IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Case No: 2026-126328
In the matter between:
THE NATIONAL FREEDOM PARTY APPLICANT
and
CYNTHIA MBALI SHINGA FIRST
RESPONDENT
THE SPEAKER OF KWAZULU-NATAL PROVINCIAL
LEGISLATURE SECOND
RESPONDENT
ZWELI ZAKWE N.O THIRD
RESPONDENT
MUNTU SITHOLE N.O FOURTH RESPONDENT
IVAN ROWAN BARNES FIFTH
RESPONDENT
2
____________________________________________________________________
ORDER
____________________________________________________________________
A
1. That this application be heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12) of the
Uniform Rules of Court, and that condonation be and is hereby granted for the
applicant’s non -compliance with the forms, time limits and service for in the
Rules.
2. Declaring that the interim relief granted by this Honourable Court per Her
Ladyship Justice Siwendu on 19 June 2026 in this matter has lapsed and is of
no further force or effect, the appeal of the first respondent to the National
Working Committee of the applicant having been determined on 4 and 5 July
2026.
3. Directing the second respondent to give effect to the applicant’s letter dated 6
July 2026 addressed to the second respondent in terms of Section 106 (3)(c) of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and to do all things
necessary to declare vacant the seat held by the first respondent in the KwaZulu -
Natal Provincial Legislature.
4. Directing the second respondent to do all things necessary to act in compliance
with Rule 14 of the Standing Rules of the KwaZulu -Natal Provincial Legislature,
including the publication of, and the swearing in of the next candidate on the
applicant’s reviewed party list.
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5. Directing that the first and second respondents, jointly and severally, the one
paying the other to be absolved, to pay costs including the costs of two Counsel
where so employed on Scale C.
B.
1. The first respondent’s application for declaratory relief with interim relief is struck
off roll due to lack of urgency.
2. The first respondent is to pay costs including the costs of two Counsel where so
employed on Scale C.
C
1. The first respondent’s counter application for an interim relief pending the
outcome of the review application is struck off roll due to lack of urgency.
2. The first respondent is to pay costs including the costs of two Counsel where so
employed on Scale C.
_____________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________
Mngadi J
[1] The applicant seeks an order that an interdict granted against it suspending the
expulsion of the first respondent as its member pending the outcome of an internal
appeal has fallen away since the appeal has been disposed of. The first respondent
opposes the application and, if it is so found, counter applies that she has a right of a
further internal appeal and that pending that further appeal or review of the decision to
expel her the decision to expel her be suspended. The applicant opposes the co unter
application. The other cited parties have not taken part in the litigation, the second
respondent filing a notice to abide.
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[2] The applicant is the National Freedom Party (the NFP), a registered political party
and voluntary association capable of suing and being sued in its own name registered in
terms of the Electoral Act 73 of 1998. The first respondent is Cynthia Mbali Shinga, an
adult female. Bar her expulsion, a member of the applicant nominated by the applicant
to and serving as member of the KwaZulu -Natal Legislature and member of the
Executive Council for Social Development in the Legislature. The second respondent is
the Speaker of the KwaZulu -Natal Provincial Legislature (the Speaker) elected in terms
of Section 111 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (the Constitution).
The third respondent is Zweli Zakwe N. O. a legal practitioner who practices as an
advocate of the High Court cited as an interested party for his role in the internal
disciplinary process a gainst the first respondent, and no relief is sought against him.
The fourth respondent is Muntu Sithole N.O. a legal practi tioner practicing as an
advocate cited as an interested party in his role in the internal disciplinary process and
no relief is sought against him. The fifth respondent is Ivan Barnes an adult male and
the President of the NFP.
[3] The first respondent on 3 June 2026 instituted an urgent application seeking an
interim relief against the NFP and the Speaker suspending her expulsion as a member
of the NFP pending the exhaustion of her internal appeal remedy and review. The NFP
opposed the application. On 19 June 2026 the court per Siwendu J granted the relief
as per the court order referred to hereunder. Pursuant to the court order , the NFP
convened its National Executive Committee (NEC) which resolved that the first
respondent’s appeal would be heard by the National Working Committee (NWC) . On
22 June 2026 the first respondent was informed that her appeal would be heard by the
NWC on 4 and 5 July 2026.
