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THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG
CASE NO: 4796/2023
(1) Reportable: No
(2) Of interest to other Judges: No
Revised: YES
SIGNATURE
DATE 08 SEPTEMBER 2026
In the matter between:
STRATORE (PTY) LIMITED First Applicant
(Reg No: 2015/168510/07),
JOHANNA NINI MAHANYELE N. O. Second Applicant
(ID No: 7[...])
DONOVAN THEODORE MAJIEDT N. O. Third Applicant
(ID No: 7[...])
(in their capacities as the jointly appointed liquidators,
in Money Box Investments 156 (Pty) Limited
(in liquidation) (Reg No: 2008/013320/07)
And
ROBERT MPHUMELELI GUMBI First Respondent
(ID No: 6[...])
MONEY BOX INVESTMENTS 156 (PTY) LIMITED Second Respondent
(IN LIQUIDATION) (Reg No: 2008/013320/07)
ITSHUDU COAL (PTY) LIMITED Third Respondent
(Reg No: 2021/113302/07)
MINISTER OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY Fourth Respondent
DIRECTOR-GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY Fifth Respondent
REGIONAL MANAGER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF Sixth Respondent
MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY MPUMALANGA
REMAINING 60 to 80 EMPLOYEES OF MONEY BOX Seventh Respondent
INVESTMENTS 156 (PTY) LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
GUMBI ENERGY SOLUTIONS (PTY) LIMITED Eighth Respondent
(Reg No: 2018/268652/07)
THE MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT Ninth Respondent
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG
THE COMMISSIONER OF COMPANIES & Tenth Respondent
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY COMMISSION
WYKOM BOERDERY CC Eleventh Respondent
(Reg No: 1994/000870/23)
MICHAEL MATIYASE MAGAGULA Twelfth Respondent
(ID No: 5[...])
VLAKLAAGTE TRADING DESK (PTY) LIMITED Thirteenth Respondent
(Reg No: 2025/238708/07)
JUDGMENT
LESO AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1] The applicants approach this Court on an urgent basis for interim interdictory
relief against the First Respondent. The applicants seek to restrain the First
Respondent from conducting or continuing to conduct the business of the Second
Respondent, Money Box Investments 156 (Pty) Ltd (“Money Box”) in liquidation. The
applicant further seeks an interdict against the First Respondent from conducting
mining operations in the Vlaklaagte mining area, and from dealing with the assets,
coal, proceeds, records and business affairs of Money Box.
[2] The relief is sought pending the determination of an application by the second
respondent in terms of section 354 of the Companies Act for the stay and setting
aside of the final winding-up order granted against Money Box on 21 February 2024.
THE PARTIES
[3] The First Applicant, Stratore (Pty) Ltd, is a company incorporated in
accordance with the company laws of the Republic of South Africa. It was a
petitioning creditor in the liquidation proceedings involving Money Box.
[4] The Second and Third Applicants are the duly appointed joint liquidators of
Money Box. They assert that, by virtue of their appointment, they have assumed
control of the assets and affairs of the insolvent estate and are responsible for
preserving and realising them for the benefit of creditors.
[5] The First Respondent, Mr Robert Mphumeleli Gumbi, was a director of Money
Box. The Second Respondent is Money Box, which is in final liquidation.
[6] The remaining respondents include Itshudu Coal (Pty) Ltd, the relevant
governmental authorities, employees and other entities.
BACKGROUND
[7] A final winding -up order was granted against Money Box on 21 February
2024. The court subsequently made provisional and final appointments of the
liquidators on 2 May 2024 and 21 August 2025, respectively.
[8] On 8 July 2026, an application was instituted in terms of section 354 of the
Companies Act seeking, inter alia, the stay and setting aside of the winding -up of
Money Box.
[9] The applicants allege that, notwithstanding the final winding -up order and the
appointment of the liquidators, business and mining operations continued without the
authority or consent of the liquidators.
[10] An undertaking was sought from the respondents on 20 July 2026 to cease
the alleged unlawful activities. The undertaking was not forthcoming.
