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[2026] ZALMPPHC 89
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Lepelle Nkumpi Local Municipality and Others v Diale (Appeal) (2026/050531) [2026] ZALMPPHC 89 (16 September 2026)
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REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LIMPOPO
DIVISION, POLOKWANE
CASE NO: 2026-050531
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO THE JUDGES: YES/NO
(3)
REVISED.
DATE:
13 FEBRUARY 2025
SIGNATURE:
In the matter between:
LEPELLE-NKUMPI LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
FIRST APPELLANT
THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
OF LEPELLE-NKUMBI
LOCAL
MUNICIPALITY
SECOND APPELLANT
COUNCILLOR MERIAM M
MOLALA N.O (MAYOR)
THIRD APPELLANT
COUNCILLOR JOYCE
NKOBELA N.O (THE SPEAKER)
FOURTH APPELLANT
DR ML CHAUKE N.O
(ACTING MUNIPAL MANAGER)
FIFTH APPELLANT
And
DOROTHY SEKGOLOLO
DIALE
RESPONDENT
ORDER
On
appeal from:
Single Judge of this
Division (Masilo AJ sitting as court of second instance):
1.The appeal is upheld
with costs on party and party scale B, including the costs of two
counsel.
2. The order of the court
of second instance is set aside and substituted with the following:
‘
The
application to enforce the order of 8
th
June 2026 is dismissed with costs on party and party scale B’.
JUDGMENT
KGANYAGO J
[1]
The respondent Dorothy Sekgololo Diale (Dorothy) is the Chief
Financial Officer (CFO) of the first respondent
Lepelle-Nkumpi
Municipality (municipality). On 25
th
November 2025 she was
placed on precautionary suspension with full pay. In terms of
Regulation 6(6)(a) of the Local Government:
Disciplinary Regulations
for Senior Managers, 2010 (the regulations), the suspension will
automatically lapse if a disciplinary
hearing does not commence
within 3 months after the date of suspension. The 3 months period in
Dorothy’s case was lapsing
on 24
th
February 2026.
[2]
Dorothy was invited by the municipality to attend to certain
interviews in relation to the pending disciplinary
hearing on 12
th
and 18
th
December 2025. According to municipality Dorothy
did not attend those interviews. On 30
th
January 2026
Dorothy was served with a notice and charge sheet to attend the
disciplinary hearing. However, the investigative report
or a bundle
of the documents which the municipality intended to use during the
disciplinary hearing did not accompany the charge
sheet. The hearing
was scheduled to be held on 9
th
February 2026. According
to the charge sheet Dorothy was facing 20 counts which included
dishonesty, fraud, MFM violations, dereliction
of duty and political
interference.
[3]
On 9
th
February 2026 the municipality served Dorothy with
its bundle of documents which it intends using during the
disciplinary hearing.
According to Dorothy the bundle was more than
800 pages. Dorothy was accompanied by Mr Mphahlele who was neither a
legal practitioner,
fellow employee or a trade union representative.
Dorothy made an application to be represented by Mr Mphahlele before
the chairperson
of the disciplinary hearing. The chairperson of the
disciplinary hearing requested the parties to submit written
submissions in
relation to Dorothy’s application by the 12
th
and 18
th
February 2026 respectively. The chairperson
postponed the hearing to the 23
rd
February 2026 for the
ruling on Dorothy’s application.
[4]
On 10
th
February 2026 the municipality notified Dorothy
through an email that the venue for the disciplinary hearing will be
moved from
the municipality to SALGA’s offices in Polokwane. On
23
rd
February 2026 Dorothy raised a point in limine that
SALGA’s offices in Polokwane did not fall within the
jurisdiction of
the municipality. The chairperson upheld the point in
limine, and the proceedings were postponed to the 27
th
February 2026.
[5]
On 25
th
February 2026 Dorothy reported for duty at the
municipality wherein she handed in a letter stating that her
suspension had automatically
lapsed on 24
th
February 2026.
