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[2026] ZALCC 42
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Lambrechts N.O and Others v Booysen and Others (163/2023) [2026] ZALCC 42 (27 August 2026)
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IN
THE LAND COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
HELD AT RANDBURG
CASE
NO: LCC 163/2023
Before:
MALULEKE AJ
Heard
on: 2 JULY 2026
Delivered
on: 27 AUGUST 2026
(1)
REPORTABLE: Yes☐/ No ☒
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes☐ / No ☒
(3)
REVISED: Yes ☐ / No ☒
Date:
24 August 2026
In
the matter between:
CHARLES
JOHANNES LAMBRECHTS N.O
.
First Applicant
CHARLES
JOHANNES LAMBRECHTS N.O.
Second Applicant
HIGHLANDS
NIGHT INVESTMENT 108 CC
Third Applicant
and
PIET
BOOYSEN
First Respondent
JOHANNA
DE
JONGH
Second Respondent
PATRICK
DE
JONGH
Third Respondent
ADAM
DE
JONGH
Fourth Respondent
ALL
OTHER PERSONS RESIDING WITH OR
Fifth Respondent
UNDER THE FIRST TO THE
FOURTH RESPONDENT
IN THE PREMISES ON
VERGENOEGD FARM,
WORCESTER, WESTERN
CAPE PROVINCE
BREEDE
VALLEY MUNICIPALITY
Sixth Respondent
PROVINCIAL
DIRECTOR OF THE DEPARTMENT
Seventh Respondent
OF AGRICULTURE, LAND
REFORM AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT
ORDER
1.
The application for leave to appeal is dismissed.
2.
There is no order as to costs.
JUDGMENT
MALULEKE AJ
Introduction
[1]
This is an application for leave to appeal against part of the
judgment and order of this Court delivered on 4 May 2026
[1]
.
The application is brought by the Applicants in the main application.
I will continue to refer to the parties as I did in the
main
judgment.
[2]
The Applicants seek leave to appeal against paragraph 3 of the order,
in terms of which the application for the eviction
of the Second to
Fifth Respondents was dismissed. No appeal is sought against
paragraphs 1, 2 and 4 of the order.
[3]
The application is brought in terms of section 31(3) of the Land
Court Act 6 of 2023, read with
section 17(1)
of the
Superior Courts
Act 10 of 2013
. The Applicants contend that the proposed appeal would
have a reasonable prospect of success and, alternatively, that some
other
compelling reason exists why the appeal should be heard.
[4]
The application is founded upon six grounds of appeal directed
principally at the interpretation and application of the
Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 ("ESTA"), the Court's
findings concerning the termination of the rights
of residence of the
Second to Fifth Respondents, the findings concerning service and
receipt of the pre-litigation notices, the
refusal of default
eviction against the Third and Fourth Respondents, the Fourth
Respondent's alleged non-residence, and the application
of the
Plascon-Evans rule. The Applicants rely, in the alternative, on the
existence of some other compelling reason why the appeal
should be
heard.
Applicable
Legal Principles
[5]
This application is governed by section 31(3) of the Land Court Act 6
of 2023, read with
section 17(1)
of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of
2013
. Leave to appeal may be granted only where the Court is of the
opinion that the proposed appeal would have a reasonable prospect
of
success, or where there is some other compelling reason why the
appeal should be heard.
[6]
The use of the word "would" in
section 17
signifies a
heightened threshold for leave to appeal. It is no longer sufficient
that another court might come to a different conclusion.
The Court
must be satisfied that there is a realistic prospect that another
court would do so.
[2]
The
enquiry requires an objective assessment of the grounds advanced.
[7]
In undertaking that assessment, the Court does not determine the
appeal itself, nor is the enquiry whether every aspect
of the
reasoning in the principal judgment is beyond criticism. The Court is
required to consider the application dispassionately
with reference
to the facts and the law.
[3]
The
question is whether the Applicants have demonstrated a basis upon
which an appellate court could reasonably interfere with
the order
granted.
[8]
The Applicants also rely on the existence of some other
compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, within
the meaning
of
section 17(1)(a)(ii).
That enquiry is distinct from the enquiry
into reasonable prospects of success and will be considered after the
individual grounds
of appeal have been examined.
The grounds of appeal
[9]
I turn now to address the grounds of appeal.
