
out. On thi:5 ba.:5i:5 a.lone:; the:; a.ppliGa.tion :5e:;e:;m:5 to me:; to be:; fa.ta.fly de:;fe:;r;tive:; and mu:5t
be dismissed".
5
[5] In Municipality of Thabazimbi v Badenhorst3 (a judgment of this division) it was expressly
held that the failure to comply with the peremptory provisions of rule 49(1)(b) in as much
as they do not set out the grounds of appeal in clear, unambiguous and succinct terms,
the court hearing the application may, on that basis alone, dismiss the application.
[6] In casu the Applicants' notice of application for leave to appeal has inter alia the following
features:
[6.1] The notice consists of 87 pages, and contains 341 paragraphs, a substantial
number of which contain sub-paragraphs;
[6.2] The notice serves to impugn literally every aspect of the judgment, relying
mostly on the same arguments which were advanced during the hearing of
the application;
[6.3] There numerous references to authorities (as if in heads of argument) and in
some instances, containing quotations from those judgments;
[6.4] The notice also contains quotations from supplementary heads of argument
previously filed during the hearing on behalf of ldexis, regurgitating the same
issues raised there in a similar manner.
[6.5] The issue whether the semaglutide found as an API in Ozempic and Wegovy
ara tha "sama" or "similar' to tha samaglutida usad in tha ldaxis product is
again laboured extensively with references to reports annexed to the
3 Municipality of Thabazimbi v Badenhorst 2024 JDR 0991 {GP} at para {17}.
6
Applicant's papers in the application, while this court clearly illustrated in the
judgment that the expert witness relied on by ldexis in the application
confirmed the difference between a product of a biological origin compared
to a chemically synthesised product.
[6.6] When the issue of the voluminous notice of application for leave to appeal
was raised with counsel acting for ldexis, specifically in regard to the fact that
the notice consists of 87 pages and 341 paragraphs, the glib response was
to say that the first 30 pages of the notice contains the required reasons and
the remainder of the notice can be ignored. Implicit in this statement is a
concession that the notice of application for leave to appeal is not succinct
and that this court was required to labour through a voluminous document for
no real purpose. It is indicative of a lack of respect and appreciation for the
ethical duty of practitioners to utilise judicial resources effectively. That
statement also carries the implicit concession that the notice of application
for leave to appeal constitutes an abuse of the process.
[7] The notice of application for leave to appeal filed by ldexis fits squarely into the
description of the application for leave to appeal referred to in the Songono judgment as
quoted supra. Instead of identifying a ground for appeal, succinctly stated, with rational
reasons to convince this court that another court will arrive at a different conclusion, the
notice of appeal is nothing more than a diatribe of some 87 pages (approximately 57 of
which are not requIrea) criticising me Juagment, analysing the eviaence, putting forwara
elaborate arguments in a similar manner as were presented during the hearing, and
quoting various authorities.
7
[8] On behalf of ldexis, heads of argument were filed to support the application for leave to
appeal. The heads of argument consist of 72 pages. In my view any experienced
practitioner will grasp the significance of the fact that the heads of argument in an
application for leave to appeal, consisting of 72 pages, disposed of the grounds relied on
with more brevity that the notice of application for leave to appeal itself.
[9] Significantly, counsels acting for Novo Nordisk were able to efficiently dispose of the
plethora of issues raised in the notice of application for leave to appeal in heads of
argument which consisted of 20 pages, succinctly illustrating the lack of merit in the
application for leave to appeal. On behalf of Novo Nordisk it was submitted that the
application constitutes an abuse of the process and I agree. On that ground alone, the
application stands to be dismissed.
IS THE ORDER APPEALABLE?
[1 O] Notwithstanding the finding above, I am of the view that it is necessary to deal with an
issue which is dispositive of the application for leave to appeal and was raised by both
parties. That issue relates to the appealability of the order in the sense that ldexis argued
that the order is final in effect and thus appealable, while Novo Nordisk contends that it
is an interim order of limited operation. In the alternative, it was argued by ldexis that it is
in the interest of justice that leave to appeal be granted, even if it is found to be an interim
order. In that regard, the following considerations are relevant:
[10.1] This court was required by Novo Nordisk to find that a temporary interdict
should be granted against ldexis in terms whereof the compounding of
medicines, which prima facie appears to be illegal and unlawful, are
8
prevented pending an investigation which was initiated by SAHPRA and
SAPC into the activities of ldexis. It was common cause that the investigation
was launched by SAHPRA and SAPC who issued compliance directives to
ldexis shortly before the application was heard. That investigation relates to
the very issues raised by Novo Nordisk in support of the relief claimed in the
application and the investigation revealed, at least prima facie, unlawful
compounding practises by ldexis. There is no doubt that whatever the
outcomes of that investigation by the relevant regulatory bodies will be, and
whatever decisions they may make and/or whatever directives they may
issue pursuant to that investigation, either ldexis or Novo Nordisk will institute
review proceedings against those findings and/or directives and/or decisions;
[10.2] The order made by this court is clearly a temporary order pending finalisation
of those proceedings, which are ultimately heading for a determination by a
court of law. This issue was dealt with fully in the judgment and the order is
clearly subject to the finalisation of that investigation and any review resulting
from it. The attempt of ldexis to argue that the order is final in effect is based
on the same convoluted argument advanced during the hearing of the
application, was dealt with in the judgment, and there is no reasonable
prospect that another court will find differently.
[10.3] Insofar as ldexis relied on the interests of justice as a ground compelling this
court to grant leave to appeal, I am of the view that it is not in the interest of
justice to grant leave to appeal. In my view it is in the interests of justice that
the investigation by the regulatory bodies being the SAHPRA and SAPC be
finalised, that the parties thereafter ventilate whatever issues they intend to
COSTS
9
do by way of review proceedings, and that the totality of any outstanding
disputes as it may materialise at that time be dealt with once and for all on
appeal, should leave be granted to any of the parties at that time. It is further
not in the interest of justice that· conduct, which appears at least prima facie
to be unlawful and not in the public interest, be allowed to continue until all
the issues are finally and fully ventilated in a court of law.
[11] In heads of argument filed on behalf of Novo Nordisk a punitive order for costs was sought
against ldexisJ based on the submission that the notice of application for leave to appeal
constitutes an abuse of the process. However, during the hearing of the application for
leave to appeal counsel acting on behalf of Novo Nordisk sought an order for costs, not
on a punjtive scale, including costs of all counsel involved, taxed on Scale C.
I make the following order:
1 . The application for leave to a.ppeal is. refused.
2. Applicants are ordered to pay the costs, including costs of three counsel, taxed on Scale
C.
PA VAN NIEKERK
JUDGE OF THE GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORJA
APPEARANCES
FOR APPLICANTS
INSTRUCTED BY
FOR FIRST RESPONDENT
INSTRUCTED BY
Adv S Maritz SC
Adv S Maritz
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Pierre Marais Attorneys
Adv A Botha SC
Adv A Molver
Adv Mazibuko
Adams and Adams Attorneys