The fifth respondent Dr ML Chauke (Chauke) who is the acting
municipal manager, responded to Dorothy letter the
same date. In her
response Chauke notified Dorothy that she remained on suspension.
[6]
That led to Dorothy launching an urgent application in the court of
first instance seeking a declaratory
order that her precautionary
suspension had automatically lapsed in terms of regulation 6(6)(a) of
the Disciplinary Regulations
for Senior Managers. The municipality
opposed the application. In opposing the application, the
municipality in its answering affidavit
submitted that on 9
th
February 2026 it was fully prepared and ready to proceed with the
disciplinary hearing. The evidence leader was ready to read the
charges to Dorothy. Dorothy launched an application to be represented
by a person who was neither an attorney, fellow employee
nor a trade
union representative. Her application required determination before
the matter could proceed. The conduct of Dorothy
directly caused the
postponement of the reading of the charges, and the delay cannot be
attributed to the municipality.
[7]
The municipality denied that Dorothy’s suspension automatically
lapsed on 24
th
February 2026. The municipality further
submitted that Dorothy was notified of the change of venue from the
municipality to SALGA’s
office in Polokwane by email and she
never objected to that. She only raised the point in limine on the
23
rd
February 2026 and the hearing had to be postponed to
the 27
th
February 2026. The municipality’s position
is that the regulation must be read purposively so as to prevent its
abuse, and
that the hearing is properly regarded as having commenced
when the presiding officer was seized with the matter and assumed
captainship
of the proceedings, thereby navigating the disciplinary
process. The reading of charges could not have happened in the face
of
Dorothy’s application for representation and jurisdictional
point. Dorothy should not be allowed to benefit from a postponement
that was engineered by her.
[8]
There remain several outstanding witnesses who are yet to testify,
and permitting Dorothy to access
the workplace while she faces
serious charges creates a substantial and credible risk of
interference with those witnesses. Further
that given the nature of
the financial misconduct charges levelled against Dorothy, there
exists a real likelihood that her return
to the workplace would
compromise proper financial governance and undermine the integrity of
ongoing internal controls.
[9]
On 17
th
March 2026 the matter came before Pillay J who
removed the matter from the roll for lack of urgency. Dorothy
subsequently applied
for a preferential date and the matter was
allocated the date of 28
th
May 2026. The matter came
Mashilo AJ (court of first instance) who on 8
th
June 2026
granted Dorothy the following orders:
“
1.The
court finds that the application is urgent.
2. It
is declared that the Applicant’s suspension lapsed
automatically on 24
th
February 2026 in terms of Regulation 6(6) of the Local Government
Disciplinary Regulations for Senior Managers.
3. The
decision taken by the 1
st
and 5
th
Respondents on 25
th
February 2026 for the continuation and extension of the Applicant’s
precautionary suspension is declared unlawful, irregular
and
void
ab intio
.
4. The
1
st
and 5
th
Respondents are interdicted from blocking, interfering or in any
other manner interfere with the Applicant’s return to his
employment with the Lepelle-Nkumpi Local Municipality.
5. The
1
st
and 5
th
Respondents are ordered to pay the costs of this application on party
and party scale B, including the costs of counsel”.
[10]
On 10
th
June 2026 Dorothy reported for duty at the municipality but found
that her office was locked. She again tried to report for duty
on
11
th
June 2026 but was denied access to the municipality. On 11
th
June 2026 the municipality filed an application for leave to appeal
and at the same requested reasons for the order of the 8
th
June 2026. That led to Dorothy launching an urgent application in
terms of s 18(1) read with s 18(3) of the
Superior
Court Act
[1]
(Act) seeking an order for the operation and execution of the
judgment and order of Masilo AJ not be suspended pending the
finalisation
of any application for leave to appeal.