This application
is not a rehearing of the eviction proceedings. The Court's enquiry
is confined to the statutory threshold for
leave to appeal.
Ground
1: The application of
Klaase
and the lawful ground
for terminating the independent rights of residence
[10]
The first ground concerns the Court's reliance on
Klaase and
Another v van der Merwe NO and Others
[2016] ZACC 17
("
Klaase
"). The Applicants contend that the Court
misapplied
Klaase
by treating the termination of the
First Respondent's employment as incapable, in law, of constituting a
ground for the separate
termination of the residence rights of the
Second to Fifth Respondents.
[11]
The Applicants' argument proceeds from the proposition
that
Klaase
does not preclude the termination of the
rights of residence of other household members merely because those
rights were acquired
independently of the employee's right. They
submit that occupiers whose consent arose through the effluxion of
time under
sections 3(4)
and
3
(5) may have that consent terminated on
a ground common to the household, provided that each occupier's right
of residence is separately
terminated on a lawful ground and the
requirements of
section 8
are otherwise satisfied.
[12]
The principal judgment did not hold that the termination of the First
Respondent's employment could never be relevant
to the residence
rights of other occupiers. Its finding was that the Second to Fifth
Respondents were occupiers in their own right,
and that the
Applicants had not established a lawful ground for terminating their
rights of residence merely by relying on the
termination of the First
Respondent's employment.
[13]
The authorities referred to by the Applicants do not support the
Applicants contention:
13.1
Klaase
establishes that an occupier whose right of
residence is independently recognised under ESTA cannot be treated as
a merely
derivative occupier whose right automatically terminates
upon the termination of another occupier's employment.
13.2
In
Misty Cliffs Farm (Pty) Ltd and Another v Christoffels and
Others
(LanC28/2025)
[2025] ZALCC 34
, the Land Court
established that family members or other co-occupiers who acquire an
independent right of residence through the
statutory presumptions of
long-term occupation (the effluxion of time under
sections 3(4)
and
3
(5) of the
Extension of Security of Tenure Act – ESTA
) hold
rights separate from an employee's service agreement. Consequently,
their residency cannot be terminated automatically upon
the dismissal
or termination of the main employee's contract, and any eviction
process against them requires independent, procedurally
and
substantively fair termination under
section 8
of ESTA.
13.3 In
Van Der Merwe N.O and Others v Stoffels and Others (2025/032788)
[2025]
ZALCC 44
(
Stoffels
) similarly emphasise
that the right of each occupier must be considered on its own legal
and factual basis. They do not, however,
establish that a particular
event affecting one occupier can never constitute a lawful ground for
terminating the independent right
of another occupier.
13.4
Belle Vallee Vineyards (Pty) Ltd and Another v Lakey and Others
(LanC15/2025)
[2025] ZALCC 27
(
Belle
) did not establish
principles regarding independent rights of residence acquired through
the effluxion of time under
sections 3(4)
and
3
(5) of ESTA. The Court
in paragraph
[148] said: “
Disputes
about eviction are often messy. This case is no different. Neither
party is all in the right or all in the wrong. Courts
must weigh
competing facts and try to reach a just outcome. Here, justice and
equity require that the Occupiers leave Soetendal
and find a new home
somewhere else
.”
Therefore,
Belle
does not, establish an unqualified proposition that the
termination of one occupier's employment constitutes a lawful ground
for
terminating the independent rights of residence of other
occupiers.
[14]
The question for present purposes is not whether another court might
adopt a different formulation of the relationship
between employment
and residence under ESTA. The question is whether the Applicants have
demonstrated a reasonable prospect that
an Appellate Court would
conclude that this Court erred in finding that the termination of the
First Respondent's employment did
not, on the facts of this matter,
constitute a lawful ground for terminating the independent rights of
residence of the Second
to Fifth Respondents.
[15]
In these circumstances, the Applicants have not demonstrated that the
principal judgment misapplied
Klaase
in a manner
that gives rise to a reasonable prospect of success on appeal. The
judgment did not treat the rights of the Second
to Fifth Respondents
as incapable, in principle, of termination. It recognised that their
rights had to be considered independently
and concluded that the
Applicants had not established a lawful ground for terminating those
rights merely by relying on the termination
of the First Respondent's
employment. The Applicants' disagreement with that conclusion does
not, without more, establish the threshold
contemplated by
section
17(1)(a)(i).
