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Dansabe Trading 17 Proprietary Limited v Fire and Fitness (Pty) Limited and Another (2024/091679) [2026] ZAGPJHC 1050 (8 September 2026)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Case Number: 2024-091679
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
(3)
REVISED: NO
8
September 2026
In
the matter between:
DANSABE
TRADING 17 PROPRIETARY LIMITED
Plaintiff (Applicant)
and
FIRE
& ICE FITNESS (PTY) LIMITED
First Defendant (First Respondent)
JACQUELINE
BRIDGET DAVIS N.O.
Second Defendant (Second Respondent)
JUDGMENT
MODIBA, J
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for leave to
appeal against the order granted by this court on 6 March 2026, which
dismissed the plaintiff's
application for summary judgment and
granted the defendants leave to defend the plaintiff’s action.
As is customary, the
applicant is the plaintiff in the main action,
and the respondents are the defendants. It is convenient for this
court to refer
to the parties as they are cited in the main action.
[2]
The
plaintiff seeks leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal,
alternatively to a Full Court of this Division, in terms of
ss
17(1)(a)(
i
)
and 17(1)(a)(
ii
)
of the Superior Courts Act
[1]
.
The plaintiff relies on several grounds of appeal . The defendants
oppose the application.
[3]
The plaintiff contends that the appeal enjoys reasonable
prospects of success, as required in terms of s 17(1)(a)(
i
),
because the defendants failed to satisfy the requirements necessary
to resist summary judgment. It submits that:
(a) the defendants failed
sufficiently to disclose the nature and grounds of their alleged
defences and the material facts upon
which those defences were
founded;
(b) that the defences
relied upon were not
bona fide
; and
(c) that they did
not constitute defences recognised in law.
[4]
According to the plaintiff, the various defences raised by the
defendants were vague, contradictory, unsupported by the pleaded
facts and devoid of legal merit. More specifically, the plaintiff
contends that the defendants' reliance on the dispute-resolution
provisions of the Memorandum of Agreement of Sub-Lease and
Development (MASD), their challenge to the validity of the settlement
and suretyship agreement, their dispute regarding quantum, the
counterclaims and ancillary defences advanced in the plea and
affidavit
resisting summary judgment, either lacked legal foundation,
were mutually destructive, or were inconsistent with the settlement
and suretyship agreement upon which the action was based. The
plaintiff submits that these contentions did not raise triable issues
and therefore did not justify the granting of leave to defend.
[5]
On
that basis, the plaintiff submits that the court ought to have
granted summary judgment against the defendants, jointly and
severally, for payment of R 659 883.41, together with interest
a
tempore morae
and costs on the attorney-and-client scale. It further contends that,
at most, the defendants should have only been granted leave
to defend
in respect of the balance of the plaintiff's claim of R 231 500.01.
[6]
Relying on s 17(1)(a)(
ii
), the plaintiff also contends
that compelling reasons exist for the appeal to be heard. Central to
this contention is the allegation
that, despite repeated requests
made in terms of rule 49(1)(
c
), the court declined to furnish
reasons for its order. The plaintiff submits that the furnishing of
reasons is an incident of the
rule of law, promotes judicial
accountability, enables a litigant meaningfully to exercise its right
of appeal, and assists an
appellate court in determining the
correctness of the decision concerned.
[7]
The plaintiff further contends that, in the absence of
reasons, it is impossible to ascertain the basis upon which the court
concluded
that the defendants had disclosed bona fide and legally
sustainable defences or whether the discretion to refuse summary
judgment
was properly exercised. For that reason and relying on
various Constitutional Court and appellate authorities concerning the
duty
to furnish reasons, the plaintiff submits that the interests of
justice require that leave to appeal be granted.
[8]
The plaintiff also submits that the interests of justice
enquiry now informs both appealability and the granting of leave to
appeal
and that, notwithstanding the interlocutory nature of an order
refusing summary judgment, leave to appeal should be granted where
the absence of reasons and the alleged merits of the matter warrant
appellate intervention. It accordingly contends that the order
is
patently wrong and that leave to appeal should be granted.
[9]
The
defendants submit that the plaintiff has failed to satisfy the
requirements for leave to appeal as set out in s 17(1)(
a
),
relying on authorities such as
MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
[2]
and
Caratco
(Pty) Ltd v Independent Advisory (Pty) Ltd
[3]
.