[11]
Dorothy in her s 18 application has stated that the order by Masilo
AJ that the matter was urgent is not
technically correct, as the
application was at that stage on the preferential roll and not urgent
roll. The grounds of Dorothy’s
s 18 application are that if she
continues to be on suspension, she will lose her right to a
performance bonus or at least the
opportunity to be fairly evaluated
for the purpose of such a performance bonus, which is determined by
an evaluation of the standard
of her actual work or output. In her
absence as a result of the suspension, neither her work performance
nor her performance bonus
could be quantified and the prejudice she
will suffer in this regard is incalculable, substantial and
irreparable. It will be impossible
to quantify a claim for damages in
relation to a performance bonus as the right to qualify for same is
dependent on her physical
presence at the workplace. Any possible
claim for damages will be rendered hollow. The municipality will not
suffer any prejudice
in that she will return to work and continue
with her duties diligently and to the benefit of the municipality and
to the benefit
of the public and public interest.
[12]
The municipality opposed Dorothy’s s 18 application. In its
answering affidavit the municipality has
submitted that Dorothy has
failed to establish any ground that could properly be characterized
as exceptional circumstances. Her
reliance upon the speculative
prospect of a performance bonus is neither immediate nor irreparable
harm, but a contingent pecuniary
expectation. Dorothy had adequate
remedies such as vindication through the disciplinary enquiry,
followed by recourse to compensation
or unfair labour practice
proceedings under section 186(2)(b) of the Labour Relations Act.
Dorothy is facing serious allegations
of misconduct, and from the
findings of the investigative report it had become evident that
Dorothy must remain suspended whilst
proceedings are underway, to
protect the municipality from further prejudice.
[13]
The municipality further submitted that Dorothy seeks to anchor
exceptional circumstances upon tenuous allegation
that she may
forfeit a performance bonus. Clause 6 of the employment contract does
not confer upon Dorothy an automatic entitlement
to a performance
bonus. The provision merely contemplates an assessment, the outcome
of which remains subject to the employer’s
discretion. There
remain several outstanding witnesses who are yet to testify, and
permitting Dorothy to access the workplace while
she faces serious
charges creates a substantial and credible risk of interference with
those witnesses. The disciplinary hearing
is nearing its conclusion.
[14]
The section 18 application came before Masilo AJ (court of second
instance) who found exceptional circumstances
to exists and that
Dorothy will suffer severe irreparable harm. He found in favour of
Dorothy and ordered that the operation and
execution of the judgment
and order of the 8
th
June 2026 shall not be suspended
pending a decision on the municipality’s application for leave
to appeal and, in the event
the leave to appeal is granted, the
outcome of the appeal. The basis for that finding were that in his
view, the surrounding circumstances
relating to each postponement was
not attributable to Dorothy. It was the municipality’s
insistence that the interpretation
of Clause 10(4)(a) of the use of
the word ‘representative’ exclusively meant a legal
representative, thereby necessitating
the directive from the
chairperson to file a formal application. Further that Dorothy was
provided with 800 pages bundle to be
used during the disciplinary
hearing on 9
th
February 2026.
[15]
The court of second instance found further exceptional circumstances
are Dorothy’s right to return
to work and not be exposed to an
unfair labour practice as protected in section of the Constitution;
she is not able to return
to work so as to compete for a performance
bonus after she had lost at least 4 months in a financial year; her
performance agreement
is up for renewal on 1
st
July 2026
and will not be renewed in her absence; she will not be able to claim
damages under Aquilian action for the loss of a
performance bonus
which will not be quantifiable.
[16]
The municipality is dissatisfied with the judgment and order of the
court of second instance regarding Dorothy’s
s 18 application,
and they are appealing the whole of that judgment and order. The
grounds of their appeal are that the urgency
issue had already been
finally determined by Pillay J, rendering the application
res
judicata
or at least to the principle against re-litigation of
settled issues. Dorothy has failed to establish exceptional
circumstances
as required by s 18(1). Dorothy has failed to prove
irreparable harm on balance of probabilities as required by s 18(3).