NWC on 4 and 5 July 2026.
[4] On 4 July 2026 the first respondent attended the meeting of the NWC. However,
she left before the meeting could deal with her appeal. When it was learnt that the first
respondent had left, she was advised that since she had left, her appeal would be held
on 5 July 2026. On 5 July 2026 at 9 h07 the first respondent advised the NWC that she
would not attend the appeal hearing due to prior personal commitments.
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[5] The NWC resolved to proceed to hear the appeal in the absence of the first
respondent. It dealt with the appeal and took a decision to dismiss the appeal and to
confirm the first respondent’s expulsion. The NFP advised the first respondent and the
Speaker of the appeal decision. On 9 July 2026 the Speaker advised the NFP that it
had received contradictory accounts from the NFP and the first respondent as to
whether a valid appeal had taken place, she could not determine the position with
certainty, a certainty that could only be pronounce upon by a court of law, and that she
therefore remains interdicted and that status quo remains. As a result, the first
respondent remained the member of the Provincial Legislature and a member of the
Provincial Executive Council creating an untenable position for the NFP.
[6] The first respondent in her answering affida vit as grounds for opposing the
application states as follows:
1. She was advised and it is evident that her appeal was dismissed on the basis that she
had waived it. She had not waived her appeal. She lodged the appeal through the
office of the Secretary General of the NFP . When the matter was heard in court on 19
June 2026, she had already lodged an appeal with NWC against the decision of the third
respondent. She in addition attended the appeal hearing on 4 July 2026 but the
applicant decided not to entertain her . She was available to attend the appeal hearing
on 5 July 2026 after 14H00
2. The NWC was not properly constituted when it took the decision on 5 July 2026. It was
loaded with fifth respondent’s loyalists . The fifth respondent removed all those persons
he viewed as being not in his corner, to wit, Mthembu, Mkhabela, Mhlongo, Thuba and
others. The fifth respondent has systematically removed all those people who have
expressed support for her stance. As evident from the minutes , the NWC discussions
were dominated by persons who were complainants . A person who was a witness in
were dominated by persons who were complainants . A person who was a witness in
the enquiry one Sibiya was a t the forefront of leading t he discussion. The NWC
discussions as evident from the minutes were dominated by NEC members whereas the
fifth respondent stated in a sworn affidavit that the NEC decided to refer the matter to the
third respondent because it did not want to be involved in the matter. Forty-six (46)
members attended the NWC on 4 July 2026. Ten of the 46 were not supposed to be
6
part of the NWC as they were appointed to represent structures of the party instead of
being ellected by those structures.
3. The NWC as evident from the minutes made no attempt at all to deal with her grounds of
appeal and the unlawfulness of the decision taken by the third respondent. The NWC
failed to take into account the relevant consideration.
4. The NEC as it had decided not to involve itself in the matter as it would be conflicted, it
erred to refer the appeal to the NWC whereas the appeal had been lodged with the
NWC. The NWC should have met and take a decision whether it would hear the appeal
or it would refer it to the National General Council (GNC).
5. The NWC erred to deal with appeal in the absence of the first respondent. The first
respondent after she was advised of the date of the hearing of the appeal requested to
be furnished with further information relating to the coming appeal but that was refused.
The first respondent was only advised o f the venue of the appeal hearing few days
before the date of hearing which resulted in the person to represent her at the hearing
not being available. The appeal hearing on 4 July 2026 was scheduled to start at
14H00. The first respondent arrived at the venue at 14H15. She was caused to wait
and at 16H40 she left after sending a WhatsApp message at 16H23 to which there was
no response that it was very cold in the area and what was happening. It was at 17H15
when she received a message enquiring where she was as the NWC was ready to deal
with her matter to which she responded that she had left the venue. In the evening on 4
July 2026, she received a letter advising her she was given an extended opportunity to
appear before the NWC on 5 July 2026 at 09H00 and the NWC would sit until 11H00.
