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IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE DIVISION, CAPE TOWN)
JUDGMENT
Not Reportable
Case No: 2026-214642
In the matter between:
CAPE PENINSULA UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY Applicant
and
PETER OWEN N.O. First Respondent
PERTUNIA NKUNA Second Respondent
SOUTH AFRICAN DENTAL TECHNICIANS COUNCIL Third Respondent
THE MINISTER OF HEALTH Fourth Respondent
Neutral Citation : CPUT v Peter Owen N.O. and Others Case No 2026-214642
[2026] ZAWCHC (15-09-2026)
Corum : MAPOMA, AJ
Date heard : 10 September 2026
Date of Judgment : 15 September 2026
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Summary: Urgent application for interim interdict - the Cape Peninsula University of
Technology (CPUT) seeking to interdict and restrain the South African Dental
Technicians Council from requesting consent from the Minister of Health, and the latter
from granting consent for the suspension of the CPUT’s Bachelor of Health Science
(BHSc) in Dental Technology programme pending a review in the Gauteng Division -
Council invited to CPUT to make representations why the programme should not be
suspended pending fulfilment of the conditions of accreditation – CPUT refusing to
make representation insisting that the Council has already made up its mind to suspend
the programme - Whether the application is urgent – whether the CPUT would not
receive substantial redress at a hearing in due course – interim interdict against public
power also considered.- whether the requirements for interim relief have been met.
ORDER
1. The application for interim interdict in Part A of the application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is liable for costs on a party and party scale in Part A of the
application, which costs include costs attendant to the employment of two counsel.
JUDGMENT
MAPOMA, AJ
[1] This is an application brought on an urgent basis in terms of rule 6 (12) (a) of the
Uniform Rules of Court. The Cape Peninsula University of Technology (“the CPUT”
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or “the applicant”), seeks in Part A an interim interdict restraining the South African
Dental Technicians Council (“the Council” or “the third respondent”) from making a
request to the Minister of Health (“the Minister” or “the fourth respondent”) for
approval of suspension of the CPUT’s Bachelor of Health Science (BHS c) in Dental
Technology programme (“the programme” ), pending the final determination of the
university’s review application in the Gauteng Division, Pretoria and final
determination of Part B of this application. The CPUT also seeks interim relief
restraining the Minister from approving the suspension of the programme pending the
outcome of the said review proceedings.
[2] In Part B of this application, the CPUT seeks a declarator that the Special Meeting
of the Council on 6 August 2026 and its decision to notify the CPUT of its intention to
request a ministerial consent for the suspension of the programme is unlawful and
unconstitutional, and that the decision be reviewed and set aside. In the pending review
application that is serving at the Gauteng Division, the CPUT and its two sister
universities of technology, Tshwane University of Technology (TUT) and the Durban
University of Technology (DUT) seek to review the accreditation criteria of the Council
for the programme in question. These review applications are not before Court for
determination, but only Part A is, that is, the interim interdict for the status quo to prevail
pending the finalisation of both review applications.
[3] The application is opposed by the respondents on the basis of lack of urgency of
the matter, as well as absence of merits that justify the relief sought. On the merits, the
respondents contend that this Court lacks the jurisdiction to entertain the matter on the
basis that it is essentially an interlocutory application in a pending application in another
division, Gauteng. It is argued that this matter is justifiable only in the Gauteng division
division, Gauteng. It is argued that this matter is justifiable only in the Gauteng division
unless there are compelling reason s to deviate. According to the respondents, no such
reasons have been advanced by the applicant.
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[4] Another point taken by the respondents, which cuts through the urgency and merits
of this application , is the contention that the applicant seeks this Court to interdict a
procedural process of a public regulatory body that is underway and not finalised. To
fortify their argument, the respondents contend that no decision has been or is about to
be taken to suspend the programme because the Council intends requesting the Minister
to consent to the suspension.
[5] Further contention is that the applicants have failed to take reasonable steps as
required by section 40 of the Inter-Governmental Relations Framework Act 13 of 2005,
which enjoins all organs of state to make efforts to avoid inter -governmental disputes
without resorting to judicial proceedings. The last contention that the applicant has
failed to satisfy is the standard requirements for the granting of the interim interdict.
The thrust of this argument finds reliance on the aforementioned contention o f the
prematurity of this application. What follows are the brief relevant background facts
leading up to these proceedings.