They contend that leave to appeal may only be granted where there is
a reasonable prospect that another court would reach a different
conclusion or where compelling reasons exist for the appeal to be
heard. They submit that the plaintiff has demonstrated neither.
[10]
According to the defendants, the
plaintiff's notice of application for leave to appeal discloses no
sound or rational basis for
concluding that the proposed appeal
enjoys reasonable prospects of success. Instead, the plaintiff merely
repeats the arguments
advanced in support of summary judgment and
seeks a reconsideration of issues already determined by this court.
[11]
In relation to the plaintiff's
reliance on s 17(1)(a)(
ii
),
the defendants submit that no compelling reasons exist for the appeal
to be heard. They argue that the plaintiff has not identified
any
conflicting judgments, any issue of substantial public importance, or
any important question of law warranting the attention
of an
appellate court. For this reason, the plaintiff has failed to
establish any compelling reason justifying leave to appeal.
[12]
The
defendants also challenge the appealability of the order sought to be
appealed. They submit that an order refusing summary judgment
is
interlocutory in nature and ordinarily not appealable because it does
not finally determine the rights of the parties, dispose
of any
portion of the relief claimed in the main action, or bring the
litigation to an end. They rely on s 16(1)(
a
)
which provides for an appeal against any decision of a division as a
court of first instance, together with the principles articulated
in
Zweni
v Minister of Law and Order
(
Zweni
)
[4]
,
Ewels v Francis and Others (Leave to Appeal)
[5]
and
MV Smart: Minmetals Logistics
Zhejiang Co Ltd v Owners and Underwriters of MV Smart and
Another
(
MV
Smart
)
[6]
.
[13]
According to the defendants, none of
the recognised exceptions under which an order may be appealable are
present in this matter.
They contend that the action proceedings
remain pending and that the plaintiff retains the opportunity to
pursue its claims at
trial. The defendants further submit that
permitting an appeal at this stage would result in piecemeal
litigation and unnecessary
delay in the final determination of the
dispute.
[14]
Lastly, the defendants submit that
it is not in the interests of justice to grant leave to appeal. They
argue that the plaintiff,
as dominus litis, should proceed to trial
where the disputes between the parties can be fully ventilated. The
defendants therefore
contend that the plaintiff has failed to make
out a case for leave to appeal and that the application should
accordingly be dismissed.
Issues
for Determination
[15]
The application raises the following
issues for determination:
(a)
Whether the order dismissing the application for
summary judgment, reserving costs and granting the defendants leave
to defend is
appealable, having regard to its interlocutory
character, the principles governing appealability and the interests
of justice standard
relied upon by the plaintiff.
(b)
If the order is appealable, whether the plaintiff
has established a compelling reason contemplated in s 17(1)(a)(
ii
),
why the appeal should be heard, including whether the alleged failure
to furnish reasons for the order constitutes such a compelling
reason.
(c)
If the plaintiff has surmounted the
appealability hurdle, whether it has demonstrated, as contemplated in
s 17(1)(a)(
i
),
that the proposed appeal would have reasonable prospects of success.
More specifically, whether there is a reasonable prospect
that
another court would find that the defendants failed sufficiently to
disclose the nature and grounds of their defences and
the material
facts upon which they were founded; that the defences were not bona
fide; and that they did not constitute valid defences
in law, with
the result that summary judgment ought to have been granted.
[16]
It is convenient to cluster these
issues under the following topics:
(a)
Is the order appealable?
(b)
If so, has the plaintiff established
compelling reasons under s 17(1)(a)(
ii
)?
(c)
Has the plaintiff established reasonable
prospects of success under s 17(1)(a)(
i
).
Appealability
[17]
Before considering whether the
plaintiff has satisfied the requirements for leave to appeal in terms
of s 17, it is necessary to
determine whether the impugned order is
appealable. That issue is dispositive.
[18]
The order that is subject to this
application is interlocutory in nature and is neither final in
effect, nor definitive of the rights
of the parties, nor dispositive
of any substantial portion of the relief claimed in the action. The
plaintiff’s action remains
pending and is yet to be determined
on its merits. None of the recognised exceptions to the general rule
against the appealability
of a court’s decision finds
application in this matter. For reasons I outline below, the new
interests of justice standard
also does not render the order
appealable notwithstanding its interlocutory character.
[19]
The
rigid application of the test for appealability has been tempered by
constitutional developments. The ultimate enquiry is whether
the
interests of justice warrant appellate intervention. However, the
requirements set out in
Zweni
remain important considerations in that enquiry. As the Supreme Court
of Appeal has explained in
MV
Smart
[7]
the
interests of justice standard should be approached with the
"gravitational pull" of
Zweni
.