She responded by a WhatsApp message stating that the rescheduling was unilateral
and it was not suitable to her she had a preplanned family responsibility/activity. The
and it was not suitable to her she had a preplanned family responsibility/activity. The
NWC on same date advised her that they were dealing with the matter, and she would
be informed of the final decision. On 6 July 2026 she was advised that the NWC took a
decision to expel her from the NFP and she had no further right to appeal.
[7] The first respondent in the counter application , delivered under Uniform Rule 6(7)
on 23 July 2026, seeks relief in the following terms:
1. It is declared that the first respondent has a right of appeal to the National General
Conference of the applicant.
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2. It is declared that the membership of the applicant is extant until such time that she has
exhausted her remedy of an appeal to the National General Conference.
3. The applicant’s General National Conference is directed to deal with the applicant’s
appeal when it sits in terms of the applicant’s Constitution.
4. ALTERNATIVELY, to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 above, that pending the final determination
of the review application: 4.1 the decision of the applicant to expel the first respondent
as a member is suspended; 4.2 the second respondent is directed not to give effect to
the decision to expel the applicant and/or remove her as a member of the KwaZulu-Natal
Provincial Legislature.
5. The applicant is directed to pay the costs of the counter-application and such costs to
include the costs of employment of two Counsel jointly with any other respondent who
opposes this counter application.’
[8] The first respondent in support of her contention that she has a further right of
appeal refers to the provisions of the Constitution of the NFP. She says that it provides
that a member who is dissa tisfied with the decision of the District Tribunal may appeal
to the Provincial Executive Committee and subsequently to the National Executive
Committee, and the final arbiter shall be the National Council. She refers to Clause
4.2.14.3 which states that the General Conference shall have the functions and powers
to overturn any decision made by any structure or office bearer within the NFP including
decisions made by the N EC and NWC as well as decisions made by the autonomous
structure of the NFP . Clause 3.6.1.3 provides that the membership of the party shall
end when a member is expelled from the party after the finalization of a disciplinary
hearing and all subsequent appeals.
[9] The applicant in the opposing/replying to affidavit states as follows. Firstly, the
Speaker in terms of Rule 14 of the Standing Rules of the KwaZulu -Natal Provincial
Speaker in terms of Rule 14 of the Standing Rules of the KwaZulu -Natal Provincial
Legislature and section 106( 3)(c) of the Constitution is obliged once the political party
has notified her that a member no longer represents the political party to carry out the
removal of the particular member from being a member of the provincial legislature. It is
not for the Speaker to adjudicate the fairness or lawfulness of the process or decision to
terminate the membership of the member by the party. The said issues are for a review
court. Secondly, the order of Siwendu J referred to an appeal either by the National
8
Working Committee or the General Council as the NFP could determine. The NEC as
provided in the Constitution of the NFP directed that the appeal be dealt with by the
NWC. Thirdly, in terms of clause 15 .11. 13 a member holding office at District ,
Provincial or National level shall be brought before the Disciplinary Tribunal constituted
by the National Executive Committee. In terms of clause 5.2.6.2 ( j) the NEC is
empowered, subject to the Constitution, to take decisions binding on all Party structures
concerning, amongst other things, membership and discipline. Clause 15.11.13
provides: Members who hold office from the level of the District , Province and National levels
shall be brought before the Disciplinary Tribunal constituted by the National Executive
committee. They can only appeal to the National Working Committee.’ The General National
Conference is not an appeal body and there is no procedure in the Constitution
regulating referring to and dealing of appeal s by the General National Conference.
