IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH WEST DIVISION, MAHIKENG
In the matter between:
KABELO VICTOR BLOS
and
MINISTER OF POLICE
Coram: Reddy J
Reserved : 29 May 2026
Delivered : 28 August 2026
CASE NO: 114/2019
PLAINTIFF
DEFENDANT
Summary: Delict - action against the Minister of Police arising from an unlawful
shooting by a member of the South African Police Service - merits previously
determined in favour of plaintiff - trial proceeded on quantum only - general
damages - loss of earnings and impairment of earning capacity - future medical
expenses - effect to be accorded to agreements recorded in joint minutes of expert
witnesses - interest in terms of section 2A of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55
of 1975 - Minister of Police v Khedama applied and extended - interest on general
damages and on the future components of pecuniary loss to run from date of
judgment - interest on past loss of earnings to run from date of service of summons.
JUDGMENT
REDDY J
Introduction
[ 1] Mr Kabelo Victor Blos, (Blos) instituted an action against, the Minister of
Police, (the defendant) arising from an unlawful shooting perpetrated upon
him by a member of the South African Police Service on 27 April 2018.
[2] On 20 July 2023 the merits were determined, when Petersen J found the
Minister liable, on a 100% basis, for the assault with costs. It is common cause
that no apportionment arises. The crisp issue that now engages this Court is
the quantum of damages to which Blos is entitled.
[3] Having outlined the nature of the adjudication to follow, what falls to be
determined can be subclassed into the following three tiers, first, general
damages, second, loss of earnings, and third, future medical expenses. The
customary ancillary considerations that apply with equal force would be the
considerations of interest and costs which would complete the entire hearing.
Blos's evidence
[4] Blos testified that he was born on 15 June 1976 and was accordingly 41 years
old at the time of the incident. Blos is presently 50 years old. Blos is unmarried
but has a girlfriend, and is the father of four children, one major and three
minors. Blos has had no formal education. He resides at Taung. Blos is
presently unemployed and is in receipt of a disability grant of approximately
R2 300.00 per month.
[5] At the time of the incident, Blos was employed at De Krol Butcher in
Pudimoe. His duties consisted of making fires, braaing meat for customers,
and collecting and cutting wood. He earned Rl 500.00 per month, paid to him
in cash. Blos was standing at the gate of the butchery, awaiting entry to his
place of work, when a protest, in the course of which tyres and rocks were
used to barricade a nearby road, was in progress. A police vehicle stopped in
the vicinity and a police officer alighted and discharged a firearm. Blos was
not a participant in the protest. He felt himself grow weak and begin to fall,
and it was only when members of the community picked him up that he
realised that he had been shot.
[6] Blos was conveyed by members of the community to the Pudimoe Clinic,
from where he was taken by ambulance to Taung Hospital. He was informed
that he had sustained internal bleeding, and was thereafter transferred to
Tshepong Hospital in Klerksdorp. Blos spent approximately three weeks in
hospital, and was discharged on 8 May 2018. The injuries sustained are
recorded in the medical records. These injuries included, a right-sided gunshot
wound to the chest, with an entrance wound resulting in a right haemothorax,
an exit wound at the back. A right hemopneumothorax , lung contusions with
a small haemothorax, an injury to the right hemi-diaphragm, a fracture of the
right transverse process of Tll, an intrapelvic haematoma, and an injury to
segments 7 and 8 of the liver.
[7] Blos did not return to work after his discharge. He continues to experience
pain when lifting heavy objects. The injuries have affected his daily life. The
injuries had effectively diminished his ability to work to such an extent that
he can no longer support his children as before. Moreover, Blos emphasised
that the sight of his scars 'breaks him', in that they are constant reminder of
what he can no longer do. Notably Blos underscored that he experiences fear
and physiological reactions when he encounters police officers in the street.
Injuries and sequelae
[8] Physically, Blos complains, of, (i) backache on the right flank, (ii) a burning
abdominal sensation, (iii) chest pain aggravated by changes in weather, (iv)
blurred vision, and (v) an inability to lift heavy objects with his right hand. He
has also been left with permanent scarring, described by Dr Hoffmann as four
discrete scars, the first over the right axilla, where an intercostal drain was
inserted, the second below the right nipple, where the bullet struck him, the
third over the midline of the back, where the bullet exited, and the fourth
transversely over the lumbar area.