Relevant background facts
[6] The CPUT is one of the three universities of technology 1 that offer the BHSc
degree programme in Dental Technology . The Council is the regulatory body
established in terms of the Dental Technicians Act 19 of 1979 (“the Act”) to regulate
the professions of dental technicians and dental technologists in the country, and to
protect the interests of the public. The programme is offered upon the accreditation and
approval of the Council in terms of the Act.
1 The other two Universities of Technology that offer the programme are the Tshwane University of Technology (the
TUT) and the Durban University of Technology (the DUT).
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[7] The CPUT would operate the dental technology laboratory located at the S arleh
Dollie Building, Tyge rberg Hospital at Parow , under lease with the Provincial
Department of Health. For the laboratory to operate lawfully, it has to be accredited and
registered by the Council in terms of the Act.
[8] On 11 December 2 020, the CPUT was granted by the Council conditional
accreditation for the first year of the programme subject to CPUT submitting the
remainder of the required documentation by the end of the first quarter of 2021.
[9] During May 2025, upon the expiry of its lease at the Tygerberg Hospital, the CPUT
relocated its D epartment of Dental Science and dental laboratory facilities from the
Tygerberg Campus to the newly acquired building at the Tyger Valley Campus. This
relocation process required occupancy certifications and due inspection, accreditation
and registration of the new laboratory by the Council to comply with the requirements
for accreditation. It would appear that delays occurred in the acquisition of all the
requisite certificates from various authorities , that include the City of Cape Town for
the laboratory to meet the compliance requirements, resulting in disagreement between
the CPUT and the Council on temporary measures that would ensure continuous
learning of the students.
[10] On 26 March 2026, the Council issued a media statement to the effect that the
CPUT dental technology programme was suspended based on its reasons, without
indicating whether the minister had consented to the suspension. Subsequently, it turned
out that the minister had consented to the suspension of the programme. This led to
student instability at the CPUT, which necessitated an urgent application by the CPUT
to suspend the ministerial consent to the suspension of the programme.
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[11] On 5 June 2026, the Honourable Justice Sher granted the CPUT an interim order
suspending the minister’s consent to the suspension of the programme pending the final
determination of the review of the ministerial consent in Part B of that application. This
was followed by a letter dated 21 July 2026 from the State Attorne y proposing the
withdrawal of the review application on the basis that the minister had since withdrawn
his consent to the suspension of the programme.
[12] On 11 August 2026, the CPUT received a notice from the Council, informing it of
the Council’s intention to request the minister to give consent for the Council ’s
suspension of its approval of the programme to the CPUT until the latter meets the
conditions of accreditation that had been prescribed by the Council. This is what gave
rise to the CPUT’s concern, which caused it to approach the Court for the relief it seeks.
[13] In the suspension notice, the Council alleged that the CPUT had failed to comply
with the conditions of accreditation of 2020, so much so that the requisite documentation
was largely approved only in 2023. The cited reasons for the intended request for the
Minister’s consent to the suspension of the programme are the alleged CPUT’s failure
to meet the conditions of accreditation.
[14] The stated accreditation conditions were that the CPUT’s new laboratories were to
be approved by the Council, and that the CPUT should no longer graduate students who
could not be simultaneously registered with the Council. The university was given 30
days to make representations to the Council as to why its temporary accreditation of the
programme should not be suspended. In the notice, the Council informed the university
that the Council would consider the reasons advanced by the CPUT ‘with an open mind’
before making a request to the minister for the suspension.
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[15] On 14 August 2026, the CPUT attorneys responded to the Council’s suspension
notice by requesting the Council’s October 2025 accreditation report and resolution of
14 August 2026 . In its request for information, the CPUT contended that it would be
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the Council’s suspension notice if it was not
provided with that information. The C ouncil subsequently availed the requested
information to the CPUT on 18 August 2026. This was followed by a letter from the
CPUT’s attorneys demanding the Council’s retraction of the suspension notice by no
later than 21 August 2026 , failing that, the CPUT would pursue this application. The
Council refused to accede to the CPUT demand, hence this application.
Jurisdictional Challenge
[16] While the respondents have taken a point challenging the jurisdiction of this Court
to entertain the matter based on the above stated grounds, I do not consider this point to
be enjoying merit for jurisdictional bar . In National Gambling Board v Premier of
KwaZulu Natal and Others, 2 the Constitution al Court held that at common law the
court’s jurisdiction to entertain an application for an interim interdict depends on
whether it has jurisdiction to preserve or restore the status quo and does not depend on
whether it has jurisdiction to decide on the main dispute. The court went on to state that
a court that does not have jurisdiction in the main dispute will simply determine whether
the applicant has a prima facie right to the relief which is to be sought in the court having
jurisdiction to deal with it.