An order lacking one or more of the traditional attributes will
generally not be appealable unless the circumstances render appellate
intervention necessary in the interests of justice.
[20]
Measured against those
considerations, the order sought to be appealed lacks all the
traditional hallmarks of appealability. Its
consequence is simply
that the plaintiff is required to prove its claim in the ordinary
course at trial, while the defendants are
afforded the opportunity to
advance the defences pleaded by them. The litigation therefore
continues unabated.
[21]
I am also not persuaded that the
interests of justice require immediate appellate intervention. The
refusal of summary judgment
merely requires that the dispute be
resolved in the ordinary course of litigation. The impugned order
does not finally determine
any issue in the action and leaves the
plaintiff at liberty to pursue the entirety of its claim at trial.
Should the plaintiff
ultimately succeed, it will obtain the relief to
which it is entitled.
[22]
The
interests of justice further militate against entertaining an appeal
at this stage of the proceedings. As the appellate courts
have
repeatedly emphasised, piecemeal adjudication is generally
undesirable because it fragments litigation, delays the final
determination of the dispute and increases costs.
[8]
The real dispute between the parties, namely whether the defendants
are liable to the plaintiff on the claim advanced in the action,
remains to be adjudicated.
[23]
Permitting an appeal against the
refusal of summary judgment would interrupt those proceedings and
defer the ultimate resolution
of the matter without finally disposing
of any issue between the parties. There is also a risk of conflicting
decisions by the
court if it granted summary judgment on a portion of
the plaintiff’s claim and the trial court later finds that the
basis
for the defendants’ liability is not established. In the
circumstances, the interests of justice favour the expeditious
progression
of the action to trial rather than appellate intervention
at this interlocutory stage.
[24]
The plaintiff's complaint regarding
the absence of reasons does not alter this conclusion. Whether
reasons ought to have been furnished
is distinct from the question
whether the underlying order is appealable. Even assuming in the
plaintiff's favour that a proper
basis exists to complain about the
absence of reasons, that circumstance does not, without more,
transform an otherwise non-appealable
interlocutory order into an
appealable one. The question remains whether the nature and effect of
the order, viewed through the
prism of the interests of justice,
justify immediate appellate intervention. For the reasons already
stated, they do not.
[25]
I accordingly conclude that the
order dismissing the application for summary judgment, reserving
costs and granting the defendants
leave to defend is not appealable.
As already indicated, that finding is dispositive of the application.
[26]
Lest I be wrong in that conclusion,
and in deference to the submissions advanced by the parties, I
nevertheless consider whether
the plaintiff has established either
compelling reasons for an appeal to be heard or reasonable prospects
of success as contemplated
in s 17(1)(
a
).
Compelling
reasons
[27]
I deal separately below with the
plaintiff's contention that the alleged absence of reasons
constitutes a compelling reason within
the meaning of s 17(1)(a)(
ii
).
Leaving that issue aside for present purposes, I am unpersuaded that
the plaintiff has established any other compelling reason
warranting
the attention of an appellate court.
[28]
The plaintiff has not identified any
conflicting judgments on the issues arising in this matter. Nor has
it demonstrated that the
matter raises a novel question of law, an
issue of public importance, or any other consideration transcending
the interests of
the parties. At its core, the application concerns
whether the defendants disclosed triable issues sufficient to resist
summary
judgment on the facts pleaded and set out in the affidavit
resisting summary judgment. That is an issue confined largely to the
facts of the case.
[29]
Save for the issue concerning
reasons, which I address separately below, I therefore find that the
plaintiff has failed to establish
a compelling reason for the
proposed appeal to be heard as contemplated in s 17(1)(a)(
ii
).
The request for
reasons
[30]
Before dealing with the plaintiff's
contention that the absence of reasons constitutes a compelling
reason for purposes of s 17(1)(a)(
ii
),
it is necessary to address the various attempts made by the plaintiff
to obtain reasons for the order. Following the dismissal
of the
summary judgment application, the plaintiff filed a request for
written reasons dated 20 March 2026. The request did not
identify any
procedural basis entitling it to reasons. It contended, among other
things, that reasons were required to enable it
to exercise rights
allegedly arising under rule 32. When that request was declined, the
plaintiff filed a further notice purportedly
in terms of rule
49(1)(
c
).