Fourthly, the first respondent between 22 June 2026 and 4 July 2026 did not indicate
that the dates set for the appeal hearing were not suitable to her. On 4 July 2026,
having attended the venue for the appeal hearing, she was asked to wait but left on her
own without notifying or seeking leave to leave. She failed to attend on 5 July 2026 a
date prior arranged with her citing prior commitments. She thus waived her right to
prosecute her appeal before the NWC. Nevertheless, the NWC considered the report
and the findings of the disciplinary hearing . It found that the finding of guilty and the
sanction imposed were appropriate and lawful as evident from the record of the
proceedings. Fifthly, Clause 5.1.1 provides that the NWC shall consist of no more than
100 members constituted as follows. Seventeen (17) members of the NEC, fourty (40)
members elected directly at the Elective National Conference, twenty(20) members
members elected directly at the Elective National Conference, twenty(20) members
appointed by the President of the Party, all Chairpersons of the Provincial Executive
Committee, the National Secretary of the Women’s Movement and five (5) additional
members of the Women’s Movement , the National Secretary of the Youth Movement
and five (5) additional members of the Youth Movement, and the National Secretary of
the Student ’s Movement and one (1) additional member of the Student’s Movement.
The Constitution does not limit additional members to elected members, they may be
nominated. The NWC takes decisions by the majority of those in attendance . The
NWC at the relevant time had 57 members.
9
[10] The applicant contends that the applica tion is urgent because the Speaker ,
despite it having determined the first respondent ’s appeal which has the effect that the
interdictory relief in Siwendu J’s order falls away, contends that she remains interdicted
in terms of the Siwendu J order. The first respondent’s response is that since the
applicant either did not deal with her appeal or did not deal with her appeal properly
there is urgency in the matter. The issue, in my view, is whether Siwendu J’s order
was complied with or not. Before Siwendu J it was the first respondent who
contended that whether her expulsion from the NFP could be put into effect or not was
an urgent matter between her, the applicant and the Speaker. This issue of urgency
flows from the issue s creating urgency before Siwendu J . The issue is akin to
contempt of court proceedings by the alleged failure to comply with a court order which
proceedings are generally regarded as urgent. The dispute results in the NFP finding
itself in an untenable position. The first respondent occupies her position by virtue of
her membership of the NFP. The NFP, the members of the NFP and the persons who
voted for it are entitled at all times to have public representatives properly mandated to
represent them. Therefore, I find that the application is urgent.
[11] The starting point is to look at the order of Siwendu J ’s order . It states as
follows: It is ordered:
1. The application is hereby heard as an urgent application within the meaning of Rule 6(12 )
and that any non-compliance within the forms and service of or the full -time limits set out in the
Rules be and is hereby condoned.
2. That pending the determination of the appeal by the National Working Committee,
alternatively, the General National Conference of the National Freedom Party, which the NFP
may determine as it deems fit, the following orders are made:
may determine as it deems fit, the following orders are made:
2.1 the second respondent is interdicted from giving effect to NFP ’s letter purporting to remove
the applicant as the member of the first respondent in the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature;
2.2 the second respondent is further interdicted from performing any act which will have the
effect of removing the applicant as a member of the first respondent its sole member in the
KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature;
2.3 the decision of the third respondent be and is hereby suspended;
10
2.4 in the event of the second respondent having acted on the request of the first respondent,
the second respondent is directed to restore the status quo ante and reverse any action
calculated to remove the applicant as the sole member of the first respondent in the Legislature.
3. That if the National Working Committee, alternatively, the General National Conference of
the National Freedom Party does not ent ertain the appeal by applicant, then and in that event,
the following orders shall be made:
3.1 That, pending the determination of the applicant’s review application to be brought by the
applicant within 15 days of the date of this order , alternatively, the date when the NFP signifies
its intention not to entertain the applicant’s appeal to the NWC or the NGC as the case may be:
3.1.1 the second respondent is interdicted from removing the applicant as a member of the first
respondent and its sole member in the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature;
3.1.2 the decision of the third respondent be and is hereby suspended;
3.1.3 in the event of the second respondent having acted on the request of the first respondent,
she is directed to reverse the decision to remove the applicant as the sole member of the first
respondent in the Legislature.
4. The costs of the application shall be reserved for determination in the at the instance of any
party (on such papers as may be supplemented) alternatively, in the review contemplated in
paragraph 3 above.
[12] The court order is construed in the same way as any other document; according to
the language used, read in context and having regard to the apparent purpose to which
it is directed ( Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA
593 (SCA) at [18]). The meaning of the court order is common cause between the
parties. It is para 2 of the order that is determinative of the dispute between the parties.