[9] Psychologically, the reports record low self-esteem, hopelessness, negative
ideation towards the perpetrator, social withdrawal, intrusive recollection,
nightmares, impaired concentration, a depressed mood, disturbed sleep, and a
conditioned fear of police. The Specialist Psychiatrists agree that Blos suffers
from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, with Dr Pooe recording a further
diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder.
The expert evidence and the joint minutes
[10] It is apposite, before evaluating the disputed heads of damages, to traverse the
expert evidence, insofar as it is common cause or agreed to in the several joint
minutes filed of record.
Plastic, reconstructive and cosmetic surgeons
[11] Dr Hoffmann, for Blos, and Dr Volkwyn, for the Minister, agree on the cause
of the injury, the treatment received, and that Blos was in good health
beforehand. Dr Hoffmann considers Blos fit to work to the normal retirement
age of 65, with no effect on life expectancy, but notes damage to his self
image and permanent scarring not amenable to treatment. Dr Volkwyn adds
that the scarring causes ongoing pain and itchiness and remains a permanent
reminder of the trauma, concealable only by clothing.
Industrial psychologists
[12] Mr Tsikai, for Blos, and Ms Makhubele, for the Minister, agree that Blos was
41 and earning Rl 500.00 per month as a general worker at the time of the
incident. They part ways on his pre-morbid career trajectory. Mr Tsikai
postulates the upper quartile of unskilled earnings by age 48, while Ms
Makhubele adopts a more conservative postulation between the lower and
median quartile of non-corporate unskilled work. However, both agree, that
Blos would secure accommodated employment only at age 51, at the lower
quartile. Importantly both are ad idem that both past and future loss of
earnings ought to be compensated, noting specifically that 'the average of our
respective opinions may be used as a baseline for calculation purposes'.
Occupational therapists
[13] Ms Ndlhalane, for the Minister, and Ms Marule, for Blos, agree that Blos
retains a residual capacity for light to occasional medium duty work. He
would struggle with pain in his previous role, and is no longer an equal
competitor in the open labour market. They recommend occupational therapy,
assistive devices, a home-maintenance allowance, and transport to medical
appointments, and that Blos be allowed three days a week of domestic
assistance at the applicable rate.
Specialist psychiatrists
[14] Dr Pooe, for Blos, and Dr Lekalakala, for the Minister, agree on the cause of
the incident, on the PTSD diagnosis, and that Blos requires trauma-focused
psychotherapy and psychiatric medication. In an addendum joint minute of 9
April 2026, they disagree, however, on the treatment regime. Dr Lekalakala
proposes 24 months of psychiatric intervention and nine months of
medication, at R2 000.00 and R600.00 per month respectively. Dr Pooe
proposes 21 days of acute intervention in a mental health care facility, by a
multidisciplinary team, followed by 12 to 18 months of long-term follow-up
care.
Clinical psychologists
[15] Mr Manaswe and Ms Tsambos agree that Blos was cognitively average and
emotionally resilient before the incident. Post the incident Blos now evinces
residual cognitive deficits, anger, hopelessness, fear and severe anxiety, with
a significant forfeiture of the amenities of life and a diminished sense of self.
They recommend 18 sessions of psychotherapy at R2 000.00 each, and
psychopharmacological treatment at R2 500.00 per session, totalling R36
000.00 and R45 000.00 respectively.
The actuaries
[16] Mr Immerrnann, for Blos, and Mr Karidza, for the Minister, agree on the
actuarial methodology, including Life Table 2 of Dr Koch's Quantum
Yearbook and discount rates of 2% per annum for future medical expenses
and 3% to 3.48% per annum for non-medical expenses. The difference
between the latter two being negligible. Averaging the two industrial
psychologists' bases, as those experts themselves proposed, the actuaries
calculate Blos's total net loss of earnings at R958 614.00, a net past loss of
R544 941.00 (Tsikai) and Rl97 376.00 (Makhubele), and a net future loss of
R913 914.00 (Tsikai) and R260 997.00 (Makhubele), after contingency
deductions of 5% (past) and 15% (future). Total future medical expenses,
similarly, averaged, come to Rl 010 162.00, of which R719 324.00 is
attributable to the domestic assistance recommended by the occupational
therapists.