[31]
The plaintiff's reliance on rule 32
was misplaced. Rule 32(9)(
b
)
regulates the circumstances in which a trial court may, after finally
adjudicating the matter, may make an adverse cost order
against a
defendant who obtained leave to defend. Nothing in rule 32 confers a
right to reasons for a refusal of summary judgment.
Nor does the rule
render the exercise of any subsequent rights dependent upon obtaining
reasons from the court that refused summary
judgment.
[32]
The plaintiff's subsequent reliance
on rule 49(1)(
c)
was similarly misconceived. That rule applies only where a court,
when granting an order, declares that reasons will be furnished
on
application. No such declaration was made in this matter. The
jurisdictional prerequisite for the operation of rule 49(1)(
c
)
was therefore absent, and the rule conferred no entitlement to
reasons.
[33]
The interlocutory nature of the
order reinforces this conclusion. Ordinarily, reasons are sought to
enable a litigant to consider
appellate remedies. As already found,
the order refusing summary judgment and granting leave to defend is
not appealable. The underlying
rationale for insisting upon reasons
was therefore significantly attenuated.
[34]
The responses declining the
plaintiff's requests for reasons were accordingly legally correct.
Whether the absence of reasons nevertheless
constitutes a compelling
reason for the proposed appeal to be heard within the meaning of s
17(1)(a)(
ii
)
is a separate question, to which I now turn.
Whether the absence of
reasons constitutes a compelling reason
[35]
There can be no quarrel with the
principle that reasons are an important feature of judicial
decision-making. Reasons promote transparency,
facilitate
accountability, assist litigants in understanding the basis for a
court's decision and, where an appeal lies, assist
an appellate court
in discharging its functions. The authorities relied upon by the
plaintiff establish these principles beyond
doubt.
[36]
However, it does not follow that the
absence of reasons, without more, constitutes a compelling reason
requiring an appeal to be
heard. Whether a compelling reason exists
must be determined in the context of the case, having regard to the
nature of the order
concerned and the procedural setting in which it
was made, all as part of the broader enquiry into the interests of
justice.
[37]
In the present matter, the order in
question did not finally determine the parties’ rights. It
merely refused summary judgment
and granted leave to defend. The
action remains pending, and the substantive disputes between the
parties will be determined at
trial. The plaintiff therefore remains
fully able to pursue its claim and obtain final relief should it
ultimately succeed.
[38]
Equally important, the plaintiff's
complaint concerning the absence of reasons cannot be divorced from
the fact that it possessed
no procedural entitlement to reasons under
either rule 32 or rule 49(1)(
c
).
As already found, both procedural avenues the plaintiff relied on
were inapplicable. The absence of an entitlement to reasons
in terms
of the rules regulating the conduct of proceedings in this court does
not necessarily answer the s 17(1)(a)(
ii
)
enquiry but is a relevant consideration when assessing whether the
interests of justice require appellate intervention.
[39]
The plaintiff's reliance on the
absence of reasons tends to conflate two distinct enquiries: whether
reasons ought to have been
furnished and whether an appeal should be
entertained. Even if the former issue were decided in the plaintiff's
favour, it would
not follow that the latter requirement has been met.
Section 17(1)(a)(
ii
)
requires a compelling reason for an appeal to be heard. It does not
create an appeal whenever a litigant is dissatisfied with
the reasons
provided, or the absence thereof.
[40]
In the circumstances of this matter,
the absence of reasons neither alters the interlocutory character of
the order nor creates
a basis for fragmenting ongoing proceedings
through an appeal. Nor does it give rise to a discrete issue of law,
conflicting authority
or some other consideration transcending the
interests of the parties. The complaint regarding reasons remains
ancillary to the
plaintiff's contention that summary judgment ought
to have been granted.
[41]
There are also sound practical
considerations underpinning the longstanding practice in busy
divisions that reasons are not ordinarily
furnished for refusal of
summary judgment. Such applications are frequently determined on the
basis that triable issues arise from
the papers. In those
circumstances, the dispute proceeds to trial where the relevant
factual and legal issues will be comprehensively
adjudicated.
Requiring reasons in every unsuccessful summary judgment application
would divert scarce judicial resources away from
the adjudication of
matters requiring final determination, without advancing the ultimate
resolution of the dispute. The practice
therefore reflects legitimate
considerations of judicial economy and effective court administration
rather than arbitrariness.