[11] The present application was thereafter issued on 6 August 2026 and enrolled for
hearing on 25 August 2026.
The relief sought
[12] The applicants seek extensive interim relief. The First Respondent is sought
to be interdicted from conducting or continuing to conduct the business of Money
Box, trading in its name, conducting mining operations in the Vlaklaagte mining area
and dealing with coal or mineral products allegedly forming part of or derived from
the business of Money Box.
[13] The applicants further seek to restrain the First Respondent from entering into
contracts in the name of Money Box, receiving income or proceeds on its behalf,
exercising authority over its affairs and assets, interfering with the liquidators'
administration of the insolvent estate, or taking steps which may diminish, dissipate,
encumber or alienate assets of the estate.
[15] Mandatory relief is also sought requiring the preservation and delivery of
assets and records to the liquidators, unrestricted access to the Vlaklaagte mining
area and associated facilities, and disclosure of information concerning coal
extracted, proceeds received, customers, contractors and creditors.
[16] The relief is expressly sought pending the determination of the section 354
application concerning the winding-up order.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
[17] The principal issues that arise for determination are,
1. first, whether the applicants have established the degree of urgency
contemplated in Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court; secondly,
2. whether the application is properly constituted, including whether the
parties have been properly joined; thirdly,
3. whether the applicants complied with the applicable Practice Directives
governing urgent applications; and, only if those issues are satisfactorily
answered, whether the applicants have established the requirements for the
grant of the interim interdict sought.
The applicants' case on urgency
[18] The applicants contend that the matter is urgent because mining and trading
activities are continuing and that, unless restrained immediately, the assets of the
insolvent estate will continue to be dissipated. They rely particularly on the alleged
removal and sale of coal, the depletion of mineral reserves and the risk that
proceeds may be placed beyond the control of the liquidators.
[19] The applicants submit that damages would not constitute an adequate
alternative remedy because monetary compensation would not restore the
liquidators' control over the estate or prevent the continued depletion of the alleged
estate assets.
[20] It is further submitted that the urgency was not self -created. The applicants
contend that they became aware of the alleged unlawful activities when the founding
affidavit in the section 354 application was served and that they thereafter sought an
undertaking from the respondents to cease the activities.
The respondents' opposition
[21] The respondents dispute the urgency of the application. They contend that the
applicants knew of the material facts for some time before launching the urgent
application and that the application was not brought with the degree of expedition
required to justify the departure from ordinary procedural requirements.
[22] The respondents further rely on the fact that the substantive dispute
concerning the winding -up of Money Box is already the subject of the pending
section 354 application. They contend that this affords the applicants substantial
redress in due course and that the urgent application constitutes, in substance, an
attempt to obtain interlocutory relief in advance of the determination of that
application.
[23] The respondents also dispute the factual premise that Money Box is
conducting the mining operations complained of. It is contended that mining is being
conducted by Itshudu Coal (Pty) Ltd, a separate juristic person holding its own permits
and operating in a separate area.
[24] The respondents accordingly contend that the relief sought is impermissibly
broad and would affect the rights and operations of separate juristic entities.
[25] A further objection concerns the joinder of parties. It is contended that several
respondents have been cited notwithstanding that no substantive relief is sought
against them, while the relief sought is capable of affecting entities whose interests
are directly implicated in the mining operations.
[26] Finally, the respondents contend that the applicants failed to comply with the
Practice Directives governing urgent applications, particularly in relation to the
preparation, indexing, pagination and bundling of the papers. The papers comprise
approximately 619 pages and include, amongst other material, the papers in the
separate section 354 application.
THE LAW ON URGENCY
[27] Rule 6(12)(a) of the Uniform Rules permits the Court, in urgent applications,
to dispense with the forms and service prescribed by the Rules and to dispose of the
matter in such manner and at such time as the circumstances require. Rule 6(12)(b)
however, places an express obligation upon an applicant to set out in the affidavit
the circumstances rendering the matter urgent and, importantly, the reasons why
substantial redress cannot be obtained at a hearing in due course.