The municipality
has demonstrated that they will suffer irreparable
harm if the order was executed, given the serious nature of the
misconduct charges
and the risk of interference with witnesses and
evidence. The court of second instance fundamentally misattributed
the cause of
the delay in commencing the disciplinary hearing,
ignoring Dorothy’s own procedural conduct.
[17]
Before this court counsel for the municipality relying on the case of
Memani
v
Mketsu
N.O and Others
[2]
argued that the judgment of the court of second instance is wrong in
fact and in law. It misattributes the cause of delay in commencing
the disciplinary hearing, whilst ignoring the controlling authority
of Memani case, fails to apply the stringent test under section
18(3), grants enforcement in circumstances where no exceptional
circumstances or irreparable harm has been established. Dorothy
engineered the delays that caused the three-month period to expire.
She cannot now be permitted to benefit from her own procedural
strategy. The law does not permit a litigant to blow hot and cold.
[18]
Counsel for Dorothy in making his submissions relied on the cases of
Tshabalala
v Moqhaka Local Municipality
[3]
and the judgment of the full court of this division of
Fetakgomo
Local Municipality and 5 Others v Makgata
[4]
.
He submitted that this court should only adjudicate the merits of the
s 18(3) application, and subsequently s 18(4) appeal, and
not
entertain the merits of the pending leave to appeal against the
suspension application. The municipality are arguing the merits
of
the application for leave to appeal on the suspension application
rather than the merits of the s 18(3) application. The facts
of
Dorothy’s case are almost identical to the Tshabalala case in
so far as the requirements of s 18(3) and (4) are concerned.
Tshabalala’s case deals extensively with exceptional
circumstances pertaining to performance bonus and had found that the
entitlement to work towards a performance bonus is in fact
exceptional circumstances as required by s 18(3). The full court of
this division in Makgata’s case arrived at the same conclusion.
They are not saying that Dorothy should get a performance
bonus, but
that she works towards qualifying for it. For that to happen she
should be physically present at work.
[19]
This court is called upon to determine whether the court of second
instance was correct in granting an order
for the operation and
execution of the order of 8
th
June 2026 despite the
pending application for leave to appeal by the municipality. Section
18(1) and (3) of the Act provides as
follows:
“
(1)
Subject to subsection (2) and (3) and unless the court under
exceptional circumstances orders otherwise, the operation and
execution of a decision which is the subject of an application for
leave to appeal or of an appeal, is suspended pending the decision
of
the application or appeal.
(2)…
(3) A
court may only order otherwise as contemplated in subsection (1) or
(2), if the party who applied to the court to order otherwise,
in
addition proves on a balance probabilities that he or she will suffer
irreparable harm if the court does not so order and that
the other
party will not suffer irreparable harm if the court so orders”.
[20]
There are three requirements that must be met by an applicant who
seeks the operation and execution of an
order despite the pending
application for leave to appeal or an appeal. The applicant must
establish the exceptional circumstances;
that he or she will suffer
irreparable harm if the court does not so order; and that the other
party will not suffer irreparable
harm if the court so orders.
Further the prospects of success of the appeal are to be considered.
The test for the granting of
a suspension of an order under s 18 is
stringent.
[21]
In
University
of the Free State v Afriforum and Another
[5]
the court said:
“
It
is further apparent that the requirements introduced by ss 18(1) and
(3) are more onerous than those of the common law. Apart
from the
requirement of ‘exceptional circumstances’ in s 18(1), s
18(3) requires the applicant ‘in addition to
prove on a balance
of probabilities that he or she ‘will suffer irreparable harm
if the order is not made, and that the other
party ‘will not’
suffer irreparable harm if the order is made. The application of rule
49(11) required a weighing-up
of the potentiality of the irreparable
harm or prejudice being sustained by the respective parties and where
there was a potentiality
of harm or prejudice to both of the parties,
a weighing-up of the balance of hardship or convenience, as the case
may be, was required.
