IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION , MIDDELBURG
DELETE WHICHE VER IS NOT APPLICABLE
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED YES/NO
SIGNATURE
In the matter between:
10/09/2026
DATE
MKHONTO LOCAL MUNICIPALITY
And
PHADA TRADING AND PROJECTS (PTY) LTD
THE SHERIFF OF THE HIGH COURT ,
PIET RETIEF (MKHONTO)
CASE NO: 529116
APPLICANT
FIRST RESPONDENT
SECOND RESPONDENT
Delivered : This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties '
legal representat ives by email . The date for hand down is deemed to be 10 September
2026.
JUDGMENT
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Phahlamohlaka J
Introduction
[1] This is an urgent application brought in terms of Rule 6(12) of the Uniform
Rules of Court by the applicant, Mkhondo Local Municipality, seeking to stay
the execution of a warrant issued pursuant to a judgment granted in 2018. The
application is launched pending final relief relating to the enforcement of a
subsequent settlement agreement.
[2] The application is opposed and t he first respondent contended that the
application is not urgent, and if it is, the urgency was self-created.
Urgency
[3] It is trite that in terms of Rule 6(12)(b) a party seeking to approach the court
on an urgent basis must set out explicitly the circumstances rendering the
matter urgent and the reasons why substantial redress cannot be obtained in
due course.
[4] Where the urgency is due to the applicant's own actions or inaction, the
court will not come to the applicant's assistance. The respondent argued that
the applicant knew about the existence of the court order as far as 2018. The
applicant is relying on the settlement agreement that was entered into between
the applicant and the first respondent, but the applicant did nothing to make the
said settlement agreement an order of court.
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[5] According to the applicant the trigger event for the current urgent application
was the 21st of July 2026 when it became aware of the writ of execution.
[6] The warrant of execution was premised on the judgment and order obtained
by the first respondent against the applicant on 18 September 2018.
The applicant's explanation for the delay is that internal governance processes
were still being followed before appointing attorneys to launch the application.
In my view, the delay is not sufficient to justify the truncation of the ordinary
court process, especially where the risk of execution was known and imminent.
[7] The court is guided by the principle that urgency must not be self-created by
the applicant's own inaction. In Luna Meubel1 , it was held that an applicant who
unduly delays in bringing an application and then seeks to rely on urgency
created by their own conduct should not be afforded urgent relief.
[8] Similarly, in East Rock Trading2 the court sated the following:
“[7] It is important to note that the rules require absence of substantial redress. This
is not equivalent to the irreparable harm that is required before the granting of an
interim relief, it is something less. He may still obtain redress in an application in due
course, but it may not be substantial. Whether an applicant will not be able to obtain
substantial redress in an application in due course will be determined by the facts of
each case. The applicant must make out his case in that regard.
1 Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin (t/a Makin’s Furniture Manufacturers) 1977 (4) SA
135 (W) at 137F–H.
2 East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd [2011] ZAGPJHC 196 paras 6–8
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[8] In my view the delay in instituting proceedings is not, on its own, a good ground for
refusing to regard the matter as urgent. A court is obliged to consider the
circumstances of the case and the explanation given. The important issue is whether,
despite the delay, the applicant can or cannot be afforded substantial re dress at the
hearing in due course. A delay might be an indication that the matter is not as urgent
as the applicant would want the court to believe. On the other hand, a delay may have
been caused by the fact that the applicant was attempting to settle the matter or collect
more fix with regard to the two."
[9] The principle is that an applicant who, by their own delay or conduct, creates
the urgency cannot expect the court to condone such conduct by granting
urgent relief.
[10] In Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union AND Others v
Northern Platinum Ltd and Another 3 the court cautioned against self -created
urgency as follows:
“.... The more immediate the reaction by the litigant to remedy the situation by way of
instituting litigation, the better it is for establishing urgency. But the longer it takes from
the date of the event giving rise to the proceedings, the more urgency is diminished.
In short, the applicant must come to court immediately, or risk failing on urgency...”
.
[11] It is common cause that the applicant became aware of the warrant of
execution as early as 8 June 2026, but only launched the urgent application on
21 August 2026, a delay of more than sixty days. The applicant, in its founding
and replying affidavits, did not provide a satisfactory explanation for this delay.
3 2016) 37 ILJ 2840 (LC) at para 26
[12] The applicant's counsel submitted that the underlying causa is the amount
on the writ of execution. Counsel argued that the applicant only owes the first
respondent an amount of R 11 O 546.40 as opposed to the R 705 856.66 in
terms of the writ of execution. Still, the applicant had this information at least on
the 21st of July 2026, but the delay in launching this application is not fully
accounted for.
[13] In my view, the applicant failed to explicitly sate the circumstances that make
this matter urgent. The applicant, in my view, delayed in launching the
application thereby creating its own urgency. Consequently, this application
stands to struck off the roll for lack of urgency.
Order
[14] In the result I make the following order:
14.1 The application is struck off the roll for lack of urgency.
14.2 The applicant is ordered to pay the costs of the application, including
the costs of counsel to be taxed on scale B.
K F PHAHLAMOHLAKA
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG
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Appearances
For the Applicant: Adv Maponya
Instructed by: Dolamo Attorneys Inc.
Email : admin@dattorney.co.za
Répondent: Adv Maphanga
Instructed by: Molefe Attorneys
Email: mgmolefeattorneys@gmail.com
Date judgment reserved: 8 September 2026