Ground
2: Failure to conduct an individualised
section 8(1)
enquiry
[16]
The second ground concerns the Applicants' contention that the Court
failed to conduct the individualised enquiry required
by
section 8(1)
of ESTA in respect of the Second to Fifth Respondents before
concluding that their rights of residence could not be terminated.
[17]
In the absence of an established lawful ground for termination, an
enquiry into whether termination would nevertheless
be just and
equitable could not provide the Applicants with a lawful basis for
obtaining an eviction order.
[4]
The Applicants have therefore not demonstrated that the absence of a
separate
section 8(1)
enquiry, in the circumstances of this case,
gives rise to a reasonable prospect that an appellate court would
interfere with the
order.
[18]
In the circumstances, Ground 2 does not establish a reasonable
prospect of success. The Applicants have not demonstrated
that the
Court erred in requiring the termination of the right of residence of
each occupier to be considered separately.
[5]
Their contention effectively treats the termination of the First
Respondent's employment as determinative of the rights of the
other
occupiers, without identifying a legal basis for doing so. The fact
that the occupiers resided on the same property, or that
their
residence may have had some factual connection with the First
Respondent, did not dispense with the requirement to establish
the
lawful ground for termination of each individual right of residence.
[19]
The Applicants have therefore not demonstrated a sound and rational
basis upon which another court would reasonably be
expected to reach
a different conclusion.
Ground
3: Service and receipt of the pre-litigation notices
[20]
The third ground concerns the Court's finding that receipt of the
pre-litigation notices by the Third and Fourth Respondents
had not
been established. The Applicants contend that the representations
notice and the subsequent termination notice were addressed
to the
individual occupiers, that the Sheriff's returns recorded service,
and that receipt of the notices was in any event confirmed
in the
answering affidavit.
[21]
The Applicants rely, inter alia, on the Sheriff's returns as
demonstrating that the notices were served upon the individual
respondents. The four individual returns record service in respect of
the First to Fourth Respondents respectively. The return
relating to
the First Respondent records personal service upon him, as does the
return relating to the Second Respondent. The return
relating to the
Third Respondent likewise records personal service upon him. In
respect of the Fourth Respondent, however, the
return records that
the notice was served upon the First Respondent at the Fourth
Respondent's residence because the Fourth Respondent
was temporarily
absent.
[22]
The Applicants further rely on the references to “we” and
“our” in the First Respondent's answering
affidavit,
particularly the statement in paragraph 16 of the Answering
Affidavit, that “we confirm receiving the termination
notices
dated 20 July 2023”. They contend that Mr Booysen deposed to
the answering affidavit on behalf of the household as
a whole and
that the use of the plural therefore constitutes an admission of
receipt by the other respondents.
[23]
That contention is not supported by the manner in which the matter
was defended. At the commencement of the hearing,
Legal Aid South
Africa, which represented the First, Second and Fifth Respondents,
expressly informed the Court that it had no
instructions to represent
the Third and Fourth Respondents. In those circumstances, the use of
the plural pronoun by the First
Respondent cannot, without more, be
treated as an admission made on behalf of the Third and Fourth
Respondents or as establishing
that they personally received the
notices.
[24]
The distinction is material. The question was not whether the First
Respondent received the notices, nor whether he understood
the
notices to concern the rights of the occupants of the residence. The
question was whether the Applicants established compliance
with
section 8(1)(e)
in respect of each occupier whose right of residence
they sought to terminate. In the absence of an indication that the
First Respondent
was authorised to speak on behalf of the Third and
Fourth Respondents, his collective reference to “we” does
not, on
its own, establish their receipt of the notices.
[25]
There is, moreover, a further difficulty with the Applicants'
reliance on service and receipt of the notices. Even if
it were
accepted, for purposes of argument, that the Third and Fourth
Respondents received the notices and were afforded the opportunity
contemplated by
section 8(1)(e)
, that would establish only the
procedural component of the enquiry under
section 8(1).
It would not
establish that the Applicants had a lawful ground upon which to
terminate the independent rights of residence of those
occupiers. As
already explained under Ground 1, procedural fairness cannot cure the
absence of a lawful ground for termination.