[17] The applicant seeks an interim relief for the preservation of the status quo in this
division pending the final determination of the review application at another court. I am
therefore satisfied that this Court has the necessary jurisdiction to determine the
application at hand, which for interim relief for preservation of the status quo in Part A
application at hand, which for interim relief for preservation of the status quo in Part A
2 (CCT32/01) [2001] ZACC 8; 2002 (2) BCLR 156; 2002 920 SA 715 (21 December 2001) at para 50 to 53
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of the application. The main dispute remains a matter for determination at the Gauteng
Division.
Issues
[18] In light of the above background facts, the issues for determination by this Court
are two-fold. The first is whether this application for interim interdict is urgent. If the
answer is in the negative, that is the end of the matter, for the application will fall to be
struck off the roll, unless the Court exercises its discretion otherwise . If, however, the
answer is in the affirmative, the second issue will arise, namely, whether the applicant
has made out a case for the interim relief sought.
Urgency
[19] The test for urgency is whether the applicant cannot be able to obtain substantial
redress at the hearing in due course. In deciding this question, the court is requi red to
consider the nature of the harm to be averted, the circumstances in which it arises and
whether a hearing in the ordinary course would afford an effective remedy.3
[20] In East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite ( Pty) Ltd
and Others,4 the court stated as follows:
“The question of whether a matter is sufficiently urgent… is underpinned by the issue of absence of
substantial redress in an application in due course. The rules allow the court to come to the
assistance of a litigant because if the latter were to wait for the normal course laid down by the rules
it will not obtain substantial redress. The rules require absence of substantial redress.”
[21] The CPUT submits that i t will not have substantial redress at a hearing in due
course, in that it will not be afforded effective relief in the form of an interdict pendente
3 Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edm) Bpk v Makin 1977 (4) SA 135 (W)
4 (11/33767) [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 (23 September 2011) at paragraph [6]
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lite as it would have to wait for a hearing some months to come to get relief , for that
will be too late . This submission is fortified by the CPUT ’s view that, based on i ts
previous experience, the Council has already made up its mind to suspend the
programme. It is argued that the status quo must be preserved through the interim
interdict until this issue is determined in the pending review application in the Gauteng
Division.
[22] Essentially, CPUT’s contention is that the process the Council is pursuing by the
notice is simply to take them through the motions. To buttress its view that the Council
has made up its mind to suspend the programme , the CPUT submits that there is clear
and indisputable evidence to that effect. This, according to the CPUT is based on the
media statement of 26 March 2026, where the Council announced that the programme
had been suspended for the same reasons that it is advancing in the suspension.
[23] The respondents argue the contrary, contending that the matter is not sufficiently
urgent to warrant its enrolment as an urgent application in terms of rule 6(12)(a) of the
Uniform Rules of Court. In this regard, the respondent takes issue with the fact that the
CPUT was given 30 days’ notice on 1 1 August 2026 to make representation s to the
Council, subsequent to which it required an accreditation report to prepare for
representation, which it was provided with. But it instead waited until the last day of the
notice to launch this application on 9 September 2026. On this basis, t he respondents
argued that the urgency is self-created.
[24] In essence, t he applicant’s claimed source of urgency is the apprehended
suspension of the programme and the impact of that eventuality on the students and the
reputation of the institution. In my view, this apprehension is misplaced. On the facts,
the Council has not made any decision to suspend the programme. What the Council
the Council has not made any decision to suspend the programme. What the Council
has done is to invite the CPUT to make representations, which it stated it will consider
fairly with an open mind before deciding to approach the minister for consent for the
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suspension of the programme. Even if the Council were to decide to suspend the
programme, the Council would first request consent of the minister. The CPUT would
have its audience with the Minister.
[25] It is trite that an applica tion that is said to be urgent must be brought as soon as
possible; failing that, a cogent explanation must be advanced to the court for any delay
in bringing the application.5 On the facts, the delay in approaching this Court only on 9
September 2026 is not explained at all. On its own version, the CPUT’s concern arose
on 11 August 2026 when they received the Council’s notice of its intention to seek
ministerial permission, and giving CPUT an opportunity to make representations as to
why that should be done. The CPUT did not take that opportunity despite having been
supplied on 18 August 2026 with information it requested to enable it to respond to the
notice. Instead of making representations to the Council as invited, on 19 August 2026,
the CPUT demanded retraction of the suspension notice by 21 August 2026, which was
subsequently refused.