Section 18(3), however, has introduced a higher
threshold, namely proof on a balance of probabilities that the
applicant will suffer
irreparable harm if the order is not granted
and conversely that the respondent will not, if the order is
granted”.
[22]
The appeal before us is to be decided based on the requirements of s
18(3), which places a heavy onus on
the applicant who must establish
the three requirements I have already mentioned above. Several case
laws have defined exceptional
circumstances as something
extraordinary and must also be truly to justify the deviation.
Dorothy’s application for deviation
is centred around her
performance bonus. It will be prudent to deal with the circumstances
that led to Dorothy instituting her
urgent application as it will
give a better perspective to determine whether the requirements of s
18 have been met.
[23]
Dorothy was placed on precautionary suspension 25
th
November 2025. Paragraph 6.1.6 of the resolution taken by the council
of the municipality in placing her on precautionary suspension
reads
as follows:
“
That
the suspension is with full pay and shall continue until the
finalisation of the investigation and
any
possible disciplinary hearing
. Council
however reserves the right to recall the Chief Financial Officer to
report for duty prior to the expiry of the disciplinary
action should
the circumstances require that she be called”.
[24]
The court of second instance in its judgment has held that the
municipality has filed an application for
leave to appeal against the
order that it had granted on 8
th
June 2026 which in effect
means the municipality who has by all accounts, having acted
unlawfully and disregarded the rule of law
must benefit from such
conduct (which conduct it had pronounced on its unlawfulness) cannot
and should not be countenanced. The
wording of the resolution placing
Dorothy on precautionary suspension, extend the suspension beyond the
investigation. This is
distinguishable from the Tshabalala matter
which the precautionary suspension was limited to the finalisation of
the investigations.
Therefore, on merits the municipality is having
an arguable case whether the suspension automatically lapsed on 24
th
February 2026, or as per the resolution the suspension was extended
beyond the 24
th
February 2026. That resolution has not
been challenged or set aside. It therefore remains valid and
enforceable. Whether the resolution
is in conflict with the
regulations, is not for this court to determine but may be properly
ventilated during the main appeal.
[25]
The court of second instance in its judgment has found that the
failure of the disciplinary hearing to commence
within 3 months was
that in each instance the disciplinary hearing did not commence was
not attributable to Dorothy. Further that
it was at the
municipality’s evidence leader’s insistence that the
interpretation of clause 10(4)(a) of the use of
the word
‘representative’ exclusively meant a legal
representative, thereby necessitating the directive to file a formal
application. What the court of second instance had overlooked is
regulation 8(2)(e) which provides as follows:
“
the
right to appoint a representative of his or her choice, who may be a
fellow staff member, shop steward, union official or any
other
suitably qualified person”.
[26]
The word ‘representative’ in regulation 10(4)(a) has
therefore been derived and explained in
regulation 8(2)(e) as to who
is a representative. Except for any other suitably qualified person,
the people who might represent
an affected employee is not
contentious. It has not been explained as who will be regarded as
suitably qualified person, and it
might result in many
interpretations. The municipality was within its right to give it the
interpretation it had given, and it
will be unfair to blame them for
that. The chairperson of the disciplinary hearing could also not be
blamed for having requested
the parties to submit formal submissions
and thereafter postponed the matter to a specific date which was
still within the 3 months
period.
[27]
The postponement was caused by Dorothy for bringing a representative
whose credentials was subject to a challenge.
She was served with a
notice to attend the disciplinary hearing on 30
th
January
2026, and she knew that she wanted to be represented by someone who
was neither fellow staff member, shop steward or union
official. As a
senior employee of the municipality, she should have forseen that
since Mr Mphahlele was not a legal representative,
his suitability to
represent her might be challenged. The least she could have done was
to have notified the municipality in advance
to enable them to decide
what to do.
