JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE
Ref no: JSC/253/09/2025
In the matter between:
JAN HENDRIK STEPHANUS VENTER COMPLAINANT
and
JUDGE COLLEEN COLLIS RESPONDENT
Date: 11 September 2026
Decision: The appeal is dismissed.
SECTION 18 RULING
THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE (Jafta J, Saldulker JA and
Mabindla-Boqwana JP)
Introduction
[ 1] This is an appeal against the decision of the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial
Conduct Committee (Committee) in terms of which a complaint was dismissed. The
complaint was lodged by Mr Jan Hendrik Stephanus Venter (complainant) against
Judge Colleen Collis (respondent) of the Gauteng Division of the High Court.
[2] As is required by legislation, the complaint was considered by the Chairperson
of the Committee who summarily dismissed it in terms of the relevant provisions of
the Judicial Service Commission Act. 1 Those provisions empower complainants
who are dissatisfied with the dismissal to appeal to this Committee. Exercising that
right, the complainant has filed this appeal.
Legislative background
[3] Complaints against Judges are lodged and processed in terms of the Act which
authorises the Chairperson of the Committee at the outset to determine the provisions
applicable to a particular complaint.2 Having considered this complaint, the Acting
Chairperson concluded that the appropriate provision was section 15 of the Act and
proceeded to apply this section to the complaint.
[4] Section 15(2) of the Act provides:
I 9 Of 1994.
2 Section 14(2) of the Act provides :
'When a complaint is lodged with the Chairperson in terms of subsection (I) , the Chairperson must deal with the
complaint in accordance with section 15, 16 or 17, but in the event of a complaint falling within the parameters of
section 15, the Chairperson may designate a Head of Court to deal with the complaint , unless the complaint is against
the Head of Court .'
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"A complaint must be dismissed if it-
(a) does not fall within the parameters of any of the grounds set out in
section 14 (4);
(b) does not comply substantially with the provisions of section 14 (3);
(c) is solely related to the merits of a judgment or order ;
(d) is frivolous or lacking in substance; or
(e) is hypothetical" .
[5] Noticeably if any one of the conditions enumerated in this section is found to
be present in a complaint, the provision obliges the Chairperson to summarily
dismiss that complaint on the basis of that condition. In the present matter, the Acting
Chairperson held that the conditions in subsections 15(2)(c) and (d) were present
and proceeded, as he was bound, to dismiss the complaint on those grounds. Plainly
he concluded that the complaint relates solely to the order striking the complainant's
application off the roll and that the complaint lacked substance.
[ 6] For a proper evaluation of this decision it is necessary to set out the current
complaint.
The complaint
[7] The complainant commenced by describing what occurred at the hearing of
his application. He stated:
'4. On 25 September 2025, my urgent application was heard via Microsoft
Teams before Collis J.
5. Before any argument, the judge admonished me about my reading glasses
being on my head and questioned whether I would "address the court in that
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manner." I experienced this as hostile and dismissive toward me as a lay
litigant.
6. The court struck/dismissed my matter on administrative/CaseLines grounds
without hearing the merits, despite the defects being curable (two documents
could have been uploaded promptly) .
7. Immediately after judgment, I applied orally for leave to appeal (Rule
49(1 )(b ); section 17 of the Superior Courts Act). The Judge refused to hear
my application and refused to record either my request or her refusal on the
order/minute.
8. A punitive/onerous costs order was made against me as a self-represented
litigant, chilling access to justice.'
[8] He proceeded to formulate the grounds of misconduct in these terms:
'F. MISCONDUCT AND SYSTEMATIC BREACHES (GROUNDS)
1 7. Refusal to hear or record oral leave to appeal frustrated the pathway
contemplated by Rule 49(1)(b) and section 17 of the Superior Courts Act. At
minimum, the Court should note the request/refusal on the record.
18. The Code of Judicial Conduct (courtesy, propriety, equality, diligence,
fairness) was breached by
(a) hostile remarks toward a lay litigant at the outset;
(b) over-technical disposal of a curable matter; and
( c) failure to ensure a proper record.
19. The Judge's approach undermined section 34 of the Constitution (access to
courts).
20. The punitive/onerous costs order against a lay litigant engagmg
Constitutional Court guidance and deters access to justice.
21. Systemic/administrative failures (Registrar ' s delays on recordings/orders;
SCA Registry Flip-flopping on provisional acceptance vs. insisting on a non-
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existent leave order) compound the prejudice to lay litigants and require
corrective directives.'
[9] The relief he sought was framed as follows:
'22. As regards Collis J:
22.1 A misconduct finding, or at mm1mum a formal reprimand with
remedial training, for:
• Refusing to hear or record my oral leave application;
• Discourtesy/hostility toward a lay litigant
• Over-formalism that shut out a curable case instead of deciding on
the merits.
22.2 A directive that judges must note oral leave request/refusals on the
order/minute on the day.
22.3 Guidance on costs that protects self-represented litigants' access to
justice .
23. As regards systemic/administrative issues (for referral by the JSC to the
OCJ/Heads of Court/SCA President):
23 .1 Pretoria High Court: urgent, standardised protocol for fast-track
recordings/transcripts where appeal timelines run; CaseLines
remedial protocol obliging accommodation of curable defects for
SRLs absent prejudice.
23 .2 SCA Registry: clear SOP that where a High Court refuses to
hear/record leave, the petition must proceed and be placed
immediately before the SCA President for directions without insisting
on a non-existent 'leave order"; consistent written practice for Rule 4
/Rule 6 usage.'
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Evaluation
[10] Manifestly the complaint has two components. The first relates to the order
issued by the respondent which struck the application off the roll and directed the
complainant to pay costs. The second pertains to administrative challenges
experienced by the complainant when he sought to appeal against the order.
Needless to point out that the second part of the complaint has nothing to do with
the conduct of the respondent, except that she declined to entertain an irregular oral
application for leave to appeal. Notably this part does not fall under any of the
grounds stipulated in section 14( 4) of the Act and as such cannot constitute
misconduct envisaged in the Act.
[ 11] What remains for determination is whether the other leg of the complaint falls
within the ambit of section 15(2). It is apparent from the complaint that it is about
the order striking the complainant's case off the roll and directing him to pay costs.
This falls within section l5(2)(c) of the Act.
[12] However, to the extent that the complainant alleged that the respondent was
discourteous towards him, the complaint merely mentions that the respondent
admonished him for having his reading glasses on his head while addressing the
court. This is the sum total of the discourtesy. The Acting Chairperson cannot be
faulted for concluding that the complaint lacked substance.
[13] On appeal the complainant argued that, as a lay person he should have been
invited to substantiate the complaint. This is not catered for in the Act and if it were
done it would have been inconsistent with what section 15(2) requires to be done.
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[ 14] In the circumstances the appeal is dismissed .
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THE JUDICIAL CONDUCT COMMITTEE
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