Submissions on behalf of Blos
[17] Advocate Smit submits that general damages in the sum of R600 000.00
would be fair and appropriate, having regard to the comparable awards.
Advocate Smit contends further that Blos is entitled to the full amount ofR958
614.00 calculated by the actuaries in respect of loss of earnings, the
contingencies applied being fair and reasonable, and that future medical
expenses be awarded in the full sum of Rl 0 10 162.00, inclusive of the
domestic assistance component.
[ 18] Additionally, Advocate Smit claims that interest run from the date of service
ofBlos's notice in terms of section 3(1) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings
against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002, alternatively from date of
demand.
Submissions on behalf of the Minister
[ 19] Conversely Advocate Ntsamai avers that although compensation is warranted,
the amounts claimed are excessive and not fully supported by the evidence.
Advocate Ntsamai proposes for an award ofR250 000.00 in respect of general
damages. In so far as the claim for loss of earnings Advocate Ntsamai opines
that it ought to be dismissed in its entirety for want of reliable proof of
employment and income. In dealing with future medical expenses Advocate
Ntsamai suggests that it be limited to R290 838.00, the domestic assistance
component of R719 324.00 falling to be excluded as speculative and
unsupported by Blos's own evidence. Advocate Ntsamai concludes that
interest run only from date of judgment to date of payment.
General damages
[20] The assessment of general damages is pre-eminently a matter for the
discretion of the trial court. As was stated in Road Accident Fund v Marunga1,
a court, in considering all the facts and circumstances of the case, enjoys a
wide discretion to award what it considers to be fair and adequate
compensation to the injured party. In Minister of Safety and Security v
Seymour2 this principle was expressed as follows:
'The facts of a particular case need to be looked at as a whole and few cases are
directly comparable. They are a useful guide to what other courts have considered
to be appropriate but they have no higher value than that.'
1Road Accident Fund v Marunga 2003 (5) SA 164 (SCA) at 169E-G para 23.
2Minister of Safety and Security v Seymour 2006 (6) SA 320 (SCA) para 17.
[21] In Protea Assurance Co Ltd v Lamb3, the court held:
'Comparab le cases, when available, should rather be used to afford some guidance ,
in a genera l way, towards assisting the Court in arriving at an award which is not
substantia lly out of genera l accord with previous awards in broadly similar cases,
regard being had to all the factors which are cons idered to be relevant in the
assessment of general damages. '
[22] Importantly in Pitt v Economic Insurance Co Ltd\ an award should be fair
to both sides. It must compensate Blos justly, without pouring out largesse
from the horn of plenty at the Minister's expense. In Pitt this rationale was
stated as follows:
'The court must take care to see that its award is fair to both sides - it must give
just compensation to the plaintiff, but it must not pour out largesse from the horn
of plenty at the defendant's expense.'
[23] Both parties proffered comparable awards in support of their respective
contentions. Advocate Smit places store on Louw v Minister of Police 5 (R300
000.00, shooting with rubber bullets, scarring and PTSD), Poswa v Minister
of Safety and Security6 (Rl 70 000.00, depression and PTSD following
assault), Solomon and Another NNO v De Waal1 (R7 500.00 in 1972, scarring
and depression following a horse bite), and Mashigo v Road Accident Func/6
(R450 000.00, disfiguring burn scarring).
[24] Advocate Ntsamai relies on Minister of Police v Dlwathz-9 (reduced on appeal
from R675 000.00 to R200 000.00, facial injuries, hearing loss and
3Protea Assurance Co ltd v Lamb 1971 (1) SA 530 (A) at 535H-536B.
4Pitt v Economic Insurance Co Ltd 1957 (3) SA 284 (D) at 287E.
5Louw v Minister of Police [2023] ZANWHC 233
6Poswa v Minister of Safety and Security [2011] ZAECPEHC 41.
7Solomon and Another NNO v De Waal 1972 (!) SA 575 (A) at 586E.