[26]
Ground 3 does not establish a reasonable prospect of success. Their
reliance principally on the termination of the First
Respondent's
employment could not, without more, constitute a lawful ground for
terminating the independent rights of residence
of the other
occupiers. The Applicants cannot, on appeal, cure that difficulty by
inviting the Court to construct separate enquiries
or grounds of
termination which were not established in the proceedings below.
There is accordingly no sound and rational basis
for concluding that
another court would reasonably reach a different conclusion.
Ground
4: Refusal of default eviction against the third and fourth
respondents
[27]
Ground 4 concerns the refusal of default eviction against the Third
and Fourth Respondents. The Applicants contend
that these
respondents did not oppose the eviction application and that the
Court therefore erred in refusing to grant eviction
orders against
them. Their argument is, in substance, that the absence of opposition
entitled the Applicants to default relief,
particularly because the
Third and Fourth Respondents had not placed evidence before the Court
challenging the Applicants' case.
[28]
It is correct that the absence of opposing evidence from the Third
and Fourth Respondents left the Applicants' evidence
substantially
unanswered. That circumstance was relevant to the Court's assessment
of the Applicants' case. It did not, however,
convert the Applicants'
allegations into proof of every statutory requirement for eviction.
The Court was still required to determine,
on the evidence before it,
whether the Applicants had established the lawful ground for
termination of the particular right of
residence of each respondent
and whether the requirements for eviction under ESTA had been
satisfied.
[29]
The Applicants' reliance on default does not alter this conclusion.
Default may permit a court to determine an application
on the
evidence placed before it, and the absence of opposition may result
in the allegations contained in the founding papers
standing largely
unanswered. It does not, however, compel the Court to grant relief
which the Applicants have not established to
be competent in law. In
proceedings under ESTA, the Court retains an obligation to determine
whether the statutory requirements
for eviction have been satisfied
in respect of the particular occupier concerned.
[30]
The Applicants have accordingly not demonstrated a reasonable
prospect that another court would conclude that the refusal
of
default eviction against the Third and Fourth Respondents constituted
a material error warranting appellate interference. The
Applicants'
complaint therefore amounts, in substance, to disagreement with the
manner in which the Court exercised its judicial
function on the
evidence and the applicable statutory framework, rather than
demonstrating a reasonable prospect that another court
would reach a
different conclusion.
[31]
Ground 4 does not establish a reasonable prospect of success. The
Applicants have not demonstrated that the Court materially
erred in
refusing to grant default eviction against the Third and Fourth
Respondents. The Applicants have accordingly not identified
a sound
and rational basis upon which another court would reasonably be
expected to reach a different conclusion.
Ground
5: The fourth respondent's non-residence
[32]
Ground 5 concerns the Fourth Respondent's alleged non-residence on
the farm. The Applicants contend that the Court erred
in requiring
them to initiate a separate process to terminate the Fourth
Respondent's right of residence merely because he had
previously been
allocated a separate residence during his employment. They contend
that the evidence established that the Fourth
Respondent had
voluntarily relocated from the farm to Riebeek-Kasteel in or about
March 2022, however he had left his belongings
in the residence that
was allocated to him personally, and the Applicants moved those
belongings to the First Respondent's residence.
The Applicants also
indicated that the Fourth Respondent was incarcerated. On that basis,
they submit that he was no longer an
occupier as defined in
section 1
of ESTA and that no separate eviction process was required in respect
of him, however, they are applying for his eviction on the
basis of
the termination of the First Respondent’s employment.
[33]
Ground 5, accordingly there is no reasonable prospect that an
appellate court would set aside the order on this ground.
Ground
6: The application of the Plascon-Evans Rule
[34]
Ground 6 concerns the application of the
Plascon-Evans
rule.
The Applicants accept that the Court correctly identified the rule
in
Plascon-Evans
, but contend that it failed to apply the
qualification articulated in
Wightman t/a JW Construction v
Headfour (Pty) Ltd and Another
, namely that a real, genuine and
bona fide dispute of fact does not arise from a bare denial or an
unsubstantiated assertion. They
submit that none of the factual
disputes identified by the Court was sufficiently genuine to preclude
the granting of final relief
and that, properly applying
Wightman
,
the Applicants’ version stood effectively uncontradicted on the
material issues.
[35]
When the four categories of alleged factual disputes identified by
the Applicants are considered in their proper context,
none
demonstrates a material misapplication of the
Plascon-Evans
rule.