[28] In Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another 1 the Court
emphasised the obligation resting upon an applicant who seeks to invoke the
extraordinary procedure available to litigants in the urgent court. The court makes it
clear that urgency is not established merely by asserting that the conduct
complained of is unlawful or that prejudice may result. Since 1977, the principle has
been developed that t he applicant must demonstrate why the ordinary process of
litigation will not afford substantial redress.
[29] In East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd 2 it was held that
“the delay in instituting proceedings is not, on its own , a ground for refusing to regard the
matter as urgent. A court is obliged to consider the circumstances of the case and the
explanation given. A crucial test for urgency is " whether, if the matter were to follow its
normal course as laid down by the rules , an applicant will be afforded substantial redress . If
the applicant can be afforded substantial redress in due course, the matter is not urgent”.
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS
[30] I accept that the preservation of assets belonging to an insolvent estate is a
matter of importance and that the liquidators have statutory duties concerning the
control, preservation and realisation of estate assets.
[31] That consideration, however, does not dispense with the applicants' obligation
to establish urgency in accordance with Rule 6(12).
[32] The question is not whether the allegations, if ultimately established, would
justify relief. The question at this stage is whether the applicants have demonstrated
that they cannot obtain substantial redress by following the ordinary course of
litigation. In my view, they have not.
[33] A material consideration is that the dispute concerning the continued
existence and operation of Money Box is already before this Court in the section 354
application. That application seeks substantive relief concerning the winding -up
application. That application seeks substantive relief concerning the winding -up
order itself.
1 See Luna Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin1977 (4) SA 135 (W), The court set the landmark
standard for determining the degree of urgency required in urgent court applications under Uniform Rule of
Court 6(12)
2 See East Rock Trading 7 (Pty) Ltd v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd 2011 JDR 1832 (GSJ) para [8].
[34] The applicants therefore cannot, on the facts before this Court, convincingly
contend that there is no avenue through which the issues concerning Money Box's
status and its entitlement to conduct business can be determined.
[35] The applicants' own case demonstrates the connection between the relief
sought in the present application and the pending section 354 proceedings. The
present application is expressly framed as interim relief pending the determination of
those proceedings.
[36] The existence of the pending proceedings does not, by itself, render an urgent
application incompetent. There may be circumstances in which interim protection is
necessary notwithstanding pending proceedings. However, the applicants must still
demonstrate why the ordinary determination of the pending proceedings will not
afford substantial redress. That threshold has not been met.
[37] The applicants rely heavily upon the alleged depletion of coal and mineral
reserves. Yet the factual dispute as to the identity of the entity conducting the mining
operations remains material. The respondents contend that Itshudu Coal, a separate
juristic person, is conducting the mining operations pursuant to its own statutory
authorisations.
[38] This factual dispute is particularly significant because the relief sought is not
narrowly confined to identified assets proved to belong to Money Box. It extends to
mining operations in the Vlaklaagte area and to coal and mineral products allegedly
derived from the business of Money Box.
[39] The applicants have therefore not established, on the papers, a sufficiently
clear factual foundation upon which this Court could conclude that the alleged
ongoing mining activities are necessarily activities of Money Box or are being
conducted by the First Respondent on its behalf.
[40] The existence of disputed facts is not, in itself, a bar to urgent relief. It is
nevertheless relevant when determining whether the extraordinary procedure of the
nevertheless relevant when determining whether the extraordinary procedure of the
urgent court is appropriate, particularly where the relief sought is extensive and
potentially affects the rights of separate juristic persons.
[41] The applicants also rely on the refusal of the respondents to furnish an
undertaking. That refusal may be relevant to the merits of the dispute, but it does
not, without more, establish the jurisdictional requirement of urgency.
[42] The chronology is further inconsistent with the degree of urgency alleged. The
applicants became aware of the alleged conduct by at least the time the section 354
proceedings were served. An undertaking was sought on 20 July 2026, while the
present application was only issued on 6 August 2026 and was enrolled for hearing
on 25 August 2026.
[43] The applicants have not satisfactorily explained why, in the circumstances,
substantial redress could not be obtained through the ordinary determination of the
pending proceedings or by properly instituting appropriate proceedings on ordinary
notice.