Compliance with paragraph 2 rendered the other paragraphs inapplicable. Paragraph
Compliance with paragraph 2 rendered the other paragraphs inapplicable. Paragraph
2 provides that the sub-paragraphs thereof were effective pending determination of the
appeal by the NWC or the General National Council. The sub-paraphs were temporary
and conditional. They were only of effect as long as the determination of the appeal
was pending. Its disposal resulted in the sub -paragraphs automatically falling away.
The rest of the terms of court order, to wit, paras 3 it never kicked in, if para 2 kicked in,
as they were alternative to para 2 . The first respondent’s case is not that para 2 of the
11
order never kicked in. Her contention is that the determination of her appeal as
envisaged in para 2 was flawed.
[13] The first respondent admits that the NWC of the NFP was convened for it to deal
with her internal appeal. It convened and it took the decision. The issue of whether it
was properly convened; whether the members that attended some of whom were not
supposed to attend it; whether it acted correctly to proceed to deal with her appeal ;
whether it deliberated correctly on the issue; etc are issues for decision of the review
court. The Speaker acknowledged that she was advised by the NFP that it had dealt
with the first respondent’s appeal as ordered by Siwendu J and dismissed the appeal
and it confirmed the expulsion of the first respondent as the member of the NFP. She
also confirmed that the first responde nt confirmed that the appeal hearing was
convened, and she confirmed the decision taken at the appeal hearing. The order of
Siwendu J paragraph 2 granted an interim interdict pending the determination of the
appeal by the NWC or the General National Conference. The determination of the
appeal meant that the interdictory relief fell away. The Speaker misdirected herself to
regard herself interdicted in terms of interdictory that had fallen away. The issue of
whether it is the NEC that referred the appeal to the NWC, and whether it was correct
for the NEC to do so, is of no moment because the appeal as per Siwendu J’s order
was heard by the NWC. The NWC was composed of serving members of the NWC
who were known to the first respondent and no objection was raised by the first
respondent to the appointment of any of them as member of the NWC or to the
participation of any member of the NWC in the appeal hearing. The NWC takes
decisions by the majority of those present , if the quorum requirement has been met,
which is understandable for a body of that size. If for any decision it is required that all
which is understandable for a body of that size. If for any decision it is required that all
members of the NWC must agree, the body will be unable to function. The NWC took
decisions by the majority vote. It is not enough to suggest that some of the members
might have been biased against the first respondent. It needs to be shown that the
NWC as a body was biased against the first respondent, which has not been shown.
[14] The first respondent seek s a declarator that she has a right to a further appeal to
the National General Conference. She relies on the clauses in the Constitution of the
12
NFP. The applicant contends that the first respondent has no right of further appeal. It
is not explained why the first respondent before Siwendu J did not seek to protect her
alleged right to a further appeal, in particular, because she contends that in terms of the
Constitution of the NFP she remains a member until her expulsion is confirmed by the
General National Conference.
[15] The applicant contends that the first respondent has exhausted her internal
appeal remedies. The Constitution of the NFP has no provisions regulating processing
of appeals by the General National Conference. It has no provision that a member has a
right to appeal to the General National Conference and how such appeals and within
what time frames must be lodged and processed. This indicates that although the
General National Conference can revisit and reconsider any decision taken by an officer
or structure of the Party, it is at the discretion of the General National Conference to do
so. There is no right of appeal to the General National Conference.
[16] The clause that provides that a member that has been expelled remains a
member until he or she has exhausted all internal appeal processes refers to instances
where the member has a right of appeal and has not made an appeal. The court
cannot grant to a member a right of appeal that is not found in the constitution and
prescripts of the voluntary association in the name of fairness and/or justice. The court
has a discretion whether to grant declaratory relief or not. It is accepted that the main
application and the counter application can be adjudicated pari passu, but that does not
relieve the party seeking relief in the counter application to establis h the necessary
requirements for the relief sought including urgency, if brought as an urgent application.