[42]
The
authorities relied upon by the plaintiff do not compel the conclusion
that reasons were required to be furnished in the present
circumstances. In
Mahlangu
and Another v Minister of Labour and Others
[9]
(
Mahlangu
),
the court was concerned with a High Court order declaring legislation
constitutionally invalid without furnishing reasons. The
order was
final in effect, implicated constitutional review and required
confirmation by the court.
[43]
Similarly,
Airports
Company South Africa SOC Ltd v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd and
Others
[10]
(
ACSA
)
concerned the judicial approval of a settlement affecting a prior
order relating to the exercise of public procurement powers,
with
consequences extending beyond the immediate litigants. In
Prithilal
v Akani Egoli (Pty) Ltd and Another
[11]
(
Prithilal
),
the Constitutional Court dealt with the imposition of an exceptional
punitive costs order and emphasised the necessity of reasons
to
permit meaningful scrutiny of the exercise of that judicial
discretion.
[44]
In each of those matters the
impugned decision was either final in character, constitutionally
significant, punitive in effect,
or otherwise carried consequences
transcending the ordinary procedural course of litigation. By
contrast, a decision granting leave
to defend in summary judgment
proceedings is interlocutory in nature and determines no substantive
rights. The court does not pronounce
upon the ultimate merits of the
dispute but merely decides that the defendant has disclosed a
bona
fide
defence, or triable issues,
sufficient to warrant ventilation at trial.
[45]
Although the values of transparency,
accountability and reasoned decision-making underpin all judicial
proceedings, the weight to
be accorded to those considerations must
be assessed in context. In the summary judgment setting, the issues
have yet to be fully
ventilated, and the order serves only to permit
the ordinary adjudicative process to continue. To require reasons
where leave to
defend is granted would risk elevating a desirable
principle into an inflexible rule, notwithstanding the limited and
preliminary
nature of the decision.
[46]
The broader constitutional principle
affirmed in the authorities relied upon by the plaintiff therefore
does not displace the equally
important need to preserve judicial
economy, particularly in divisions where court rolls are extensive
and where a grant of leave
to defend simply restores the matter to
the ordinary trial process. The cited cases accordingly provide
support for the general
value of reasoned decision-making but are
materially distinguishable on their facts and constitutional context.
[47]
I am therefore not persuaded that
the absence of reasons, whether considered alone or together with the
remaining grounds advanced
by the plaintiff, constitutes a compelling
reason within the meaning of s 17(1)(a)(
ii
)
for the proposed appeal to be heard. Accordingly, even if the order
were appealable, the plaintiff has failed to establish compelling
reasons as contemplated in s 17(1)(a)(
ii
).
Reasonable prospects
of success
[48]
Lastly, I determine whether there exists a
sound, rational basis for concluding that another court would come to
a different conclusion.
This requires that I deal with the merits.
Before doing so, it is appropriate to record that, although I
concluded earlier in this judgment that the plaintiff had no
procedural
entitlement to reasons under either rule 32 or rule
49(1)(
c
), I nevertheless furnish reasons for the refusal of
summary judgment in what follows. I do so because the plaintiff has
persisted
with its contention that the order was wrongly granted and
may seek to pursue further appellate remedies if so advised. The
reasons
that follow are therefore intended to facilitate any further
consideration of the matter and to explain why, in my view, the
requirements
for summary judgment were not met.
[49]
The
summary judgment procedure is an extraordinary and stringent
remedy.
[12]
The question
before the Court was not whether the defendants would ultimately
succeed at trial, nor whether their pleaded case
was likely to
prevail. The enquiry was whether the defendants had disclosed facts
which, if established at trial, would constitute
a defence to the
plaintiff's claim and therefore justify leave to defend.
[13]
[50]
The defendants raised several defences and counterclaims in
their plea and affidavit resisting summary judgment, including
contentions
concerning the effect of the MASD, the validity and
enforceability of the settlement and suretyship agreement relied upon
by the
plaintiff, the authority and capacity of the signatories
thereto, the quantum of the plaintiff's claim, and counterclaims
arising
from the parties' broader contractual relationship. The
plaintiff largely bases its entitlement to summary judgment on its
contention
that the defendants' defences and counterclaims are devoid
of merit. Significantly, the plaintiff's cause of action, the
defendants'
pleaded defences and their counterclaims all arise from
the same commercial relationship and substantially the same factual
matrix.