[28]
The court of second instance had also found that the evidence leader
had handed Dorothy a bundle of documents
on the day of the hearing
which contained about 800 pages which was the cause of the
postponement of the hearing of the 9
th
February 2026. He
further blamed the municipality that it was the cause of the
postponement on 23
rd
February 2026 for having changed the
venue without consulting or agreeing with Dorothy. However, what he
overlooked is that on
the 10
th
February 2026 after receipt
of the notification to change the venue, Dorothy did not object to
that but waited until the date of
the hearing on 23
rd
February 2026 when she for the first time objected.
[29]
This makes her case distinguishable from the Makgata’s case. In
Makagata’s case, he had objected
to the hearing been held at
SALGA’s offices per a letter through his attorneys immediately
on receipt of the notice. It was
his employer who insisted on the
hearing proceeding at the SALGA’s offices in Polokwane also
warning him that should he not
attend, the hearing might proceed in
his absence. His employer was not taken by surprise like what Dorothy
did to the municipality.
Dorothy by bringing Mr Mphahlele without
first notifying the municipality and not objecting in advance of the
change of venue despite
been notified well in advance, was a well
calculated move to drag the hearing beyond the 3 months period. She
cannot complain about
been furnished with an 800 pages of bundle of
documents on the date of hearing, whilst she at the same time,
despite been notified
of the change of venue well in advance keeps
quiet and waited to raise it on the date of the hearing. On these
grounds, her case
is not distinguishable from the Memani case. It
will not be correct to allow her to benefit from the conduct which
she had engineered.
The municipality is therefore having a fairly
good chance of prospects of success in the main appeal.
[30]
From the findings of the judgment of the court of second instance, it
is evident that the issues of exceptional
circumstances and
irreparable harm are intertwined as they are all based on Dorothy’s
performance bonus. Counsel for Dorothy
has submitted that the
Tshabalala and Makgata cases are the only authority that can be
relied upon by this court, as it directly
deals with the very
specific exceptional circumstances raised by Dorothy in her s 18(3)
application. It is correct that both cases
referred by counsel for
Dorothy deals with the issue performance bonus which both have found
it to amount to exceptional circumstances.
However, both cases are
distinguishable from Dorothy’s matter.
[31]
Despite what I have stated as a distinguishable feature in paragraph
24 regarding Tshabalala’s case,
there are further
distinguishable features. Tshabalala was suspended on 3
rd
March 2024 which was with effect from 1
st
March 2024. He
was served with a notice to attend the disciplinary hearing on 31
st
May 2024 which was a day on which the 3 months suspension period was
expiring. Dorothy was served with the notice to attend the
disciplinary well in advance before the expiry of the suspension
period. Tshabalala first appearance date was on 13
th
June
2024 which fell outside the 3 months suspension period. Dorothy’s
two appearance dates were still within the 3 months
suspension
period. Even on 13
th
June 2024 Tshabalala matter could not
proceed as it was not yet ripe for hearing and was postponed to 1
st
and 2
nd
August 2024. The delay was in no way
associated to Tshabalala.
[32] In
Dorothy’s matter the municipality was ready to read the charges
to Dorothy on their first appearance
on 9
th
February 2024
and second appearance on 23
rd
February 2024. However, on
both dates the hearing could not proceed due to the actions of
Dorothy who brought Mr Mphahlele to represent
her without prior
notification to the municipality well knowing that he was neither
fellow staff member, shop steward, union official
or legal
representative. It was therefore not given that Mr Mphahlele will be
automatically allowed to represent her as his suitability
might be
questioned. It was therefore upon Dorothy to have notified the
municipality in advance to enable it to decide what to
do well in
advance. Even the postponement of the 23
rd
February 2026
was a result of the last-minute objection by Dorothy without
forewarning the municipality of what she intended to
do. All these in
my view, were calculated moves by Dorothy to delay the municipality
in reading charges to her well knowing that
it was to her benefit and
advantage as the 3 months period will lapse without the municipality
having read the charges to her.