8Mashigo v Road Accident Fund [2018] ZAG PPHC 539 para 22.
9Minister of Police v Dlwathi [2016] ZASCA 6 paras 7 and 19.
psychological sequelae),Louw (supra), Poswa (supra), and Sitimela v Mphara
and Another 10 (R430 000.00, gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen, liver
laceration, spinal complications and chronic pain).
[25] Of the comparators proffered, Sitimela is, to my mind, the closest comparison,
insofar as it too concerned gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen with an
associated liver injury. The injuries are, however, readily distinguishable.
What stands out is that Blos suffered materially more extensive injuries than
those recorded in Sitimela. In addition to the liver injury, Blos sustained a
hemopneurnothorax, lung contusions, a diaphragmatic injury and a vertebral
fracture, together with permanent, visible scarring and a diagnosed psychiatric
sequela in the form of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, with an added
diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder by one of the two psychiatrists.
[26] As I see it, this greater severity justifies an award modestly above the R430
000.00 awarded in Sitimela. The two awards nonetheless remain closely
comparable. Solomon and Mashigo, concerned as they are predominantly with
scarring unaccompanied by comparable thoraco-abdominal organ injury, are
of limited comparative value, notwithstanding the substantial updated values
contended for by Blos. Louw and Poswa, involving injury by rubber bullet
and assault respectively, without the organ injury sustained by Blos, are,
consonant with the submission made on behalf of the Minister, of a lesser
order of severity. Nonetheless, our law is settled that previous awards hold no
value other than as a guide. If slavishly followed, they risk placing a court on
a treacherous judicial slope.
10Sitimela v Mphara and Another (2024] ZAGPJHC 240 paras 83 and 85.
[27] Having regard to the nature and extent of the injuries sustained, the
permanence of the scarring, the diagnosed psychiatric sequelae, and the
impact thereof on Blos's self-image and enjoyment of the amenities of life, it
is my considered view that an award of general damages in the amount of
R450 000.00 constitutes fair and adequate compensation.
Loss of earnings
[28] This contention rests on the inconsistency in Blos's evidence as to the duration
of his employment (six months, on his oral evidence, as against ten years
recorded in Ms Makhubele's report). Crucially, no documentary proof of
employment or income was produced, and Blos conceded under cross
examination that he was on good terms with his employer yet made no effort
to procure such proof. Advocate Ntsamai relies on Nkala v Road Accident
Fund11 , Pretorius v Road Accident Fund 12 and Lenchwe v Road Accident
Fund13 for the proposition that a claim for loss of earnings unsupported by
documentary and factual proof cannot succeed.
[29] Advocate Smit counters that where loss of income has been established but
strict proof of quantum cannot be produced, a court is not entitled to non-suit
a claimant, but must make the best use of the evidence tendered. This principle
finds its origin in Herman v Shapiro & Co'4 , and has since been approved in
Essa Standard SA (Pty) Ltd v Katz'5 and in Road Accident Fund v Kerridge 16.
Advocate Smit further relies on the effect to be accorded an agreement
11 Nkala v Road Accident Fund [2025) ZAGPJHC 255 para 5.
12? ,·etorius v Road Accident Fund (2017) ZAGPPHC 353 para 18.
13Lenchwe v Road Accident Fund [2025) ZANWHC 232 para 19.
14Herman v Shapiro & Co 1926 TPD 367 at 379.
15Esso Standard SA (Pty) Ltd v Katz 1981 ( 1) SA 964 (A) at 970D-H.
16Road Accident Fund v C K [2018) ZASCA 151 paras 25-26.
recorded in a joint minute, as explained in Bee v Road Accident Fund
11
: where
experts meet and reach agreement, a litigant may not repudiate that agreement
save clearly and, at the very latest, at the outset of trial. Thereafter the facts so
agreed enjoy the same status as facts common cause on the pleadings, a
principle traced to Thomas v BD Sarens (Pty) Ltd18 and approved in Malema
v Road Accident Fund19•
[30] The way I see it the Minister's contention that the claim ought to fail in its
entirety cannot succeed. It is significant that Ms Makhubele, the Minister's
own industrial psychologist, was party to the joint minute in which it is
recorded, without qualification, that Blos was earning Rl 500.00 per month
at the time of the incident. The joint minute of the industrial psychologists
records that 'due compensation is advised' in respect of both past and future
loss of earnings. There is no indication on the record that the Minister
repudiated this agreement, timeously or at all, prior to or at the
commencement of the trial. What matters more is that the Minister did not
lead any evidence, from the alleged employer or otherwise, to gainsay the
figure of Rl 500.00 per month, which figure was, moreover, consistently
reported by Blos to each of the experts who examined him.