The dispute concerning the housing agreement did not determine the
independent rights of residence of the Second, Third
and Fourth
Respondents; the status of those respondents as ESTA occupiers did
not determine whether their respective rights of
residence were
lawfully terminable; the existence of an RDP house did not, without
more, establish suitable alternative accommodation;
and the receipt
of notices did not establish the lawful termination of the particular
rights of residence. The alleged disputes
therefore do not
demonstrate that a different application of
Plascon-Evans
would
have produced a different result.
[36]
I accordingly conclude that the Applicants have not demonstrated that
the principal judgment misapplied the
Plascon-Evans
rule
or the qualification articulated in
Wightman
in a
manner giving rise to a realistic prospect of appellate interference.
Compelling
Reasons:
Section 17(1)(a)(ii)
[37]
The absence of a reasonable prospect of success does not, however,
dispose of the application for leave to appeal. Having
considered the
six grounds advanced by the Applicants, I turn to the second basis
upon which leave to appeal may be granted.
Section 17(1)(a)(ii)
of
the
Superior Courts Act provides
for leave where there is “some
other compelling reason why the appeal should be heard, including
conflicting judgments on
the matter under consideration”.
[38]
The Applicants argue, in the alternative, that compelling
reasons exist for leave to be granted. They contend that such
a
compelling reason exists because the Land Court is presently
delivering inconsistent decisions on the proper approach to the
eviction of household members whose right of residence is linked to
the employment of another household member, and on the
inter-relationship
between
sections 3(4)/(5)
and
section 8
of ESTA.
Cases pointing in different directions include
Visser and Another
v Marthinus and
Others
(LCC 178/2022)
[2023] ZALCC 10
,
Belle Vallée Vineyards
(Pty) Ltd v Lakey and Others
[2025] ZALCC 27
,
Misty Cliffs Farm
(Pty) Ltd and Another v
Christoffels and Others
[2025] ZALCC 34
,
Van Der Merwe N.O.
and Others v Stoffels and Others
[2025] ZALCC 44
and
Maluleke
N.O. v Sibanyoni and Others
(LCC 2018/59) [2020] ZALCC. The
judgment under appeal stands at the more restrictive end of that
spectrum and creates a precedent
that a
section 3(4)/(5)
right is not
terminable so long as the owner has no “
further connection”
with the occupier. Clarification by the Supreme Court of Appeal
(“SCA”) is required to ensure legal certainty and
uniformity.
[39]
The Applicants further contend that the judgment is at odds with
binding higher court authority. That the judgment is,
with respect,
in tension with the principles articulated in
Klaase
v Van der Merwe N.O.
[6]
,
Baron v
Claytile
[7]
,
Nederburg
Wines (Pty) Ltd v Nero
(SCA),
[8]
Sterklewies
(Pty)
Ltd v
Msimanga
[9]
,
and
Aquarius
Platinum
(SA)
(Pty) Ltd v Bonene.
[10]
The SCA's intervention is required to settle the proper application
of those authorities at first-instance level.
[40]
Some of the authorities referred to by the Applicants,
Klaase and
Another, Misty Cliffs, Van Der Merwe and Belle Vallee
have been
discussed in paragraph 13 and it is clear that the decisions taken
depended on the facts of each case and none of them
establish the
principle argued by the Applicants.
[41]
Visser v Marthinus
likewise does not establish that the
termination of one occupier’s employment is, without more, a
lawful ground for terminating
another occupier’s independent
right. In that matter the Court recognised the wife, daughter and
children as occupiers in
their own right and subjected their rights
to the enquiry under
section 8(1).
The fact that they had remained on
the farm for approximately ten years after dismissal and that the
relationship with the owner
had broken down formed part of the
factual setting in which the Court concluded that termination was
just and equitable. The decision
accordingly demonstrates that an
independent right may be terminated; it does not establish the
proposition for which the Applicants
contend.
[42]
The authorities, however, do not establish two competing
rules, one holding that the termination of an employee’s
employment automatically provides a lawful ground for terminating the
independent right of a household member, and the other holding
that
it can never do so. Rather, they demonstrate the importance of first
identifying the source and nature of the particular occupier’s
right of residence and then determining whether the ground relied
upon constitutes a lawful ground for terminating that particular
right.
