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[2026] ZAGPJHC 1039
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Marumo Gallant FC v National Soccer League and Others (185110/2026) [2026] ZAGPJHC 1039 (9 September 2026)
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REPUBLIC OF SOUTH
AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 185110/2026
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES / NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: NO
9 September 2026
In the matter between:
MARUMO
GALLANT FC
Applicant
AND
NATIONAL
SOCCER LEAGUE
First Respondent
ANDILE
JALI
Second Respondent
MUSA
NYATAMA
Third Respondent
JUDGMENT
Mia, J
Introduction
[1]
The applicant seeks an interim interdict restraining the first
respondent, the National Soccer League, from deducting amounts from
its monthly grants and paying those amounts to the second and third
respondents, pending the finalisation of review proceedings
under
case number 085426/2026 and the alleged appeals before the South
African Football Association (“SAFA”). The application
is
opposed by the second and third respondents. The first respondent
does not oppose.
Applicable law
[2]
Rule 6(12)(b) requires an
applicant to set out explicitly both the circumstances rendering the
matter urgent and the reasons why
substantial redress cannot be
obtained at a hearing in due course. In
East
Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd
,
[1]
the enquiry is not confined to whether the applicant may suffer harm
before a hearing in due course. The guiding consideration
is whether
substantial and effective redress will be unavailable in due course.
Enrolment
[3]
As a matter of procedure, the application was timeously enrolled.
Compliance with the Thursday-for-Tuesday enrolment timetable
does
not, however, establish substantive urgency. The applicant is
required to make out its case regarding urgency having regard
to
principles set out in
East Rock.
Analysis
[4]
The objective reason for the alleged urgency is found in the first
respondent’s letters of 11 and 12 June 2026. Those letters
required the applicant to provide proof of payment by 30 June 2026,
failing which deductions would be made from its grants. The
applicant
avers it requires the grant for its operational requirements. The
applicant was therefore aware of the threatened deductions
by no
later than 12 June 2026 and seeks to protect its grants
pertaining to its operation.
[5]
The history related to the payments due to the second and third
respondents predates those letters. The applicant knew in
February 2026
that SAFA regarded its appeals as non-compliant.
My understanding of the correspondence is not that SAFA had made the
decision
but that the applicant has not complied with the application
process and in the absence thereof the appeal had lapsed. The
applicant
may well be able to request condonation for the late filing
but in the absence of it doing so, SAFA regarded the appeal has
having
lapsed. The applicant instituted the review on 15 April 2026
but did not seek interim relief. It only launched its first urgent
interdict application on 23 June 2026.
[6]
That application was dismissed on 23 July 2026 because the applicant
had not established the requisite capacity to institute the
application. The judgment came to the applicant’s attention on
24 July 2026. It consulted its attorneys and authorised fresh
proceedings on 27 July 2026. The new papers were signed on 28 July
2026 and filed on 31 July 2026. The applicant acted promptly
after
the dismissal, but that dismissal did not create a new underlying
cause of urgency. The present application merely cured
the defect in
the earlier proceedings. The enforcement risk remained the risk which
the applicant had been aware of since June 2026,
and importantly
earlier than that date when it became aware of the looming threat of
deductions from its grants in February 2026.
[7]
The applicant anticipates a deduction will be made on 25 August 2026.
The June deadline passed without a deduction. No deduction
was made
during July. The assertion that the dismissal of the first
application “paved the way” for a deduction on
25 August
2026 is an inference, unsupported by a subsequent demand or
confirmation from the first respondent.
[8]
The applicant alleges that the grant is required to pay salaries and
meet the expenses necessary to honour fixtures. It further
alleges
that the second and third respondents are unemployed, have no
executable assets and will dissipate the money. These are
material
assertions, but they are unsupported by financial statements, payroll
records, cash-flow evidence, fixture expenses or
evidence concerning
the respondents’ means. The allegation that the respondents
will spend the money and will be unable to
repay it is speculative.
[9]
The prejudice alleged is essentially financial. The applicant has not
shown that any loss cannot be addressed through repayment,
restitution or damages if the review ultimately succeeds. It may also
prosecute the pending review on an expedited basis or seek
properly
formulated preservation or suspension relief on evidence
demonstrating an imminent deduction and an inability to recover
the
money. The founding papers do not explain why these remedies would
not afford substantial redress.
[10]
The measured procedural timetable adopted by the applicant ensured
that the respondents had a reasonable opportunity to answer.
That
does not overcome the absence of substantive urgency. The applicant
has not demonstrated that it will be unable to obtain
substantial
redress at a hearing in due course. To the extent that urgency now
exists, it results substantially from the applicant’s
failure
to seek interim relief when the review was instituted and its delay
in acting on a risk known for several months.
[11]
The application therefore does not satisfy Rule 6(12)(b) and falls to
be struck from the urgent roll. It is consequently unnecessary,
and
inappropriate, to determine the merits of the application for interim
interdictory relief.
[12]
The second and third respondents have successfully opposed the urgent
enrolment and are entitled to their costs. I am not persuaded
that a
punitive costs order is warranted merely because the present
proceedings cured the authority defect in the first application.
Order
The
application is struck from the urgent roll for lack of urgency.
The
applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the second and third
respondents on a party and party scale B.
S C MIA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION
JOHANNESBURG
Appearances:
On
behalf of the applicant:
:
Mr L E Thobejane
:
[email protected]
Instructed
by
: Botha Massyn &
Thobejane Attorneys
:
[email protected]
On behalf of the
respondents
Instructed
by
Date of hearing
Date
of judgment
: Adv K L Klopper
:
[email protected]
:
Brink de Beer & Potgieter Inc
:
26 August 2026
[1]
[2011]
ZAGPJHC 196.