[31] Where certain facts are agreed between the parties in civil litigation, the
court is bound by such agreement, even if it is sceptical about those
facts. Where the parties engage experts who investigate the facts, and
where those experts meet and agree upon those facts, a litigant may not
repudiate the agreement 'unless it does so clearly and, at the very latest,
at the outset of the trial'. In the absence of a timeous repudiation, the
178ee v Road Accident Fund [2018] ZASCA 52; 2018 (4) SA 366 (SCA) paras 22, 30 and 64.
18Thomas v 8D Sarens (Pty) Ltd [2012] ZAGPIBC 161 paras I 0-14.
19Malema v Road Accident Fund [2017] ZAGPIBC 275 para 92.
facts agreed to by the experts enjoy the same status as facts which are
common cause on the pleadings or facts agreed to in a pre-trial
conference.
[32] However, it does not follow, that Blos is entitled to the average of the two
industrial psychologists' postulations. Mr Tsikai postulates that Blos would
have progressed to the upper quartile of unskilled earnings by age 48. This
rests on an assumed career trajectory. There is no evidence for that trajectory
beyond the bare fact of prior informal employment. The assumption is also
undermined by the very inconsistency in Blos's evidence as to the duration of
that employment. A trajectory of sustained career progression presupposes
stable, lengthy tenure. Blos's own evidence on this point was materially
contradicted. It does not reliably establish such tenure. Ms Makhubele's
postulation is the more conservative of the two. It also proceeds from the
Minister's own expert. To my mind, it is the more reliably grounded of the
two. It is accordingly to be preferred over an unweighted average of the two
positions.
[33] The Minister raised, in cross-examination, certain further factors said to bear
on Blos's residual earning capacity. These were a prior leg operation in 2010
and admitted pre-incident heavy alcohol consumption together with continued
smoking. Contingencies of this kind are properly catered for as the ordinary
vicissitudes of life. This Court is alive to the fact that none of these factors
was put to either industrial psychologist. Also, they were not put to any other
expert. There was no attempt to quantify their bearing, if any, on Blos's pre
or post-morbid earning trajectory.
[34] Ms. Makhubele's basis, unlike Mr Tsikai's, already proceeds from a
conservative premise. It already incorporates contingency deductions of 5%
(past) and 15% (future). There is no evidence quantifying the additional
impact, if any, of the further factors raised. I decline, therefore, to superimpose
a discretionary deduction of my own invention upon an otherwise properly
reasoned actuarial basis. To do so would be to substitute impression for
evidence. This is no more permissible where it operates to reduce an award
than where it operates to inflate one, as was held in Bee v Road Accident Fund.
[35] In the premises, Blos is awarded the sum ofR458 373.00 in respect of loss of
earnings and impairment of earning capacity, being Ms Makhubele's basis as
calculated by the actuaries.
Future medical expenses
[36] The actuaries have calculated Blos's future medical and associated expenses,
averaged across the respective reports, at Rl 010 162.00. Unlike the
calculation of loss of earnings, no separate contingency deduction was applied
to these figures. This is unremarkable, future medical expenses are needs
based, itemised costs tied to specific recommended treatments, rather than
assumption-laden projections of career progression, and the mortality risk
inherent in any award for the future is already accounted for through the Life
Table 2 methodology both actuaries agreed to apply.
[37] Of this amount, R719 324.00 is attributable to domestic assistance,
recommended in the joint minute of the occupational therapists on the footing,
recorded at paragraph 6.4(b) thereof, that 'Ms Marule opines that he should
be allowed 3 days a week of domestic assistance at current AA [rates]' and
that 'Ms Ndlhalane concurs that the same can be provided'.