Whether the defendants’ defences and counterclaims are
devoid of merit is an issue for the trial court. Further, the
determination of the issues that arise is likely to depend on factual
findings that can properly be made only after the hearing
of oral
evidence and the testing of that evidence under cross-examination. In
those circumstances, the defendants have disclosed
triable issues
which are more appropriately determined at trial than in summary
judgment proceedings.
[51]
The purpose of summary judgment is not to
resolve complex factual disputes, to determine whether defences are
devoid of merit or
to determine competing, contradictory or vague
versions on pleadings and affidavit. Where the material issues arise
from an interconnected
factual matrix and the resolution of one issue
may bear directly on the others, the interests of justice ordinarily
favour ventilation
of the evidence at trial. In my view, this is such
a case.
[52]
Whether the defendants' defences and
counterclaims will ultimately succeed is not presently the question.
For reasons set out above,
I remain satisfied that another court
would be unlikely to conclude that summary judgment should have been
granted. The present
application demonstrates no basis for concluding
that another court would reasonably reach such a conclusion.
[53]
In these circumstances, I am not
persuaded that there exists a reasonable prospect that another court
would conclude that summary
judgment ought to have been granted,
whether in whole or in part. Accordingly, even if the order were
appealable, I would find
that the plaintiff has failed to demonstrate
reasonable prospects of success for purposes of s 17(1)(a)(
i
).
Costs
[54]
The defendants seek costs on a punitive scale. I am not
persuaded that such an order is warranted. Although the plaintiff has
failed
to establish that the order is appealable or that there are
compelling reasons or reasonable prospects of success as contemplated
in s 17 of the Superior Courts Act, the application raised issues
concerning appealability, the interests of justice and the
consequence
of the absence of reasons. While those contentions have
not succeeded, they cannot be characterised as frivolous, vexatious
or
an abuse of process.
[55]
No reasons were advanced as to why costs should not follow the
result. Having regard to the nature of the issues raised, which were
neither novel nor particularly complex, costs on scale B are
appropriate.
Order
[56]
The following order is made:
1.
The application for leave to appeal is
dismissed.
2.
The plaintiff shall pay the defendants'
costs of the application for leave to appeal, including the costs of
counsel on scale B.
LT MODIBA
Judge of the High
Court
Gauteng
Division
JOHANNESBURG
APPEARANCES
For
the plaintiffs:
Adv. HP van Nieuwenhuizen
Instructed
by:
Barry Aaron & Associates JHB
For
the Defendants:
Adv. Aldrin Moodley
Instructed
by:
L. Mafetsa Attorneys
Date
of Hearing:
18 June 2026
Date of
Judgment:
8 September 2026
[1]
10 of 2013.
Unless
otherwise specified, reference to statutory provisions are
references to this Act.
[2]
MEC
for Health, Eastern Cape v Mkhitha
2016
JDR 2214 (SCA) at paragraphs 16 and 17.
[3]
Caratco (Pty)
Ltd v Independent Advisory (Pty) Ltd
2020 (5) SA 35
(SCA) at paragraph 2.
[4]
1993
(1) SA 523
(A) at 532I-533B.
[5]
Ewels v
Francis and Others (Leave to Appeal)
2025 JDR 1195 (WCC) paragraphs 6 and 12.
[6]
MV Smart: Minmetals Logistics
Zhejiang Co Ltd v Owners and Underwriters of MV Smart and
Another
2025 (1) SA 392 (SCA).
[7]
Id
at
paragraph 32.
[8]
Democratic
Alliance and Others v Acting National Director of Public
Prosecutions and Others
(288/11)
[2012] ZASCA 15
;
2012 (3) SA 486
(SCA);
[2012] 2 All SA 345
(SCA);
2012 (6) BCLR 613.
See also
Lebashe
Investment Group (Pty) Ltd and Others v United Democratic Movement
and Another
(1308/2023)
[2025] ZASCA 29
(28 March 2025) at paragraph 18.
[9]
Mahlangu
and Another v Minister of Labour and Others
2021 (2) SA 54
(CC) at paragraphs 14-17.
[10]
Airports
Company South Africa SOC Ltd v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Ltd and
Others
2019
(5) SA 1
(CC).
[11]
Prithilal
v Akani Egoli (Pty) Ltd and Another
2026 (2) SA 1 (CC).
[12]
Maharaj
v Barclays National Bank Ltd
1976 (1) SA 418
(A) at 423F-G.
[13]
Id
at
423F-H to 426A-B.