[26] In Stock v and Another v Minister of Housing and Another,6 it was held that where
an applicant seeks compliance from the respondent before launching an application, it
cannot be said that the applicant had been delayed in bringing the application or that the
agency is self -created. On the facts of this case , given that the stance of the Council
regarding its suspension notice was clearly articulated, I am not persuaded that it was
reasonably expected that this position would change. Thus, t he letter demanding
retraction of the notice was simply a formality and dilatory in the circumstances.
[27] In this case, I find that the delay is attributable to some attempts by the CPUT to
resolve the matter and ameliorate the legal proceedings. Instead, what is clear is that the
5 Shivambu v Chairperson for the Joint Committee of Ethics and Members Interests (unreported, WCC Case No
22223/23 dated 1 February 2024) at paragraph [33]
6 2007 (2) SA 9 (C) 12I-13A
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CPUT spent the notice period gathering information to litigate instead of complying
with the lawful regulatory process of a statutory body. As such, the delay cannot be
justified by the sudden urgency of the matter. In my view, the conduct bears the
attributes of a self-created urgency.
[28] In the circumstances, I am not persuaded that the application meets the threshold
of urgency, and ordinarily the matter should be struck from the roll. However, it is a
well-established principle that in pronouncing on the issue of urgency, the court
exercises a wide discretion.7 This matter was fully ventilated by the parties, and it is in
the interests of justice that I deal with the merits of the application so as to reach finality.
The Test for Interim Interdict
[29] The test for the granting of interim interdict is trite. It is whether the four
requirements, which are well established Setlogelo v Setlogelo ,8 are met . These
requirements, all of which must be met, are: a) a prima facie right, even if open to some
doubt, b) a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not
granted and ultimate relief is eventually granted; c) that the balance of convenience
favours the granting of the interim relief; and, d) that the applicant has no other adequate
or satisfactory remedy. The above requirements were refined in Webster v Mitchell.9
[30] In International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty)
Ltd,10 the Constitutional Court held that where the court is seized with an application
for interim interdict that would restrain the exercise of public power, the court can only
grant such in the clearest of cases. The court, per Moseneke DJP, remarked:
7 Cornerstone Logistics (Pty) Ltd v Zacpak Cape Town Depot (Pty) Ltd [2022] 2 All SA 13 (SCA) st paragraph [19]
8 1914 AD 221
9 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W) at 1189
10 International Trade Administration Commission v SCAW South Africa (Pty) Ltd 2012 (4) SA 618 (CC) at paragraph
[101]
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“When a court is invited to intrude into the terrain of the executive, especially when the executive
decision-making process is still uncompleted, it must do so only in the clearest of cases and only
when irreparable harm is likely to ensue if interdictory relief is not granted...”
[31] The statutory powers of the Council are derived from section 4 of the Act, which
gives the Council powers to, with the consent of the Minister, suspend any programme
if it does not meet the conditions of approval it has imposed . Section 4(e) of the Act
provides:
“4 The Council may:
(e) Approve training institutions in accordance with the prescribed conditions, inspect such
institutions, and withdraw or suspend the approval of any such institution if the education
or training provided at such institution is, in the opinion of the council, not satisfactory, or
if any condition imposed in respect of the approval of such institution is not complied with:
Provided that the council shall not without the consent of the Minister refuse to approve any
such institution, or withdraw or suspend the approval thereof”
Prima facie right
[32] In National Treasury and Others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and
Others (OUTA,)11 the Constitutional Court held that prima facie right for the purpose of
the grant of interim relief is a right to which, if not protected by an interdict, irreparable
harm would ensue.12 The court made it clear that a mere right to administrative action
that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair as provided for in section 33 of the
Constitution, read with PAJA, is not enough to satisfy the requirement of a prima facie
right to interim interdict pending review of the impugned decision.
[33] The CPUT avers that it has a prima facie right of access to courts and a fair hearing
of the review applications. It claims that those rights are undermined and threatened by
the Council’s suspension notice, which has been issued for alleged non-compliance with
the Council’s suspension notice, which has been issued for alleged non-compliance with
11 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at paragraph [45]
12 2012 (6) SA 223 (CC at paragraph [50]
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conditions of accreditation whose legality it challenges in the review. In light of the
OUTA principle mentioned above.
[34] The suspension notice is initiating a regulatory consultative process in terms of the
statute. In this regard, the Council, in exercise of its statutory powers, simply notified
of its intention to request the consent of the Minister and invited the CPUT to engage.
The CPUT has no prima facie right to refuse to participate in a statutory process of the
Council, in performance of its regulatory functions.