[38] This contention is grounded on the fact that Blos resides with his mother and
family in a four-roomed house, remains fully ambulant, and has not been
shown to be incapacitated in the performance of ordinary domestic tasks. The
Minister relies on Bee v Road Accident Fund supra, for the proposition that
an expert witness is required to lay a factual basis for a conclusion and to
explain the reasoning underlying it, and that a court, even where a joint minute
reflects agreement, retains the entitlement to reject an opinion which is
unconvincing or founded on an inadequate factual foundation.
[39] The joint minute of the occupational therapists, whilst detailed and cogent
insofar as it addresses Blos's residual physical capacity for work, is notably
thin in its treatment of the need for domestic assistance. Towards this end, it
records no more than an opinion and a bare concurrence, without reference to
any specific functional limitation preventing Blos from performing ordinary
household tasks. No explanation is advanced as to why three days a week,
rather than some lesser measure, is required. This stands in contradistinction
to the balance of the joint minute, which is grounded in specific, reasoned
observations as to Blos's tolerance for standing, walking and lifting. At one
with the principle in Bee, I am not bound to adopt an agreed opinion which
lacks a proper evidentiary foundation, and I decline to do so in respect of this
component.
[40] The balance of the future medical expenses, comprising occupational therapy,
assistive devices, psychiatric and psychological treatment, scar revision
surgery, home maintenance and transportation, is not disputed by the Minister
and is, in any event, well supported by the joint minutes set out supra. Blos is
accordingly awarded future medical expenses in the sum of R290 838.00,
being Rl 010 162.00 less R719 324.00.
Interest
[41] Section 2A(2)(a) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 197520 provides
that interest on an unliquidated debt runs from the date on which payment is
claimed by service of a demand or summons, whichever is earlier. Section
2A(5), however, confers upon this Court a discretion to make such order as
appears just in respect of the payment of interest on an unliquidated debt,
including the rate at which interest shall accrue and the date from which
interest shall run. It is against this legislative framework that the question of
interest in the present matter must be considered.
[ 42] The application of these provisions to an award of general damages was
recently and authoritatively settled by the Constitutional Court in Minister of
Police v Khedama21. The apex Court held that general, non-pecuniary
damages are invariably assessed by a trial court in the monetary values
prevailing as at the date of its own judgment , and not as at the earlier date of
the delict, demand or summons. It followed that interest calculated on such an
award from the date of summons would overcompensate a plaintiff, in that the
plaintiff would receive both an award expressed in current values and interest
calculated as though that award had already fallen due years earlier.
[ 43] Mathopo J, writing for a unanimous Court, explained:
[50] A finding that interest on general damages runs from date of service of
summons or demand , whichever is earlier , would mean that a creditor must pay
interest on such damages despite the fact that they have been valued as at the date
of judgmen t, and not as at the date of the delict or the date of the demand or
summon s. Such an interpretation would lead to great injustice and unjustified
enrichment and it cannot be what the Legislature intended.
20Prescribed Rate ofln terest Act 55 of 1975, s 2A(2)(a) read with s 2A(5).
21 Minister of Police v Khedama [2026) ZACC 27 paras 50, 54 and 56.
[54] ... it is fair and reasonable that the court shou ld order a departure from the
date of demand or service of summons if it is assessing the genera l damages at the
date of jud gment. Conseq uently, it follows that interest should be ordered to run
from the date of judgment , and this wou ld in any event follow from section 2A of
the PR! Act.
[56] I therefore conclude that interest on genera l damages should run from date
of judgment to the date of payment. This of course assumes that the trial court, as I
believe is invariably the case, expresses general damages in monetary values it
regards as appropriate at the date of judgment.
[ 44] Importantly, the Constitutional Court in Khedama drew an express distinction
between general, non-pecuniary damages of the kind under discussion, and
unliquidated claims for pecuniary loss, to which the default rule in section
2A(2)(a) remains primarily applicable. The Court explained22:
' [49] There are different types of unliquidat ed claims, general non-pecuniary
damages (as in the present case) and unliquidated claims for pecuniary loss. My
understanding is that section 2A(2)(a) was primarily meant to apply to the latter
damages. This is because a claim for pecuniary damages, on the one hand, must be
assessed according to its nominal value at the date of the delict or breach of
contract ; whereas a claim for non-pecuniary damages, on the other hand, is assessed
according to its nominal value as at the date of its jud gment. '
[ 45] Applying this distinction to the present matter, the general damages awarded
to Blos in the sum of R450 000.00, expressed as they are in the monetary
values this Court regards as appropriate as at the date of this judgment, must
accordingly bear interest only from the date of this judgment to date of
payment.