[33] In
Memani
case at para 43 and 44 the Court said:
“
[43]
This brings into sharp focus the question whether an employee can
still rely on the failure to have that charges read on the
date a
disciplinary enquiry that was scheduled to commence, when the enquiry
is postponed at the request of the employee, to argue
that the
enquiry could no longer proceed on the postponed date. The time
limits in the regulation are, at least to the benefit
of the employee
to prevent the employer dragging out disciplinary proceedings as
Mgengo and Tshabalala held. In this instance the
applicant
effectively asked that the hearing should not commence within the
three month-month period. In fact the parties agreed
to a set of
dates in February 2026, well outside the period.
[44]
In my view it would be an absurd reading of the regulations that when
an employee, for whose benefit a time limit exists for
an employer to
act, requests a postponement which would have the effect that the
time limit would be exceeded, could argue that
despite asking for the
commencement of the enquiry to be delayed, they can turn around and
argue that having obtained that concession,
the employer cannot
proceed on the date they had agreed to. This effectively amounts to a
party blowing hot and cold”.
[34]
The municipality was ready to read the charges on 9
th
February 2026, however Dorothy brought Mr Mphahlele and also
complained of the 800 pages bundle of documents. However, when she
saw that the municipality was violating regulations in the change of
venue to Polokwane, instead of alerting it in advance, she
kept quiet
until the last hour as it was to her benefit and advantage. She
cannot complain of been given the bundle of documents
late, whilst
she at the same time does not timeously object to the change of venue
to prevent the delay of the charges been read
to her.
[35] In
the same way that the time limits in the regulations are meant to
benefit the employee to prevent the
employer dragging out the
proceedings, must also protect the employer from the employee from
applying tactics that prevent charges
been read to her/him within the
3 months period. For one to qualify for performance bonus must be
assessed on the actual work done.
This will therefore entail an
employee been physically present at the workplace or physically doing
the work. The entitlement to
performance bonus under certain
circumstances might amount to exceptional circumstances. However, in
my view, it will be for employees
who did not intentionally engineer
the situation to benefit them.
[36]
Dorothy is the one who had engineered the proceedings to drag beyond
the 3 months period without the charges
been read to her and should
therefore not be permitted to benefit from her own strategy. Dorothy
is therefore in my view blowing
hot and cold, and taking into
consideration that the municipality had a fairly good chance of
prospects of success in the main
appeal, Dorothy has not demonstrated
exceptional circumstances warranting an order that the execution and
operation of the order
of 8
th
June 2026 not to be
suspended pending the municipality’s application for leave to
appeal or appeal. It follows that the appeal
stands to be upheld. The
are no reasons why costs which is inclusive of the employment of 2
counsel should be awarded to the appellants.
[37] In
the result the following order is made:
1.The
appeal is upheld with costs on party and party scale B, including the
costs of two counsel.
2.
The order of the court of second instance is set aside and
substituted with the following:
‘
The
application to enforce the order of 8
th
June 2026 is dismissed with costs on party and party scale B’.
KGANYAGO J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
I
AGREE
NAUDE-ONDENDAAL J
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA, LIMPOPO
DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
I
AGREE
BURNETT AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH
AFRICA, LIMPOPO DIVISION,
POLOKWANE
APPEARANCES:
Counsel
for the appellants
: Adv E Seima SC &
Adv L Nkoana
Instructed
by
:
NJ Morero Inc Attorneys
Counsel
for the respondent
: Adv F Marx
Instructed
by
: CH Zeelie Attorneys
Date
heard
:
9
th
September 2026
Electronically
circulated on
: 16
th
September 2026
[1]
10 of 2013
[2]
[2026] ZALCCT 51
[3]
[2024] ZALAC 60
[4]
[2025] ZALMPPHC 246
[5]
[2016] ZASCA 165
at para 10