[43]
This distinction also answers the Applicants’ proposed
question concerning the owner’s burden where the
grounds of
residence of individual occupiers overlap. The fact that the
circumstances giving rise to different occupiers’
residence
overlap does not make their rights identical. Once the Court finds
that the occupiers possess independent rights, the
owner must
establish the lawful basis for terminating each such right. This does
not necessarily mean that the factual event relied
upon must always
be different. A single event could conceivably constitute a lawful
ground applicable to more than one independent
occupier. The owner
must nevertheless demonstrate why that event constitutes a lawful
ground for terminating each particular right.
[44]
The Applicants’ formulation of the first proposed
question—whether a deemed right under
sections 3(4)
and
3
(5)
can be terminated “in the absence of a continuing
employment-related nexus”—also reverses the statutory
enquiry.
The question is not simply whether an employment nexus
continues to exist. The question is what lawful ground has been
established
for terminating the particular occupier’s
independent right of residence.
[45]
That is the distinction applicable to the present matter. The Court
found that the Second to Fourth Respondents were
occupiers in their
own right. The question was therefore whether their respective rights
of residence had been lawfully terminated.
The termination of the
First Respondent's employment was capable of providing the basis for
terminating his own employment-related
right of residence. It did
not, without establishing the legal connection between that event and
the independent rights of the
other respondents, establish the lawful
ground for termination of those rights. The Applicants' reliance upon
the same event as
the basis for all the terminations therefore did
not dispense with the requirement to establish a lawful ground in
respect of each
right.
[46]
I accordingly accept that the issue is an important and developing
one. I am, however, not persuaded that the authorities
disclose
conflicting judgments on the precise question that determined the
order under appeal. Nor does the present matter, on
the case actually
pleaded and litigated, raise a discrete unresolved question of law
requiring authoritative determination independently
of those facts.
The apparent differences between the decisions are substantially
explained by the different factual and juridical
bases upon which the
relevant rights of residence were established. The Applicants have
therefore not established, on this basis,
a compelling reason within
the meaning of
section 17(1)(a)(ii).
[47]
No compelling reason exists. The application therefore does not
satisfy either of the alternative requirements in
section 17(1)(a)
of
the
Superior Courts Act.
>
Conclusion
[48]
In these circumstances, leave to appeal is not warranted and must be
refused.
Order
[48]
Accordingly, I make the following order:
1. The application for
leave to appeal is dismissed.
2. There is no order as
to costs.
J
MALULEKE
Acting Judge of the
Land Court
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicants:
ADV. ADRIAAN MONTZINGER
Instructed
by:
OTTO THERON ATTORNEYS INC
For the First, Second and
Fifth Respondents: LEGAL AID SOUTH AFRICA
Instructed by: LEGAL AID
SOUTH AFRICA
[1]
Lambrechts
NO and Others v Booysen and Others
(LCC163/2023)
[2026] ZALCC 20
(4 May 2026).
[2]
In
The
Mont Chevaux Trust v Goosen and others
[2014] ZALCC 20
, 2014 JDR
2325 (LCC) para 6.
Bertelsmann
J (in an
obiter
dictum
)
held that: ‘It is clear that the threshold for granting leave
to appeal against a judgment of a High Court has been raised
in the
new Act. The former test whether leave to appeal should be granted
was a reasonable prospect that another court might
come to a
different conclusion, see
Van
Heerden v Cronwright & Others
1985 (2) SA 342
(T) at 343H. The use of the word “would” in the new
statute indicates a measure of certainty that another court will
differ from the court whose judgment is sought to be appealed
against.’
[3]
Minister
of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others v South African
Litigation Centre and Others 2016 (3) SA 317 (SCA).
[4]
Maluleke
N.O. v Sibanyoni and Others (1012/2020) [2022] ZASCA 40.
[5]
Van Der
Merwe N.O and Others v Stoffels and Others (2025/032788)
[2025]
ZALCC
44
.
[6]
Klaase
and Another v van der Merwe NO and Others
[2016]
ZACC 17.
[7]
Baron and Others v Claytile and Another 2017 (5) SA 329 (CC).
[8]
Nederburg Wines (Pty) Ltd v Nero and Others (1084/17) [2018] ZASCA
119.
[9]
Sterklewies
(Pty)
Ltd v
Msimanga
2012 (5) SA 392 (SCA).
[10]
Aquarius
Platinum
(SA)
(Pty) Ltd v Bonene
[2020] 2 All SA 323
(SCA).