See Graham & Another v Law Society, Northern Provinces & Others 2016 (1) SA 279
(GP) para 38; Marais v Melck [2025] 1 All SA 422 (WCC) at para 51; Truter v Degenaar
(GP) para 38; Marais v Melck [2025] 1 All SA 422 (WCC) at para 51; Truter v Degenaar
1990 (1) SA 206 (T). The first respondent seeks declaratory relief without explaining
why the sought relief was not sought before Siwendu J . In addition, the first
respondent seeks declaratory relief to undermine the relief she obtained before
Siwendu J because the internal appeal was decided against her. The first respondent
by implication before Siwendu J effectively abandoned the right to claim interim relief
pending the decision of an appeal by the General National Conference. These are
13
strong factors indicating that the court’s discretion to grant the declaratory relief be
exercised against the first respondent. In Absa Bank Ltd v Naude NO and Others 2016
(6) SA 540 (SCA) it was held that a counter application , in truth, which is a defence to
the main application the court should decline to deal with it. The first respondent seeks
the declaratory as a back door appeal to the order of Siwendu J and to avoid the
consequences of that order, which should not be allowed (LexisNexis South Africa (Pty)
Ltd v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development [2025] ZASCA 181; 2026 (3)
SA 71 (SCA) at [22]. ) It is found that the declaratory relief sought by the first
respondent is not related to the order of Siwendu J and no urgency has been
established relating to that re lief. It is correct as argued by the applicant that the first
respondent seeks the declaratory relief as a final relief. She, however, has not stated
how she has met the requirements of a final relief , particularly, in an urgent application .
The application for declaratory relief is struck off roll due to lack of urgency.
[17] The first respondent was informed that the appeal was to be heard by the NWC as
she requested before Siwendu J. She did not indicate before the hearing of the appeal
her objection to the appeal being heard by the NWC. She too, as a senior member of
the NFP and member of the NEC knew the composition of the NWC and who were
members of the NWC but did not raise any objection to the composition of the NWC and
to any members of the NW C attending and taking part in the appeal hearing. The first
respondent did not exercise her right to attend the appeal hearing and to make her
input. There is no indication that the NWC did not consider the material that was before
the NWC. The first respondent admits that the appeal decision was taken by the
majority of the NWC that attended the hearing. The first respondent had legal
majority of the NWC that attended the hearing. The first respondent had legal
representation before Siwendu J, if prior to the appeal hearing, there were indications
that her appeal would not be dealt with properly , she could have interdicted the
proposed appeal hearing until her concerns were addressed.
[18] The first respondent to succeed with an interim interdict pending the review must
show an existence of clear right or a prima facie right though open to some doubt. The
prima facie right is constituted by the existence of reasonable prospects in the review .
The court has to evaluate the prospects of success in the review application . If there
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are such prospects of success the Court has a discretion whether to grant interim relief
in the form of a prohibitory interdict ( Ladychin Investments (Pty) Ltd v South African
National Roads Agency Ltd and Others 2001 (3) SA 344 (N) at 357C-D). The other
requirements in cases of interim relief are reasonable apprehension of harm or actual
harm, balance of convenience and absence of alternative relief. The first respondent
contends that she has in terms of the Constitution the right to have fair administrative
action which is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. She fails to state that her prima
facie would be established by an indication that there has been an infringement of her
right to an administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.
[19] The first respondent contends that reasonable apprehension of harm is
constituted by the threat to remove her as a member of the Provincial Legislature. It
would be harm if her removal based on her expulsion as member of the NFP is likely to
be found to be as a result of an unlawful expulsion. The first respondent contends that
she has good prospects of success in the application for review. The first respondent
at the hearing confirmed that she had just issued the review application. The applicant
had not answered the review application. As a result, it shall not be proper to deal with
the grounds of review as set out in the review application. The grounds of review as set
out in the first respondents’ answering affidavit have been referred to. I shall refrain
from expressing a firm view on the grounds of review stated by the first respondent
except to say that taken with the applicant’s response, in my view, it has not been
shown that the first respondent has reasonable prospects of success on review of the
NWC appeal decision. This finding has the effect that the first respondent has not
shown on the preponderance of probabilities the existence of a prima facie right
shown on the preponderance of probabilities the existence of a prima facie right
although subject to some doubt , let alone a clear right . This makes it unnecessary to
consider whether the other requirements of interim interdict have been established.