22Minister of Police v Khedama [2026] ZACC 27 para 49.
[ 46] The same reasoning applies with equal force to the future components of the
pecuniary awards. The real reason Khedama treats general damages
differently is not simply that they are non-pecuniary. It is that they are valued
as at today, the date of judgment , rather than at some earlier date. The future
loss of earnings component of R260 997.00, and the future medical expenses
of R290 838.00, are, in the same way, both actuarially calculated as present
values as at the date of this judgment. Interest on these amounts from an earlier
date would overcompensate Blos in the same manner identified in Khedama,
since he would receive both an award expressed in current values and interest
calculated as though that award had already fallen due years earlier. These
two amounts must accordingly also bear interest only from the date of this
judgment to date of payment.
[47] The past loss of earnings component of Rl97 376.00 stands on a different
footing. This amount represents income which was, on the finding made
above, actually due to Blos from the time of the incident, and of which he has
been kept out since 2018. This is precisely the class of claim to which the
default rule in section 2A(2)(a) applies without need for departure. Section
2A(2)(a) allows interest to run from either of two dates, whichever is earlier.
The date of demand, or the date of service of summons. The particulars of
claim refer to two notices given in terms of section 3 ( 1) of the Institution of
Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002. Neither
notice is, however, before this Court, and it cannot be verified whether either
constituted a demand for payment of a quantified amount. The record does,
however, contain clear proof that the summons in this matter was served on
the Minister on 21 January 2019. Blos is accordingly entitled to interest on
Costs
this amount from 21 January 2019, being the date of service of summons, to
date of final payment.
( 48] The ordinary rule is that costs follow the result. There is no reason, in the
premises, to depart from the ordinary rule. The Minister shall bear Blos's costs
of suit, including the costs reserved, on the scale as between party and party,
Scale B, together with the qualifying, preparation and reservation fees, where
applicable, of the expert witnesses whose reports and joint minutes served
before this Court.
Order
(49] Accordingly, the following order is made:
1. The Defendant shall pay the Plaintiff the sum of Rl 199 211.00, made up as
follows:
1.1 General damages: R450 000.00,
1.2 Loss of earnings: R458 373.00, comprising Rl97 376.00 in respect of past
loss and R260 997 .00 in respect of future loss,
1.3 Future medical expenses: R290 838.00.
2. The Defendant shall pay interest on the amount ofR450 000.00 referred to in
paragraph 1.1 above, on the future loss component ofR260 997.00 referred to
in paragraph 1.2 above, and on the amount of R290 838.00 referred to in
paragraph 1.3 above, at the rate prescribed in terms of the Prescribed Rate of
Interest Act 55 of 1975, from the date of this judgment to date of final
payment.
3. The Defendant shall pay interest on the past loss component ofR197 376.00
referred to in paragraph 1.2 above, at the rate prescribed in terms of the
Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975, from 21 January 2019, being the
date of service of summons, to date of final payment.
4. The Defendant shall pay the costs of suit, including all costs reserved, on the
scale as between party and party, Scale B, such costs to include the qualifying,
preparation and reservation fees, where applicable, of Dr D Hoffmann, Dr L
~yn, T Tsikai, Ms BW Makhubele, Dr JM Pooe, Dr RTH Lekalakala,
M Man swe, Ms M Tsambos, Ms S Marule, Ms P Ndlhalane, Mr R
and Mr I Karidza.
0tt--M~H GH COURT, SOUTH AFRICA,
NORTH WEST DIVISION
Appearances
For Plaintiff :
Instructed by:
For Defendant :
Instructed by:
Advocate D Smit
Nienaber & Wissing Attorneys, Mahikeng
Advocate O Ntsamai
The State Attorney, Mahikeng