[35] Moreover, t he suspension notice does not cause any irreparable harm to the
CPUT’s right to be heard in the pending review at the Gauteng Division , nor does it in
any way undermine the review proceedings . This is so because the Council is not
suspending the programme, nor is the minister consenting to the suspension. Thus, even
of the review application succeeds, no irreversible harm will be suffered by the CPUT,
for the regulatory process of engagement to find solution s for the accreditation of the
programme will still be required.
Irreparable harm
[36] In this case, th e CPUT’s apprehended harm is the suspension of the programme ,
based on the suspension notice the CPUT received from Council . It avers that it will
suffer irreparable harm if the interim relief interdict is not granted and it ultimately
succeeds in the review application.
[37] On the facts before the Court, the suspension notice is not per se does not mean
that suspension shall occur. The apprehended harm can only arise, if at all it does, after
the minister consents to the suspension. That apprehended eventuality is neither certain
nor imminent, for it can only occur at the tail end of the two- staged process and once
the minister consents to the suspension of the programme . Essentially, the Council is
initiating a process of engagement with the CPUT.
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[38] I find no harm to the CPUT for participating in the statutory process, for its
participation by making representations to the Council will not mean that it is complicit
to what it challenges in the review proceedings. If anything, it will help enrich the
perspective of the Council, by providing reasonable alternatives to the suspension of the
programme. The CPUT will be afforded an opportunity to be heard in both Council's
and later the Ministers’ decision -making stages. The outcome of these stages will
depend largely on the representations made by the CPUT.
[39] That process, which might not even result in the need for the ministerial consent,
let alone the consent itself, has just started and is far from being finalised for it to cause
alarm requiring this Court’s urgent intervention. The first stage is the consideration of
the CPUT representations against the suspension. The second, which depends largely
on the outcome of the Council’s consideration of the CPUT representations, is the
ultimate consent by the Minister which, in my view, is far from imminent.
[40] In my view, one has to be mindful that the Council’s previous approach in March
2026 was flawed, in that it did not give audience to the CPUT before suspending the
programme and announcing the decision to the media. This time, the Council is making
amends by following the due process; hence it invites the CPUT to make representations
to it before it decides to request the consent of the Minister for the suspension of the
programme.
[41] Thus, th e argument that the Council has made up its mind to suspend the
programme is not sustainable. It is not backed by facts. It is simply based on suspicion
against the regulatory body of professionals and cannot be countenanced. It cannot be,
that just because the Council has in the past failed to follow the process before making
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its decision, the refore it is disqualified from executing its regulatory functions,
following the correct process.
Balance of Convenience
[42] For the applicant to succeed, the balance of convenience must be in favour of the
grant of the interim relief. The court must weigh the prejudice the applicant will suffer
if the interim order is not granted against the harm the respondent will suffer if it is
granted, bearing in mind the wider public interest and the underlying principles of the
democratic society.
[43] Based on the above findings, the Court has to balance the irreparable harm to be
suffered by the applicant against the restraint of public power. In terms of the OUTA
principle, the court can interfere only in the clearest of cases. In my view , for reasons
stated above, this case does not meet the threshold of the clearest of cases to justify the
Court’s intervention, more so on an urgent basis. The balance of convenience is
therefore not in favour of granting the interdictory relief.
No alternative adequate
[44] In light of the Court’s finding above, th e Court’s view is that the CPUT’s
alternative remedy to the relief sought is clear. It lies in the CPUT’s participation in the
Council’s statutory process, by making representations against the suspension of the
programme and proposing plausible alternative solutions.
Conclusion
[45] In conclusion, having considered all the relevant facts and the law in this matter,
my view is that the requirements for granting the interim relief sought have not been
met. It follows that the application must fail.
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Costs
[46] Regarding costs, the Court finds no grounds to deviate from the general rule that
costs follow the result. The respondents are therefore entitled to costs on the party and
party scale, including costs attendant to the employment of two counsel.
[47] In the result, the following order is made.
1. The application for interim relief in Part A of the application is dismissed.
2. The applicant is liable for costs of Part A of the application on party and party
scale, which costs include costs attendant to the employment of two counsel.
_______________________
ZL MAPOMA
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
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Appearances
Counsel for the Applicant : Adv S Magardie
Instructed by : Cheadle Thompson and Haysom Inc,
Johannesburg
Counsel for the Respondents : Adv V Notshe SC
Adv N Loopoo
Instructed by : State Attorney, Pretoria, c/o Ward Brink
Attorneys, Cape Town