[44] The contention that damages would not be an adequate remedy does not
answer the separate question whether substantial redress can be obtained in due
course. The existence of an inadequate damages remedy does not, on its own,
establish urgency.
[45] I accordingly find that the applicants have failed to establish the jurisdictional
facts required to invoke the urgent procedure under Rule 6(12).
Non-compliance with the practice directives
[46] There is a further difficulty concerning the manner in which the application
was prepared and placed before the urgent Court. The Mpumalanga Division's
Practice Directives apply to matters placed on the Court roll, including urgent
applications. They require court papers to be properly indexed and paginated and
provide, importantly, that where the papers exceed 250 pages, they are to be divided
into bundles not exceeding 250 pages each.
[47] The papers before Court comprised approximately 619 pages in a single
bundle. The applicants also incorporated the papers in the pending section 354
application into the urgent application.
[48] Compliance with practice directives is not a matter of mere administrative
convenience. Practice directives exist to facilitate the proper administration and
adjudication of cases, particularly in the urgent Court where the Court is required to
deal with substantial volumes of material within compressed time periods.
[49] The applicants' failure to comply with the applicable requirements materially
compromised the orderly presentation of the matter. The inclusion of an entire
separate application, already pending before this Court, compounded the difficulty.
[50] The fact that an application is urgent does not relieve a litigant from
compliance with the applicable practice requirements. On the contrary, the greater
the degree of urgency claimed, the greater the need for the papers to be properly
prepared and presented in a manner enabling the Court to identify the issues
expeditiously.
[51] I accordingly find that the applicants failed to comply materially with the
applicable Practice Directives relating to the preparation, pagination and bundling of
urgent applications.
Joinder and the proper constitution of the application
[52] There is a further difficulty arising from the manner in which the proceedings
have been constituted. The applicants cite numerous respondents, including the
Second Respondent, Itshudu Coal, governmental authorities, employees and other
entities, yet the substantive relief is directed principally against the First Respondent.
At the same time, the relief sought is formulated in terms wide enough potentially to
affect the business, mining operations, permits, assets and interests of entities other
than the First Respondent.
[53] The applicants' explanation that certain respondents have been cited
notwithstanding that no substantive relief is sought against them because they have
no substantial interest in the proceedings is difficult to reconcile with the breadth of
the relief claimed.
the relief claimed.
[54] Joinder is not a matter of form. A party is required to be joined where it has a
direct and substantial interest in the subject matter of the litigation which may be
prejudicially affected by the order sought. The SCA has recently reaffirmed that the
enquiry turns on whether the order sought may directly affect the legal interests of
the party concerned3.
[55] In the present matter, the applicants seek to restrain mining operations in a
defined geographical area. The respondents' case is that at least some of those
operations are conducted by Itshudu Coal, a separate juristic person holding its own
authorisations.
[56] If that contention is correct, an order restraining mining operations in the area
may directly and substantially affect Itshudu Coal's legal and commercial interests ,
yet the applicants have not established a proper legal basis upon which this Court
can grant such relief against the operations of a separate juristic person through an
order ostensibly directed at the First Respondent.
[58] Equally problematic is the fact that the applicants seek relief against the First
Respondent personally on the premise that Money Box is in liquidation. The
liquidation of a company does not, without more, make its former director personally
liable for the company's obligations, nor does it dispense with the need to establish
the legal basis for relief against that individual.
[59] The corporate identity of Money Box and that of its directors and other
associated companies must be respected unless a recognised legal basis exists for
disregarding that separate personality. On the papers before the Court, that legal
basis has not been satisfactorily established.
[60] The application is therefore materially defective in its formulation of the parties
and the relief sought. The difficulty is not merely technical. It goes to whether the
Court can make an effective and legally competent order without prejudicing the
rights of persons and entities whose interests are implicated by the relief.