[20] The Speaker has clear statutory duties. It is not for the Speaker to be satisfied
that the appeal was determined in a fair process or not, nor to determine whether the
result of the appeal was fair or not. Once she has been notified and verified that as per
the court order the tribunal appeal convened and took the appeal decision, she is
obliged to accept those facts and advise the party contending otherwise to seek an
15
appropriate remedy from the court. She acted contrary to her statutory duties which
resulted in the applicant instituting these court proceedings. She involved herself in a
dispute she was not party to siding with the first respondent contrary to her statutory
and Constitutional obligation s. The Speaker by her decision flouts the order m ade by
Siwendu J in that her decision has the effect of extending that order beyond its terms.
She placed the applicant a political party in a situation where it could be undermined by
its members. This is likely to create chaos in the affairs of political parties and promote
ill-discipline. Fortunately for the Speaker , the applicant did not seek a punitive costs
order against her. In Economic Freedom Fighters v Gor dhan and Others; Public
Protector and Another v Gordhan 2020 (6) SA 325 (CC) at [106-7] the court held the
decision taken in the exercise of power stands and has legal effect until the court
reviews and sets it aside.
[21] In the result, the main application succeeds with costs. Both counter applications
fall to be struck off roll due lack of urgency. The first respondent to pays costs in
respect of each counter application.
[22] It is ordered as follows:
A
1. That this application be heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule 6(12) of the
Uniform Rules of Court, and that condonation be and is hereby granted for the
applicant’s non -compliance with the forms, time limits and service for in the
Rules.
2. Declaring that the interim relief granted by this Honourable Court per Her
Ladyship Justice Siwendu on 19 June 2026 in this matter has lapsed and is of
no further force or effect, the appeal of the first respondent to the National
Working Committee of the applicant having been determined on 4 and 5 July
2026.
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3. Directing the second respondent to give effect to the applicant’s letter dated 6
July 2026 addressed to the second respondent in terms of Section 106 (3)(c) of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and to do all things
necessary to declare vacant the seat held by the first respondent in the KwaZulu -
Natal Provincial Legislature.
4. Directing the second respondent to do all things necessary to act in compliance
with Rule 14 of the Standing Rules of the KwaZulu -Natal Provincial Legislature,
including the publication of, and the swearing in of the next candidate on the
applicant’s reviewed party list.
5. Directing that the first and second respondents, jointly and severally, the one
paying the other to be absolved, including the costs of two Counsel where so
employed on Scale C.
B.
1. The first respondent’s counter application for declaratory relief with interim relief is
struck off toll roll due to lack of urgency.
2. The first respondent is to pay costs including the costs of two Counsel where so
employed on Scale C.
C.
1. The first respondent’s counter application for an interim relief pending the
outcome of the review application is struck off roll due to lack of urgency.
2. The first respondent is to pay costs including the costs of two Counsel where so
employed on Scale C.
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__________________
Mngadi J
APPEARANCES
For the applicant : Indhrasen Pillay SC
with Zuleka Rasool
Instructed : AP Shangase Attorneys
c/o Themba Mkhize Attorneys
PIETERMARITZBURG
For the first respondent : T G Madonsela SC
With W S Kuboni
Instructed by : Sthembiso Mbhele & Associates Inc.
c/o Naidoo & Co. Attorneys
PIETERMARITZBURG
Second Respondent’s attorneys : Garlicke & Bousfield Attorneys
c/o Stowell & Co.
PIETERMARITZBURG
Third Respondent : Zweli Zakwe N.O
Maisels Chambers
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SANDTON
Fourth Respondent : Muntu Sithole N. O
Duma Ndlovu Group of Advocates
SANDTON
Fifth Respondent : c/o Shangase Attorneys
UMHLANGA
Heard on : 9 September 2026
Judgment delivered on : 15 September 2026