The requirements for an interdict
3 See Rose v National Prosecuting Authority N O and Others [2026] ZASCA 91, The first is whether the failure to
join the accused as a party renders the application fatally defective. The court held, with reference to Gordon v
Department of Health, KwaZulu-Natal [2008] (6) SA 522 SCA“that if the order or judgment sought cannot be
sustained or carried into effect without necessarily prejudicing the interest of a party or parties not joined in the
proceedings, then that party or parties have a legal interest in the matter and must be joined”.
[61] Even if I were to overlook the defects relating to urgency, joinder and
compliance with the Practice Directives, the applicants would still be required to
establish the requirements for an interim interdict.
[62] The requirements are a prima facie right, although open to some doubt; a
well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted; a
balance of convenience favouring the grant of the relief; and the absence of another
satisfactory remedy.
[63] The applicants' difficulty is that the alleged unlawful conduct is itself disputed.
In particular, the identity of the entity conducting the mining operations and the
relationship between those operations and Money Box remain disputed.
[64] The relief sought is also considerably wider than the factual foundation
established in the papers. It would potentially restrain mining operations and
dealings with mineral products beyond assets demonstrated to belong to Money
Box.
[65] In those circumstances, the applicants have not established a sufficiently
clear prima facie right to the full breadth of the relief sought , n or have they
established, with sufficient particularity, that the alleged threatened harm is
attributable to the First Respondent in his personal capacity.
[66] The Court therefore cannot grant an interdict merely on the basis that the
liquidators have a statutory duty to preserve the estate. That duty does not relieve
the applicants from proving the factual and legal basis upon which the particular
respondent is to be restrained.
CONCLUSION
[67] First, the applicants have failed to establish that the matter is sufficiently
urgent to justify the departure from the ordinary procedures of the Court. The
existence of the pending section 354 proceedings is particularly material because it
demonstrates that the applicants have a substantive avenue through which the
underlying dispute can be ventilated and determined.
[68] Secondly, the application has not been properly constituted. The relief sought
is directed at the First Respondent but is formulated in a manner capable of affecting
the rights and operations of separate juristic persons. The applicants have not
established a proper legal basis for such relief.
[69] Thirdly, the applicants materially failed to comply with the Practice Directives
governing the preparation and presentation of urgent applications. The filing of
approximately 619 pages as a single bundle, including the papers in a separate
pending application, is inconsistent with the requirements intended to facilitate the
efficient determination of urgent matters.
[70] Fourthly, and independently of the foregoing, the applicants have failed to
establish the jurisdictional and substantive requirements for the interim interdict
sought.
[71] The Court is mindful that the applicants are liquidators and that the
preservation of the assets of an insolvent estate is an important function. That
consideration cannot, however, justify the Court dispensing with the procedural and
substantive requirements applicable to urgent interdictory proceedings.
[72] The applicants elected to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the urgent
Court. They consequently bore the burden of demonstrating why the ordinary course
was inadequate and why the Court should intervene in advance of the determination
of the pending section 354 proceedings. They have failed to discharge that burden.
[73] Although the absence of urgency ordinarily results in an application being
struck from the roll rather than dismissed, the present matter was argued on both
urgency and the merits, and the Court has considered and determined the
substantive defects in the application, including the defective joinder and failure to
establish the requirements for the interdict. In those circumstances, a final dismissal
of the application is appropriate.
ORDER
[74] In the result, the following order is made:
1. The application for urgent interim interdictory relief is dismissed with costs.
2. The costs shall include the costs occasioned by the employment of counsel.
(This judgment is handed down electronically by uploading to the electronic file of
this matter on CaseLines and by email to the Parties/their legal representatives by
email. The date of this Order is deemed to be 08 September 2026)
________________________________
ACTING JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
MPUMALANGA DIVISION, MIDDELBURG
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicants:
Counsel: Adv Kloek
Attorneys: Jooste Peters Inc
087 701 1837
clemens@joostelaw.co.za
For the 1st, 2nd,3rd,8th and 12th Respondents
Counsel: Adv Sihlali
065 053 3559
Mafika.sihlali@gmail.com
Attorneys: Sihlali Attorneys
013 282 7304
Date of Hearing: 25 August 2026
Date of Delivery: 08 September 2026